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0.1 Media and cultural diversity in Germany: research aim and questions 
Germany is a country of migration and continues to be so, increasingly becoming a society of 
diverse ethnic and cultural identities. In institutional politics, or in the media, this reality is, 
however, often represented in a fragmented, sometimes belated, or even contradictory 
manner. 
This dissertation looks at ways the cultural politics of difference, nation, identity, and 
citizenship are embedded and articulated in the media. It does so by using the example of a set 
of programs – a radio station and a media event -  by German public service broadcasters 
specifically dedicated to multicultural life in the country. The thesis identifies and examines 
core notions of “difference” and the ways these are figured in media discourses about 
multiculturalism, focusing on concepts such as integration, tolerance, multiculturalism, and 
cosmopolitanism. It looks at how the vectors of power and knowledge have intersected in 
these concepts, and how these have moved and developed over time. 
“Securing an independent basic provision with education, information, guidance and 
entertainment”,1 is how the German legislation on the media defines the remit of the public 
service broadcasters. Established after the end of the Second World War, the German public 
service media were explicitly endowed with the task of contributing to the formation of 
individual and public opinion, and in this way also of a functioning democratic polity. 
However, seven decades after their establishment, it is worthwhile looking at how the German 
public service media cope with a social situation that is quite different from that in the 
aftermath of the Second World War, when they were founded in the course of the 
denazification of the country. How do the public service media shape society’s ideas in times 
of growing cultural diversity within the society? How do they go about creating “public value” 
                                                      
1 The remit of the public service media is regulated by the German State Treaty on Broadcasting Services and 
Telecommunication Media. The Treaty among the 16 German federal Länder concretizes the provision of the 
German Constitutional Law that guarantees freedom of opinion and freedom of the press as a fundamental right. 
Staatsvertrag für Rundfunk und Telemedien (Rundfunkstaatsvertrag – RStV),  
https://recht.nrw.de/lmi/owa/br_bes_text?anw_nr=2&gld_nr=2&ugl_nr=2251&bes_id=12784&aufgehoben=N&
menu=1&sg=0, accessed 17/08/2018 
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in the context of political controversies over cultural diversity and immigration? What type of 
“information, education and entertainment” do they offer and what are the processes through 
which they obtain social significance?  
Today, over one fifth of the inhabitants of Germany have a so-called migration background, 
defined either as having immigrated themselves or being children of at least one parent who 
has immigrated into the country. In some urban areas, almost half of the inhabitants have a 
migration biography, with Frankfurt being the first city in Germany whose ethnic German 
population made up less than half of the number of its inhabitants in 2017.2 How do the media 
portray this transformation of the German society? How do they articulate difference? How do 
they define identity? How do they foster inclusion or exclusion? What do the stations or 
programs do when they address certain audience segments? What do they do when they report 
on the majority and the minorities in the country? Who in a media text is “us,” and who is 
“them”? These are some of the questions that serve as guiding points for analysis.  
When the media deal with questions of difference, culture, or belonging, they also create 
effects on inclusions into and exclusions from the social body and construct imaginaries 
concerning the terms of citizenship. So, in a multicultural context, their role can become 
crucial in articulating and co-creating cultural politics of difference. Seeing pictures on the TV 
screen, hearing words from the radio, or reading a text on the Internet shapes the way we see 
the physical and social reality around us. Even if media consumption is a complex interaction 
between production and reception, allowing encoding and decoding of media texts and 
including the possibility of resistance and subversive readings, the process is not wholly 
arbitrary. Although multiple interpretations are possible, there are, according to Stuart Hall 
([1973] 2007), representational strategies which privilege certain interpretations (“preferred 
readings”). This is especially relevant in texts concerning ethnic belonging, where there is a 
series of strategies at work – stereotypes, binary oppositions, erasures, essentializing, and 
others – that all lead the audience towards a certain reading that upholds the existing power 
structures (Askew 2002: 5).  
                                                      
2 Premiere in Frankfurt : Mehr als die Hälfte mit ausländischen Wurzeln, 26.06.2017, Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung 
http://www.faz.net/aktuell/rhein-main/frankfurt-erstmals-ueber-50-prozent-mit-auslaendischen-wurzeln-




In this thesis, the analysis of “preferred readings” will specifically focus on WDR Funkhaus 
Europa, a radio station established in 1999 by the biggest public service broadcaster in 
Germany, the Westdeutscher Rundfunk (WDR). The WDR is the largest of the nine regional 
member broadcasters of the ARD (Arbeitsgemeinschaft der öffentlich-rechtlichen 
Rundfunkanstalten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland), the German Association of Public 
Service Broadcasters, and, following the BBC, the second largest public service broadcaster in 
Europe. Next to its digital channels and online formats, the WDR broadcasts one television 
and six radio stations linearly, among them an information station, a station targeting young 
audiences, and a classical culture station. Funkhaus Europa (which in 2017 changed its name 
to Cosmo) is the smallest of the WDR radio stations. Defined as special-interest radio, it offers 
a German language program from 6 a.m. to 8 p.m. and continues with programs in six 
languages of migrant communities in the evening, and further languages during the weekends. 
In its German-language program, it offers a mix of topics and music that differ from the media 
or pop-chart mainstream, catering instead to a young, urban audience with an emphasis on 
multiculturality and cultural mixing. Established with the explicit purpose of depicting the 
cultural diversity in the society, after two decades of broadcasting, the station remains the only 
public service offer in Germany with this specific political task. Its area of broadcasting 
encompasses the most populous German Land of North-Rhine Westphalia, as well as the city 
areas of Bremen and Berlin.  
Funkhaus Europa was born when former information programs for guest workers were unified 
into one station. Various German public service radio stations had been broadcasting 
information programs starting from the 1960s, with the purpose of facilitating the integration 
of guest workers arriving in Germany at the time – similar to today’s media offerings directed 
at the newly arriving refugees. At the end of the 1990s, WDR Funkhaus Europa was 
established as a full-time radio station with the main part of the program in German, and with 
additional shows in the languages of the largest migrant communities, which were now all 
transferred to this station. Its proclaimed aim was to be an “integration radio station,” and a 
“contribution of the public broadcasters to the dialogue of cultures”.3 Its explicit task was to 
address the then around four million people with a migration background living in North-
Rhine Westphalia,4 recognized as an audience segment to whose specific media needs the 
public service media had hitherto not catered to. At the time of establishment, three main goals 
for Funkhaus Europa were named: being the integration radio, the European radio station, and 
                                                      
3 WDR Funkhaus Europa. Europäische Vielfalt: 24 Stunden täglich, WDR, Cologne, 2000, 2 
4 http://www.statistikportal.de/Statistik-Portal/, accessed 17/05/2016 
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the world music broadcaster for North-Rhine Westphalia,5  with the goal of “showing cultural 
diversity as a chance and a lived normality of the migration society.”6  
In the course of the next decade and a half, “the spirit” of the station turned from integration 
towards depicting multicultural social realities and celebrating cultural diversity through music 
and diverse protagonists, and further to representing the “cosmopolitan feeling” of the cultural 
mix and hybrid identities that characterize the new German cultural diversity. Today, three 
factors are named which define the station against the other five WDR radio stations: an 
intense relationship with cultural diversity, linguistic diversity, and a specific music color. The 
focus of the German-speaking station has, however, moved away from targeting people of 
foreign origins as their audience, to one that addresses a larger portion of the German 
audience, an audience interested in diversity.  
One of the main questions of the thesis is how these changes can be interpreted. This thesis 
argues that even if these station policy changes might at first sight seem small adjustments, 
they have led to quite fundamental shifts.  
The changes have concerned the “handicraft of radio-making,” including a stronger formatting 
of the shows, new modalities of music selection, a stronger emphasis on Internet and social 
media content production, and others. But, these tangible changes – affecting the relationship 
of the radio makers towards multilingualism, the changing program scheme, the choice of 
terminology to refer to cultural and ethnic diversity in Germany on the air, and many others – 
also reflect ideological transformations of the station, and, as I argue, of the larger discourse 
concerning the cultural politics of difference. 
On the one hand, such adjustments in media production are consequences of an interplay of 
factors that influence media work in general, such as financing, dependence on audience 
ratings, or changes in modalities of media consumption, technological developments, and 
others. However, there are also factors at play that are unique to this radio station, so that, due 
to its position within the landscape of German public service radio as the only one of its kind, 
the developments of its policies can be interpreted as an articulation with public policies 
concerning notions of “difference” and “diversity” in Germany in general. 
                                                      
5 WDR Funkhaus Europa. Europäische Vielfalt: 24 Stunden täglich, WDR, Cologne, 2000, 5 
6 http://www.wdr.de/unternehmen/programmprofil/integration/integrationsbeauftragter.jsp  
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0.2 Research approach, methodology, and overview of the thesis 
As already noted, the main question of this thesis is how notions of “difference” and 
“diversity” have been constructed and reconstructed in contemporary media discourses in 
Germany, with specific focus on the radio station WDR Funkhaus Europa, which was 
established with the aim of reflecting the cultural diversity in the country. In order to address 
the complexity of this question, I grounded my interest in the media within theoretical 
frameworks of “power and knowledge” and “identity and subjectivity.” I regard the 
contemporary debates in the social sciences and humanities over the concepts of “identity” 
and “culture” as inseparable (Ahmed 2000; Brah 1996, 2000; Balibar 2004; Gilroy 2004; 
Laclau 1990, 2007; Stam and Shohat 1994, 2003, 2012). Cultural studies theorists (Avtar Brah 
1996, 2000 and Stuart Hall 1992, 1996, among others), argue that concepts of “culture” and 
“identity” signify a historically variable nexus of social meanings. That is to say that “culture” 
and “identity” are discursive articulations. According to this view, the fields of “culture” and 
“identity” are not separate from economic, social, and political issues but, on the contrary, are 
constructed through social, economic, and political relations (Božić-Vrbančić 2008). Issues 
related to “media” are central to them both. By asking what role the “media” play in 
representing cultural diversity in Germany, I am considering “media” not just as a reflection of 
social issues, but also as a form of social action, as a mechanism that contributes to the 
formation of identity.  
Whereas most of the German-language literature on media and cultural diversity concentrates 
on analyses of causes and effects of media discourse as a tool of integration (for example, 
through analyses of reception, analyses of media content, etc.), this thesis methodologically 
takes a problem-oriented approach. It examines the media programs in an interdisciplinary 
way within the theoretical framework broadly influenced by discourse theory. The notion of 
discourse is understood in a Foucauldian way, in that  
it refers to groups of statements which structure the way a thing is thought, and 
the way we act on the basis of that thinking. In other words, discourse is a 
particular knowledge about the world which shapes how the world is understood 
and how things are done in it. (Rose 2007: 142)  
Discourses are always articulated through a diversity of forms, which means that the 
meanings of any discursive media text “depend not only on that one text […] but also on the 
meanings carried by other images and texts” (Rose 2007: 142). Analytically inspired by this 
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approach, and through an analysis of the radio station documents and interviews with the 
makers of Funkhaus Europa, in this thesis I highlight the interplay of different discourses in 
radio station changes which correlate with the changes in the politics of cultural difference in 
Germany. In discussing the multicultural nature of Funkhaus Europa, I point to the ways in 
which certain media, even though designed to display a positive approach to multiculturalism, 
expose various acts of inclusion and exclusion, as well as contradictions that accompany the 
negotiations of what constitutes culture, nation, citizenship, identity, or difference in 
Germany.  
According to Foucault, discourses, as specialized forms of knowledge, are powerful and 
productive; they make subjects and subject positions. As Stuart Hall (1999) notes, there is 
nothing meaningful outside of discourse, and there are always many different discourses and 
discursive formations which compete through a struggle with each other. The dominance of 
particular discourses is always related to the intersection of power/knowledge, and to claims to 
truth. In line with this approach, I see media discourses as powerful sites where public policies 
are articulated, and subject-citizens and claims to truth are created. In that context, it is the aim 
of this thesis to unlock the regimes of truth that construct the examined media texts and 
documents. I do so by unpacking some of the core concepts of the media discourses on 
“difference” ( among them multiculturalism, integration, tolerance, and cosmopolitanism) and 
locating the points where they crack and rupture, thus pointing to the very intersections of 
power and knowledge and the shifting historical conditions that provide “a contingent 
horizon” for their construction (Torfing 2005: 8). In other words, these media are analyzed as 
technologies of power (governmentality),7 as sites where discourses of the German society, 
nation, and citizenship refract and articulate.  
My research was ethnographic. Here it is important to say that my own positions, first as radio 
editor on the team of WDR Funkhaus Europa and then as Commissioner for the integration 
and intercultural diversity of WDR, affected my research position and approach. I was 
involved, or rather immersed on an everyday basis, in what Sara Ahmed (2006, 2007, 2012) 
calls “diversity work.” I was at the same time an “insider” and an “outsider,” a situation that 
sometimes made my position very challenging – I had to critically reflect on the media in 
whose making I was involved.  
                                                      
7 For Foucault governmentality “has the population as its target, political economy as its major form of 
knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its esential technical instruments” (2009: 108).  
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Susan Wright argues that when we do ethnographic research on public policy issues, including 
media policy, our “field and site are clearly no longer coterminous. Rather than studying up, or 
down for that matter, [we] can select sites from which to follow a flow of events as they move 
up and down, back and forth, across this field” (2006: 22), or to put it in Susan Reinhold’s 
words, we need to “study through”: 
First, by following the interacting flow of events through different sites 
(including localities), the media, national and international fora, one can 
describe in ethnographic detail how something came about. Second, deeper than 
the descriptive level, a study of a policy process acts as a window onto changing 
forms of governance and regimes of power (Wright 2006: 22).  
Following this “studying through” approach, in the first phase of research I collected data 
related to diversity issues (mission statements, policies, speeches, articles, leaflets, official 
publications, descriptions of different programs and initiatives, brand descriptions, and others). 
I also conducted many participant observation sessions at various meetings and training 
events, as well as participating in working groups, especially those where brand 
transformations or the elaboration of the target audience of the radio station were discussed, in 
the years 2010-2011. In the second phase, I conducted interviews with Funkhaus Europa radio 
makers, in order to collect data on the ways people respond to different discourses on diversity 
and difference. I interviewed six media makers involved with Funkhaus Europa in 2012, at the 
time the station was going through fundamental changes in its structure and program policy. 
The interviewees were three freelance authors and reporters, two editors, and the former head 
of the radio station. Interviews were semi-structured and were designed to invite the 
interviewees to reflect on their own experience in media program-making. In the third phase, I 
focused on diversity projects on a wider national scale (such as the Tolerance Week of the 
Association of the German Public Service Broadcasters in which I participated in 2014), in 
order to analyze their articulation with programs offered by Funkhaus Europa. My main task 
in all of these phases was to question “naturalised” assumptions, which often frame programs 
related to cultural difference, to focus on what Ahmed (2006: 24) calls “a set of practices, 
techniques and technologies” that shape “diversity world.” That means that my “studying 
through” ethnography was related to what the anthropologist George Marcus calls “multi-sited 
ethnography” (Marcus 1995, 2005). 
 8 
In the formal mode, multi-sited ethnography emerges from the objective 
following of a known conventional process, or an unconventional process – 
following a commodity chain/productive process, migration networks, or 
following a plot/narrative, a metaphor, or circulation of an idea. (Marcus 2005: 
12) 
Multi-sited ethnography in my research is not related to different geographical 
locations but to different sites which emerged through my ”studying through”-
approach while following ”diversity issues”. Even though at the beginning of my 
research I specifically focused on diversity issues as they are represented by Funkhaus 
Europa, “studying through” ethnography, or “multi-sited ethnography” moved my 
research to different sites, for example, to the analysis of EU policies and their 
articulation with German policies, or to the analysis of their intersections  in the 
“Tolerance Week”. “Tolerance Week” is just one in a series of topical weeks, staged 
on a yearly basis by the German Association of public service broadcasters (ARD). 
The weeks involve a focus on various aspects of the chosen topic, presented through 
films, reportage, interviews, and many other formats in the public service channels. In 
the framework of the event dedicated to tolerance in November 2014, I worked as 
coordinator of radio content for WDR, which gave me insight into the workings of the 
event and an overview of the produced content, as well as allowing me to participate 
in numerous discussions in lieu of its preparation. In short, it involved “the 
connections, parallels and constructs of a variety of seemingly incommensurate sites 
[…] practices and histories” (Ahmed et al. 2006: 23). 
I am aware that the way I connect and analyse these incommensurate sites is inscribed by my 
theoretical approach. Hence, the chapters that follow do not reflect either the media policy of 
the WDR, or an official policy on diversity of Funkhaus Europa’s, but explore instead the 
discursive space through which these policies operate and are constructed. 
 
0.2.1 Outline of the thesis  
The thesis is structured in four parts. In Part I, I offer the theoretical framework that influenced 
my approach. Chapter 1 elaboates on the key concepts of nation, difference and diversity, 
while Chapter 2 offers an overview of literature concerning societies characterized by cultural 
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diversity, including the contestations around terms such as multiculturalism, or the trajectory 
of integration, tolerance or diversity as terms central in the public and institutional discussion 
on migration. Chapter 3 looks specifically at the role of media in multiculturalism. 
In Part II, I offer the historical background of cultural diversity in Germany and Europe, as 
well as an overview of the German language literature on media and integration (Chapter 4).  
In Part III, I focus my analysis on the radio station Funkhaus Europa (Chapter 5, Chapter 6 
and Chapter 7). Part IV places considerations on radio station policy into a larger context, 
analyzing a media thematic week dedicated to the topic of tolerance, organized by the German 
public service broadcasters in 2014 (Chapter 8). The thesis concludes with Chapter 9.  
Chapter 1 considers theoretical approaches to the notions of nation, nation-state, and 
questions of citizenship in Europe, showing how crucially all of these are shaped by migration, 
by contact with the Other, and in ways of responding to and “managing” difference within the 
territorial borders of the “nation-state.” It outlines the key concepts of culture, power, nation, 
and identity that influenced my analysis, relying strongly on Laclau and Mouffe’s concept of 
articulation, as well as linking Foucault’s notions of governmentality and technologies of 
government to the operation of the media discourse.  
Chapter 2 then elaborates on an array of approaches to difference, diversity, multiculturalism, 
and race, concentrating on authors of the Anglo-Saxon area, situated in the fields of 
postcolonial studies, cultural studies, and critical migration and diaspora studies. The authors 
uncover the manifold contestations over these issues of identity, as well as identifying some of 
the core “nodal points” (Laclau and Mouffe, [1985] 2014) of these discourses, among them the 
terms multiculturalism, integration, and cosmopolitanism. Here, I draw parallels to the 
discussion in Germany, that I also see as articulating around these points.  
Chapter 3 explores the role of the media in constructing difference. In particular, it considers 
those theorists who offer ways in which these constructions can be challenged and radically 
subverted in media texts and practices, to reverse the positions of the dominant and the 
subaltern in multicultural situations. 
Chapter 4 more specifically considers issues of cultural diversity and migration in Germany 
and Europe. It starts with a historical overview of immigration into Germany and the discourse 
on migration, before continuing to look at the key concepts of these issues made visible in 
various discourses. In particular, it notes their development and shifts through time, showing 
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how political approaches to the multicultural situation, including ways of managing contact 
with and the presence of difference within the nation state in Germany, have been articulated 
through the media and political discourses. Of particular interest here is the centrality of 
integration that has crystalized as the practice of choice seeking to stabilize identities in the 
face of migration flows and the growing cultural diversity in the country. Finally, the chapter 
looks specifically at the role of media in Germany’s multiculturalism and the literature on this 
topic in the German speaking area, where it detects the same centrality of integration. In a 
large number of texts on the subject, integration is seen as a goal that can be concretely 
facilitated by media texts and practices. 
In Part III, I focus my analysis on the radio station Funkhaus Europa. I start with an analysis of 
station policies in Chapter 5, as articulated in the changes in the station’s brand and self-
definition. I show how the paradigm change in the station’s policy, from a station dedicated to 
integration, then a station celebrating diversity to a station that wants to address young 
cosmopolitans with hybrid identities, articulates the changes in the cultural politics of 
difference in Germany and Europe in general. 
Chapter 6 looks at how such a discursive shift affects the people producing the content of the 
radio station in question, and in particular how this shift affects their feelings about their work 
and about their own social position in a society characterized by migration and diversity. It 
does so through an analysis of six interviews with the makers of the radio.  
Chapter 7 concentrates on the ideal-type audience of the station, as developed in the 
elaboration of the station’s marketing personas. One of the arguments that runs through all 
three chapters of Part III is that the paradigm shift from being a station dedicated to 
multiculturalism to being a station addressing a “cosmopolitan” audience brings a strong 
strand of depoliticization with it, especially because it relegates the contact with difference 
from the public to the intimate sphere.  
In Part IV, Chapter 8 places considerations on media policies concerning cultural diversity 
into a larger context, analyzing a media thematic week dedicated to the topic of tolerance, 
organized by the German public service broadcasters in 2014. It looks at the operation of 
tolerance in media texts, which is here also seen as having mainly depoliticizing effects, 
constructing subjects and fixing their identities as being in need of toleration. Tolerance, seen 
as a way of securing pluralism, is here shown to operate in a profoundly ideological way in 
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order to preserve the social relations that define the norm and those citizens who are seen as 
deviant from the norm.  
The closing chapter (conclusion) summarizes all these findings and attempts to point out 






















Nation, difference, and diversity: key concepts 
 
Questions of difference and community within the space of the nation-state are one of the 
central sites of contestation in today’s Europe – a perfunctory look at media coverage on 
immigration, at election campaigns of political parties, and at the rhetoric of the populist right 
are a clear testimony to that. 
Europe has in the last decades witnessed the emergence of new forms of identity and 
belonging, particularly in the context of the advancing project of European integration after 
the end of the Cold War, as well as that of growing globalization that includes the rising 
mobility of people, goods, and financial flows. These new forms are characterized by a 
continued reshuffling of definitions of political membership, of sovereignty, of center and 
peripheries, of populations and diasporas, and with these, of the terms of inclusion and 
exclusion. Material globalization has indeed contributed to a growing integration of 
communication and information, tourism, financial flows, and mobility. On the other hand, 
and in contrast to predictions expressed in liberal political programs, this has not led to an 
abandonment of national borders and ethnic divides. Unless they are “global nomads,” 
members of the economic elites, or exchange students, migrants have in general not 
experienced more fluid opportunities for membership in – still mostly nationally defined –  
communities. 
In short, a cultural disintegration of the nation-state has not taken place, and contemporary 
realities show a rather different picture, including the emergence of nationalism and populism 
after the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, and increasingly also in Western Europe. The 
continuing global inequalities and other existential risks furthering migration flows as well as 
the social and political exclusions of non-nationals and non-residents in Western countries of 
immigration are contradicting such programs as for example the “European cosmopolitanism” 
evoked by Jürgen Habermas (2006, 2007) and by Ulrich Beck, who detects a process of 
cosmopolitanization of a Europe that retains the national differences going on, a “nationally 
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rooted cosmopolitanism” (2007: 16). In short, global developments have not dissolved the 
political nation but have instead gone hand in hand with its continuing redefinition, including 
questions on how rules of membership are set, how citizenship is constituted and embodied, 
and how it can be redefined to lead to a more democratic civil participation.  
The continuing political and discursive contestations around migration remain a central field 
where these developments are represented: What constitutes the nation and how is national 
culture to be defined? Who belongs to it and who does not or cannot belong? Who are we 
talking about when we say “we”? Is this “we” defined as a national, cultural, institutional 
community? All these questions have been contested and re-contested throughout Europe in 
recent decades, with nation-states facing continuous evolutions of their ethnic and cultural 
make-up. From the movements of economic migration to the Western European states of the 
1960s, continuing all the way to the period of the heightened influx of refugees starting in 
2015-16, the constructions and reconstructions of the national and cultural “us” and “them” 
have been a major field of negotiations in the European public. This thesis analyzes how these 
negotiations are articulated in the media discourse. In this chapter, it offers the outline of the 
key concepts that influenced my analysis.  
 
1.1 The concepts of culture, power, nation, and identity 
Following Michel Foucault, the contestations around nation, identity, belonging, and 
migration are seen in this thesis as central fields where processes of classification, 
normalization, and problematization take place. According to Foucault, in modern society, 
power is exercised simultaneously along two lines: on the one hand based on the public right, 
that is on the right of sovereignty and its organization through legislation or discourse, “and, 
on the other hand, by a closely linked grid of disciplinary coercions whose purpose is in fact to 
assure the cohesion of this same social body” (Foucault 1980: 106). It is at the point in which 
modern capitalism was constituted in the eighteenth century that Foucault locates the 
emergence of this new “régime of power […] exercise[d] within the social body, rather than 
from above it” (1980: 39). 
This biopower or bio-politics, the “politics of life” that emerged in Foucault’s thought in the 
1977-78 lectures, stresses the productive character of power as life-administering. No longer 
reduced to the sovereign’s “right of death,” it refers to procedures and relations that monitor 
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and regulate features such as birth rate, illness, fertility, marriage rate, education, mortality 
rate, and others. This whole realm of life thus becomes the site where political power operates 
over a population. In this way, bio-politics adds another dimension to the disciplining of the 
individual body, to its monitoring and optimizing: that of the social regulation or management 
of the body of the population, which becomes the subject on whom political sovereignty is 
exercised. Its rise coincides with the birth of liberalism, which  
differs from reason of state in that it starts from the assumption that human 
behavior should be governed, not solely in the interests of strengthening the 
state, but in the interests of society understood as a realm external to the state. 
(Rose 2006: 84)  
It is a novel dimension that conceptualizes “humans as forming a kind of natural collectivity 
of living beings” (2006: 84). This population with its own characteristics has “to be 
understood by means of specific knowledges and to be governed through techniques that are 
attuned to these emergent understandings” (2006: 84). For example, the development of 
public health, hygiene, and epidemic control shows how authorities came to see the 
population as having a dynamic, a reality of its own, and it is from this moment on, that 
those who inhabited a territory were no longer understood merely as judicial 
subjects who must obey the laws issued by a sovereign authority nor as isolated 
individuals whose conduct was to be shaped and disciplined, but as existing 
within a dense field of relations between people and people, people and things, 
people and events. (Rose 2006: 87) 
The new issues that the governmental practice started to deal with, such as health, hygiene, 
birthrate, life expectancy, race, and others, in turn raised new political and economic issues. 
Crucial in Foucault’s thought on governmentality is the nature of the mechanisms of 
disciplinary coercion. They are not products of operations of a sovereign or a dominant group; 
rather, they have their own discourse which engenders “apparatuses of knowledge (savoir) and 
a multiplicity of new domains of understanding. They are extraordinarily inventive 
participants in the order of these knowledge-producing apparatuses” (Foucault 1980: 106). 
The discourses of discipline proliferate, they invade and colonize the area of law, but the code 
they define is not that of law but that of normalization. This explains “the global functioning 
of what I would call a society of normalization” (Foucault 1980: 107). 
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Practices of dividing and classifying populations, where individual diversity is categorized 
into unified groups, such as for example the sane or the mad, are the modes of operation of 
bio-power. They function through disciplinary discourses of normalization, offering a picture 
of normality against which “truth” can be judged, or problematization, which in turn defines 
the norm against the concept of the deviant.  
Following this argument, I see the struggles over immigration, cultural identity, and difference 
as central objects of management in today’s public policies on national and European levels. 
These constructions circle around questions of what constitutes national or European identity 
and cultural norms, and set the boundaries separating the national and cultural “we” from the 
“Other,” with immigration often being “the site of struggle over definitions of class, race and 
nation” (Fortier 2000: 20). In the national realm, I see the normalizing judgement as enabling 
the classification of persons as belonging or not belonging to a nation and a culture and 
enforcing processes of normalization in the drive to harmonize difference. The discourse on 
cultural difference, on the other hand, is an example where practices of problematization and 
normalization operate in the production of “truth.” Within the European nation-states, the 
categories of norm and deviance have acquired new meanings, denoting the positions of 
majority and minority, as well as the requirements this “truth” poses on the individuals and 
their bodies, both when pertaining to the majority and to positions that deviate from the norm.  
For Foucault, the start of bio-politics as an organizational principle is also part of a larger new 
“economy of power,” a set of mechanisms that make the effects of power circulate through 
the entire social body. This relational character of power rejects the notions of power through 
ideology or repression. Foucault’s investigations into the history of penal right, psychiatric 
power, and the control of infantile sexuality, uncover that rather than repression, constraint, or 
a force pushing onto the individual, mechanisms of power happen in a capillary form, and 
power reaching “into the very grain of individuals, touches their bodies and inserts itself into 
their actions and attitudes, their discourses, learning processes and everyday lives” (Foucault 
1980: 39).  
Foucault analyzes this “how of power” within two poles: the formal delimitation of power on 
the one hand and the “effects of truth that this power produces and transmits, and which in 
their turn reproduce this power” (Foucault 1980: 92-93) on the other hand. Seeing power as 
the producer of effects or régimes of truth implies that the individual is not the passive 
receiver on whom power is exercised but is in fact in part constituted as individual through its 
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operation: he or she is in fact one of the results of power. In Foucault’s words, the individual 
is “an effect of power, and at the same time, or precisely to the extent to which it is that effect, 
it is the element of its articulation. The individual which power has constituted is at the same 
time its vehicle” (1980: 98). “Bio-politics” implies this transformation of disciplinary power 
into bio-power, which functions in two directions: as regulator of social life starting from the 
individual body and as result, activated from the individual body. Individuals are not 
exclusively subjects who exercise power or else objects on whom power is exercised, but 
“always also the elements of its articulation. In other words, individuals are the vehicles of 
power, not its points of application” (Foucault 1980: 98).  
I see the strong discursive production associated with nation and culture as creating a web of 
power in Foucauldian terms: it constructs the concept of difference through the practices of 
problematization, classification, and normalization that operate in the production of “truth,” of 
“common knowledge.” 
For example, practices of categorization and classifying can be detected at the core of politics 
of race or ethnic difference. The discourse of difference increasingly permeates a great part of 
contemporary public rhetoric on immigration and particularly on Islam in Western Europe, 
normalizing in its course the perception of Islam as the West’s Other. Sara Ahmed (2000), for 
example, traces how practices of normalization and problematization are “making the 
common” in the Neighbourhood Watch schemes in Great Britain, where  
the good citizen is not given any information about how to tell what or who is 
suspicious in the first place. […] It is the technique of common sense that is 
produced […] [that] not only defines what "we" should take for granted (that is, 
what is normalised and already known as "the given"), but it also involves the 
normalisation of ways of "sensing" the difference between common and 
uncommon. [...] Neighbourhood watch is hence about making the common: it 
makes the community. (Ahmed 2000: 29, emphasis in original) 
The normalizing judgement can, on the other hand, be detected in the requirements for those 
outside of the norm to integrate into it and accept a dominant, “host culture.” One example of 
the latter is the political discussion around the concept of “leading culture,” Leitkultur, in the 
context of immigration in Germany. The concept of “leading culture” was introduced by the 
German political scientist Bassam Tibi in 1998, who defines it as follows: “The values of the 
desirable leading culture must stem from the cultural modernity, and they are: democracy, 
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laicism, the Enlightenment, human rights and civil society” (Tibi 1998: 154). Since 2000, the 
concept has been used in the political debate on immigration. The Christian-democratic 
politician Friedrich Merz introduced the term into the discussion on the planned changes of 
the immigration law in 2000, formulating the rules for immigration and integration, and 
against multiculturalism and parallel societies. Merz demanded that “immigrants who want to 
live here permanently must adjust to a grown, liberal German leading culture” (Eitz 2010, 
translation from German by the author), a demand that provoked much public controversy at 
the time. 
After an ensuing period of absence from public discussion, the term again surfaced during the 
debates surrounding the so-called refugee crisis of the year 2015-16 in Germany. In 2017, 
then interior minister Thomas de Maizière published a text listing ten aspects of Leitkultur, 
that “go beyond language, constitution and the respect for human rights,” and are “things that 
hold the Germans together, make them what they are and make them different from others” 
(de Maizière 2017). The interior minister starts his list with the words, “We value certain 
social habits […] we say our name. We give our hand in greeting” and adds, “We show our 
face. We are not burka” (de Maizière 2017). 
Like many other contributors to the debate around integration, the minister apparently also 
starts from the premise that there is cultural distance separating the migrant from the 
dominant culture. Found in visible signs such as the burka, not giving one’s hand in greeting, 
or maybe not speaking the German language, such cultural distance can be overcome by 
adopting common rules of behaviour, such as greeting or showing one’s face in public, and 
common values such as respect for the Constitution or for human rights. On the other hand, it 
is also some unnamed essence that holds Germans together, something that goes beyond the 
visible signs and possibly beyond things that can be learned at all.  
While somehow beyond description, culture is still used as a parameter to measure 
integration, with cultural factors serving to uphold the differentiation between ethnic groups. 
In light of such narratives, Paul Gilroy points out how in this constellation,  
culture is conceived along ethnically absolute lines, not as something 
intrinsically fluid, changing, unstable, and dynamic, but as a fixed property of 
social groups rather than a relational field in which they encounter one another 
and live out social, historical relationships. (1993: 24) 
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In this way, the “inherent cultural nature” of groups explains their different positions in the 
social strata, “if not the impossibility of the insertion of minorities into mainstream national 
cultures” (Gilroy 1987: 61, paraphrased in Fortier 2000: 24). Anne-Marie Fortier also attracts 
attention to the role ethnicity plays in binding culture and biology. For her, ethnicity becomes 
the nodal point that mediates culture and race and allows them  
to congeal in pseudo-biological underpinnings. As ‘race’ is culturalized, 
‘ethnicity’ is essentialized. What stems from this is the notion of an invisible 
ethnicity as well as the idea that ethnic identification is somewhat intrinsic. 
(Fortier 2000: 24)  
“Nodal point” is a concept derived from the Lacanian notion of points de caption, “privileged 
signifiers that fix the meaning of a signifying process” (Božić-Vrbančić 2008: 23).  According 
to Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe ([1985] 2014), nodal points emerge through 
antagonism, and although they create a sense of permanence or fixing, by linking signifiers to 
signifieds, by quilting the whole chain, they cannot make meaning entirely stable. However, 
often they appear as something fixed, or as the German minster puts it referring to ethnicity, 
as something “which makes Germans different from others.” 
Inspired by Lacanian psychoanalysis, Slavoj Žižek argues that this identification with 
ethnicity, or national identity, or in the example quoted above, with “something that makes 
Germans different from others,” cannot be understood just on the level of discourse but must 
include the affective dimension. 
Starting from the historical developments in post-communist Eastern Europe, in his essay 
“Enjoy Your Nation as Yourself!” Žižek (1993) points to the questions emerging from the 
flaring up of nationalism and populist policies in Eastern Europe of the 1990s, going against 
the grain of the widespread premise in Western Europe that the fall of oppressive regimes 
would inevitably lead the populations to embrace Western democratic values, the rule of law, 
ethnic tolerance, and a new unity within the diverse European identity. Žižek sees in the 
West’s disillusionment with developments, such as the wars in former Yugoslavia and the 
flaring up of xenophobia and anti-Semitism in Eastern Europe, a disappointment in its desire 
to be admired and find again its lost original experience of “democratic invention.” Instead of 
seeing in nationalism only a symptom of ideology, Žižek rethinks national identification in 
psychoanalytical terms, pointing to a level beneath the symbolic one. Whereas the notion of 
the “imagined community” (Anderson 1983) explains the production of a nation as a process 
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of self-ordering along an array of symbolic identification points towards an ideal unit 
envisaged amongst a given group of people, for Žižek the explanation of the nation as a 
product of discursive practices still leaves out an important, non-discursive level:  
A nation exists only as long as its specific enjoyment continues to be 
materialized in a set of social practices and transmitted through national myths 
that structure those practices. To emphasize in a ‘deconstructionist’ mode that 
Nation is not biological or transhistorical fact but a contingent discursive 
construction, an overdetermined result of textual practices, is thus misleading: 
such an emphasis overlooks the remainder of some real, nondiscursive kernel of 
enjoyment which must be present for the Nation qua discursive entity-effect to 
achieve its ontological consistency. (1993: 202) 
Žižek points to the “shared relationship toward a Thing, toward Enjoyment incarnated” (1993: 
201) that underlies values, myths, and social practices woven into the fantasy of the nation. 
For Žižek, the Thing is the Lacaninian Real – something that resists symbolization but is 
created by the symbolic. The role of fantasy is crucial here, because it is through fantasy that 
the world is experienced as a meaningful order, and the way that belonging to a particular 
group is constructed involves an element of fantasy. In other words, national identity cannot 
be fully symbolized and it is precisely because of that impossibility that members of a 
particular group cannot express what it really means to belong to a particular group. Therefore, 
they usually refer to “something more,” something that defines them. In short, there is a belief 
among the members of a particular group that there is “something more,” some essence within 
those features that they define as theirs, something that materializes through their discursive 
practices.  
Members of a community who partake in a given way of life “believe in their 
Thing, where this belief has a reflexive structure proper to the intersubjective 
space: “I believe in the (national) Thing” equals ”I believe that others (members 
of my community) believe in the Thing”. (Žižek 1993: 201-202, emphasis in 
original)  
This belief shared by the members of a group (nation), that there is a set of characteristics and 
practices – traditions, myths, customs – that make the group what it is, leads to enjoyment 
(jouissance) resulting from the performance of these practices. Therefore, the national cause 
is “nothing but the way subjects of a given ethnic community organize their enjoyment 
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through national myths” (Žižek 1993: 202) and a nation exists “only as long as its specific 
enjoyment continues to be materialized in a set of social practices and transmitted through 
national myths or fantasies that secure these practices” (1993: 202, emphasis in original).  
It is therefore not only on the level of differences between social practices that communities 
are defined against one another, but on the affective level, on the level of fantasy of their 
particular relationship towards the Nation-Thing: “Our Thing” is ours only; our enjoyment 
cannot be experienced or learned by non-members. The Thing exists in a paradox of being, on 
the one hand, inaccessible to Others and on the other, in constant threat by them, keeping the 
members in a state of awareness – even if this threat to “our way of life” is not a social reality, 
but played out on the symbolic level.  
Here, racism and exclusions are a discursive product of the national fantasy, the fantasy that 
on the one hand, makes us believe the Other desires to “steal our enjoyment” and on the other 
hand, we assume an excessive, even perverse and secret enjoyment by the Other. In short, 
“what really bothers us about the ‘other’ is the peculiar way he organizes his enjoyment, 
precisely the surplus, the ‘excess’ that pertains to this way: the smell of ‘their’ food, ‘their’ 
noisy songs and dances, ‘their’ strange manners, ‘their’ attitude to work” (Žižek 1993: 202-
203), which explains the sense of panic that occurs when social and physical distance towards 
the Other diminishes. Our hatred of the Other is a hatred of the Other’s enjoyment, which 
“would be the most general formula of the modern racism we are witnessing today: a hatred of 
the particular way the Other enjoys” (1993: 203). 
The fantasy of the Other’s enjoyment is at the heart of the construction of cultural difference. 
It is something that “we” cannot penetrate, and something that in the racist discourse “we” do 
not want to have in our proximity, since it is seen as insurmountable and a natural cause of our 
rejection. While on the legislative level discrimination of migrants is rejected in European 
countries, such as Germany or France today, the discrimination arises from the affective level. 
It is formulated as a rejection of “cultural difference,” which becomes a key organizing 
principle of what Étienne Balibar (1991) calls “cultural racism.” It becomes the point around 
which processes of exclusion happen, and the “way of life” of minorities becomes a “natural” 
base for antagonism.  
Balibar analyzes the development of new discourses of racism in which the new “racist 
community,” with its catalogue of practices of violence, stereotypical representation, and 
exclusion of the Other, no longer develops based primarily on a hatred that reflects a pseudo-
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biological concept of race; instead, in the era of decolonization and post-colonialism, Balibar 
locates immigration as the site where this discourse arises, with the “insurmountability of 
cultural differences” as its dominant theme (Balibar 1991: 20-21). This “differentialist racism” 
does not postulate a superiority of certain groups, but “‘only’ the harmfulness of abolishing 
frontiers, the incompatibility of life-styles and traditions” (1991: 21). Culture here takes over 
the function of nature, in that individual Others are a priori locked into a determined category 
where “individuals are the exclusive heirs and bearers of a single culture, segregate 
collectivities (the best barrier in this regard still being national frontiers)” (1991: 23). In this 
new “racism without races,”  
(i)t is granted from the outset that races do not constitute isolable biological units 
and that in reality there are no ‘human races’. It may also be admitted that the 
behaviour of individuals and their ‘aptitudes’ cannot be explained in terms of 
their blood or even their genes, but are the result of their belonging to historical 
‘cultures’. (1991: 21)  
This belonging is essentialistic and immutable; cultural difference cannot be surmounted. 
Balibar illustrates this “differentialist racism” using the example of current Arabophobia, 
based on “an image of Islam as a ‘conception of the world’ which is incompatible with 
Europeanness and an enterprise of universal ideological domination” (1991: 24).  
The discourse of cultural difference threatening “our way of life” is becoming mainstreamed 
in a number of European contexts at the time of writing, especially in the case of the large 
number of immigrant refugees, seen as carriers of cultural habits incompatible with European 
(or German) values, such as gender equality or a democratic outlook. In this discourse, racist 
reactions become “natural,” transforming the theory of races into “‘a theory of ‘race relations’ 
within society, which naturalizes not racial belonging but racist conduct” (Balibar 1991: 22).  
It is precisely within the framework of “cultural racism” that this thesis looks for the 
operations of normalizing and problematizing in the creation of the “Other.” The articulations 
of “cultural difference” are analyzed through a set of media broadcasts. The analysis looks 
specifically at those programs that are regarded as favorable towards cultural contact, looking 
for their responses to the problematizations of difference. Among others, it strongly draws on 
the work of Sara Ahmed, who introduces the concept of the “stranger,” and explores the 
instrumentalization of the stranger in the production of (Western) self and community. In her 
study “Strange Encounters: Embodied Others in Post-Coloniality,” Ahmed explores these 
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instrumentalizations through the prism of feminist and postcolonial theory, and introduces the 
concept of “stranger fetishism,” where “[t]he alien is not simply the one whom we have failed 
to identify (‘unidentified flying objects’), but is the one whom we have already identified in 
the event of being named as alien: the alien recuperates all that is beyond the human into the 
singularity of a given form” (2000: 2). Investigating various discourses, Ahmed shows how 
communities need the “close encounter” with strangers/aliens to be able to construct what is 
beyond the community in order to define  the community itself. It is through this “fleshing out 
the beyond” that the community is given a face and form. “The alien stranger is hence, not 
beyond human, but a mechanism for allowing us to face that which we have already 
designated as the beyond” (2000: 3, emphasis in original).  
Based on her conceptualization of the “stranger” and “stranger fetishism,” Ahmed sees these 
spaces as unavoidably situated within the historical negotiations of “nation.” She analyzes the 
necessity of the presence of “strangers” within the nation-space, to facilitate “the demarcation 
of the national body” (2000: 100). Furthermore, Ahmed points to the multicultural society’s 
ability to turn ethnic belonging into a consumption good, imbuing Western consumer culture 
with phantasies of “becoming,” a notion that will be analyzed more deeply in the example of a 
radio station in Chapter 7, and which involves, according to Ahmed, the construction of 
assimilable difference which can be put on or taken off. For Ahmed, “passing” is therefore 
crucial in the national phantasy of multiculturalism, while at the same time “acts of 
'transgression' implicit in passing do not transcend the systematization of differences into 
regularities” (2000, 91). On the contrary, passing can serve as a re-organizing principle of 
racial categories, where the disorganisation of identities  
can become a mechanism for the re-organizing of social life through an 
expansion of the terms of surveillance (how are we to know the other's difference 
if we cannot see her?). The economy of desire [...] is itself an apparatus of 
knowledge which already fixes others into a certain place. Such an economy of 
desire to tell the difference assumes that the difference can be found somewhere 
on (or in) the bodies of others (on or underneath their skin). (2000: 91)  
The categories of difference found on or in bodies exclude any sort of ambiguity or 
transgression of existing categories. Invoking a parallel (Black passing for White, White 
passing for White), Ahmed links the processes of stranger-production and stranger fetishism to 
historical power assymetries, since the difference between a Black and a White subject passing 
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for White is not essential, but rather “a structural difference that demonstrates that passing 
involves the re-opening or re-staging of a fractured history of identifications that constitutes 
the limits to a given subject's mobility.” To refuse that difference is to refuse to acknowledge 
“the constraints which temporarily fix subjects in relations of social antagonism” (2000: 93, 
emphasis in original). 
 
1.2 Governmentality and media as spaces of articulation of difference 
In this thesis, I look for the ways that subjects are fixed in relations of antagonism – these 
include the web of meanings “quilted” around terms such as integration, culture, 
multiculturalism, and tolerance. Many of these imaginaries are articulated in the media 
discourse, the main field of exploration of this thesis. Van Dijk argues that the media 
discourse is one of the most powerful discourses, operating from a position of authority, and 
notes that “among many other resources that define the power base of a group or institution, 
access to or control over public discourse and communication is an important ‘symbolic’ 
resource” (Van Dijk 2004: 355, emphasis in original). In Foucauldian terms, this means that 
the media discourse can be seen as part of modern-day governmentality, as leading to specific 
modes of individualization, through articulating modes of “conduct,” where “conduct of 
conducts” represents a simple definition of “governmentality.” In Foucault’s words, 
governmentality, understood “in the broad sense of techniques and procedures for directing 
human behavior”  (Foucault 1997: 83), encompasses an “ensemble formed by the institutions, 
procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics, that allow the exercise of 
this very specific albeit complex form of power” (Foucault 1979: 20, quoted in Rose 2006: 
86). In short, governmentality operates to produce a subject. 
As has already been stated, Foucault traces the emergence of a novel idea in the mid-
eighteenth century, that of a collectivity of living beings, a population with characteristics not 
the same as those of individuals, a collectivity that had to be understood by specific 
knowledges and governed according to them (Rose 2006: 84). Since this perspective sees 
power as operating in terms of specific rationalizations, an analysis here “seeks to identify 
these different styles of thought, their conditions of formation, the principles and knowledges 
that they borrow from and generate, the practices that they consist of, how they are carried out, 
their contestations and alliances with other arts of governing” (Rose 2006: 87). 
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In other words, governmentality leads to specific modes of individualization, including 
“becoming a Western-modern subject” (Lorey 2015: 3). While individualization means a 
separation, “primarily a matter of constituting oneself by way of imaginary relationships, 
constituting one’s ‘own’ inner being,” at the same time “this interiority and self-reference is 
not an expression of independence, but rather the crucial element in the pastoral relationship 
of obedience” (Lorey 2015: 3). Therefore, practices of governing can be seen as leading 
individuals “to produce relations to self that are then perceived, in the best case, as 
independent and autonomous” – the “conduct of conducts,” in other words, consists of 
“influencing the conduct of others through their individualization” (Lorey 2015: 3). The 
individuals are thus placed at the intersection of being guided to a certain conduct and self-
government, between subjugation and self-determination.  
At the same time, this intersection is open to counter-conduct, something that becomes an 
interesting area of study in terms of the topic of this thesis, the media discourse. This thesis 
approaches the media from the framework of a governmentality analysis and sees them as 
closely linked to formations of citizenship. This is especially visible in the social position of 
the public service media, with a remit “to inform, educate and entertain all audiences.” 
“Financed and controlled by the public, for the public,” the public service broadcasters are 
even defined as “the cornerstones of democratic societies” by the European Broadcasting 
Union (EBU).8  
In an analysis inspired by Foucauldian governmentality, David Nolan (2003, 2004, 2006) 
looks in particular at the role of the media in contemporary formations of citizenship. 
Disarticulating existing citizenship and the practices that shape it from critical-normative 
definitions, in his analysis citizenship is seen as a theoretical ideal, performatively embodied 
in broadcasting institutions, which enshrine and uphold individuals’ rights as members of civil 
society. On the other hand, conditions of civic membership are determined by operations of 
“citizens-forming” institutions (Nolan 2006). Nolan rejects the notion of citizenship as an 
ideal outside reality; instead he looks at citizenship as embodied in it – as a performative 
outcome of the field of government, “since it is this field that determines both the extent to 
which particular subjects are included in and/or excluded from the polity” (Nolan 2006: 231).  
                                                      
8 “What is public service media?”, EBU, https://www.ebu.ch/about/public-service-media, accessed 
12/November/2018 
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In discussing public service media in Australia, Nolan analyzes them as technologies of 
government in relation to the questions of citizenship, technologies that “do indeed perform 
this role of making available spaces where ideas of collective identity are articulated and 
deliberated, and in so doing constitute a ‘technology of citizenship’” (Nolan 2006: 227). 
Therefore, the public service broadcasters are on the one hand positioned as a field of practice 
(alongside others) and work to performatively define formations of citizenship, and on the 
other are situated within and governed by a larger field of socio-political relations (Nolan 
2006: 227-228). Therefore, citizenship formations are shaped by interactions between 
different authorities and different ways of defining “the public” and “publics” that the media 
deploy, with the “importance of such interactions [… being…] that they inform modes of 
governmental practice (including media practice) that literally serve to “define” formations of 
citizenship” (2006: 227-228).  
Instead of looking for a process in which a state moulds its citizenry through the media and 
other discourses, a governmentality approach recognizes that citizens exercise governmental 
power simultaneously to being subject to it, depending upon the social, cultural, and 
economic resources at their disposal. This mode of analysis finally “suggests that practices of 
government tend to be informed by (and are themselves governed by reference to) 
representations of the political community (or public) itself” (Nolan 2006: 233). 
The journalistic understanding of “the publics” is that in 
which journalism itself bears the responsibility of both shaping and representing, 
that marks it as a liberal technology that plays a key role in a broader apparatus 
of government. It must be emphasized, however, that “publics” do not exist 
simply as objectively identifiable entities but are discursively produced through 
various forms of quantitative and qualitative knowledge. (Nolan 2003: 1372) 
 In this sense, “journalism exists in a reciprocally constitutive and dependent relationship with 
other such agencies” (Nolan 2003: 1372). In conclusion, a governmentality analysis can show 
how “the material politics of actually existing citizenship can gain visibility, by focusing on 
how various social practices and institutions contribute to formations of citizenship” (Nolan 
2006: 240). 
I follow this line of analysis in my elaborations of concrete case studies within the media 
discourse. I see the media as one of the central spaces of representation in society, in terms of 
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their role in (co-)defining the power relations as defined by (cultural) difference within a 
multicultural situation. I also see them as participating in the discursive production of various 
forms of knowledge and the subjectification of citizens. At the same time, they are also an 
area where counter-conducts or alternative modes of individualization can be articulated. 
I draw in particular on the work of Ella Shohat and Robert Stam, who concentrate on the role 
of media in multiculturalism and pose questions about the ways the media participate in the 
construction of cultural identities. Shohat and Stam detect ideological and power structures in 
a large array of popular culture texts – from Hollywood genre movies to indigenous cinema, 
from television serials to U.S. coverage of the Gulf Wars, from the Brazilian Tropicalia to rap 
and hip-hop movements. In their analysis of the overlapping of the beginnings of colonialism, 
scientific development, and technical progress, they point to the participation of the media – 
in particular photography and film – in the imperial project, showing how the material from 
the time “enshrines and naturalizes the hierarchical stratifications inherited from colonialism, 
rendering them as inevitable and even ‘progressive’” (Stam and Shohat 2012: 61). In other 
words, this film material introduces the normalized view of the “civilizational” project of 
European colonialism that continues in the Eurocentric paradigm and justifies the “us vs. 
them” problematizations to this day – both in the media discourse itself and the 
individualizations and the social positionings articulated through the media discourse. 
Two points are central to the Eurocentric paradigm for Shohat and Stam: firstly, it sanitizes 
Western history and patronizes the non-West, thinking of itself “in terms of its noblest 
achievements – science, progress, humanism – but of the non-West in terms of its 
deficiencies, real or imagined" (Shohat and Stam 1994: 3). Secondly, it naturalizes this stance 
as “common sense,” rather than a political position. The “ideal portrait” of Eurocentrism 
shows it as a diffusionist narrative, assuming that Europe generates ideas that spread around 
the world; as evolutionary, with Europe leading the way for others; as embedded in binary 
metaphors of center and periphery, order and chaos, self-reflexivity and blindness; as denying 
the agency of colonized peoples; as implying an inherent drive towards democracy in the 
West but not elsewhere; as having a monopoly on beauty, artistic modernism, self-critical 
reflectivity, universal thought, progress (unrelated to the appropriation of wealth from 
colonized regions), and so on (Stam and Shohat 2012: 65-67). 
Eurocentrism, however, is not a synonym for “European,” so that “(i)t is not Eurocentric to 
love Shakespeare or Proust, but it is Eurocentric to wield these cultural figures as ‘proof’ of 
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an innate European superiority” (2012: 62). The Eurocentric paradigm instead “refers to 
western hegemonies rooted in colonialism and imperialism. It refers not to Europe but to a 
perspective on the relationship between the West and its Others” (Shohat and Stam 2009). 
The nature of the “Europe” at the heart of this paradigm has changed since the colonial period 
to include for example (White Anglo-Saxon) North America; therefore, alternative terms such 
as “Eurotropism,” “Westernism,” “Western hegemonism,” and “Occidentalism” could be 
used as alternatives to Eurocentrism. 
Since the power structure described by Shohat and Stam is present as a hidden paradigm not 
only in colonial film, but also in a large part of today’s media production that implicitly 
positions the Western subject as dominant, in the reverse argument the media can gain a 
pivotal role in the decentralizing and dispersing of power, in the rejection of Western and 
Eurocentric power structures. The media discourse can become a site where counter-conduct 
or alternative individualizations are articulated, a space where it would be possible to exercise 
a radical “un-thinking” of Eurocentrism, a deconstruction and destabilization of the “habit of 
Eurocentrism,” or those “paradigms which simplify and make Europe a singular source of 
culture” (Shohat and Stam 1994: 1). Shohat and Stam point to the crucial question of the 
distribution of representational power in the media; however, they see the media as fields of 
representation that can open up spaces for resisting the Eurocentric discourse. Media can 
construct identity and a sense of belonging to a national community, but just as “the media can 
exoticize and otherize cultures, they can also reflect and help catalyze multicultural affiliations 
and transnational identifications” (Shohat and Stam 2003: 1)  
This thesis analyzes a particular radio station and a media event of German public service 
broadcasters and their effects on multicultural citizenship, explicitly looking for ways these 
media articulate belonging and citizenship. What kind of individualizations are they in the 
context of the German multicultural society? What narratives do they uphold? Do they follow 
dominant scripts, or do they offer modes of alternative or counter self-determination? These 
are some of the overreaching questions of the thesis. 
Whereas a large part of the German-language literature on the topic of media and 
multiculturalism sees the mass media as a tool, as a means of carrying the message that will 
lead to harmonious co-existence and social cohesion9 in the best case, or contribute to social 
                                                      
9 An overview of the German-language literature in the field of media and multiculturalism is offered in Chapter 
4. 
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disintegration in the worst, this thesis aims to expand the discussion towards a discursive 
analysis, that explicitly treats media as technologies of governing in the Foucauldian sense. 
The thesis looks at the questions of power implicit in media discourses, at how the audience 
and the media makers “manipulate […] (media) technologies to their own cultural, economic, 
and ideological ends” (Askew 2002: 1).  It asks specific questions in terms of power workings 
within multicultural societies, or a context of majority and minorities, in particular: What kind 
of “truth” do media discourses under scrutiny construct? And whose interests does that serve 
in the final consequence? How do the media contribute to the processes of problematization 
and normalization? How do they work towards “Othering” or towards national and cultural 
community building? How do these discourses work within and on the concept of difference, 
on subject and object positionings? Who has access to the media discourse as a member of the 
audience, as a protagonist or a creator?  
I scrutinize two particular media examples. One of them is the radio station WDR Funkhaus 
Europa, that will be introduced in more detail later. At this point, it is important to note that it 
is at the moment of writing the only public service radio station in Germany dedicated 
specifically to cultural diversity in the country (under the new name WDR Cosmo). It 
broadcasts word content and music that differ from the daily potpourri of agency news and 
reporting of the mainstream media as well as from the choice of chart music, which is 
dominated by Anglo-Saxon hits. To this extent, I see it as partially offering alternative modes 
of individualization or embodiment of citizenship in multicultural Germany at the turn of the 
century. My second example is the thematic week dedicated to tolerance, a media event 
organized by the Association of German Public Service Broadcasters in 2014.  
I do not see these media examples, or media content in general, as reflecting physical or social 
reality in a straight-forward manner. Instead, I analyze both of these examples as articulations 
of particular meanings in a particular historical moment in the context of the German 
multicultural society. I analyze the negotiations of multicultural living as mediated through 
the “snapshot” of media discourse, caught in a certain historical moment in a media broadcast. 
I specifically seek for the ways some meanings are included and some excluded from the 
discourse, as well as how meanings around cultural diversity are fixed in it. 
Here, I follow Laclau and Mouffe, who argue that our perception of reality and its objects is 
mediated through discourse. In their vivid comparison,  
(t)he fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has nothing to 
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do with whether there is a world external to thought, or with the realism/idealism 
opposition. An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event that certainly 
exists, in the sense that it occurs here and now, independently of my will. But 
whether their specificity as objects is constructed in terms of ‘natural 
phenomena’ or ‘expressions of the wrath of God’, depends upon the structuring 
of a discursive field. What is denied is not that such objects exist externally to 
thought, but the rather different assertion that they could constitute themselves 
as objects outside any discursive conditions of emergence. (Laclau and Mouffe 
2014: 94) 
Important for my analysis is the assertion that the meanings of social phenomena are not 
fixed; rather, they are the result of a spectrum of discourses, structuring reality in different 
ways, so that  
(p)eople’s understanding of these aspects […] is contingent upon the ongoing 
struggle between discourses, with perceptions of society and identity always 
open to new representations as meanings are constantly altered and reconfigured 
through contact with competing discourses. (Rear 2013: 5) 
In particular, I analyze how crucial terms of the cultural politics of difference in Germany – 
among them multiculturalism, integration, tolerance – are configured and reconfigured 
through competing discourses, as they are articulated in the media. According to Laclau and 
Mouffe, articulation is “any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their 
identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice,” while a discourse is “the 
structured totality resulting from this articulatory practice” (Laclau andMouffe 2014: 91). 
Since this structuring of meanings involves exclusion of alternative meanings, “any discourse 
is constituted as an attempt to dominate the field of discursivity, to arrest the flow of 
differences, to construct a centre” (Laclau & Mouffe 2014: 98-99). 
As was already mentioned, Laclau and Mouffe point to nodal points that organize discourses 
around a reference point, the “privileged signifiers that fix the meaning of the signifying 
chain” (2014: 99). As Slavoj Žižek (1989) explains, this does not mean that a nodal point is 
simply the word that condenses all the meaning of the field it “quilts,” rather, it is “the word 
which, as a word, on the level of the signifier itself, unifies a given field, constitutes its 
identity” (Žižek 1989: 95-96). In other words, a nodal point possesses no density of meaning, 
but is instead an “empty signifier, a pure signifier without the signified” (1989: 97), that only 
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acquires meaning in its positioning to other signs, and through articulation. For example, 
Torfing (1999) explains the functioning of the word “nation” as the nodal point quilting the 
discursive field of “nationalism”: he points out that it is the “aim of a nationalistic movement 
to hegemonize the content of the empty signifier of ‘the nation’ by attaching it to a 
transcendental signified, able once and for all to arrest the play of meaning” (1999: 202). 
In this sense, the media discourse, including the particular station under scrutiny, WDR 
Funkhaus Europa, is seen here as organized around nodal points such as multiculturalism and 
integration, positioned in articulatory relation to other elements within the discourse. I see 
multiculturalism, diversity, and integration in this particular discourse not as condensing some 
central meaning of the discourse on difference, but as filled and refilled with different 
meanings in an attempt to fix them in a certain way. The relationship of these nodal points to 
other elements in the discourse is not one of straightforward causes and effects, and it is also 
always contingent. The contingency of articulations always becomes visible in light of newly 
arising antagonisms, which then lead to new articulations and discourse rearrangements. I 
show this in examples such as the change in how “enriching difference” was articulated in the 
picture of the ideal listeners of the radio station Funkhaus Europa. While initially personified 
by a young Arab man, over the course of years the picture of the young Arab male became a 
point that “quilted” a whole new discourse arising from the events of the Cologne New Year’s 
Eve 2015/16 and subsequent media coverage on the cases of sexual violence and predation 
perpetrated by refugees from the Middle East.10 It is such rearrangements arising from new 
antagonisms that I reveal through a scrutiny of programs dedicated to cultural diversity, 
detected in concepts and narratives that media content is built around, as well as in the 
changes that have occurred in the past years. In sum, they point to rearrangements in the 






                                                      




Contestations around identity issues - migration, multiculturalism, integration, 
assimilation, interculturalism 
 
The antagonisms around “cultural difference” influence the ongoing rearrangements in the 
discourse on multicultural living in many European states of migration, mobilizing the 
emotions around the contestations of difference, race, and culture. The contingency of any 
points of reference in the discourse on difference or multicultural living becomes visible in the 
ongoing struggle over words, over terms with which to describe the social situation 
characterizing modern European societies characterized by migration and cultural and ethnic 
diversity. This can be seen very vividly on the trajectory of some of the key terms in the 
debate in recent years, among them most strikingly multiculturalism, but also integration, or 
interculturalism, terms that are central to the ways citizens of contemporary Germany 
subjectify themselves today. 
 
2.1 Migration and multiculturalism 
As has already been stated, over 23 percent, or more than every fifth person living in Germany 
has a so-called “migration background”11. Since this statistical category applies also to people 
born in Germany to at least one parent of migrant origins, further cultural and ethnic 
diversification of the population in Germany is set to continue even if physical immigration 
were to stop completely. So, how does the German “we” constitute itself in light of such social 
transformation? How are the citizens of Germany, whose political institutions only recently 
officially confirmed the physical reality that Germany was a “country of immigration”12, 
subjectified today in terms of their cultural and national identity? How does the political 
                                                      
11 Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung: Bevölkerung mit Migrationshintergrund I. In absoluten Zahlen, Anteile 
an der Gesamtbevölkerung in Prozent, 2017, 
https://www.bpb.de/wissen/NY3SWU,0,0,Bev%F6lkerung_mit_Migrationshintergrund_I.html, accessed 18 
Nov. 2018 
12 Until the late 1990s, the official line of the German institutions was that Germany was not a country of 
permanent immigration. 
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discourse reconcile its reference point as a nation-state with the changing cultural identities of 
a large bulk of its citizens? Finally: what versions of citizenship and what narratives of the 
“good life” in Germany as a country of changing identity are articulated through the media? 
The last decades have seen a change of paradigm in the official German politics13, from 
denying the facts of immigration, towards efforts to promote integration, and even pride in the 
country’s diversity. For example, in 2011, the 50th anniversary of the bilateral contract which 
started the arrival of foreign workers in Germany from Turkey was a cause for celebration of 
the success of its largest migrant community, otherwise often perceived as a source of 
problems and an implied lack of full acculturation. On this occasion however, awards for 
“successful integration” were handed over, books about businesspeople, physicians, and artists 
of Turkish origin were published, the media celebrated the “good co-existence.” As is often 
the case in the rhetoric concerning migration in Western Europe, cultural diversity, when 
framed positively, is seen in terms of the potential of economic enrichment or of helping to 
solve the looming demographic crisis. However, even when the discourse of “enrichment” is 
evoked, ostensibly the nation state remains the “natural” point of departure for celebrating 
diversity. This in turn leads to continuing struggles over the concepts of cohesion, integration, 
cultural values, and tolerance in the political, public, and media discourse. Therefore, 
regardless of the ideological underpinnings of the arguments, the picture of the society 
continues to be based on prior normativity and assumptions of major and minor elements 
within it (Stam and Shohat 2012: 119). 
This becomes all too visible when large-scale events are perceived as a crisis, such as the 
influx of hundreds of thousands of refugees from the Middle East into Germany in 2015-16. 
Termed a “refugee crisis” in the media, the events reinforced the sense of institutional 
inaptness, insecurity, and threat that favored the rise of the xenophobic party Alternative für 
Deutschland (Alternative for Germany) and the right-wing populist movement Pegida14. 
Whereas the demand to integrate and become part of the society remains a priority in the 
                                                      
13 Chapter 4 will deal in more detail with the historical transformation of policies concerning immigration and 
diversity in Germany. 
14 Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the Occident (Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung 
des Abendlandes), abbreviated Pegida, was established in October 2014, when it staged its first rallies against 
further immigration in the German East, accusing the authorities of facilitating immigration and a silent 
Islamization of Germany. Pegida has continued to demonstrate around the country on a regular basis, regularly 
also provoking counter-demonstrations. Founded as a loose association of right-wing organizations and 
individual citizens, it has over and again been accused of colluding with the extreme right.  
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pegida, accessed 03 Jan. 2019 
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political approach to immigration, the continuing conflicts around the conditions for obtaining 
– and properly living – German citizenship point to the danger that the “new restrictions and 
the symbolic effect of debates about which new citizens are deemed worthy or unwelcome 
may counteract the intention of increasing the naturalization rates of immigrants and hinder 
their full incorporation into German society” (Schönwälder 2010: 153).  
The negotiations around questions of migration and cultural diversity have turned around 
several crucial terms; multiculturalism is the most prominent example that shows a larger 
European and Western paradigm change in the discourses around migration and the policy 
responses to it. It has been used to describe a set of politics regulating diversity, or as a term 
used to denote a celebration of the cultural mix in the country, and, in a more recent complete 
semantic turn, as the umbrella term describing everything that went wrong with immigration, 
in a strong “backlash against multiculturalism” (Fortier 2008; Vertovec 2010; Wessendorf 
2010). How are such shifts in public discussion to be analyzed in terms of their operation in 
governing difference? I see multiculturalism as a textbook example of a “nodal point,” 
defining and unifying the meaning of the field it “quilts” (Žižek 1989). Without density of 
meaning in itself, multiculturalism is filled with meaning through articulation, depending on 
the context, and on its positioning in relation to other signs. 
Let me trace its trajectory: In very broad terms, the concept of multiculturalism points to a 
constellation of the loosening ties between the nation-state and a homogeneous national 
culture, and a parallelity of various individual cultures (ethnic and other) within the nation-
state. Multiculturalism can thus be seen from two perspectives, both as “a feeble 
acknowledgement of the fact that cultures have lost their moorings in definite places and an 
attempt to subsume this plurality of cultures within the framework of a national identity” 
(Gupta and Ferguson 1992: 7). 
The concept of multiculturalism emerged in the context of the social and migration 
movements of the mid-twentieth century and was later theoretically approached in post-
colonial theories, against the backdrop of the experience of global migration movements of the 
post-colonial era. As such, it has not only analytical but also institutional connotations, and 
continues to be emotionally charged on the level of everyday political debate in a large 
number of European countries of immigration. Speaking within the British context, Anne-
Marie Fortier refers to this proliferation of discussion when she notes that the “sheer volume 
of debates, consultations, analyses, editorials, and images circulating around multiculturalism 
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in the British public sphere since the turn of the millenium makes it impossible not to notice 
how unsettled and unsettling, multicultural Britain is” (Fortier 2008: 2). 
In the course of the years and with changing political climates, the term multiculturalism has 
often been used with manifold, sometimes contradictory meanings, depending on the 
historical, political and socio-cultural context and purpose. In Fortier’s words, 
(s)truggles over exclusion, discrimination, and recognition of people minoritized 
on the basis of race, ethnicity, and to a lesser extent, gender, sexuality, class, or 
disability have variously been mobilized in the name of multiculturalism (2008: 
1-2)  
and its deployment in government strategies and social policies also varies and is always 
subject to intense debate. Whereas many countries of immigration have operationalized 
multicultural practices in their normative frameworks as well as on the level of everyday life, 
and spontaneous forms of multicultural life exist in all of them, the public, media, and 
political discourses have seen a steady growth of criticism of the concept, so much so that 
some authors even see symptoms of its “slow death” approaching. All in all, when describing 
cultural and political dilemmas in heterogeneous societies, even if turning into a problematic 
category, Stuart Hall notes that multiculturalism “contain[s] the seeds of a major disruption in 
our normal common sense political assumptions” (Hall 2000: 1) and points out that the 
multicultural is not a policy decision or a life-style choice, but “an inevitable process of 
cultural translation” (2000: 6). 
The main thoretical approaches to multiculturalism I refer to in this text identify different 
concepts within this broad area as their focus of analytical interest (diaspora, space, identity, 
citizenshhip, power politics, etc.), but they all share an intrinsically political character, in that 
they all propose alternatives to dominant practices. Most of the analytical approaches referred 
to in this dissertation stem from the Anglo-Saxon area, and even if some of the social, 
political, and economic indicators differ, I see strong parallels to the German context on the 
level of political and public contestations around identity and belonging, as well as their shifts 
through time. 
One of the most interesting of these is the self-image, or the fantasy, that immigration 
societies develop in terms of their changing ethnic makeup and the ensuing cultural identity – 
a point of much contestation in the political and media discourse in Germany. Anne-Marie 
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Fortier analyzes this on the subject of British multiculturalism in her  essay “Pride Politics 
and Multicultural Citizenship” (2005). Starting from the analysis of newspaper coverage 
during the public outcry and the ensuing debate over the publication of the so-called “Parekh 
Report,” Fortier uncovers the dominant cultural and political assumptions underlying the 
seemingly liberal public discourse on multiculturalism in Great Britain and discovers in it 
patterns of what she brands “multicultural nationalism.”  
The claim of the report of the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain (Parekh 
2000), published in October 2000, that caused such polemic, was the implication that Britain 
as well as the dominant understanding of Britishness rest on – systematic and largely 
unspoken – racial connotations. As is stated in the report, 
(w)hiteness nowhere features as an explicit condition of being British, but it is 
widely understood that Englishness, and therefore by extension Britishness, is 
racially coded. […] Race is deeply entwined with political culture and with the 
idea of nation. (2000: 38)  
The Parekh report called for the members of the dominant group to “rethink the national 
story” and re-evaluate their assumed identities and historical narratives – even if this meant 
hazarding the consequence of destabilizing them.  
The highly emotionalized public response to the Parekh report was marked by declarations of 
pride in British citizenship, and it is in these publicly displayed emotions that Fortier finds the 
fantasy of Britain as being a multicultural nation: it encompasses the image of Britain as a 
culturally mixed community, but based on clear criteria of belonging and entitlement posed by 
the dominant group. The media retort to the Parekh report was a counter-question: “how can 
‘we’ be racist if we’ve always been multicultural?” and the assertion that “we” are proud of 
“‘our’ inherent cultural diversity and recognize that it ‘strengthens’ and ‘enriches’ the nation” 
(Fortier 2005: 560, emphasis in original). Differing sharply from the rhethoric of “immigration 
floods” or the national boat being “full,” this discourse circled around the notion of 
enrichment through diversity, claiming the almost coquettish sounding attribute in the 
assertion that “Britain is a ‘Mongrel Nation’” (2005: 560).  
On the one hand, in the debate ensuing from the publication of the Parekh report, it was 
repeatedly claimed that Britain was a multicultural society which had disavowed a 
monoculturalist stance and had decoupled diversity from the images of threat or danger, 
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turning it into a source of pride. On the other hand, however, the discourse was still based on 
the dichotomy between “us” and “others” (even if it was a benevolent “us” facing harmless 
“others”). For Fortier, in this new version of national identity, imagined as one “based on a 
common hybridity” (2005: 560), Britain is still primarily ethnicized, but re-imagined as a 
result of a mixing of cultures, “in a typical melting-pot assimilationist stew where differences 
are dissolved and assimilated into a palatable diversity” (2005: 561).  
Again, the contingency of such scripts as those of Britain as being proud of being a “Mongrel 
Nation” is obvious from a distance of only a few years, with the public discussion turning 
around, rejecting further immigration and the often-voiced fear of losing the nation’s cultural 
identity. At the same time, the reactions to the Parekh report show how difficult it is to point 
to the ethnicization underlying such scripts once they become established as “common sense.” 
In times of crisis or perceived crisis, such as during the movement of refugees in 2015-16 or 
the Brexit referendum in 2016, the underlying antagonisms come back with full force. Similar 
swings can be noted in other countries, for example in Germany, that celebrated migration 
from Turkey in 2011 on the highest institutional level, before a situation evolved in which 
public opinion circled around new immigration as a cultural and security threat, or the 
impossibility of integration of certain ethnic groups, just five years later. 
Interestingly, similar contradictions in self-reflection do not disappear from the discourse 
when multiculturalism is elevated onto the level of state politics, as examples such as 
Australia show. On the one hand, the nation is institutionally defined as a multicultural mix, 
on the other, the power to define belonging remains part of the White hegemony, as Ghassan 
Hage shows in his study of Australian multiculturalism, White Nation. Fantasies of White 
Supremacy in a Multicultural Society (2000). Hage deals with the underlying assumptions at 
work in both the nationalist and the multiculturalist discourses, seeing them both as based on 
the same power-relations and on the same centrality of the White Anglo-Celtic individual, 
who assigns societal positions and entitlements. To denominate this narrative, Hage coins the 
term “White multiculturalism,” that operates as  
an adaptation of the assimilation fantasy of postwar Australia which allows the 
White subjects to retain their governmental position within the nation. It does so 
through a process of incorporating Australia's multicultural reality by 
constructing it into a reality of tamed ethnicities structured around a primary 
White culture. (Hage 2000: 209)  
 37 
Hage finds the roots of what he calls the “White Nation fantasy” in a recurring “discourse of 
Anglo-decline,” a discourse that “bemoans what it sees as the attack on the core British values 
of traditional White Australia, in which the figure of the ordinary 'mainstream' Australian, the 
'traditional Aussie battler', is perceived as a victim of a conspiracy to change the very nature of 
the country” (2000: 20). This fantasy thus locates the nationalist subject within nationalist 
practices, with the nationalist’s meaning being that of a nation-builder, “derived from the task 
of having to build his or her ideal homely nation, a national domesticator” (2000: 70). 
Hage points to the “fantasy” of a nation, on one level functioning as a yearning for an ideal 
state, or even a yearning for a lived past, one before the country was “flooded” by “migrant 
waves.” On another level, Hage uses the term fantasy in Lacan’s sense of the ideal image of 
the self as a “meaningful” subject, of people inhabiting “fantasy spaces of which they are a 
part” (2000: 70).  
Hage uses the concept of “White Nation fantasy” in a psychoanalytical sense of idealized 
nationalists at the center of an idealized national space to draw attention to the similarity 
between two politically opposite projects: White Racism and White Multiculturalism, which 
“despite their many differences, […] [share] a similar fantasy structure. […] this fantasy 
structure is, ultimately, a fantasy of White supremacy” (2000: 232). He makes visible the 
shared assumption of the central position of the White national subject in decreeing the desired 
ethnic composition of the Australian society in both the racist and the multiculturalist 
approaches. The two sides differ considerably on the level of everyday politics by demanding 
that ethnic diversity be or not be tolerated. But, central and common to both is the self-
assigned position of the power to tolerate or not to tolerate. Ultimately, “the distinction 
between valuing negatively/valuing positively mystifies the deeper division between holding 
the power to value (negatively or positively) and not holding it” (2000: 121). In both 
discourses, the element of power relations means that “White multiculturalism and White 
racism, each in their own way, work at containing the increasingly active role of non-White 
Australians in the process of governing Australia” (2000: 19, emphasis in original). 
Anne-Marie Fortier in turn reveals racism to lie at the core of the paradox of “multiculturalist 
nationalism” that causes the compulsive public displays of pride in the diverse British nation 
and where, crucially, pride is not displayed by White but by non-White Britons. Fortier 
analyzes the example of the testimony of the Olympic medallist Kelly Holmes. It “makes 
sense” for her to display pride in multicultural Britain only due to the fact that she is not 
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White, that she is seen in the newspaper photograph as Black, as a racialized subject. 
Therefore, while claiming a post-racial color blindness, it is precisely color that gives sense to 
her testimony. 
Despite her refusal of blackness, Holmes (and others) circulated within an 
iconography of Britishness that put skin colour at the forefront of the meaning 
of Britishness. The way she and others were taken up by the press was as 
racialized subjects (Fortier 2005: 569, emphasis in original),  
who in their testimony refused the historical mechanisms that made their skin color the 
“other” of the British nation. Minorities continue to be the “others” within the British nation, 
but they are asked to relinquish their racial categorization (they should, for example, not be 
“angry black men and women”). For Fortier, “(t)alking the talk of national allegiance and 
pride makes the ‘other’ one of ‘us’ and the non-white skin colour is rendered irrelevant. Their 
deracination makes them available to adopt ‘the nation’ and available for adoption by ‘the 
nation’” (Fortier 2005: 570, emphasis in original). This makes the demand to deracialize 
pardoxical, since it is only as racialized subjects that they are asked this, and it is in the action 
of their own deracialization that they continue to be ascribed to their ethnic “otherness.”  
Fortier asks what happens to “national culture” when minority cultures are proclaimed an 
integral part of the nation or what are the “new economies of exclusion/inclusion and 
toleration through different acts of interpellating ‘others’ to be seen to speak out as proud 
subjects of multicultural Britain” (Fortier 2005: 562, emphasis in original). Not all 
multicultural subjects are deemed as having a legitimate right to speak in the name of the 
nation – this belonging to the nation must first be earned:  
one must be seen and heard to declare her pride in Britishness in order to achieve 
un-marked status. An ‘achievement’ that is endlessly deferred, as the non-white 
skin is never fully peeled off, in a continuous process of de/re-racialization. [...] 
Ethnicity here is conceived as foreignness and otherness, but it is also seen as 
something that one can willingly shed in exchange for legitimate citizenship. 
(2005: 574, emphasis in original) 
Fortier detects this mechanism as especially at work after the attacks of September 11th in the 
USA and the London bombings of July 2005, when all non-White and Moslem Britons were 
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requested to publicly proclaim loyalty to British values. It is this possibility of “earning” the 
right to belonging that is part of cultural politics which assume  
that they can transact their ethnicity, where their ethnicity can be shed or 
exchanged for legitimate citizenship. In order to be welcome in the national fold, 
they must deracinate themselves, yet they remain, willingly or not, aligned to 
their ethnic otherness (2005: 571).  
Recognizing in multicultural citizenship also a “process of ascription of differential identitites, 
and indeed of differential bodies, to some citizens rather than others within multiculturalist 
nationalism” (2005: 570), Fortier identifies the ultimate goal as being not to disturb the 
balance in which the White British subject continues to occupy the decision-taking position. In 
this sense, the formation of new multicultural subjects involves a  
movement between closeness and distance; that is, one which means that the 
other is now integral to ‘our’ imagined community, while at the same time, their 
otherness, which is necessary to the project of multiculturalist Britain, keeps 
them distant and indeterminate. (2005: 572)  
A crucial element of “multiculturalist nationalism” is its de-historizing effect, so that in the 
debate around the Parekh report, Fortier uncovers a “political rhetoric of citizenship that 
assumes sameness between individuals by denying the socio-political significance of 
‘difference’ and evacuating histories of domination, racism and resistance” (2005: 572). 
Fortier’s analysis uncovers the paradox: The racialized subjects are asked to take off their 
racial marking, in order to become entitled to belonging. Belonging in turn means ignoring the 
history of power relations that have brought the racial markings salience and assigned the 
racialized subjects to the positions of “other” in the first place. 
The construction of the image of Britain as a multicultural society, “officially” proud to be a 
“Mongrel Nation,” is also about “making the common,” making the nation’s historical 
narrative. In the British case, the claim of modern tolerance and inclusiveness is inextricably 
linked to a rejection of a historical legacy of imperialism as something which is beyond the 
boundaries of today’s understanding of the British nation and Britishness.  
The claim of modern openness and tolerance is also a way of eradicating shameful histories. 
The “politics of pride” in response to the Parekh report – which in turn detected the creation of 
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a racialized British nation in the course of its imperial past as the base for continuing social 
inequalities and discrimination,  
seek to eradicate shame: pride in ‘our’ history, in ‘our’ country, in ‘our’ 
passports, is repeatedly rehearsed by way of sanitising the attachment to the 
nation under a veneer of guiltless pride, one which knows no shame or guilt. 
(Fortier 2005: 565, emphasis in original)  
Refusing shame for itself, the public looks for culprits, the ones “in our midst,” who 
“are ashamed of us as a nation” – these are to be found predominantly within the 
liberal Left. On the other side of the political spectrum, there are also culprits who 
“shame us as a nation”: these are in turn not found in the political far right as a whole, 
but specifically among individuals, for example, in the British National Party or 
among football hooligans. The rejection of both a generally felt shame and of the 
accusations of racism in the course of the media debate around the Parekh report was 
thus the expression of a “sanitized ‘happy’ multiculturalism” requiring the 
“eradication of unwanted unhappy subjects, including those whose anger might be 
justified but which can be managed and re-directed away from the nation (the 
collective self) and on to individualized selves” (2005: 567). 
Also turning to the historical roots of today’s racism, Paul Gilroy searches for them in the 
unprocessed legacy of imperial history and poses the question why Empire and racialized 
thinking keep defining the essence of postcolonial discourse and public policy in Britain, 
where “it is homogeneity rather than diversity that provides the new rule” (Gilroy 2004a: 2). 
In After Empire: Melancholia or Convivial Culture? (2004), he concentrates on two key 
points: One is the unbroken power of the notion of “race” and the consistency of racism in 
postcolonial times. The other is what he terms post-colonial “melancholia,” dead freight 
weighing on the collective psychological makeup of former imperial masters, even if hollowed 
out by an actually existing “convivial culture,” that “evasive, multicultural future prefigured 
everywhere in the ordinary experiences of contact, cooperation and conflict accross the 
supposedly impermeable boundaries of race, culture, identity and ethnicity” (Gilroy 2004a: 
viii). Exploring in detail the history of imperialism, as well as the intersections of race and 
nation in British political culture, Gilroy concludes that, contrary to expectations, the 
“historical anomaly” of “race” is  
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still somewhere "on hold" and therefore a muted part of the history of our 
present, […] most likely to be recovered or remembered in the name of the same 
racial, ethnic and national absolutes and particularities. (2004a: 15-16)  
Gilroy rejects any racialized order as being not caused by “race,” but causing this “complex, 
unstable product” (2004s: 15-16), which “refers primarily to an impersonal, discursive 
arrangement, the brutal result of the raciological ordering of the world, not its cause” (2004a: 
42). 
Instead of disappearing, race thinking has proliferated, even if it has changed since the end of 
the Empire. However, Gilroy points here to the important element of ambivalence surrounding 
antagonism based on racial thinking, as well as the role of emotions that allows different 
experiences of social positioning in a situation of diversity: 
The simpler hatreds forged in more innocent days now coexist with complex, 
proteophobic, and ambivalent patterns. This change means that blackness can 
sometimes connote prestige rather than the unadorned inferiority of ‘bare life’ 
on the lowest rungs of humanity's ontological ladder. Under these conditions, 
the boundaries between contending groups must repeatedly be made anew and 
may only be respected when they have been marked out in warm blood. (2004a: 
40)  
Gilroy also points to the unstable and shifting nature of these scripts, seeing, for example, 
patterns of segregation or of framing crime and terrorism as ensuing from difference, as 
having transferred directly from the colonial situation into the urban metropolis. At the same 
time, under the banner of “ethical” and “civilizational” force, Britain has incorporated aspects 
of American nationalism, militarism, and expansionism, which bring back old colonial 
thinking into play, by defining geopolitical conflicts as a battle between homogeneous 
civilizations, so that for Gilroy, Guantánamo Bay and Abu Ghraib represent the continuation 
of divisions at the core of an imperialist mission. Instead of becoming irrelevant, the issue of 
“race” has again gained relevance for great parts of society, especially since the beginning of 
the state of emergency caused by the “war on terror,” which has strongly reintroduced 
“cultural difference” as the basis for divisions. 
Today's civilisationism shamelessly represents the primary lines of antagonism 
in global politics as essentially cultural in character. Its figuration of the post-
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Cold War world bears the significant imprint of the grand, nineteenth-century 
racial theory that was formed by the terrifying prospect of racial decline and 
degeneracy. (2004a: 25)  
Gilroy rejects all kinds of pseudo-civilizationism that has become the accepted feature of 
liberal discourse in the course of peace-making, peace-enforcing, and state-building missions 
around the world in the past decades, and which continues to draw the boundary between the 
civilized “us” and those incapable of building a peaceful democratic society based on the rule 
of law.  
As a counter-strategy, necessary in order to end racialized hierarchies and inequalities, Gilroy 
calls for “historical analyses of racial hierarchy that overflow the fading boundaries of national 
states” (2004a: 167), analyses that include a categorical rejection of any kind of identity 
politics aimed at fixing delimited categories imposed on individuals and groups. 
Deconstructing racialized difference means questioning the practice of categorizing migrant 
population and connoting it negatively. At the same time, deconstructing “race” is pivotal also 
for the liberation of the British of their postcolonial burden – what Gilroy, following social 
psychology, terms “melancholia,” a collective condition of never having overcome the loss of 
the Empire. It is in this sense of loss and the pathological incapability of getting over the loss, 
that Gilroy sees the core of the political and cultural thinking of today’s British society: 
instead of processing the past, it seeks refuge in creating an artifical ideal state of 
homogeneous identity.  
The inability to process the past means that its patterns translate into a contemporary edition of 
imperialism. On one level, today’s problems are manipulated by being projected onto 
migrants: whereas “strangers” cannot be held responsible for their lives, coming to symbolize 
national decline in the era of de-industrialisation, “perhaps it’s just easier to go along with the 
traditional script that makes Britain’s perennial, organic crisis primarily intelligible as a matter 
of race and nation” (Gilroy 2004b: 2). On another level, the symbolic level, the “infra-human 
body of the would-be immigrant” comes to represent the discomforting ambiguities of the 
British colonial past. Group identification in today’s Britain converges in 
the intrusive presence of the incoming strangers who, trapped inside the local 
logic of race, nation and ethnic absolutism not only represent that vanished 
empire but persistently refer consciousness to the unacknowledged pain of its 
loss and the unsettling shame of its bloody management. (2004b: 3)  
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2.2 The “multiculturalism backlash” 
Coming back to the German context, I observe the same intensity of affect in the contestations 
around belonging. In a similar trajectory to its fate in the British discussion, here the term 
multiculturalism has also been pronounced dead and buried as a policy approach, so that even 
as a purely descriptive term, it has become at best problematic in usage. Today, 
multiculturalism is commonly associated with essentializations of group belongings, 
unwillingness to integrate, segregationism, ghettoization and the creation of parallel societies.  
The concept of multiculturalism reached its political peak in Germany in the early 1990s, in 
the wake of and as a reaction to a series of murderous neo-Nazi attacks on migrants. It 
comprised claims of representation and culturally sensitive service provision, “based on a 
‘corporatist’ model of ethnic groups” (Vertovec undated). In public policy, this approach has 
included (and still includes) public recognition, education issues, provisions within law, legal 
exceptions, as well as protection from discrimination, religious accommodations, and a special 
emphasis on positive images within the media broadcasters. 
Following this era, the concept faced setbacks, leading to public rejections of multicultural 
policies and claims of their failure in the early 2000s – for example, both German chancellor 
Angela Merkel in 2010 and British Prime Minister David Cameron in 2011 famously claimed 
that multiculturalism as a policy had failed. Among the major arguments raised against 
multicultural policies have been the supposedly low socio-economic indicators concerning 
educational attainment, higher unemployment rates than in the majority population, and 
deficits in social mobility measured among the migrants.  
A frequent point of criticism is that multiculturalism essentializes, reducing individuals to 
membership in certain groups based on race, ethnic origin, or religious affiliation, which in 
turn damages the already disadvantaged members further, leading to the charge that “it is 
multiculturalism – and not discrimination – that creates separate communities” (Stam and 
Shohat 2012: 96). Ulrich Beck offers an exemplary argument when he writes that  
the principle of multiculturalism refers exclusively to collective categories of 
difference; it is geared, first, to (more or less) homogeneous groups and, second, 
locates the latter within the nation-state framework. In this respect, 
multiculturalism is antagonistic both to transnationalization and to 
individualization. (Beck 2007: 14) 
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Stam and Shohat trace a “left-right convergence” between otherwise ideological adversaries 
over the denunciation of multiculturalism. Notably, a number of feminist authors criticize the 
concept, claiming that respect of diverse cultural values can also mean condoning patriarchy 
and frustrating the emancipation of women in the minority groups (see Moller Okin 1999; 
Shachar 2001, 2007). Another point of criticism by a number of authors is that 
multiculturalism is an inherently Eurocentric, American, or a capitalist project. The argument 
ultimately leads to a “split on the left” in a “class or race” discussion, with accusations of 
valorizing culture over economic struggle (Stam and Shohat 2012: 93-131).  
Slavoj Žižek, for example, argues that multiculturalism is not the opposite of neoliberalism but 
rather “the ideal form of ideology of this global capitalism” (Žižek 1997: 44). In 
“Multiculturalism, or, The Cultural Logic of Multinational Capitalism,” Žižek sees 
multiculturalism as “the attitude which, from a kind of empty global position, treats each local 
culture the way the colonizer treats colonized people – as ‘natives’ whose mores are to be 
carefully studied and ‘respected’” (1997: 44, emphasis in original). In this view, observing the 
Other’s identity as “authentic” and self-enclosed, and maintaining a distance to it, is only 
made possible by the privileged positioning of the multiculturalist as universalist. Therefore, 
for Žižek, multiculturalism “retains this position as the privileged empty point of universality 
from which one is able to appreciate (and depreciate) properly other particular cultures” (1997: 
44), so that in this way the multiculturalist respect for the Other's specificity becomes “the 
very form of asserting one's own superiority” (1997, 44). Furthermore, Žižek sees 
multicultural struggles as effectively upholding the position of capitalism as having no 
alternative. It is due to its appearance as the universal world system that is “here to stay”, that 
critical energy has turned from imagining its eventual demise to fighting for cultural 
differences, which in turn “leave the basic homogeneity of the capitalist world-system intact” 
(1997: 46). 
In sum, the term has been so emptied of meaning that it can prove divisive in any number of 
dichotomies, so that Shohat and Stam’s list of charges against it is only mildly exaggerated 
when they sum up that multiculturalism has been  
described variously as falsely universalist (the Žižek and Bourideu/Wacquant 
charge) or as particularist and anti-French republican ([…] Alain Finkielkraut) 
or as simultaneously dogmatic and relativist (the U.S. right wing’s contradictory 
charge) or as relativist and patriarchal (a white feminist charge) or as 
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dogmatically revolutionary (the right-wing charge) or as neoliberal (Žižek 
again) or as divisive of the left (the Todd Gitlin charge) or as divisive of the 
nation (the Schlesinger charge) or as pro-American (as many French 
intellectuals assume) or anti-American (the U.S. right-wing charge, echoed by 
French allies such as Finkielkraut). (Stam and Shohat 2012: 131) 
The political rhetoric on immigration in Europe reflects the theoretical fuzziness of the term, 
so that “multiculturalism” continues to fall out of favor in public debate. In Germany, the 
sociologist Steven Vertovec detects core idioms that accompany this “backlash against 
multiculturalism”: that it stifles debate, fosters separateness, refuses common values, denies 
problems, fosters segregation between cultures, and leads to the creation of “parallel 
societies,” supports reprehensible practices, and even provides a haven for terrorists (Vertovec 
2010: 6-10). In Western Europe, where Islam is increasingly presented as incommensurable 
with Western democratic values, due to a history of sexism and violence, multiculturalism is 
accused of “pandering to Muslims” (Vertovec undated), as well as creating a context for 
security concerns due to the growing difference, alienation, and dissatisfaction of immigrant 
groups. All this leads to a turn in public and media discourse, which “suggests 
multiculturalism has accentuated/preserved difference” and hindered social cohesion and 
integration in the name of a ruling “political correctness” (Vertovec undated).  
In institutional and public discourse, several responses have been proposed to fill the void, so 
that multiculturalism has been replaced by new terms, such as interculturalism and 
cosmopolitanism. Ulrich Beck for example proposes cosmopolitanism as a response to what 
he terms “global risk society.” For Beck, cosmopolitanism  
heightens awareness of the fact that the apparently sharp ethnic boundaries and 
territorial bonds are becoming blurred and intermingling at both the national and 
the transnational level. As a result, under conditions of radical global insecurity, 
all are equal and everyone is different. (2007: 14)  
Cosmopolitanism has emerged as an alternative in the discourse on difference on various 
levels in the European context, also in the media discourse. In Chapter 5, I embark on an 
analysis of what it means when a radio station dedicated to diversity replaces the term 
multiculturalism with cosmopolitanism in its brand claim and policy documents. Without 
going into an extensive discussion at this point, it can be summed up that the celebrations of 
intercultural contact and dialogue, as well as the individualization of the cosmopolitan citizen 
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as a mobile, urban, hybrid mix, both contained in the narrative of cosmopolitanism of the 
particular radio in question, avoid the contestations around antagonisms to diversity or those 
around identity and nation. Instead of locating them as subjects of negotiation in the public 
sphere and the official politics, they relegate them to the private sphere of individual citizens.  
The ease of mobility of the new urban cosmopolitan is also strongly interlocked with 
European integration and is one of its tangible results. The opportunities for openness, for 
mobility, the cosmopolitan experience of the new European citizen, have all led to the 
optimistic expectation that supranational integration might end antagonisms over difference 
within the nation-state. Seeing intercultural diversity within the EU as the added value of the 
European project and fostering opportunities of celebrating on the institutional level has, 
however, gone hand in hand with the closing-off on the level of the new unity. In this 
contradiction new ambiguities arise, including those inherent in the very concept of 
cosmopolitanism. 
Ulrich Beck, for example, envisions the new cosmopolitan, cooperative, European citizen as 
translating between cultures and with multiple memberships – but strongly linked to the 
effects of (economic and cultural) globalization. For him, new political superstructures such as 
the European Union provide the framework for the development of a new European 
citizenship, based on the voluntary redefinition of national sovereignty reflecting the 
cosmopolitan spirit of member-states. Beck differentiates between two processes: that of a 
spontaneous cosmopolitanization going on at the quotidian level, and a cosmopolitanism as a 
political project that needs to be embarked upon by member states in a common political and 
philosophical endeavor of self-redefinition. The first is an emerging social reality, a 
cosmpolitanization as an unintended side-effect of globalization,  
unfolding powerfully and aggressively beneath the surface, involuntary and 
unnoticed, behind the facade of existing national spaces, sovereign territories 
and customs. [...] affecting work situations, individual careers and bodies, even 
though national flags are still waved and national attitudes, identities and forms 
of consciousness are even growing stronger. (Beck 2012: 129-130)  
Therefore, Beck also envisions transformation towards “cosmopolitan citizens” as a 
“spontaneous” process, in the space of individual lives and bodies, even if it stands in 
contradiction to the “national flags” still being waved. He envisions a cosmopolitan Europe 
that abandons the “either/or logic” of Europeanization or national interests, and does not mean 
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simply a dissolution of the nation, but rather its interpretation in light of the ideals that Europe 
stands for. As an alternative to the “American way,” this “Europan way” “accords priority to 
the rule of law, political equality, social justice, cosmopolitan integration and solidarity” 
(2007: 264). For Beck, this European cosmopolitanism presupposes a national Europe and 
“calls for new concepts of integration and identity that enable and affirm coexistence across 
borders, without requiring that distinctiveness and difference be sacrificed on the altar of 
supposed (national) equality” (2007: 14).  
This view is in stark contrast to the analysis offered by, for example, Étienne Balibar, who 
points out that European integration has led to new forms of exclusion. It is not in opposition 
to the European political project, but stemming from it where Balibar detects the emergence 
of a new “Euuropean apartheid” (Balibar 2004: 43). For Balibar, it is this new political 
superstructure that favors the “development of forms of a specifically ‘European’ racism, [...] 
[and] generates discriminations on the basis of national origin by radically separating 
nationals of member countries from those of nonmember countries” (Balibar 2004: 44). The 
institution of “European citizenship,” with its formal aspects of rights and obligations of 
European nationals, has been accompanied by an inequality in political rights between 
nationals of EU-member states and those who are not EU-nationals, even when they are 
included in the economic life of the European countries, denoting “the critical nature of the 
contradiction between the opposite movements of inclusion and exclusion” (2004: x). In 
short, the process of European integration stumbles on the practical dilemma of simultaneous 
economic inclusion and political exclusion of non-members, which in turn leads to the 
question of how belonging (political, social, economic) can be articulated beyond the nation.  
Balibar thus deconstructs the premise of European supranational identity as the basis for 
institutional and political unification – instead, the very attempt of constituting European 
political, economic, or military power in the age of globalization is complicit in creating 
national and political conflicts or global economic imbalances, all of which produce cases of 
violence, insecurity or mass migration, and with it new exclusions at European borders and 
within them.  
In the context of a “recolonization of immigration” in the recent period (2004: 47), Balibar 
points to the quantitative and qualitative importance of immigrant populations residing in 
Europe and the metamorphoses they are undergoing in the process of the creation of European 
citizenship, from which they are excluded: firstly the transformation of denomination from 
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“foreigners” to “aliens,” secondly the move from protection to discrimination based on 
European preference, and finally from the discourse of cultural difference to a stigmatization 
and creation of a “new racism” (2004: 122). Especially in terms of barring their participation 
in class struggle or in the invention of new forms in transnational social relations to foreigners,  
[i]t is clear that the ethnicization of human groups and the correlative 
representation of unbridgeable “cultural differences” between individuals, 
maintained against the logic of the work situation itself by the accumulation of 
discriminatory practices, is much more the doing of the societies of the North 
that organize the movement of immigrants than that of the immigrants 
themselves. (2004: 42)  
Specifically, the prescription of the Maastricht Treaty that European citizenship automatically 
be awarded to nationals of member states, excluding non-nationals among the migrants, even 
when they enjoy residency rights, means that the very construction of the European Union 
“generates discriminations on the basis of national origin by radically separating nationals of 
member countries from those of nonmember countries” (2004: 44). 
This new institutional exclusion calls for a radical redefinition of European citizenship, the 
institution of borders, and of political membership. Transnationalizing European citizenship 
for Balibar means that 
unless jus soli is generalized and extended in the direction of a veritable 
citizenship of residence in Europe, the addition of the exclusions proper to each 
of the national citizenships united in the European Union will inevitably produce 
an explosive effect of apartheid, in flagrant contradiction with the ambition of 
constituting a democratic model on the continental and world scale. (2004: 43, 
emphasis in original)  
Indeed, the development of a European apartheid “[i]n the long or even the short run, [...] 
could obstruct or block the construction of a democratic European community” (2004: 121, 
emphasis in original) so that consequently new European citizenship  “can only emerge on the 
condition of being more democratic than the traditional constitutions of the ‘national’ states – 
or it will be deprived of any legitimacy, any capacity to ‘represent’ the populations and solve 
(or mediate) their social conflicts” (2004: viii-ix, emphasis in original).  
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2.3 Looking for alternatives – diversity and super-diversity 
Recent years have shown that discussions around multicultural lives and migration continue to 
be central sites of struggle in the political debate of European countries of migration. Even 
before the more recent migration movements from the Middle East, the second decade of the 
twenty-first century has seen a steady growth of criticism of multiculturalism and skepticism 
as to the very possibility of a functioning multicultural society. At the same time, the debate is 
characterized by a vagueness at its center, with the meaning of multiculturalism depending on 
the context and purpose of those debating it. New political calls in Germany and Great Britain 
have rejected multiculturalism as a concept and reinforced calls for integration and a sense of 
common citizenship, going hand in hand with introducing immigration limits or institutional 
mechanisms to steer the kind of immigration that is (economically) desired. In practical terms, 
this is reflected in the introduction of integration courses and citizenship tests for new 
immigrants, a strong emphasis on the importance of language acquisition, as well as in the 
organization of integration days and summits, such as chancellor Merkel’s annual Integration 
Summit and the Islam conference of the German government, where modalities of common 
living are discussed on the highest institutional level.15 
The major turn in public discourses away from multiculturalism has led to diversity and 
cohesion as concepts that connote the situation in the desired way. In particular, “diversity” 
has enjoyed increasing popularity in a number of contexts, from the entrepreneurial and 
business sector, to policy papers and business strategies, as can be seen in German political 
and business initiatives such as the “Diversity Charta,” that promotes the management of 
diversity as a resource in the world of work, or the campaign “Diversity as a chance” of the 
German industrial associations.  
The latter shows the general trend of diversity being praised more as an economic or business 
asset than as a political term or even less an emancipatory call. In her investigation of the “run 
to do diversity” of the institutions of higher education, Sara Ahmed shows that the term has 
been so wholeheartedly accepted on the level of institutions precisely due to its ambiguity and 
flexibility. Its adoption leads to “the departure of other (perhaps more critical) terms, including 
‘equality,’ ‘equal opportunities,’ and ‘social justice’” (2012: 1). In other words, she shows 
                                                      
15 Both events will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. 
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how the adoption of the term “diversity” points to a change in the stance of an institution, but 
also how the adoption of certain words can become a substitution for deeds, how words 
become alibis for a lack of action. She exposes the non-performativity of terms and statements 
when produced in institutional frameworks as “‘the reiterative and citational practice by which 
discourse does not produce ‘the effects that it names’” (2012: 117, emphasis in 
original). Ahmed not only shows what the term diversity has come to encompass, but also 
what its usage obscures, namely Whiteness and racism at the heart of the institutions in 
question, such as the academic ones that she investigates, so that for her, the term actually 
becomes complicit in the discourse of “overing” racism (2012: 22). By this, she denotes an 
attitude which closes off the possibility of the continuing existence of racist discrimination and 
where any mention of inequalities is seen as anachronistic complaining. However, it is 
precisely due to its relative hollowness that “diversity” can also be “turned around,” filled with 
different meanings. In other words, under certain conditions, the term can indeed also turn into 
an action-oriented tool for diversity practitioners, as Ahmed shows in some of the examples 
investigated. 
Cultural diversity, however, represents the status quo of the societies characterized by 
continuing migration. Both Great Britain and Germany show that the new social make-up, 
especially in industrial or urban centers, an even more visibly in youth and popular cultures, 
can no longer be accurately described by existing terms that arise from the division of “us” 
(the host society, culture, language) and “them” (foreigners, immigrants, other cultures), seen 
as homogenous social groups.  
A sociological perspective makes clear that not only have the conditions of globalization 
changed the nature of the nation-state, and not only has the social picture been changed by 
new generations of migrants’ descendants, but the very modalities of immigration into 
countries of Europe have also changed, making old categories of thinking and analysis 
obsolete. Vertovec uses the term “super-diversity” to describe a transformation of migration 
patterns, whose important trait in the past two decades has been its diversification: “not just in 
terms of bringing more ethnicities and countries of origin, but also with respect to a 
multiplication of significant variables that affect where, how and with whom people live” 
(Vertovec 2007: 7). This existing “comprehensive heterogeneity” (Fenzel 2010: 85) concerns 
differences in ethnicity, language, religion, regional identities, cultural values, and practices, 
in addition to different social and residence statuses of individuals.  
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Firstly, quantitative data show that the classical immigrant groups arising from historical 
conditions, such as the immigration to Great Britain from its former colonies or labor 
immigration from the countries Germany had bilateral contracts with, such as Turkey, Italy, 
and the countries of former Yugoslavia, no longer form the largest sections of migrants in 
urban centers. Rather, the number of countries that migrants come from has grown, so, instead 
of a few large communities, a very segmented array of small communities from a large 
number of countries is the more accurate picture of today’s ethnic diversity in urban centers 
such as London or Frankfurt. 
Secondly, sociological data point to a diversification within groups, which is not a new 
phenomenon, but has rarely been researched, as the preferred way of dealing with immigrant 
communities has been as homogenous ethnic blocks. Over half a century of labor migration 
into Germany, for example, has seen a strong diversification within national groups as to the 
geographic region of origin on the sub-state level, as well as religion, or minority and 
linguistic status in the country of origin. Also, there are factors of diversification concerning 
the host country, among them social status, educational attainment, date of arrival, and 
citizenship. Migration channels and immigration statuses are also crucial, so that sometimes 
“people of differing origins who nevertheless migrated by the same route have more in 
common than those who share the same nationality” but have different reasons for migrating 
(Fenzel 2010, 86). A third factor is the temporal one, which after decades of migration has led 
to new cross-ethnic ties between groups on all levels – from professional to personal ones.  
All in all, it becomes obvious that using solely categories such as “foreigner,” “national,” or 
“legal” or “illegal alien,” or, for example, the race categories such as those in the British 
Census, cannot depict the existing diversity and its true impact on the cultural and social 
makeup of a country. Instead,  
[s]ocio-cultural axes of differentiation such as country of origin, ethnicity, 
language and religion are of course significant in conditioning immigrants’ 
identities, patterns of interaction and – often through social networks determined 
by such axes – their access to jobs, housing, services and more. However, 
immigrants’ channels of migration and the myriad legal statuses which arise 
from them are often just as, or even more, crucial to: how people group 
themselves and where people live, how long they can stay, how much autonomy 
they have (versus control by an employer, for instance), whether their families 
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can join them, what kind of livelihood they can undertake and maintain, and to 
what extent they can make use of public services and resources (including 
schools, health, training, benefits and other ‘recourse to public funds’). 
(Vertovec 2007: 15) 
Immigration statuses bring with them citizenship rights or restrictions of rights, so that they 
indeed are a crucial factor within the picture of super-diverse societies. When all these are 
taken into account, it becomes clear that any political plan based on the sole criterion of 
“nationality” must fall short of the mark in very practical terms.  
A large part of discussions on immigration and integration in European societies is based on 
the implicit premised division based on cultural/national membership, with the autochthonous 
population in one category and the migrants in the other. These categories are based on formal 
citizenship or nationality, which in turn places the people with migrant family backgrounds in 
an ambiguous position moving between the two categories. 
In terms of national belonging, the concept of “allegiance” to the host society is often raised as 
a demand made on long-term migrants. Their loyalty to the values of Western democratic 
society and cultural norms, their willingness for language acquisition and the acquisition of 
social norms, and others, are invoked, for example, in debates on citizenship, especially in the 
discourse rejecting dual citizenship.  
However, defining the dichotomy of national belonging contradicts the fact that people are 
always members of multiple categories: ranging from those pertaining to their family 
situations, professional environments, interests and hobbies, and many more. Whereas such 
sub-national memberships are not put into question, the possibility of multiple cultural or 
even national belonging is often seen as problematic. It is not only in formal citizenship terms 
that migrants are required to somehow demonstrate their loyalty to the host country by 
rejecting split identities, feelings of belonging to more than one culture, and sometimes even 
bilingual children rearing, which in this discourse are all seen as a sign of a lack of 
willingness to integrate.  
Furthermore, multi-ethnic or multicultural belonging is seen as problematic in the migrant 
group, but not when it refers to members of the majority, where it is complimented as a 
cosmopolitan attitude and an openness to the world. Whereas transnational practices are 
deemed the norm and even desirable in the conditions of global economic, professional, and 
 53 
educational exchange, in the lives of migrants they are often seen as an integration deficit 
potentially leading to “ghettoization,” even if belonging to a culture other than that of the host 
country is played out only on the intimate, affective level. 
However, as Vertovec points out, “belonging, loyalty and sense of attachment are not parts of 
a zero-sum game based on a single nation-state or society” (2007: 20). Especially due to very 
concrete technological advances and the lowering costs of telecommunications, homeland 
links maintained by migrants have in recent years not diminished but grown to a level 
unthinkable only two decades ago. The accessibility of satellite TV-channels from the country 
of origin, low-cost international phone calls and air travel, the Internet, low cost transfers for 
remittances: all these have led not only to more frequent transnational practices in the lives of 
migrants, but “have allowed migrants to maintain, as never before, extensive social, economic 
and political ties with places of origin or fellow members of global diasporas” (2007: 7). 
The changing habits concerning transnational practices and the quality of these cross-border 
connections “need to be considered with regard to changing dynamics of integration, as well” 
(Vertovec 2007: 7). Instead of drawing simple formulae, as Vertovc points out, the picture of 
the lives of migrants must be considered in its complexity, so that “the 'more transnational' a 
person is does not automatically mean the 'less integrated' they are, and the 'less integrated' 
does not necessarily prompt or strengthen the 'more transnational' patterns of association” 
(2007: 5). Instead, the new transnational ties facilitate the processes of selective integration in 
which an immigrant does not identify with one or the other country exclusively but has the 
possibility to pick and choose the preferred segments from the country of origin or the country 
of habitation. These can include formal aspects such as the choice of citizenship or real estate 
ownership, or personal ones, such as the quantity of family contacts and the frequency of visits 
to the country of origin, the choice of language spoken in the home, allegiance to a sporting 
team, media and news consumption, and many others. 
In view of the transforming nature of super-diversity and the growing complexity of the social 
lives of migrants, Vertovec launches an appeal for an integration policy that would take into 
account new factors that stand out in this differentiated picture. Rather than offering 
prefabricated desired outcomes based on notions of allegiance and integration willingness, the 
actual situation would be better reflected if multiple category memberships and identities as 
well as differences in the immigration experiences were considered. This would mean 
recognizing institutionally “(a) ’the new pluralism’ and the inherent multiplicity of identities 
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among all members of the public, [and] (b) new modes of social and political networking” 
(Vertovec 1999: 3). 
One way of fostering participation, inclusion, and social cohesion is to “bring people together” 
(Vertovec 2007: 26), a task that can be undertaken by public and voluntary bodies, where 
again  
it appears that much success in building positive relations can arise with the 
recognition that individuals each belong to multiple group identities at different 
levels of inclusiveness – that individuals are both members of discrete groups 
and members of superordinate, cross-cutting or overlapping social formations. 
(2007: 27) 
Instead of trying to obliterate boundaries or differences between groups, “individuals should 
be made aware of their multiple category memberships under conditions that promote 
inclusiveness,” but in conditions that do not include competition and power-differences. 
Instead, “multi-category interactions should also be based as far as possible on considerations 
of equal status. ‘Contact’ should not place anyone in a subordinate status” (2007: 27). 
Vertovec suggests the concept of “networked diversity” as a follow-up to the work of 
integration commissioners and others involved, consisting in essentially “bringing people 
together to talk to one another and exploit shared interests to reduce the barriers between 
them” (Fenzel 2010: 88). In this scheme, the role of public institutions would be not to dictate, 
but to promote contacts and interaction, which in turn should develop into sustainable social 
networks transcending ethnic boundaries and legal restrictions (2010: 89). 
A part of policy discussion in Great Britain and Germany laments precisely a lack of 
meaningful or sustained interchange between minority groups and the dominant society, even 
if it is not often clear what constitutes “meaningful contacts” or how these can be stimulated 
through the institutions. In view of social realities, Vertovec reverses the question and asks 
what role “less-than-meaningful” interchanges can play, that is “[m]ight these have some 
productive impacts on cohesion as well?” (2007: 24). The communication habits here are not 
reduced to the opposition between the majority and the minorities, but are simply a fact of 
urban life, in which fleeting and not “meaningful” interchanges are the norm. So,  
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desirable as these might be toward promoting better relations, ‘sustained 
encounters’ and ‘deep and meaningful interactions’ are simply not going to 
occur among most people in British cities today, whether ethnic majority, 
minority or new immigrant. Apart from a few contexts such as work or school, 
most urban encounters are fleeting or momentary, although importantly they 
might be regular (such as greeting or acknowledging neighbours, and purchasing 
goods). Ephemeral interactions comprise the bulk of social relations in libraries, 
parks and playgrounds, apartment buildings and housing estates, street markets, 
shops and shopping centres, hospitals and health clinics, hair salons and other 
commonplace sites. (2007: 28-29) 
Since ephemeral encounters build the largest bulk of exchanges in urban public space 
(Vertovec, undated), such encounters are also the platform for daily intercultural interaction,  
or the already discussed “conviviality,” as observed by Paul Gilroy who refers to “processes of 
cohabitation and interaction that have made multiculture an ordinary feature of social life in 
Britain’s urban areas and in postcolonial cities elsewhere” (Gilroy 2004a: xi). 
As such, even random interactions constitute shared meanings and values, and foster 
cooperation for a collective purpose, where “[p]eople accomplish this by learning, negotiating 
and reproducing 'overreaching principles for stranger interaction' and basic, albeit unspoken, 
modes of civility (especially the exercise of common norms of courtesy and consideration)” 
(Vertovec 2007: 6). The functioning of these fleeting relationships in modern urban areas 
premises some principles for interaction, among them “civil inattention,” “restrained 
helpfulness,” and “civility towards diversity” (2007: 30). The latter in particular should be 
understood rather as indifference than as benevolence towards diversity, and puts into 
perspective the notion of fixed identities and single belongings, introducing instead  
a measure of distance from the pivotal term "identity," which has proved to be 
such an ambiguous resource in the analysis of race, ethnicity, and politics. The 
radical openness that brings conviviality alive makes a nonsense of closed, 
fixed, and reified identity and turns attention toward the always-unpredictable 
mechanisms of identification. (Gilroy 2004a: xi) 
Taking into account the social realities of urban living, including the relativization of single 
category memberships, the inadequacy of concepts such as “integration” is revealed, one 
which has dominated the public discussion on immigration in many European countries.  
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Vertovec introduces instead the notion of “civil-integration,” described as “the acquisition and 
routinization of everyday practices for getting-on with others in the inherently fleeting 
encounters that comprise city life” (2007: 4).  
These practices can be defined as ground rules for functioning in an urban environment; they 
include “simple forms of acknowledgement, acts of restricted helpfulness, types of personal 
consideration, courtesies, and 'indifference to diversity'” (2007: 4). These competences of 
civility can be learned formally, “but they are probably best inculcated informally through 
daily practice (since many of the principles described above become routinized into non-
conscious acts). The acquisition of these commonplace practices of getting-on with others 
amounts to a process that we might call everyday ‘civil-integration’” (2007: 32-33, emphasis 
in original). 
This type of social cohesion arises spontaneously, born out of the necessities of urban life and 
its daily interactions, instead of being prescribed top-down, fostered by instilling rules. Indeed, 
cohesion  
cannot be manufactured from the top down, or simply stimulated by putting 
people into the same places with scripted roles and behaviours. Norms of civility 
must be enacted in a wide variety of contexts and public spaces, automatically 
as it were, and this comes through wholly through experience and practice. 
(2007: 33) 
Adding to the existing parameters, the success of well-functioning urban milieus could also be 
used as a measure of social cohesion by policy makers and the public. Firstly, they show that a 
lack of “deep and meaningful interaction” between communities does not need to mean poor 
social cohesion. Vertovec reminds that not only is the urban context known to function 
without deep and meaningful interactions, but that “indeed, most people seem to be more than 
satisfied with maintaining cordial but distant relations with their neighbours and particularly 
with strangers” (2007: 33). Secondly, it means that immigrants might be better integrated than 
often assumed, that is, when their integration is not measured solely by the usual parameters of 
language mastery, regular jobs, education levels, and such (2007: 4).  
Acknowledging the meaning of ephemeral urban encounters as a solid basis for the 
functioning of a “super-diverse” social situation, means rejecting claims of “immigrant 
enclaves” or “ghettos” often cited as a result of an unwillingness to integrate and even as a by-
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product of multiculturalism. Instead, these encounters not only comprise the bulk of all urban 
encounters, but they also evolve on a wide number of axes: not just between minorities and the 
majority, but also between minority members, within minority groups, between earlier and 
newer immigrants, and so on. As such, it is indispensable that “social scientific theory and 
public policy development should consider everyday kinds of constructive social interaction in 
a variety of spaces” (2007: 8). 
Similarly, Mark Terkessidis (2010) also concentrates on urban life to illustrate the existence of 
new networks not based on national models, and leaving behind the notion of a “leading 
culture” that excludes a large proportion of the population. He describes the transformation 
from the polis to the parapolis (2010: 11): the latter is “used” by a multitude of different 
individuals who live in it, even if only temporarily, and who often have transnational ties and 
lead parts of their lives in other places. However, whereas the parapolis is a living organism, 
the picture of a network of links that cross each other at multiple points (or even isolate 
themselves consciously in ghettos), the institutions continue to treat the society as divided into 
two groups, with one part of it having to be guided towards dominant standards. Terkessidis 
offers a solution in the concept of “inter-culture,” seen as a radical opening and reform of 
institutions, “which will have to change, in order to do justice to the increasing diversity. This 
transformation has become a task of surviving” (2010: 8, translation from German by the 
author). The concept does not put the responsibility on the migrants, but on the entire society 
which must transform in order to create a “freedom from barriers,” the possibility for all 
citizens to use institutions, and to take part in the social development. In other words, the aim 
is not to recognize ethnic groups, but “to create a space of possibilities free of barriers for 
individuals who potentially feel they belong to certain groups or are assigned to them” (2010: 
119, translation from German by the author). 
It is therefore in the space of inter-human contact as a response to pragmatic needs of securing 
the existence and spontaneous solutions to the problems of everyday life, especially in the 
urban space, that these authors see intercultural life unfolding without the affective pressure of 
defining such terms as identity or difference. This is visible in Gilroy’s “convivial culture” as 
well as in his recognition of the fulfillment of the multicultural project in its informal 
manifestations. Gilroy points to a multiculturalism that is alive and functioning well in the 
“cohabitation and interaction” characterizing British and other cities of migration (Gilroy 
2004a: xi), showing that, with its ability to constantly redefine modes of everyday life and 
popular culture, this “conviviality” has become a planetary phenomenon in which  
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racial difference ist not feared. Exposure to it is not ethnic jeopardy but rather 
an unremarkable principle of metropolitan life. Race is essentially insignificant, 
at least when compared either to the hazards involved in urban survival or to the 
desperate pleasures of the postcolonial city: ‘sex and drugs and on the dole’. 
(2004a: 105)  
It is here, in this cosmopolitan “conviviality,” that Gilroy sees a possibility to build an 
alternative model of British identity, and here he finds the site of a new planetary humanism, 
one which understanding is distilled from the historical experience of oppression and 
suffering.  
I detect this conviviality to be an exposure to difference and the celebration of the mixing of 
the metropolitan life as the imaginary space in which the radio station WDR Funkhaus Europa 
moves. While the reality of unproblematic multicultural living in everyday life is both 
something that is experienced by anybody inhabiting cities strongly shaped by migration, 
such as those of the German West, and something that can be celebrated for its many cultural 
expressions, this observation does not solve the antagonisms surrounding the strong 
contestations over identity or belonging on other levels. Whereas civil-integration is a joyful 
everyday reality to anybody living in a multicultural society, with its myriad daily 
occurrences of inter-cultural contact in spite of insufficient language knowledge or differing 
cultural modes, social cohesion is a necessity on many more levels than the everyday.  
Indeed, while this existing conviviality blatantly contradicts the contestations over belonging 
or identity, I see in the sole concentration on conviviality an attempt to create a “safe space” 
were inequalities are blurred out. This however means that it can easily slip into an attitude of 
what Sara Ahmed calls “overing racism.” In the analysis of the brand change of WDR 
Funkhaus Europa in Chapter 5, I show what effects this can have when practiced within the 
media discourse, or in concrete terms, how attempting to capture this “feeling of life” in its 
brand Global Sounds Radio, the radio station in question avoids addressing antagonisms 






In Germany, as elsewhere in the European countries of immigration, contemporaneously with 
the rejection of multiculturalism, there has been a turn in the public discourse towards social 
cohesion and integration. As already mentioned, this has gone hand in hand with enshrining 
common citizenship and unity in diversity, guided by common European democratic values, 
such as tolerance, gender equality, and freedom of expression, as political and social ideals. 
The introduction of integration courses and other institutional measures has been paired with 
demands to pledge loyalty to the “host country” and reject cultural particularity.  
Elevated into the highest ideal leading to a new, inclusive commonality enriched by diversity, 
integration has become a very prominent “technology of citizenship” in the sense used by 
Barbara Cruikshank (1999), as representing the power exercised “in the material, learned, and 
habitual ways we embody citizenship” (1999: 124), which will be the subject of more detailed 
analysis in Chapters 4 and 5.  
Integration has emerged most recently as a response to the high immigration rates of refugees, 
but it has a long tradition as a central technology of government not only in individual states, 
but in the whole European Union. For example, in its conclusions of June 2014, the Council of 
the European Union agreed on supporting the member states “with a view to promoting the 
integration of third-country nationals” (Council of the European Union 2014: 1). It also 
recognized “that diversity is an enriching and permanent feature of European societies” and 
calls for a “holistic approach to integration” (2014: 3). In 2004, European governments 
discussed common basic principles concerning integration policies, listing eleven principles of 
integration, among them principles stating that “integration is a dynamic, two-way process of 
mutual accommodation,” that employment is a key part and central to the social participation 
of immigrants, and that basic knowledge of the host society’s language is indispensable to 
integration (2004). The principles stress the importance of education, access to institutions, as 
well as “frequent interaction between immigrants and Member States citizens” as fundamental 
mechanisms for integration.  
The Council document also states the usefulness of successful integration for the host society, 
since  
[w]ell managed migration as well as effective and balanced integration policies 
contribute towards achieving the goals of the Europe 2020 growth strategy, 
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given the demographic shrinking in Member States and the shortages in certain 
sectors of the European labour market. (2014: 2)  
As a strategy that will contribute to economic growth and alleviate the shortages in the labor 
market, immigration and integration are here framed as a biopolitical project, in the 
Foucauldian sense. Well-managed immigration is seen as a recipe for curing the demographic 
decline of Europe, while at the same time the conflicts around questions of culture and 
identity associated with immigration are not mentioned at all. 
In Germany, integration has also become a central term in institutional discourse, rising to 
become the nodal point that influences all social practices around questions of diversity in the 
country: from education, through to policies towards non-nationals, immigration policies, and 
others. For example, the government document “National Action Plan for Integration” starts 
with the sentence: “The integration of people with a migration background in Germany is a 
key task of the federal government” (Die Bundesregierung 2012: 1, translation from German 
by the author). The German Office for Migration and Refugees defines integration as a long-
term process of inclusion of all the people who live in the country “legally.” Whereas it offers 
equal participation in all social areas to immigrants, it also obliges them to learn the German 
language and respect the German Constitution.16 
However, what connotations, or what kind of knowledge or “truth,” does the concept of 
integration actually carry? In what way does it subjectify the citizens? At the core of the 
demand for integration is the implied division between the “host” and “visiting” populations, 
with the further implication being that these two are incompatible at the outset of contact and 
can only be made to cohabit if the effort of integration is undertaken. Even if it is often 
stressed that it is two sides that take part in the integration process, it is usually the immigrants 
who are explicitly called upon to actively contribute to their own successful introduction into 
the society. The dominant picture  
is one in which integration is strongly linked to obligations on the part of the 
migrants and adjustment to mainstream culture and values. The latter is not 
merely related to a wish for uniformity but also seen as a precondition to 





improved opportunities – and yet, adjustment is the demand of the time. 
(Schönwälder 2010: 156)  
In a Foucauldian sense, I see the demand to integrate as a mechanism of self-disciplining. 
When the descendants of migrants, in the second and third generations are also called upon to 
integrate, it becomes obvious that at the core of this demand there are no measurable 
parameters that are often cited as indicators of successful integration, such as employment 
rates, or figures denoting educational success or the housing situation. Instead, integration 
refers here to a fuzzy set of “values” that characterize the “host” nation, so that, carried to its 
logical conclusion, a demand to integrate posed on second generation migrants is actually a 
demand to assimilate. At the same time, this demand contains the implicit impossibility to 
really complete this process. As long as the migrant looks different, has a different name, or 
ostentatiously practices a different religion from what is understood to be the norm of the host 
nation, he or she, even if officially a national, will always be marked as outside of the nation. 
For Étienne Balibar, the very demand to integrate is also the proof of continuing structural 
inequalities, since  
[n]o theoretical discourse on the dignity of all cultures will really compensate 
for the fact that, for a ‘Black’ in Britain or a ‘Beur’ in France, the assimilation 
demanded of them before they can become ‘integrated’ into the society in which 
they already live (and which will always be suspected of being superficial, 
imperfect or simulated) is presented as progress, as an emancipation, a 
conceding of rights. (1991: 25) 
To summarize, calls for integration rest on unequal social positions of the “host” or “majority” 
society on the one side, and the immigrant on the other, and postulate an incompatibility that 
needs to be surmounted, or even erased.  
Here, “cultural difference” takes the discursive position that nature (genes, blood) had in the 
framework of “scientific racism,” as observed by Balibar, who identifies the emergence of the 
already discussed “neo-racism” within the discourse of immigration, with its catalogue of 
practices of violence, stereotypical representation, and exclusion of the Other, based on the 
assumption of the insurmountability and harmfulness of cultural difference within the nation 
space.  
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The problem with cultural difference as the obstacle to cohesion is that at the same time as it 
leads to discriminations, the problematization of cultural difference is seen as very different 
from race hatred. It is instead seen as the “normal,” even “rational” response to social conflict 
– which in turn makes the problematization and management of cultural difference an 
effective governmental mode. In the words of Balibar, in the context of capitalist production 
of choice, excess, and promised enjoyment (and ultimately the incomplete subject), the 
discourse of insurmountable cultural difference is being normalized, mainstreamed. It serves 
as an explanation of racist reactions as “natural” so that “the return of the biological theme is 
permitted and with it the elaboration of new variants of the biological ‘myth’ within the 
framework of a cultural racism” (Balibar 1991: 26, emphasis in original). 
 
2.5 Tolerance  
The point where cultural difference becomes salient, the famous “tolerance threshold,” that 
becomes the line separating cohesion from difference that cannot be assimilated, thus becomes 
the frontier between welcoming and exclusion.  
In the German discussion, tolerance is firmly placed in the realm of political bargaining, as a 
“rational” response to the dilemma of aversion, with the metaphor of the threshold designating 
the liminal space in which rejection, even aversion, is acknowledged. As a way of dealing with 
difference, tolerance offers both a way in which to ethically whitewash those who reject 
others, and a possibility of finding a way for non-antagonistic coexistence with what is seen as 
reified difference – but difference that society cannot get rid of. However, as a way of 
responding to the encounter with difference, tolerance is interlocked with the distribution of 
social positions within a society, and at the same time, it secures the stability of those social 
positions. In other words, tolerance can operate only in a power imbalance, with the dominant 
position having the power over those who are objects of toleration, since subaltern subjects 
can never be the ones to decide to tolerate or not to tolerate the dominant ones. 
In the discussion of the term, which I will elaborate on further in Chapter 8, tolerance is seen 
as a viable way of managing diversity, even a rational way of handling one’s own rejection of 
or aversion to difference – which in certain conditions is seen a legitimate response to 
difference. Jürgen Habermas (2003), for example, sees toleration as possible only if both 
parties involved – the tolerator and the tolerated – base their rejection “on a cognitive conflict 
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between beliefs and attitudes that persists for good reasons” (Habermas 2003: 3, emphasis in 
original). Rejection can of course also be unreasonable, for example, if somebody rejects 
people of a different skin color, which for Habermas is not an ethical judgement and can thus 
not be countered with calls for tolerance. In this case, “the appropriate answer is a critique of 
prejudices and the combating of discrimination, in other words the fight for equal rights, and 
not ‘more tolerance’” (2003: 3). Therefore, tolerance is offered as a practice of solving the 
insecurities surrounding civic living with irresolvable difference. In countries of immigration, 
these ethical insecurities, often conceptualized in terms of religion or cultural diversity, turn 
around the question of how and to what extent those pertaining to the majority should tolerate 
those that deviate, or at what point they should impose normative rules.  
In Germany, the practice historically hails from the realm of religious toleration, and it 
continues to be contested in the space where religious and cultural difference intersect with 
questions of institutional regulations. Two examples from the German context can illustrate 
this: the row over whether public schools should allow teachers to wear the Islamic veil and 
the row over whether public schools can display Christian symbols, such as the crucifix on the 
wall. In both cases the state was called upon to resolve ethical questions through judiciary 
institutions, when the citizens were not able to determine the extent of toleration that was 
necessary or institutionally prescribed.17 However, even if in both cases the state was called 
upon to impose tolerance as a practice of dealing with difference, they started from two very 
different social positions: in the crucifix row, the parents invoked the constitutionally 
guaranteed principle of neutrality in education against the wish of the schools to display 
Christian symbols as an expression of adherence to the majoritarian Christian affiliation. The 
                                                      
17 The so-called Bavarian crucifix row, which focused on the question of whether the crucifix could hang on the 
walls of public schools, was resolved in 1995 when the Constitutional Court ruled that Christian symbols on the 
walls violated the prescribed religious neutrality of the German school system. However, regardless of this state 
intervention, crosses continue to be displayed on the walls of Bavarian schools and taking them down remains 
rare. In the few cases in which parents have demanded that the schools do so, there has ensued fierce public 
debate. The judicial row over the headscarf goes back to the case of Fereshta Ludin, a teacher seeking 
employment in the state school system of Baden-Württemberg, who refused to take off her headscarf during 
classes. The school authorities at the time characterized the veil as a visible symbol of “cultural disintegration.” 
In contrast to the Bavarian crucifix row, here it was an (immigrant) minority acting incompatibly with state 
neutrality in religious questions. Numerous controversial discussions ensued, among them the discord within the 
feminist discourse around whether the Islamic headscarf was a symbol of oppression or if seeing it as such was a 
Eurocentric relegation of the Muslim woman to a mere passive object. The case made its way through the 
German judiciary and was heard before the Constitutional Court in 2003. The Court relegated the decision in 
individual cases to the Länder, which are in charge of education under the German federal system. The decision 
was revised in 2015 in a ruling that defined the religious neutrality of the state not as a tool of distancing it from 
the church, but as an “open and all-encompassing stance that promotes freedom of belief for all religions in the 
same measure” (Bundesverfassungsgericht 2015). In this sense, “an overall ban on wearing the Islamic scarf for 
teachers in public schools is not compatible with the Constitution” (2015), as the Court ruled. 
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second case, and one which led to much more public controversy, was one in which the 
majority defended the guaranteed religious neutrality from presumably the invasive 
symbolism of a minority, representing religious deviance from the Christian norm.  
So, in a sense, both these cases are examples of the failure of rational consideration as a mode 
of settling ethical questions in civic living, such as that proposed by Habermas. In both cases it 
was ultimately the state that, through its judiciary organs, had to intervene and impose the 
practice of tolerating irreconcilable difference, when this was not practiced by the citizens. 
But, whereas in the “Christianity row” the debate turned around institutional responses to the 
rules of the political community, in the “veil row” it was about dealing with difference which 
was not part of “our” culture or tradition. The row over the Islamic veil was crucially also a 
debate about the role of Islam in shaping the modern identity of Germany as a country of 
immigration, as well as the question of where the “tolerance threshold” for visible religious 
practice could be set. 
Habermas (2003), however, sees tolerance as a pragmatic response when there is mutual 
recognition and mutual acceptance of divergent worldviews, a way of allowing the co-
existence of religions and democracy in a pluralistic environment and opening the way to 
“reconciliation between multiculturalism and equality” (2003: 1). He also postulates the 
highest form of tolerance, respect for difference, as the mode for coexistence in a multicultural 
society. However, as he points out, acceptance is not enough, “toleration – as regards equal 
respect for everybody – means the willingness to neutralize the practical impact of a cognitive 
dissonance that nevertheless in its own domain demands that we resolve it” (2003, 12, 
emphasis in original). 
In this way, the “cognitive dissonance” produced by an encounter with difference stays in 
place and toleration is the answer for dealing with this in order to continue the “co-existence 
of different life forms as equals” which “also requires the integration of citizens – and the 
mutual recognition of their sub-cultural memberships – within the framework of a common 
political culture” (2003: 10-11). For Habermas, the citizens can maintain their “cultural 
idiosyncrasy” if they understand themselves “as citizens of the same political community” 
(2003: 10-11). And, in the reciprocal recognition of the rules of behavior, Habermas finds the 
solution to the paradox of tolerance:  
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Each act of toleration must circumscribe a characteristic of what we must accept 
and thus simultaneously draw a line for what cannot be tolerated. There can be 
no inclusion without exclusion. (2003: 5)  
As long as this line is drawn unilaterally, in an authoritarian manner, toleration remains 
stigmatized for arbitrariness. “Only with a universally convincing delineation of the borderline 
– which requires that all those involved reciprocally take the perspectives of the others – can 
toleration blunt the thorn of intolerance” (2003: 5, emphasis in original). 
However, if we look at the position of Islam in Western immigration societies, the problem 
with it lies precisely in the imputation that it is inherently incapable of recognizing the rules of 
the (democratic) political community. It is discussed as incompatible not only with Western 
societies but also with the rules of living in the Western societies as crucially characterized by 
diversity. Wendy Brown, who explores tolerance primarily as a technology of government, 
also reflects upon the position of Islam in the growing Islamophobia characterizing the public 
discussion in the West, and observes firstly that there has been something of a global 
renaissance in “tolerance talk” in the last decades,  
as multiculturalism became a central problematic of liberal democratic 
citizenship; as Third World immigration threatened the ethnicized identities of 
Europe, North America, and Australia; […] and as Islamic religious identity 
intensified and expanded into a transnational political force. (Brown 2008: 2) 
Crucial for Brown is the constructed opposition between a cosmopolitan West and the 
fundamentalist Other, so that tolerance here becomes a demarcating line and at the same time 
part of the “civilizational project” of the West. Wendy Brown argues that tolerance is “an 
instrument of liberal governance and a discourse of power that legitimizes white Western 
supremacy and state violence” (2014: 9-10), exploring in particular how tolerance as a 
discourse of power has depoliticizing effects. She points out that even though tolerance has a 
different meaning in different contexts, it is mostly associated with “multicultural justice and 
civic peace” and has an “impressive range of potential objects, including cultures, races, 
ethnicities, sexualities, ideologies, lifestyle and fashion choices, political positions, religions, 
and even regimes” (Brown 2008: 3). However, it is always also about objection, aversion, 
error, deviation, and falsehood; therefore, for Brown, it cannot give a positive notion of 
difference (2008: 67). Instead, Brown sees the operation of tolerating as the opposite of 
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incorporating; it is about producing the norm and deviance as a practice of normalization, and 
about securing the supremacy and hegemony of Western liberalism. 
I will turn again to the concept of tolerance through the analysis of a media event staged by the 
German Association of Public Service Broadcasters in 2014. Suffice it to say at this point that 
one of the major questions in the discussions of tolerance in preparation of the event, that I 
took part in, was the question of the limits of tolerance: Where does tolerance stop? Where 
does it reach the famous “threshold” that cannot be crossed? The conception of tolerance as a 
frontier, a corrective offered in good will, can be seen, for example, in the debates surrounding 
such seminal events as those on New Year’s Eve 2015/2016 in Cologne18, involving sexual 
harassment of women gathered to celebrate in the center of the city by a large number of 
migrant men. The case led to a public debate intertwining a number of discourses: from a 
critique of patriarchy, to religious, cultural, and gender contestations, and others, most of them 
invoking a “red line” where “tolerance stops.” For example, the German feminist author Alice 
Schwarzer offered an exemplary warning in a text on the Cologne events of a decades-long 
“naive import of male violence, sexism and antisemitism,” asserting that  
these young men are the sad product of a failed, or insufficiently wanted 
integration. They are a product of a false tolerance, in which almost everybody 
– the people, the media, the churches and the politics – put into question our 
democracy, our state of law, our equality. They even let them be stepped upon 
in favor of ‘other traditions’, or an ominous ‘freedom of religion’. We have let 
parallel worlds arise in their name, instead of insisting on integration. 
(Schwarzer 2016, translation from German by the author) 
To me, the fact that the discourse on integration is interlocked with the discourse on tolerance 
when dealing with cultural difference points in a striking manner to the disciplining character 
of integration. Integration starts as a straightforward relation of minorities “adjusting.” This 
adjustment reinstates the dominant discourse, constituting the national and cultural “us” and 
“them,” with “us” being at home here, belonging. However, this presents a dilemma – the 
cultural difference, locked in with ethnicity, cannot be stripped off at the end of the day, so 
there can actually never be an end to integration efforts. Therefore, since difference will 
                                                      
18 On New Year’s Eve 2015/2016, there were numerous sexual assaults on women by groups of men from north 
African and Arab regions, in the area of the Cologne railway station and the main square around the Cologne 
cathedral. The police were later accused of not having the situation under control and having tried to downplay 
the events in their initial press reports. The events led to a major discussion and public backlash against refugee 
immigration and the media, both in Germany and internationally. 
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always exist, only tolerance (on the part of the dominant social position) can provide a way 
towards co-existence. And, tolerance is intrinsically always present in the closed circle of 
living with difference that cannot be adjusted. When, however, events such as the one in 
Cologne prove the point of cultural incompatibility, epitomized in the sexism and disrespect 
for women on the part of the Arab men involved (and implicitly presuming Arab men in 
general), tolerance has reached its limit, it stops. 
I therefore see integration as an empty signifier because it rests on a contradiction: It is 
presented as a set of quantifiable and controllable parameters, such as language proficiency, 
employment, housing statistics, and others, to be checked off on a list measuring integration 
success. But, not only is social integration hardly quantifiable, the state of full un-
objectionability can never be reached. It becomes the point which temporarily fixes meanings 
and changes the discourse in question: the education system, the immigration legislature, 
diversity policies in business, as well as gender roles and class relations. When combined with 
tolerance, its character as a technology of governing is revealed even more strongly, because a 
call to integrate becomes a rejection of difference, or a call for only that variant of difference 
that unfolds under the threshold of the tolerable, of the “rational rejection.” At the same time, 
it is probably precisely the emptiness at the core of the concept of integration that turns it into 













Media and multiculturalism 
 
3.1 Media and citizenship in multiculturalism  
A large part of the politics of difference is articulated through the media discourse, which I 
see as a crucial space for articulating social power and applying technologies of government. 
Indeed, a large body of literature as well as political institutions emphasize the role of the 
media as “tools” of integration. This interlocking of discourses will be analyzed in more detail 
in Chapter 4, but it is important to say at the outset that the view of media as integration tools 
resonates well with the official politics in Germany and that it indeed explicitly forms the 
base of media policies of public service programming in this area. 
The work of the media in this view is usually broken down into several rather straight-forward 
steps that should be undertaken in order to achieve integrative effects on the audiences. Firstly, 
they should offer the migrants information that will help them get to know and understand not 
only the facts useful for getting started in Germany, but also the dominant cultural norms, the 
rules of behavior, the goals they should strive for. The second step consists of putting role-
models, people of migrant backgrounds, on the screen, to serve as a projection of what 
successful integration can look like and to show it as an achievable goal. Also, content that 
celebrates the contributions of migrants and rejects discrimination should be presented in the 
mainstream media, for example, through stories of refugees who have become successful 
citizens. The described steps are often cited in policy recommendations for successful 
integrative programming. 
The implication from the governmental point of view is that the passage of migrants and the 
majority from a position of antagonism towards one of successful co-existence, can be 
facilitated by media pictures. There is an assumption at work here that by adjusting very 
concrete switching points concerning media texts – such as the quantity and quality of 
representing migrants on the screens, avoiding discriminatory reporting, recruiting migrants 
into media professions, and others – the desired effects on the audience will be achieved.  
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For example, during the influx of refugees in 2015/16 several public service broadcasters in 
Germany initiated offers directed at refugees, offering them orientation help, explaining core 
“values” and “norms” for living in Germany, and encouraging their language acquisition19. 
Even if these examples were very straightforward in their governmental, even biopolitical, 
intention of citizen-making, I see other media dedicated more generally to diversity as 
functioning in this sense, if without explicit didactic intentions. I see my central object of 
analysis, the radio station WDR Funkhaus Europa, also as an attempt to respond to social 
antagonisms of diversity and to contribute to its management, but with scenarios that offer an 
alternative to the dominant ones. 
The rationale for establishing this station, as well as its changing strategies – from integration, 
through multiculturalism, towards cosmopolitanism, that will be discussed in the course of the 
thesis – make visible the role the media are assigned in the project of citizen-making. For 
example, Chouliaraki (2015) points out that like any discourse, the mass media are also a site 
of power, with their multiple technologies and strategies of management, and a site of 
resistance. It is on the “mundane, on the non-political, yet the intensely politicised [basis], 
which the media operate most significantly,” filtering and framing realities, producing 
references for the conduct of everyday life and the production of common sense (Chouliaraki 
2015: 276). Or in other words, “there is a politics of truth at play in every mediated debate 
which is central in the constitution of the debate as a public sphere” (2015: 257, emphasis in 
original). Therefore, investigating media discourse offers insight into  
the mundane business of governing everyday economic and social life, in the 
shaping of governable domains and governable persons, in the new forms of 
power, authority, and subjectivity being formed within these mundane practices 
(Rose 2006: 11)  
since like every such practice it “involves authorities, aspirations, programmatic thinking, the 
invention or redeployment of techniques and technologies” (2006: 101). 
A large body of literature in the field of media anthropology explores media discourses, 
technologies, and texts in terms of their role in representing cultures, in community and in 
identity formation, with the creation of difference, and with subject and object positionings. 
Seeing media as pertaining to and inseparable from contexts of social power, helps to identify 
                                                      
19 The refugee programs will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. 
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dominant messages, selective perception, or unintended identifications. Within the 
multicultural context, questions can be posed in terms of what the effects of media 
technologies are on human life, primarily in creating the sense of national community with 
other members of the audience, or in the processes of “Othering.”  
These are investigated through a large spectrum of media production (editorial work, media 
policy documents, journalistic prioritization and categorization, etc.), through reception habits 
(observing audiences in their media consumption and reactions to media texts), to the 
interaction of people with media technologies – all these showing implicit power relations 
underlining media discourses. Also, a central question when discussing media discourse is the 
question of its power, starting from the “cultural industry” model as proposed by the Frankfurt 
School theorists. In a broadly negative view of media effects, this “hypodermic-needle” 
approach sees the audience as passive recipients, as objects onto whom political and cultural 
formulae are superimposed through media messages. Here, the mass media can “impede the 
development of autonomous, independent individuals who judge and decide consciously for 
themselves” (Theodor Adorno, quoted in Askew 2002: 4). In a more positive, but deeply 
ideological turn, the American mass communications theory, for example, also concerned 
itself with “media effects” on society and treated these as measurable in empirical studies. 
Stuart Hall, on the other hand, investigates the power of media, but rejects such simplistic 
cause-and-effect approaches as the mass communications research, shifting the attention to 
the questions of how this power is spread within the discourse. The audience here is not 
factored out of the processes of exercising power, but rather recognized as an active side of 
media communication. The functioning of media discourse is seen as a complex interaction 
between sending and receiving, or rather production and consumption, which underlies the 
active roles of both sides – and the systemically inherent distortion of the media message. The 
encoding and decoding (Stuart Hall [1973] 2007) of media texts includes the possibility of 
resistance and subversive readings: the “lack of fit” between the two sides of the exchange, 
between the moment of production (encoding) and consumption (decoding), which is built 
into the system. But, although in this sense multiple interpretations are possible, the outcome 
of the process is not entirely open-ended, as Hall points to numerous representational 
strategies which privilege certain interpretations, or “preferred readings.” This is especially 
relevant in media texts concerning difference (ethnic, cultural, racial, etc.), which use a 
number of strategies, among them stereotyping, essentializing, binary oppositions, erasures, 
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and others to lead the audience in the direction of a reading that upholds existing power 
structures (Askew 2002: 5). 
However, rather than being a straightforward producer of identities, individuals, or realities, it 
should be emphasized that media discourse as such is productive of power and thus also 
carries possibilities of resistance. Interpreting the media discourse as a tool of a dominant 
force, while being an oversimplification, tends to imply an ideology or a repressive force 
aimed at the population or parts of it. Media discourse instead offers material for an 
“ascending analysis of power” (Foucault 1980: 99, emphasis in original), that starts at the 
basic levels of procedures and techniques of power and shows how more general interests 
engage with these procedures “that are at once both relatively autonomous of power and act 
as its infinitesimal elements” (1980: 99). The freedom implicit in the relational functioning of 
power in a discourse means its inherent instability and the unpredictability of its outcome, 
because in every discourse “there are always also movements in the opposite direction, 
whereby strategies which co-ordinate relations of power produce new effects and advance 
into hitherto unaffected domains” (1980: 199-200).  
The media are also a site where alternative images can be circulated, and multiple points of 
resistance can lead to broader alternative strategies. For example, Shohat and Stam propose 
using media texts as a field of resistance to dominant narratives in what they call “artistic 
jujitsu,”, which overturns asymmetries in representational power within the media discourse. 
In their analysis of a broad range of fiction genres, their narrative structures and processes of 
production, Shohat and Stam encounter asymmetries in representational power on many 
levels: in the argument of universal appeal used when casting White protagonists in a 
blockbuster film; in the representation of dominant groups as naturally diverse, and subaltern 
groups as homogenous; in various “mediations,” such as narrative structure, cinematic style, 
framing, lighting, the relations of foreground and background, as well as in relations 
concerning the economics of media and film production (1994: 208). 
However, countering negative stereotyping in media texts and images by positive examples is 
not enough to alter these asymmetries. On the one hand, texts and images follow from tropes 
which stereotype, generalize, essentialize. On the other hand, images and texts stabilize the 
discourse, making it a closed circle. Therefore, an analysis of media discourse entails both 
identifying power relations and structures that lead to it, as well as the ways in which the 
discourse supports the existing structures or attempts to subvert it and offer a resistant 
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discourse. Shohat and Stam offer here a methodological approach that instead of “images” 
speaks of “discourses,” calling attention to all the cultural voices involved in a text, thus 
bringing out “the voices that remain latent or displaced” (1994: 214). It is also an approach 
that allows not only the “pseudo-polyphonic” discourse of TV commercials (1994: 215), but a 
hearing of conflicting and competing voices, a “multivocality,” “an approach that would strive 
to cultivate and even heighten cultural difference while abolishing socially-generated 
inequalities” (1994: 215).  
One way of countering asymmetries is gaining control of media technologies and, in the 
terminology of Shohat and Stam, performing “artistic jujitsu,” stealing “elements of the 
dominant culture and redeploy[ing] them in the interests of oppositional praxis” (1994: 328). 
Such is the approach that characterizes parodies of Hollywood genre films, and also, for 
example, those employed by artists in the project Laughing in a foreign language (2008), who 
use humor, or more precisely its untranslatability, as a vehicle of cultural relativism, aimed at 
combating Western ethnocentrism. It is precisely in seeing humor as a form of cultural insider-
knowledge (Critchley 2008: 17), insisting on its untranslatibility that “might endow native 
speakers with a sense of their cultural distinctiveness or even superiority” (2008: 17), that 
exposes the “xenophobic flipside of a belief in the untranslatability and exclusivity of 
humour” (2008: 18). Challenging the notion of borders between humor(s), the artists use 
strategies such as “defamiliarizing and accentuating preexisting materials” (Shohat and Stam 
1994: 331-332), rechanneling “energies in new directions, generating a space of negotiation 
outside of the binaries of domination and subordination, in ways that convey specific cultural 
and even autobiographical inflections” (1994: 331-332). This way, “artistic jujitsu” consists of 
“multiple strategies, for infiltrating the dominant, transforming the dominant, kidnapping the 
dominant, creating alternatives to the dominant, even ignoring the dominant” (1994: 332).  
Another field where resistance can arise is within the audience, viewed as active participants 
in the discourse, whose final interpretation of media content is open-ended. The audience can 
commit reception acts which counter or ignore the dominant message, even if unintentionally, 
as Ien Ang showed in her analysis of reception habits of the soap opera Dallas among Dutch 
audiences (Ang 1991). 
In an example of a similar approach, Lila Abu-Lughod analyzes the reception of Egyptian 
soap operas, and their role in the internal cultural politics of the government-controlled media, 
which “articulate contested visions of modernity” (Abu-Lughod 2002, 377), visions which are 
 73 
both elitist and nationalist. She analyzes the receptions of one serial about recent Egyptian 
history (Hilmyya Nights), which is interpreted as a product of a “socially concerned and 
politically conscious group of culture-industry professionals,” who have “constructed as their 
object ‘a public’ in need of enlightenment” (2002: 384). While illustrating “the faith that mass 
media have powerful effects,” this “discourse of protection” (2002: 384) is subverted by the 
reception habits, especially the selective viewing by the very objects of the intended message: 
the subaltern working women of Upper Nile villages, who choose to ignore the didactic 
intention interwoven in the story and instead admire a character intended to serve as a negative 
warning. Therefore, even if television plays a central role in their lives, “this public subverts 
and eludes them [the messages], not because they are traditional and ignorant of the modern, 
[…] but because the ways they are positioned within modernity are at odds with the visions 
these urban middle-class professionals promote” (2002: 377). 
In the post-colonial era, new fields of contestation, new relations of majority and minority, as 
well as new inequalities in representation arise as a result of migration movements. Even 
though not all immigration countries have a colonial history, the situation is still shaped by “a 
diffuse colonial context […] and just as important, the discourses about it” are shaped by it as 
well (Shohat and Stam 2009). However, the dualisms of the colonizer/colonized, the 
First/Third World no longer hold up, with the main issue being that “the nation-state, once the 
primary unit of analysis, has given way to analytical categories both smaller and larger than 
the nation” (Stam 2003: 34), and thus to “images of interdependency,” “identity as an 
endlessly recombinant play of constructed differences,” “metaphors of fluidity and crossing,” 
and “mutual shaping and indigenization” (2003: 34-35) that all lead to a new aesthetics:  
The segregated space of the Algerie Francaise of the Pontecorvo film20 has 
become the miscegenated space of contemporary France and the miscegenated 
aesthetics – at once North African, French, and Afro-American, of beur cinema, 
the films made by Maghrebians in France. The brutal borderlines of colonial 
Algeria have been replaced by the more subtle borderlines separating the urban 
metropolises of France from the banlieu. (2003: 34) 
In Race in Translation. Culture Wars around the Postcolonial Atlantic, Shohat and Stam paint 
a large and elaborate portrait of issues of racial politics and cultural movements around the 
Red, Black, and White Atlantic, to portray not only a range of cultural policies and ideas in the 
                                                      
20 The Battle of Algiers. Directed by Gillo Pontecorvo, 1966 
 74 
parallel histories of their development, but also the vital mutual fertilizing in transnational 
exchange, emphasizing the intellectual and creative influences they have had on each other. 
The authors trace transnational movements of ideas and debates across cultural and national 
borders, viewing cultures as heteroglossic, and not hermetically sealed from one another, so 
that their project is “to offer a multi-perspectival approach, a kind of a ‘Cubist’ re-reading of 
the multi-directional travel of aesthetic ideas” (Shohat and Stam 2009). They create a  
historicized, poly-chronotopic and relational approach by seeing the culture 
wars against the broader backdrop of the history of an Atlantic World shaped by 
the violent “encounter” between Europe and indigenous America, by the 
exploitation and transplanting of African labor, and by the evolving attempts to 
go beyond “master-race democracy” to full, participatory, polyphonic equality. 
(Shohat and Stam 2009)  
Against this backdrop, translation becomes a key concept, both literal and “as a trope to evoke 
all the fluidities and transformations and indigenizations that occur when ideas ‘fora de lugar’ 
cross borders and travel from one place to another” (Santos 2012: 33).  
Shohat and Stam propose a “radical multiculturalism” to theoretically tackle this new 
constellation. It is a multiculturalism that moves further from both the descriptive and the 
politically normative approach and comprises a critique of inherent power structures, because 
a multiculturalism  
without the critique of Eurocentrism runs the risk of being merely accretive – a 
shopping mall boutique summa of the world's cultures – while the critique of 
Eurocentrism without multiculturalism runs the risk of simply inverting existing 
hierarchies rather than profoundly rethinking and unsettling them. (Shohat and 
Stam 1994: 359) 
In the understanding of multiculturalism which comprises a critique of power relations, 
difference is not celebrated for its own sake, but its meaning lies in “recognizing 
discrepancies in historical experience” (Stam 2012: 104). In terms of race, this means that, 
even though there is consensus about race as being socially constructed, “race as a social 
construct and racism as a social practice shape the contemporary world by skewing the 
distribution of power and resources” (2012: 103). 
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A radically multicultural approach to filmmaking presents a viable tool of resistance to 
Eurocentric discourse in the arts and the media, arising simultaneously with the “seismic shift” 
in scholarship, brought about by post-colonial studies. This “broad decolonization of 
knowledge and academic culture” (Stam and Shohat 2012: 61) is defined as a critique of 
political-economic conditions and ways of thinking that Empire instilled, but which continue 
to persist after the formal end of colonialism. In this way, this academic shift addresses a large 
field, going beyond the former axes of discussion around empire and nation, but includes 
multiplied axes “to include race, gender, class, region, religion, sexuality, and ethnicity” 
(2012: 85).  
Going beyond binarisms of race or majority/minority relations, in a “relational approach” 
(Shohat and Stam 1994: 228), it is necessary to acknowledge the interdependency, the 
multidimensionality of the multicultural society. In it,  
the self is inevitably syncretic, especially when a preexisting cultural polyphony 
is amplified by the media. This syncretism is first of all linguistic […] Cultural 
syncretism takes place both at the margins and between the margins and a 
changing mainstream, resulting in a conflictual yet creative intermingling of 
cultures. (1994: 237)  
The authors challenge linear historiographic periodizations as well as the notion of separate 
community narratives, concluding that it is an illusion that communities and societies can exist 
autonomously, the world being characterized by a “densely woven web of connectedness, 
within a complex and multivalent relationality” (Shohat 2003: 1). At the core of this 
relationality is the dynamism of identity formation: here, identities are seen as socially 
constructed  
markers of history, social location, and positionality, lenses through which to 
view the world. Rather than ethno-characterological essences, identities are 
chronotopic positionings within social space and historical time, the place from 
which one speaks and experiences the world. (Stam 2012: 100)  
The political valence of multiculturalism therefore “depends on who is seeking multicultural 
representation, from what social position, in response to what hegemonies, in relation to 
which disciplines and institutions, as part of what political project, using what means, toward 
what end, deploying what discourses, and so forth” (Shohat 2003: 6). The media can play a 
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role in the project, if they are understood as a “radical critique of power relations, turning […] 
into a rallying cry for a more substantive and reciprocal intercommunalism” (2003: 7). 
 
3.2 Media texts and national fantasy 
Funkhaus Europa can, in this context, be viewed as an institutional attempt to respond to the 
crises and antagonisms arising from growing diversity in the country, as an attempt to create 
an alternative strategy for reflecting this diversity and giving it a public space. The station has 
continued to adjust and respond to the constant repositionings in the social and political 
discourses on difference, in relation to concepts such as integration, multiculturalism, and 
cosmopolitanism, and constantly fine-tuning the definition of its target audience.  
How can the re-positioning of Funkhaus Europa from being an “ethnic” or “multicultural” to a 
“cosmopolitan” radio station be read in this context? In reading this re-positioning, I was 
inspired by Lauren Berlant’s analysis of mass mediated texts as showing the underlying 
national fantasy. By examining various mass mediated narratives which represent the state of 
political hegemony and examining technologies of citizenship that create national subjects, she 
shows these texts to be “the definitional field of citizenship – denoting simple identifications 
by a national identity category, a reflexive operation of agency and criticism, or a mode of 
social membership” (Berlant 1997: 31). Here, Berlant demystifies the modes of operation of 
nation, citizenship and public culture, showing the importance of affect and of fantasy in the 
operation of nation building. Berlant points out how we inhabit the political space of the 
nation “which is not merely juridical, territorial (jus soli), genetic (jus sanguinis), linguistic, or 
experiential, but some tangled cluster of these. I call this space the ‘National Symbolic’” 
(Berlant 1991: 4-5). Whereas legal regulations dominate citizenship by constructing technical 
definitions of rights, duties, and obligations, “the National Symbolic also aims to link 
regulation to desire, harnessing affect to political life through the production of ‘national 
fantasy’” (1991: 5).  
In her analysis of the rise of the Reaganite right in the U.S., Lauren Berlant shows how 
intimate, familial politics entered the public sphere and started defining what citizenship and 
nation in America stood for. She introduces the notion of the “intimate public sphere,” which 
“renders citizenship a condition of social membership produced by personal acts and values, 
especially originating or directed towards the family sphere” (Berlant 1997: 5), as well as the 
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figure of the “infantile citizen,” one who "figures a space of possibility that transcends the 
fractures and hierarchies of national life" (1997: 27) and whose faith in the nation is based in 
the belief of the state`s commitment to representing the best interest of the ordinary citizens 
(1997: 27-28). Berlat argues that the “patriotic view of national identity, which seeks to use 
identifications with the ideal nation to trump or subsume all other notions of personhood” 
often makes use of subaltern bodies and identities “which bear the burden of representing 
desire for the nation” (1997: 27; emphasis in the original). The latter point and the notion of 
“infantile citizenship” inspired my analysis of Funkhaus Europa’s ideal target-audience in 
Chapter 7, where I show how placing citizenship in the sphere of private choice and the 
intimate life changes the ways national identity is imagined in the media. 
Berlant explores a large array of media texts, among them various media narratives of the 
pilgrimage to Washington, a symbolic image as a place central to the nation, a "place of 
national mediation," that becomes "a test of citizenship competence" (1997: 25). Using film 
narratives of Mr. Smith goes to Washington, directed by Frank Capra, and an episode of The 
Simpsons, “Mr. Lisa Goes to Washington,” Berlant concentrates on this particular national 
plot, in which the patriotic view of national identity, which seeks to use identification with the 
ideal nation, clashes with a view in which citizenship talk concerns unequal conditions of 
economic, social, and political struggle. At the same time, even if specific interest groups are 
consolidated against others, all involved in this "production of mass nationality" (1997: 31) 
claim that it is serving citizens and bringing a democratic sphere about that is their main 
concern. The pilgrimage-to-Washington narratives are based on the idea that contact with the 
monumental nation can turn the citizen's infantilized feelings of rage or opposition into adult 
subjectivity, ready to disengage from any past trauma and face the present (1997: 33).  
Especially relevant for my analysis of how WDR Funkhaus Europa creates ideal citizens and 
the narrative of the “good life” in cultural diversity is Berlant’s insight of how creating the 
images of mass nationality is about creating “norms of proper national subjectivity and 
concepts of social membership” rather than a political public sphere (1997: 35). The iconicity 
of mass society also happens through the “commodity culture’s marketing of normal 
personhood as something […] in the range of what is typical in public yet is personally 
unique” (1997: 36). At the same time, she shows how subaltern personhood allows for no 
personal uniqueness, no institutions for the unmarked status. Instead, the subaltern body 
allows stories of the "inclusion" of minoritized citizenship "in the self-justifying mirror of the 
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official national narrative while being expatriated from citizenship's promise of quotidian 
practical intimacy" (1997: 36). 
Combining Berlant’s argument that the national fantasy is crucially formed by representations 
of public culture, and that citizenship depends upon these, with a governmentality approach, 
means that “it must always be remembered that such representations are both provisional and 
contingent upon the power relations that support them, and that they are necessarily partial” 
(Nolan 2006: 230). The “publics” of representative democracy are always “performative” 
entities, so a “way of representing the people constructs the people” (Warner 1990: xi, quoted 
in Nolan 2006: 230). The question this opens for the analysis of WDR Funkhaus Europa 
centers on what the politics that the positioning as a “cosmopolitan” broadcaster emerged 
through, as well as whose interests are served by such a definition (Nolan & Radywyl 2004: 
50), something that I elaborate on in Chapter 5. 
Recalling again Shohat and Stam’s call for a redistribution of representational power and an 
“artistic jujitsu” in media production, the radio station WDR Funkhaus Europa can be seen as 
a field of resistance to dominant narratives concerning multiculturalism. Instead of 
accentuating the problems of diversity, the station attempts to create a new space in which this 
new social diversity, the existing “convivial culture,” as described by Gilroy, can be 
constituted as a living discourse. Avoiding the banalizations, essentializations and divisions 
common to many media responses to socially traumatic moments, I show how WDR 
Funkhaus Europa attempts to create a new space of representation and offer a new picture of a 
German and European cosmopolitan citizen. This ideal citizen should be open to everything, 
mobile, interested in diversity, a well-travelled cosmopolitan, and at home in the multicultural 
everyday of West European urban life, ready to embrace all sorts of unthreatening and 
consumable difference. At the same time, he or she should feel a citizen of Germany, and 
adhere to the values promoted as European, such as non-violence, gender equality, freedom of 
expression, and others. As a “technology of citizenship,” this station has aimed at creating a 
new audience segment, at representing the new ideal of the culturally mixed German citizen, 
but in this, to a certain extent it also engenders transformations in the polity (Nolan 2006). It 
subjectifies a new audience that can avoid the traumatic point that opens up through the 
questions discussed above. As a technology of citizenship, the station has not only provided 
expressions of difference, but has tried to “facilitate expressions of unity and provide 
opportunities for the development of chains of equivalence” (Nolan 2006: 226), deliberating 





Migration and cultural difference in Germany 
4.1 Historical overview of concepts 
The efforts in creating a multicultural society in Germany have not been successful: “that 
approach has failed, absolutely failed,” said the German chancellor Angela Merkel in 
November 2010 at a rally of the youth organization of the Christian Democratic Union in 
Potsdam (Siebold 2010). She also offered her vision of “co-existence” within the ethnically 
mixed German society: the immigrants must learn German in order to raise their chances in 
the labor market, forced marriages are unacceptable, crimes must be speedily tried, and there 
must be no neighborhoods that the police dare not enter. 
In the same year, the social democratic politician Thilo Sarrazin published the inflammatory 
book Germany Is Doing Away with Itself (Deutschland schafft sich ab), promoting the thesis 
that, due to the low birthrates of ethnic Germans, Germany was “becoming smaller and more 
stupid,” whereas the “social pressure of uncontrolled migration is being kept secret out of 
political correctness” (Sarrazin 2010b, translation from Greman by the author). The author 
claimed that Muslim migrants were reluctant to integrate, dependent on social aid, that they 
did not care about the scholastic success of their children and tended to create parallel 
societies (Sarrazin 2010c). With almost a million and a half copies sold, the book became one 
of the most successful works of political non-fiction in Germany. 
Five years later, Germany found itself as the main destination for immigrants arriving from the 
war zones of the Middle East. Chancellor Merkel’s now famous sentence, “Germany is a 
strong country – we will manage” from August 201521, meant that from September that year, 
Germany factually ceased applying the Dublin regulations. Until then, these had determined 
that the EU Member State through which an asylum seeker first entered the EU, was 
responsible for processing their asylum application. In practical terms, abandoning the 
                                                      
21 https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Mitschrift/Pressekonferenzen/2015/08/2015-08-31-pk-
merkel.html, accessed 01 Sept /2018 
 80 
application of the Dublin regulations meant that Germany stopped deportations of new arrivals 
to other EU countries. By the end of the year, the number of asylum seekers in Germany 
coming from Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and other countries, amounted to over a million people. 
Nevertheless, this move led to an unprecedented wave of solidarity in the German civil 
society, and manifestations of “welcome culture” (Willkommenskultur) around the country. 
Since then, the institutional response has been “complemented by NGOs, grass roots 
initiatives as well as the general public, with ongoing voluntary engagement at all levels of 
society.”22  
Not much later, however, in the midst of growing institutional struggle to cope with the 
situation, the public mood soured, and criticism of the government’s immigration policy 
mounted, accompanied by vocal attacks against the media, often accused of reporting too 
favorably of Merkel and the refugee situation. The right-wing upstart, the Alternative for 
Germany (AfD), had by then entered several regional parliaments and, in the 2017 general 
elections, for the first time also the national parliament, the Bundestag, with 12.6 percent of 
the overall vote. So, in only four years since its founding, the AfD had transformed from a 
party worried about the future of the euro-zone to a robustly anti-immigration and 
Islamophobic party, shaping its political platform around the rejection of Merkel’s open-door 
policies towards refugees and, related to this, a strong criticism of the media, characterized as 
the “lying press.” 
The very speed of radical changes and force of public reactions showed how central to the 
German political and public discourse the struggle with the topic of immigration is. The 
developments since 2015 also show how central the perception of the media as an actor in this 
struggle is, a perception echoed in a large part of the German language literature on the topic. 
The German Federal Statistical Office counted 19.3 million people, or 23.6 percent, with a so-
called “migration background” or “migration biography”23 in 2017.24 Roughly half of these, 
around 9.4 million, were foreign nationals. Starting from the early 1960s, Germany has 
                                                      
22 http://www.unhcr.org/dach/wp-content/uploads/sites/27/2017/11/Factsheet_Germany_Q4.pdf 
23 The population group with a migration background consists of all persons who have immigrated into the 
territory of today’s Federal Republic of Germany since 1949, of all foreigners born in Germany, and all persons 
born in Germany who have at least one parent who immigrated into the country after 1949 or was born as a 
foreigner in Germany. Persons of “migration backgrounds” do not have to have immigrants themselves, indeed 
every third person with a migration biography has been living in Germany since birth. 
https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/SocietyState/Population/MigrationIntegration/Methods/MigrationBack
ground.html 
24 https://www.bpb.de/wissen/NY3SWU,0,0,Bev%F6lkerung_mit_Migrationshintergrund_I.html, accessed 29 
Nov 2018 
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continued to receive immigrants, but even after more than half a century of continuing 
immigration there is no clear-cut institutional or ideological stance towards Germany being an 
immigration society. Also, the effects this development has on the definitions of national 
culture or identity are often not represented institutionally, including the fact that there is no 
clear vision of the future of the German (diverse) “we,” so that  
while the facts of past immigration and the resultant plurality of backgrounds 
and experiences in the German population are now accepted, this is not 
accompanied by a generally positive approach to cultural diversity and public 
representation of minorities as groups. Germany's life as a self-conscious 
country of immigration begins in a climate unfavourable to an active promotion 
of minority rights and identities. (Schönwälder 2010: 153) 
Public policies concerning ethnic diversity instead continue to be characterized by 
controversy, including statements on the failure of the multicultural approach, such as that 
made by chancellor Merkel in 2010. 
Whereas in the past decades the parliamentary parties have differed in their opinion on 
immigration, they have all gradually accepted the fact that Germany is a country of 
immigration. The discussion on the level of political institutions and mainstream parties today 
circles mostly around questions of who is responsible for securing the successful integration of 
immigrants, how to organize and improve it, and what constitutes it in the first place. Only in 
individual cases does the discussion move towards questions of how the new German national 
identity could or should be redefined in the public discourse, in light of the fact that it is a 
country whose culture(s) can no longer be defined in national terms. 
Normative steps, such as adjusting the Law on citizenship in 2000 and passing the Law on 
immigration25 in 2005, marked the formal end of the earlier policies aimed at stopping 
immigration all together. These policies began with the oil crisis of 1973, which led Germany 
to stop further arrival of so-called “guest-workers” (Gastarbeiter) and to offer financial 
incentives for the return of workers into their countries of origin. This turned Germany into a 
country where permanent immigration from outside of the EU was de facto legally not 
                                                      
25 The full name of the German immigration act is “Law on administrating and limiting immigration and 
regulating the residence and integration of the citizens of the European union and foreign nationals” (Gesetz zur 
Steuerung und Begrenzung der Zuwanderung und zur Regelung des Aufenthalts und der Integration von 
Unionsbürgern und Ausländern), which points to its regulatory and limiting nature. 
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possible, with the exception of immigration in the context of protection under the Geneva 
convention. Since the early 2000s and the passing of the Law on immigration, the official 
politics have shifted emphasis from stopping immigration to heightening social cohesion, with 
strong demands directed at migrants to integrate.  
At the same time, a problem-oriented examination of the concepts of integration, assimilation, 
cosmopolitanism, interculturalism, and multiculturalism is largely lacking, and the positions of 
the majority society and the immigrants (and their descendants), those of “host” and “guests,” 
remain critically mostly unexamined, even if on the level of the public and media discourses a 
positive approach to cultural diversity in the context of “enriching” the German society has 
entered the mainstream. In this context, migrants are increasingly seen as bringing the 
potential for economic growth, as a way of stopping the downward demographic development 
and on a more abstract level, as contributing through expressions such as music, food, and 
cultural traditions, of making the host culture more heterogeneous and thus somehow 
“richer.”26  
The year 1955 marked the first step in a process that aimed at leading Germany to become a 
country of cultural and ethnic diversity. It was the year in which the Federal Republic of 
Germany signed its first bilateral recruitment contract with the aim of bringing Gastarbeiter, 
guest workers, to the country, in order to fill labor force shortages in the industrial and 
agricultural sectors. Following the first contract with Italy, seven further contracts were signed 
with South European and North African countries, the last with former Yugoslavia in 1968. 
Ever since the guest-worker scheme, the majority of the legislative acts and political decisions 
concerning immigration have been guided by economic concerns – both in the negative sense, 
seeing immigration as a hazard for the labor market and the social systems, and in the positive 
sense, seeing it as a way out of labor shortages in specific sectors.  
The first such decision came in 1973, when the influx of immigrants was stopped 
(Anwerbestopp) amidst the global oil crisis and fears of an economic slow-down. Since this 
did not factually stop immigration, in 1983/84 a controversial Law on return assistance 
(Rückkehrhilfegesetz) introduced financial stimuli for the return of workers to their countries 
of origin, in order to lower the pressure on the labor market. The 1980s and a part of the 
                                                      
26 The discourse of “enrichment” through palatable diversity will be discussed in more detail in Chapters 5 and 
7. 
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1990s were characterized by narratives of work market saturation and fears of rising 
unemployment. The media coverage can be summarized around the metaphor of a “full boat,” 
giving the impression of a growing number of people applying for political asylum and 
raising the pressure on the social state. The period will also be remembered for a series of 
deadly racist attacks on immigrants in the cities of Rostock, Solingen, Mölln, and others. In 
1992, the regulations for asylum application were tightened through a constitutional change, 
resulting in a drop-off in the number of applications (Bundesamt für Migration und 
Flüchtlinge 2018). The same fears of rising unemployment, wage dumping, and social 
insecurity years later defined the German response to EU-enlargement, leading to the 
imposition of transitional periods for issuing work permits for nationals of new EU-member 
states in 2004 and 2007 (Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2013).  
Following the Gastarbeiter-era, the first perspective change on immigration, in which it was 
again regarded as a desirable and controllable economic factor, appeared in the IT-Green Card 
schemes of the years 2000 to 2004 that aimed at recruiting computer experts. Several years 
later, during the early 2010s, the federal government led campaigns with the purpose of 
facilitating the employment of a foreign, highly-qualified work force by German enterprises 
(SWR 2011). In fact, every shortage of professionals in a specific sector has at some point led 
to the idea of recruiting foreign workers, so that in 2018, for example, the federal health 
minister floated the idea of recruiting foreign workers for medical and home care professions 
to fend off the shortage of professionals in those areas (Zeit Online 2018). 
The current immigration policies at the time of writing cover two areas: As a signatory of the 
Geneva convention and a major host country for newcomers from Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, 
and other countries, Germany continues its engagement in refugee protection, both as a 
receiving country for refugees and as a European and global broker on refugee policies 
(UNHCR 2017). On the other hand, the immigration of non-EU citizens into the country is 
based on the assumption that immigration can be used and steered as an instrument of 
economic growth.  
Similar to other European countries of immigration, since the beginning of the twenty-first 
century, Germany has witnessed a contradiction between the social realities and the official 
politics accompanying them. In light of the influx of refugees that started in 2015, it is clear 
that Germany remains a country of continuing immigration. The more interesting statistical 
figure in this context, however, is that every third child born in Germany has at least one 
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parent with a migration background (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung 2018), meaning 
that the ratio of people with migration backgrounds will continue to grow even if further 
immigration were to stop entirely. However, this is not accompanied by a political or 
ideological willingness to re-define the terms of citizenship or cultural identity, even if the 
society has been deeply shaped by migration and cultural diversity for several generations 
already. 
The social transformations in the course of ongoing immigration have seen such developments 
as multilingualism, religious diversity, cultural heterogeneity, and transnational practices 
entering the German social sphere. The education system, especially in its view of language 
acquisition needs, illustrates the response of the institutions to these transformations. For 
example, Terkessidis (2010) warns that, far from any effort at de-ethnicizing the education 
system, it still treats persons with migration backgrounds as a separate part of society who 
need to be brought closer to the dominant standards through added compensatory efforts of the 
society, outside the “normal workings” of a kindergarten, school, or other institutions (2010: 
47) rather than as an integral part of their work. For example, calls for learning German are 
often paired with language proficiency tests to detect and solve problems in the pre-school 
age, rather than embracing children’s multilingualism as a normal practice in a multicultural 
society. 
The central institutional and political response to the cultural transformation in Germany 
remains the objective of integration. Indeed, as has already been noted, integration is named 
the “key task of the federal government” regarding immigration (Die Bundesregierung 2012: 
1). Although almost unquestioned in the public debate as the only viable objective of the 
policy measures on immigration and diversity, the very term “integration,” however, remains 
not clearly defined and thus suitable for being filled and re-filled with all sorts of meanings, 
depending on the context. 
Several critical points can be raised concerning the demands for integration in general and in 
the German context in particular. One of them is the question of what exactly migrants are 
meant to integrate into. The concept of integrations rests on the premise of a relatively 
homogenous, or at least definable, host culture, implicitly contained within the nation-state, 
into which one can integrate. When examined as to its contents, the “host culture” is usually 
defined in terms of historical continuity (which, however, does not allow for the dynamic 
leading to the present culturally diverse society), in connection with the German language, or 
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as based on “European” and “universal” principles of democratic rule (which again says 
nothing about the specificity of a “German host culture”). A further question would be why 
the demand for integration is placed on the migrants and their descendants, even if a large 
majority of them are born and raised in the society that they are then supposed to integrate 
into.  
And finally, integration is usually not understood as a process concerning the whole 
immigration society, a process in which all citizens – the new migrants, ethnic Germans, and 
others already living in Germany – actively look for modes of common living and social 
cohesion. Instead, in the best case, it is seen as an effort to be undertaken by the migrants and 
the host institutions but leaving out the changes that the society as a whole undergoes through 
migration, or what its citizens can undertake in this context. This “common effort,” however, 
also rests on a picture of a social division between the two groups – the hosts and the migrants 
– and their gradual coming together. In the worst, but not uncommon, case, it is a demand 
posed solely on the migrants. Here, the “willingness to integrate” is postulated as the basis 
necessary for co-existence. It is understood as a process of acquiring cultural literacy, with the 
final question being where this process ends in the individual case, and where assimilation 
starts. 
The Federal Office for Migration and Refugees narrows the term integration down on its web-
page as follows:  
Integration is a long-term process. Its aim is to include into the society all people 
who live in Germany permanently and legally. An encompassing and equal 
participation in all social areas should be made possible for immigrants. They 
are on the other hand obliged to learn German, to acquaint themselves with, to 
respect and to follow the Constitution and the laws. (Bundesamt für Migration 
und Flüchtlinge 2007) 
When used as a positive attribute, a well-integrated person is one recognized as successfully 
introduced into and functioning within the norms of the society. On the negative side of the 
discussion, there is talk of “integration-refusers,” “insufficient integration efforts,” and 
“processes of disintegration,” The success of a person’s or a group’s integration is perceived 
as measurable along a scale of quantifiable parameters, a combination of cultural, social, and 
economic factors. If unsatisfactory, these can threaten the overall socio-economic picture of 
the country, which in turn results in negative public responses to the statistics on under-the-
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average education levels or migrants’ participation in the labor market. A further 
recommendation listed in the National Action Plan, is social contact and exchange (including 
the warning against creating minority enclaves and “parallel societies,” a warning against 
groupism and segregation) as well as a call to accept the values of German democracy and 
culture (Bundesregierung 2011).  
Especially since the comparative European study of scholastic success PISA of 2000, that 
showed migration origins to be an obstacle to scholastic success in Germany (Verbeet 2010), 
learning the German language has become a crucial demand directed at migrants. Proficiency 
in German language occupies a central position in the institutional and political discussion, 
almost as a demand dictated by common sense: nobody in their right mind can disagree that 
language knowledge is indispensable for education, a career, and getting on in the society. For 
example, the Web-page of the German Office for Migration and Refugees states that,  
If you live in Germany, you should try to learn German as quickly as possible. 
It is important to do so to meet new people, to make yourself understood in 
everyday life, and find work. There are many different opportunities to learn 
German. (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2016)  
However, burdened with symbolic connotations as a carrier of some essence of national 
culture, the language of the host society, especially as mother-tongue, remains a strong 
biopolitical factor in immigration societies. While language proficiency is offered as a fool-
proof way of securing economic and social participation, at the same time lacking language 
sufficiency can function as a marker leading to social exclusion.  
Language knowledge is expected in pre-school children in several, but not all, German 
Länder, and a considerable part of the examination for enrolment into primary school is 
dedicated to language skills – albeit not as an exclusion criterion but rather as a “diagnostic 
tool,” used to assess if compensatory measures should be organized. A positive attitude 
towards multilingual education is gradually becoming consensual in the institutions of 
education, even though doubts about this approach continue to be voiced regularly on various 
levels. In some contexts, multilingualism is cited as a potential impediment for acquiring the 
proper language skills of the host society, leading, for example, to periodical calls to prescribe 
speaking German during school breaks, even if these are mostly met with ridicule and 
dismissal. Gradually, the view that multilingualism does not affect the acquisition of German 
in a negative way is gaining prominence in the institutional approach. It is framed positively, 
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especially as a factor in raising competitive advantage in conditions of globalization. A 
positive approach to multilingual living in the context of mobility in the globalized economy, 
however, remains paired with continuing problematizations around the assessment of the 
German language proficiency of migrants. There are numerous institutional publications, 
quantitative studies, and papers within educational sciences that deal with the levels of 
language proficiency and questions surrounding it, most of them typically reflecting the matter 
in terms of efficiency. Quotes from one publication, “Language integration of migrants” 
(Haug 2008), that analyzes the language proficiency levels of children, may serve as a typical 
example:  
Knowledge of the language of the receiving country is indispensable for the 
integration of migrants. Knowledge of German is therefore a central aspect and 
can be considered a measure of integration of migrants in the receiving society. 
Besides knowledge of German, the knowledge of a language or languages of the 
country of origin is to be taken into account. Although the role of 
multilingualism in integration is discussed with some controversy, its 
importance for the everyday life is uncontested. 
[…] 
In general, the language levels of migrant children can be judged as problematic. 
Language tests in pre-school age show up deficits in oral linguistic skills, 
understanding and vocabulary. (Haug 2008: 5, translation from German by the 
author) 
The centrality of language in national self-understanding raises important implications in its 
development, which has seen language becoming probably the most important parameter of 
both the willingness of migrants to integrate and the readiness of the state to facilitate 
integration. Núria Garcia (2014), for example, investigates the link between language regimes 
and citizenship in Germany, seeing both as objects of governance. The politicization of the 
language issue is traced through the changing attitudes and official politics towards language-
of-origin courses, leading to the conclusion that “the debate around the recognition of 
multilingualism, […] is linked to the larger debate on citizenship polarizing politics on the 
national level since the 1980s” (Garcia 2014: 5). The polarization around issues related to 
language and identity remains strong, together with the self-understanding of Germany as 
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mono-cultural and mono-lingual, so that language remains a “field of negotiation of 
differences and their political regulation” (Tietze, quoted in Garcia 2014: 18). 
Focusing on the question of “Why language?”, Elana Shohamy (2009) also warns that 
“ideologies and beliefs about languages” are deeply rooted in all sorts of biographical and 
educational contexts, making language a sphere heavy with symbolic and ideological 
superstructure (Shohamy 2009: 46). In nation-states, language has become “the major definer 
of national identity” so that the knowledge and use of the hegemonic language “serve as 
primary symbols of belonging, loyalty, patriotism and inclusion and can therefore be used 
legitimately as criteria for classifying people” (2009: 46). In this context, policies aimed at 
fostering, measuring, and using language knowledge as a criterion for citizenship rights can be 
seen as veritable technologies of government. They are arbitrary but not naive, serving instead 
as “unrealistic mechanisms for control, categorization, gate-keeping and classification of 
human beings and denial of basic human and personal rights” that go together with 
membership in the society, such as education or social security (2009: 55). 
In sum, language proficiency in immigration societies today has become both the demand and 
the offer to belong that the “host” society extends to the migrants through its institutions. At 
the same time, language remains one of the strongest benchmarks of social exclusion, and one 
of the easiest to apply, since nobody can “become” a native speaker, and deviance from 
perfection as personified by a native speaker quickly becomes a marker of difference.  
In general, integration can be interpreted as a crucial, even if not clearly defined, condition for 
citizenship and nationality rights. In the political discourse, it is very often presented through 
the metaphor of a “two-way street,” with both the migrant and the institutions of the host 
country obliged to “put in an effort” of adjustment. But while the metaphor uses a non-
hierarchical picture of a two-way street, integration actually rests on the picture of a “visitor” 
and a “host”, the latter representing the cultural norm that migrants need to actively try to fit 
into. The political slogan of “demanding and promoting” (fordern and fördern) that has 
accompanied the integration debate, points to the focus of the official politics “on the 
individual who is offered help but is in turn constantly required to prove his or her willingness 
to co-operate and achieve the necessary preconditions” (Schönwälder 2010, 155). Far from 
being a value-neutral term,  
there are all sorts of unpronounced perceptions behind [it] concerning what it 
means to be “German,” how people should behave at “our” place and what they 
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should not do, who fulfills the requirements and who has deficits, whom the 
institutions are made for and who is here actually just as a visitor. (Terkessidis 
2010: 7, translation from German by the author) 
Furthermore, within the narrative of integration, an unpronounced hierarchization takes place 
among immigrant groups, so that those who are “culturally marked,” for example through 
public displays of religiosity, such as the wearing of the Islamic veil, are seen as less 
compatible with the host culture. In this sense,  
integration and equal opportunities are not promised to everyone: only some 
groups of immigrants are to be integrated, and the opportunities granted may not 
be equal. Furthermore, there is an emphasis on cultural and identificational 
assimilation, and themes like sanctions, pressure and selection are constantly 
reiterated. (Schönwälder 2010: 154) 
The demand to comply with the Constitution can be read in a similar way: instead of being a 
catalogue of citizens’ rights and obligations, the Constitution in the integration discourse 
symbolizes a kind of “cultural manual,” which contains a cultural code. What actually makes 
up this cultural norm is not explicitly defined, but it is bundled within the fuzzy complex of 
ideas around Western liberal democracy, secularism, individual self-determination, gender 
equality, and others.  
At the same time, the very fact that the demand to integrate implies there is a defined national 
culture to integrate into means that it does not correspond to social realities, which are defined 
by transnational practices and multiple memberships – very strongly, but not exclusively 
among the migrants, and especially among the young and within popular cultures. Therefore, 
the demand to integrate in essence remains  
a negative diagnosis. There are problems, and they are caused by deficits of 
certain persons, who belong to certain groups. The starting point is always the 
society as it should be, not the society as it is. (Terkessidis 2010: 9, translation 
from German by the author)  
In sum, Terkessidis criticizes the concept of integration as “upholding the distance between 
the majority and the immigrants” (2010: 9) rather than diminishing it. 
 90 
The question is, therefore, if in this situation, integration can be made the condition for full 
citizenship. For Stuart Hall, the universalistic language of citizenship – even though 
historically, from the Enlightenment and the French Revolution onwards, it was often denied 
to groups such as Black slaves and women –  
is transformed in the light of the proliferation of cultural difference, [and 
therefore] the idea cannot and does not deserve to survive in the transformed 
conditions of late-modernity in which it is required to become substantively 
operable. (Hall 2007: 42)  
In other words, the rights of citizenship and the incommensurabilites of cultural difference 
need to be “respected and […] one not made a condition of the other” (2007: 42).  
Regardless of the above considerations, integration is generally not put into question as the 
key concept of the German debate on immigration or diversity. In contrast, the term 
multiculturalism has experienced a rather brutal death in the German debate, reflecting a 
Europe-wide backlash, discussed previously in Chapter 2. Widespread critique of 
multiculturalism includes its supposed promotion of the withdrawal and segregation of 
minority cultures, an indifference to the lack of integration, and an oppressive political 
correctness. Its connotations include an antagonistic stance towards the majority, and in the 
extreme case, even the infliction of cultural norms of the Other on the majority (Vertovec 
2007, 2010). Whereas this criticism is not unique to the German context, the wholeheartedness 
of support that chancellor Merkel’s statement on the failure of the multicultural approach 
received could be interpreted as a sign of a high degree of unease about the idea of a profound 
transformation of the national model – even if the media and the institutions continue to 
propagate a more inclusive approach. 
Parallel to a growing rejection of the term “multiculturalism,” calls for strengthening social 
cohesion and a sense of common citizenship are getting stronger. On the level of federal 
politics, in 2006, chancellor Angela Merkel initiated the National Integration Summit, which 
has since invited associations, the media, and community representatives to discuss questions 
of integration and diversity, resulting in the development of a National Action Plan on 
Integration. The Ministry of the Interior in turn has since 2006 been organizing an annual 
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Islam Conference in order to uphold the dialogue between state institutions and the Muslim 
communities.  
New terms such as “diversity” are being embraced in the context of “enrichment” and a more 
general discourse on globalization. The term is increasingly finding its way into institutional 
statements and political programs, such as the already mentioned “Diversity Charta” (Charta 
der Vielfalt) of the German industrial association, the government campaign “Diversity as 
Chance” (Vielfalt als Chance), and many others. It is seen as taking place in a broad spectrum 
of areas: from business venues (the introduction of diversity managers in companies), through 
cultural aspects (intercultural dialogue in local initatives, celebrations of immigrants’ 
traditions in educational institutions), to institutional efforts (recruiting multi-ethnic staff into 
public administration).  
Similarly, the concept of “cosmopolitanism,” that has been spreading in the media discourse, 
emphasizes diversity as a positive asset and celebrates the mobility of the globalized nomad, 
but often neutralizes difference to a decorative element. The cosmopolitan citizen’s experience 
of transnationality, be it due to migration or to travel, “enriches” the country, contributing to 
its multivocality, a “unity in diversity.” Ghassan Hage, however, points out that the discourse 
of enrichment not only places the majority culture as dominant, but it also assigns it a different 
role. Whereas the dominant culture “merely and unquestionably exists, migrant cultures exist 
for the latter. Their value, or the viability of their preservation […], lies in their function as 
enriching cultures” (Hage 2000: 121, emphasis in original).  
Therefore, while on the one hand the concepts of cosmopolitanism and diversity imply the 
rejection of claims to ethnic or cultural purity as anachronistic, and greet cultural diversity, 
they do so without challenging the framework of the nation-state as the primary field in which 
this transformation is taking place. Both cosmopolitanism and diversity see difference as an 
object of governmentality, of management, upholding the discourse of difference as enriching 
the host culture by added value, something that can be consumed and absorbed, without 
challenging the status quo of the social positions.  
In a very broad conclusion, it can be said that the institutional politics concerning the changing 
face of the German society, including such fundamental transformations as the rise of 
multilingualism, transnational practices, hybridizations in the popular cultures, and others, 
have not developed as an active effort, but rather as a reaction to developments taking place in 
the course of immigration. They remain mostly concerned with practical questions; however, 
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even when they view cultural diversity as a positive development, they rarely abandon nation-
state as their discursive framework. How these considerations have been articulated through 
media discourses, how difference and belonging have been constructed and re-constructed 
within these discourses, and how the key points in the discourses have changed in the course 
of time, will all be the subject of analysis in the following chapters. 
 
4.2 Media and multiculturalism in Germany 
The media discourses have gone hand in hand with these developments, with both the public 
service broadcasters and the commerical media often championing a sympathetic and 
inclusive attitude to cultural diversity within the country, largely within the discourse of 
enrichment. Furthermore, the media, especially the public service broadcasters, have 
increasingly been assigned the role of “tools” and “facilitators” of integration.  
This emphasis on the media as instruments of social cohesion can be read in a number of 
strategic papers and policy documents on various institutional levels. On the level of the 
federal government, this can be observed in the conclusions of the “Media and Integration” 
working group, as part of the National Integration Plan27, which includes demands for the 
media to “reflect cultural diversity as normality in their outputs and show the opportunities of 
an immigration society,” demands for the broadcasters to recruit and qualify media 
professionals with migration backgrounds, and demands to secure specific media offers for 
migrant target groups (2007: 157-158, translation from German by the author).  
Also, the number of round tables on the topic of media, integration, and diversity policies has 
grown significantly in recent years, with several broadcasters introducing the topic of the 
“integrative role of the media” into their program documents, for example, in the context of 
the European year of intercultural dialogue 2008. The members of the German Association of 
public service broadcasters, ARD, produced the position paper “Integration and cultural 
diversity – A cross-section task of the ARD” (Inegration und kulturelle Vielfalt – 
Querschnittsaufgabe der ARD), which emphasizes the aim of reflecting the composition of the 
German society in media content and personnel. It cites as its guiding principle the need to 
show 
                                                      
27 The National Integration Plan was the precursor to the later National Action Plan on Integration. 
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the realities of immigration society in all programs, especially the mass-
attractive ones, where the ARD presents the everyday life of people from 
immigrant families as part of social normality and strives to authentically show 
the chances of a culturally diverse society, without negating its problems and 
risks. (ARD 2007: 472, translation from German by the author)  
The biggest broadcaster within the ARD, the West German public broadcaster, WDR, cites in 
its statute that it “must promote international understanding, European integration, and 
coexistence without discrimination” (WDR 2008: 18, translation from German by the author) 
and its programs should show “the cultural diversity of the broadcasting area, the process of 
European integration, and the interests of the population, including those of the people with 
migration backgrounds living in the broadcasting area” (2008: 7, translation from German by 
the author). 
In short, on numerous levels, the media have been explicitly called upon to take part in 
shaping the public discussion on immigration and integration and mobilized as active tools in 
managing diversity and difference. Although, for example, the ARD paper states that it does 
not primarily understand integration as a task for a specific target group and instead needs to 
“reflect the demographic, ethnic and cultural transformation of our society and with it our 
audience and the changes of its horizon of experience and expectation,” (ARD 2007: 474, 
translation from German by the author), it can be noted that both the political and the media-
political discussion circle around the position, role, and potential of the media with the aim of 
integration.  
A striking recent example of this approach was provided during the influx of refugees into 
Germany starting from the autumn of 2015. Both the public and the commercial media in 
Germany reacted very quickly to the development. The commercial broadcaster n-tv started a 
video format in Arabic, Marhaba - Arriving in Germany (Marhaba - Ankommen in 
Deutschland) in September 2015, as “the first program in Germany addressing specifically the 
refugees and immigrants from the Middle East, in Arabic.”28 In the weekly format, the 
German anchor Constantin Schreiber explained, in fluent Arabic, the basics of life in 
Germany. As presented on the Web site of the program, Schreiber “explains our country and 
us, the Germans, and gives practical information about life in Germany” (translation from 
German by the author). Several public service broadcasters followed suit, offering practical 
                                                      
28 http://www.n-tv.de/marhaba/ 
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tips on life in Germany in Arabic, translating their online news bulletins into English and 
Arabic, and offering episodes of a popular children’s TV-programs in Arabic, Kurdish, and 
Dari.29 
In January 2016, the WDR started a multilingual Web program WDRforyou, which in the next 
two years turned into the largest public service program offered to refugees, newcomers, and 
other interested audiences, with almost 380.000 subscribers30. As a WDR radio editor at the 
time, I was part of a small team that during a period of around three weeks in October 2015 
researched the information needs and wishes of the refugees as well as their technical 
possibilities for receiving programs, especially in the big refugee centers. Based on 
conversations with refugees, social workers, and volunteers, several meetings of a group of 
TV and radio editors were held to discuss what a future WDR offering for refugees should 
look like.  
From these meetings it became obvious that both the program makers and the management of 
the broadcaster saw their role as social actors. They saw themselves in a position where they 
needed to take on part of the responsibility of ensuring the refugee influx into the society ran 
smoothly – on the one side for the refugees themselves, who needed to be informed and 
helped to find their way quickly, and on the other side for the receiving society, by making the 
expected social and cultural friction less sharp. The term integration was mentioned 
frequently: the declared aim of offering the refugees media content was to facilitate their 
integration and to make this wave of immigration and integration smoother and easier than 
was the case for the first generation of “guest workers” in the 1960s. Language acquisition 
was often cited as an important aim, so that a balance was to be struck between offering the 
refugees formats in the languages they understood, and getting them to learn German as 
quickly as possible, to facilitate their integration.  
In this context, the question of money was raised, or rather the question of how to justify 
spending the fees of the German subscribers for programs in foreign languages. One of the 
managers involved said in an interview that  
there are also critics who ask why we finance such shows with subscribers’ fees. 
[…] But most of the refugees will stay here, we have to be pragmatic. We must 
                                                      
29 http://www.wdrmaus.de/sachgeschichten/maus-international/ 
30 WDR – figures from March 2018 
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all contribute to this integration to function well. (Srikiow 2015: 46, translation 
from German by the author) 
It was often stressed in the meetings that in this way, the WDR was cultivating a future 
audience segment, people who would, when they set foot into the society proper, remain loyal 
to the public service media. For example, when discussing the choice of languages in which to 
offer these programs, the languages of the Balkans were rejected because refugees from the 
Balkan countries were not granted legal stay in Germany31, which meant they could not be 
considered a future audience segment. 
Entering the dynamics of governmentality, the media here took upon themselves the role of 
making new citizens, offering them “cultural translation” for everyday life but also guidelines 
on the national culture. This “citizen-making” can be seen, for example, in the list of topics of 
the first episodes of Marhaba, containing such titles as “This is how the Germans think,” “The 
Constitution and the Sharia,” “Women in Germany.” “Love and sex in Germany,” “The role 
of religion,” and “Eating and drinking.”32 In the words of the show’s host,  
[t]he intense reporting might lead to the impression that we have started a full 
program in Arabic. This is definitely not our intention. Just the opposite, it is 
important that the refugees learn German, but we want to give them orientation 
help. (Srikiow 2015: 46, translation from German by the author) 
A large part of the literature and research in this area also discusses the “integrative function” 
of the media. Even if a simple relation of cause and consequence is not presumed, there is a 
general assumption that representing migrants as a normal part of society can lead to lowering 
prejudice and diminishing social distance. On the other hand, the media are seen as a tool for 
reaching out to the migrant communities, preventing their separation from the majoritarian 
discourses. Citing the tasks for the public media as listed by the German Constitutional Court 
in 1961, Siepmann (2006) states that  
television professionals are not only observers and reporters of the active and 
passive integration processes; they are also mobilizers, that is, they are both the 
                                                      
31 In the autumn of 2015, the German federal parliament voted the Balkan countries as safe countries of origins, 





medium and the factor of intercultural social convergence. (Siepmann 2006: 8, 
translation from German by the author) 
Siepmann regards the media co-responsible for the “success or failure of cohabitation in the 
conditions of globalization” (2006: 8, translation from German by the author).  
The terminology includes “effect,” “intention,” and “function” in integrative processes, or the 
stated aims of “diminishing social distance” and facilitating “cohesion,” which all point to the 
constellation in which the majority performs integrative actions on subjects, who in turn form 
communities on the margins or outside the majoritarian discourse. Also, the negative potential 
of the media as contributing to segregation through spreading stereotypes or tendentious 
reporting is assumed. The media are called upon to use their positive potential in working 
towards “successful cohabitation” and “social convergence.” In their strategic papers, the 
public broadcasters pledge to work towards pro-active mainstreaming of diversity and 
examine every piece of content along the criterion if it reflects reality or is undifferentiated 
and tendentious.33 Parallel to these elaborations, changes in the media discourse in the past 
years can indeed be noticed: from the growing number of “ethnic” protagonists to a generally 
more relaxed attitude towards showing the existing diversity on-screen and on the air.  
Next to the questions of content, the question of personnel is raised, with the aim of reflecting 
the culturally diverse population in the make-up of the newsroom. There are no diversity 
quotas or percentage targets in the German media. Instead, several broadcasters have 
introduced individual projects such as workshops or seminars with the aim of opening up 
editorial offices to people with migration backgrounds. The non-binding objective of 
recruiting people of migration backgrounds or promoting their employment, such as the one 
that has been articulated in the ARD paper on integration, is generally greeted as a way to 
reflect the audience make-up more realistically. 
The number of people with migration backgrounds working in journalism in Germany cannot 
be exactly deciphered; however, it is clear from partial studies that it by far underscores the 
overall percentage of people with migration backgrounds living in Germany. In 2006, the 
                                                      
33 In its “Diversity Toolkit for Factual Programs in Public Service Television,” the Intercultural and Diversity 
Group of the European Broadcasting Union offers public broadcast program makers guidelines that can be 
applied in the everyday newsroom work, such as: Who is talking and who is being addressed? Is the author 
conscious of the power of images, words, music? Are the interlocutors chosen for the relevance to the story or 
because they will draw attention? Is the whole spectrum of opinion within the minority community represented 
or is the community treated as a homogenous unity? Are the minority representatives in the piece for authentic 
reasons? Does the piece reflect stereotypes? 
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Federal Work Agency, for example, listed between two and three percent of registered 
journalists in the country as having a migration biography (MMB 2007). It is difficult to 
pinpoint the figures firstly because of the methods of data collection, with statistics often 
based only on citizenship data, and secondly for reasons of data protection, with disclosure of 
cultural origins possible only as voluntarily given information. Also, where they exist, partial 
figures concerning individual broadcasters or print media say little about the status, functions, 
or employment levels of the people involved: Are they employed editors or free-lance 
journalists? Are they part of the management structures? Do they work in the mainstream or in 
niche media? Are they seen on-screen and heard on the air? And crucially: Are they 
encouraged to work mostly on “migration topics” or are even limited to those?  
The objective of recruiting more journalists of diverse cultural origins into the media arises 
against the backdrop of the assumption that they will automatically bring new points-of-view 
into the reporting and the choice of topics, perspectives that might be blind spots of journalists 
and editors of German origins. In this sense, people of migration backgrounds are somehow – 
when actively encouraged to enter the newsrooms – seen as embodying added value in media 
work. Through their own biographies and experiences, they represent that part of the society 
that needs to be targeted by media offers. They are seen as “gate openers” into the migrant 
communities, until then unreached by the mainstream media, and they are expected to bring in 
original topics and themes into the newsrooms, topics that stem from their lives as “culturally 
diverse” citizens.  
Assuming, however, as diversity management strategies in various businesses seem to, that 
diversity amongst personnel will automatically lead to diversity in the product, leaves aside 
the particular characteristic of media products as creators of social discourse – one that is not 
shared by a car or a telecom package for example. It also neglects some of the specifics of the 
media work on the day-to-day level, including the hierarchizations of newsrooms and the 
question of who decides on what is newsworthy or who is allowed to air opinion and 
commentary. In other words, a more diverse newsroom does not automatically lead to better 
programming in terms of cultural and other diversity, unless there is a willingness to question 
the existing hierarchies and modes of participation in the content production, the adopted 




4.2.1 Media and multiculturalism in Germany – literature overview 
The largest part of German language theoretical literature on the media in the context of a 
culturally mixed society also concentrates on the subject of integration. Many authors consider 
the effects of media texts and the patterns of their usage in social processes, often posing the 
question of how these can be steered to achieve the desired results of integration. To name just 
a few authors, Geissler and Pöttker (2006) see the model of “intercultural media integration” 
through practices of production, content, and usage, as a middle road between segregation and 
assimilation, whereas Weber-Menges (2005) interrogates modes of “reporting on foreigners” 
as a factor in social integration (translations from German by the author).  
Although the presumed importance of the media in social integration has turned into a well-
worn truism in the public debate, individual authors do pose the question of what is 
understood under the term integration, how it can be “measured,” and why it is premised as 
the desirable outcome of social processes in the first place, “a question that needs answering 
before any scientific questions can be posed on how certain patterns of media usage serve or 
do not serve integration” (Müller 2008: 61, translation from German by the author). Trebbe 
warns that the integrative function of the mass media  
(1) is one of the constructs that are most difficult to operationalize and 
empirically interrogate and as such (2) it is one of the empirically least proven 
hypotheses on the effects of the mass media. (2009: 109, translation from 
German by the author) 
Regardless of the “construct” of the integrative function of the media, lamented by Trebbe, 
there is a large body of German-language literature that has formulated research questions 
concerning media production and usage in relation to their effects on integration and social 
cohesion. Among the literature, there are concrete analyses of normative demands in 
journalistic work contained in the German Press Code, such as the effects of the warning 
against discrimination in media texts. Also, numerous content analyses interrogate the modes 
of representing migrants in the mainstream media, asking questions such as: Do the media 
ignore the migrants, contort their image, uphold stereotypes, or essentialize minorities? Do 
they strengthen or weaken the existing prejudice? How do processes of discrimination 
function and do the media contribute to ending them? There is also a large body of literature 
on patterns of media usage among the migrant population. In the same argumentative line, 
these studies aim at reaching conclusions about the adjustments in the media production that 
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could lead to more desired results and ask what can be done in order to contribute to the social 
inclusion of the migrants and their stronger acceptance in the society.  
Various studies note a certain negative tendency and problematization of migrants in their 
representation as criminals or felons, as competition or a threat to the majority, as well as their 
frequent positioning in a passive role in reporting (Namin 2009; Fick 2009). Trebbe (2009) 
lists the main processes that lead to a negative picture of the migrant in the German media: 
overrepresentation (for example, in reports on social problems or crime, and in reports on 
“undesired” ethnic communities), marginalization (minority members are not protagonists of 
media reports and they do not get a say), stereotyping (Italians and the mafia, Turks as kebab 
vendors, the relations of men and women in the Turkish family). and framing (Islam as a 
threat) (2009: 79-93). Trebbe’s analysis of the representations of the Turkish minority in TV-
programs points to a double marginalization: “in the sense of a discrepancy between a ‘TV-
world’ and their ‘real everyday world’ and in the sense of insufficient representation by means 
of political and social spokespersons in the mass-mediated public” (2009: 242, translation 
from German by the author). 
Ruhrmann and Sommer (2005) summarize the last twenty years of media representations of 
migrants and conclude that the mass media  
by no means – as is often presumed – simply reflect the reality of migrants in 
Germany or the world as it really is. Instead, the media select certain events, 
accentuate and valorize them according to formal and content criteria. (2005: 
127, translation from German by the author)  
In journalistic practice, this means that the media prefer negative reporting, and that reporting 
on migrants, especially in conflict situations and crises, can strengthen prejudice. The authors 
show, for example, how reporting on crime rates among the migrants doubled in the decades 
around the turn of the twentieth century. They also emphasize the passive role of migrants in 
the media, “which underscores their lack of political influence” (2005: 127, translation from 
German by the author). 
Researching the representations of ethnic minorities in Switzerland and Germany, Bonfadelli 
(2007) also points to a marginalization of minority protagonists, rare and negative reporting, 
and the representation of foreigners as passive rather than active subjects in everyday 
situations, while also documenting stereotypical representation, mostly concerning Islam. 
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Ruhrmann, Sommer and Uhlemann (2006) deal with the changed political context after the 
attacks of September 11th 2001 and the influence on the negative attitudes in reports on 
migrants, posing the question of how far the frame of the war on terrorism has been 
transferred to the picture of Muslim immigrants in Germany. These authors also document a 
thematic shift from “classical” migration topics to sensationalism, terrorism, and crime.  
A study by the Westdeutscher Rundfunk (WDR) in 2004, on the other hand, found that 
migration topics were not limited to problem areas in TV programs. The topic of “integration” 
was most present in the daily regional programs, and for the authors of the study “this result is 
especially important knowing that these [...] are among the most watched programs of the 
WDR” and thus thematically nearest to the everyday lives of the audience in the region 
(Krüger and Simon 2005: 113, translation from German by the author). 
In line with a view of media effects as being the result of certain conscious changes in media 
content, underlining the bulk of considerations of media policies in Germany, individual 
studies have also undertaken the task of measuring the effects of media reporting on migrants 
and the majority. Several authors have assessed the effects of negative reporting and the 
spreading of stereotypes as leading to discriminatory practices and segregation. For example, 
Ruhrmann and Sommer (2005) discern two main areas of prejudice in the reporting on 
migrants: firstly, migrants are shown as different, as not belonging, if their origins lie in non-
West European cultures. Secondly, they are often valued negatively, both in their political 
activity and in their behavior in the labor market, so that “prejudice represented through 
decades of reporting can lead to migrants being discriminated against in their everyday lives 
and at work” (2005: 124, translation from German by the author). 
For Ruhrmann (2009), reporting on migrants even influences the picture migrants have of 
themselves and their own position in the German society. Especially if negative, “migrants 
feel that their relationship with the majority society is damaged and count with reprisals due to 
negative reporting” (2009: 8, translation from German by the author). Geissler and Weber-
Menges (2009) report that Turkish respondents in particular, strongly criticized the German 
mass media, whereas the German resettlers of Russian origins felt an assimilative pressure 
through media content, with both groups feeling that “a stronger participation of migrants in 
media production was an important demand for stopping the dominance of negative pictures in 
the media representations of migrants” (2009: 42, translation from German by the author). 
One WDR study from 2006, which analyzed the reception of television programs among 
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young people of Turkish origins, showed that in the conditions of a changed social climate, the 
respondents more strongly connected with the Turkish culture, although almost all of the 
respondents were born in Germany. They objected to both the factual and the fiction television 
programs as reproducing stereotypes and clichés about Turks, which in turn led to a “defiantly 
proud attitude about their identity, signaling a distance from the German society: ‘I am a 
Turk’” (Hammeran 2006: 4, translation from German by the author).  
Another area of research, studies of media usage patterns, also premises a certain media 
functionality in social processes, with the primary goal being to gain a comprehensive insight 
into the media consumption behavior of immigrants and their descendants. Regardless of the 
results of the studies, several aspects are visible in the method, firstly that even second and 
third generation migrants are treated as a group separate from the majority, as seen in the 
implicit expectation that their media usage is different from that of the majority. Another 
drawback of such studies, as cited by several authors, is that they treat migrants as a 
homogenous group, not sufficiently differentiating according to origins or to socio-economic 
criteria. Moreover, there is an implicit problematization of the transnational media 
consumption of immigrants, with the unspoken question being that if there is a “media parallel 
society” in Germany, then how can this pattern be broken?  
The first comprehensive study on the federal level was conducted by the two German public 
service broadcasters, the ARD and the ZDF, in 2007. It surveyed five ethnic communities 
(former USSR, Turkey, Poland, former Yugoslavia, Italy, and Greece) and explicitly set itself 
the goal of looking at the differences between migrants and Germans in terms of media usage, 
that is, of finding out if there is indeed a “parallel society” in terms of media consumption. 
The main conclusion of the study was that a migration background does not mean that the 
respondents live in a mediatic parallel universe, but that they primarily use media offerings in 
German, combined with those in the languages of origin. The study concluded that it is the 
combination of the two, and not a complete assimilation of the German media culture, that 
characterizes the lived reality of the largest part of the audience with migrant origins (ZDF 
2007). The follow-up study “Migrants and the media,” conducted in 2011, confirmed that, as 
with the majority audience, television continues to be the most important medium for the 
minorities who also consume TV-shows from the countries of origin on a daily basis. The 
study concluded that factors of age, educational level, and social context are at least as 
important as ethnic origins in terms of media usage (ARD and ZDF 2011). 
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One of the notable aspects of these studies is the treatment of foreign language media 
consumption as a big unknown – both in terms of the mother-tongue programs in Germany 
and satellite or Internet-broadcast programs from the countries of origin. Zöllner (2008), for 
example, studies ethnic media in Germany and asks what tasks these media must fulfill, what 
integration goals they follow, and what the consequences are for intercultural communication. 
In a part of the research on mother-tongue media consumption, there is an undercurrent of 
worry that transnational or multilingual media usage could potentially lead to social 
segregation or insufficient social belonging, or even subvert the dominant media messages. A 
withdrawal to a niche outside of the influence of the mass media message is implied, which 
goes counter to the goal of social cohesion. The ARD/ZDF surveys indeed showed that media 
in the language of origins contributed to identity formation, with most respondents claiming 
the media were used in family contexts and the usage was more emotionally marked. 
Moser (2007) focuses on the influence of media on the concepts of identity and the move 
towards hybrid identities, as well as the question of what that means for people with migration 
biographies. He points to a changed context of migration in advanced globalization and asks 
for diasporas to be understood as imaginary groups upheld also through media 
communication. This in turn means that the “ideology of quick integration” cannot be the 
response to the complex migrations of the present. Bonfadelli also writes about a “globalized 
community of young migrant media users” (2009: 63, translation from German by the author) 
and demonstrates multifarious influences of the media on migrants at the intersection between 
integration, links to the diaspora communities, and the demands for those two cultures to 
connect. He also introduces the concept of hybrid identity into the search for new perspectives 
of integration, a concept that  
integrates “here” and “there” in the construction of identities, [...] that accepts 
that integration is not a process of a fundamental identity change, [...] and unlike 
conservative approaches, needs to be interpreted as a positive resource of 
positions and attitudes in the multicultural society. (2009: 64, translation from 
German by the author) 
In conclusion, it can be said that public policies on media in Germany are based on the idea 
that difference is an object of governance in the culturally diverse society. Furthermore, the 
media are explicitly called upon by the political institutions to actively take part in this 
governance of difference. In the German language discussion, the media are seen as tools that 
 103 
can contribute to social cohesion: this functions through helping the migrants’ integration into 
the society by offering them information, by putting protagonists onto the screen that migrants 
can relate to, and by offering role-models and models of successful co-existence to the 
audience. On the other hand, models that reject discrimination and celebrate the contributions 
of migrants to society are often presented as the mainstream – which seems to imply that the 
German majority needs to be led to an acceptance of the diverse society and that this passage 
needs to be facilitated by positive media pictures.  
In conclusion, on the level of the official politics, the media are considered to be actors of 
social transformation that must work towards the goal of social cohesion through integration. 
They are called upon by the institutions to accept this role and act upon what is presented as 
their social responsibility. The implicit assumption is that there is a cause-and-consequence 
relation between media texts and social effects. On the other hand, the media develop new 
imaginaries that they project to the audience. In the following analysis, I will attempt to show 
specific media offerings, what kind of régimes of truth are articulated through these, and how 
they correlate with the public policies. The analysis will concentrate on selected cases in order 
to examine the questions of power implicit in these discourses, particularly in how they work 
on subject and object positionings.  
Media representations carry assumptions about social relationships, so that every text makes 
implicit factual claims, offering “a mediated version of an already textualized and 
‘discursivized’ socioideological world” (Shohat and Stam 1994: 179-180), with all the 
subjects of the discourse immersed in historical and sociological contexts. Viewing media 
artifacts not as neutral windows on reality, but as representations, does not, however, mean 
that they have no real effects, but rather that “truth” in the media should not be searched for 
through questions of their realism, but those of representation and dissemination (1994: 179). 
Here, the question arises concerning the ways in which media texts participate in the 
construction of cultural identities, in creating the sense of belonging to a national community, 
in leading to “preferred readings” (Hall [1973] 2007), and in establishing the picture of the 
national and cultural Other. In short, the analysis will look at how the media participate in the 
creation of the national fantasy, and what kind of a national fantasy it is. 
The analysis will attempt to show how the régimes of truth about citizenship as created by the 
media go hand in hand with the adjustment in public policies concerning Germany as a society 
of many cultures. In particular, the analysis is concerned with those media narratives that left 
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behind the concept of multiculturalism and adopted concepts such as cosmopolitanism or unity 
in diversity as key concepts in the discourse on German citizenship. Some of the principal 
questions will be: How do the media interpret these public policies concerning cultural 
difference? What effects do these policies and their mediatic representations exercise on the 
relations of power in the society? How do the media operate in terms of normalization – how 
do they establish the mainstream, the norm, and belonging? What feelings are mobilized in 
media representations? In short, the analysis will concentrate on the question of how media 
discourse, through its practices of categorizing and prioritizing, as well as the way topics are 
dealt with, functions in the relations of social power in the culturally diverse society, that is, 


















This part of the thesis concentrates on the concepts of “difference” and the cultural politics of 
difference, through a case study of a radio station dedicated to cultural diversity in Germany. 
The radio station WDR Funkhaus Europa34 was established in 1999 by the biggest German 
public service broadcaster, the Westdeutscher Rundfunk. It was brought to life with the idea 
of reflecting and addressing multicultural living in the German Land of North-Rhine 
Westphalia. Since its establishment, it has undergone several deep-reaching changes in the 
definition of its goals and purpose. In these, I see articulations of larger political changes 
concerning questions of “difference” and “identity” in Germany, while they also point me to 
changing fantasies underlying the conceptions of how citizenship in the new, culturally 
diverse Germany is to be embodied.  
The self-definition and self-image of the station, as well as the content and the target audience 
– or the ways the radio makers define it – have changed in the course of the two decades since 
the station’s establishment. Considering that at the moment of writing, WDR Funkhaus 
Europa is the only public service station in Germany that is explicitly dedicated to cultural 
diversity, it is a suitable case for analysis as an ensemble of considerations on the politics of 
diversity in general as well as on the operation of the media within the discourse of ethnic and 
cultural diversity in the country. And it is precisely due to the fact that the station has 
addressed a comparably small fragment of the overall audience outside the media mainstream, 
that the very way it approaches the plurality of ethnic origins in the country says something 
about the dominant narrative of nation and citizenship. In other words, being a special interest 
station with a narrowly focused mission, makes it particularly interesting for this analysis, 
since it is precisely such “projects then [that] frequently mirror the dominant ethnic project” 
(Smaill 2002: 394).  
In this light, I examine how the transformation of the self-understanding of the station, 
especially its move from multiculturalism towards cosmopolitanism, reflects the changes in 
the imaginaries around the concepts of cultural diversity – both the imaginary of the nation 
                                                      
34 On January 1st, 2017, the radio station WDR Funkhaus Europa changed its name to WDR Cosmo. The 
material analyzed for this paper, however, all stems from before the name change, and therefore I will refer to 
the station as Funkhaus Europa. 
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and the imaginary of Germany as a place of many cultures, and how these relate to the 
articulations of such imaginaries on the European level. In particular, I also look for the 
emotions involved in these changing imaginaries, both in the emotions projected onto the 
radio audience and the emotions of the radio makers involved. 
I draw on the work of Ann-Marie Fortier and other authors concerning the role of emotions, 
especially pride and a “good feeling” in establishing the multicultural as an apolitical 
discourse within the nation. I see this station, as all media, as a technology of citizenship, one 
that addresses a defined audience segment, which at the same time, it produces as a body of 
subject-citizens. I look at the ways the audience is produced as clues to the expectations 
imposed on subject-citizens concerning the ways they are expected to embody citizenship 
within the context of the management of diversity in the country. My reading of the radio 
transformations does not, however, aim at finding some “master plan” guiding the changes of 
media policies or the management of diversity in general in the country. Rather, I am 
interested in how various actors in the discourse – the media makers, the management of the 
broadcaster, the policy makers, and the audience addressed (and among them particularly the 
minoritized subjects) –  experience the feelings and opinions that are sent through radio waves 
of this particular station concerning their citizenship, or as Gail Lewis puts it, “I am 
suggesting, […] that there is a whole range of experiences, feelings, and opinions that policy 
frameworks simultaneously produce and occlude for those who are positioned as ‘immigrant’” 
(2005: 538). 
I undertake ethnographic work in three large sites that relate to the radio station. In Chapter 5, 
I look for the transformations of the brand definition of this station – as articulated in the 
media policy documents, in the advertising for the station, on its Web page, and in official 
interviews and correspondence around the station. In Chapter 6, I analyze six interviews with 
media makers, conducted during the period of the latest brand change from multiculturalism 
to cosmopolitanism. Here, I look for the emotional effects these changes have on the media 
makers, especially on those who are not ethnic Germans. I look at how the changes and the 
work in the radio affect how they feel about belonging or not belonging to the society and to 
the media mainstream. And finally, in Chapter 7 I analyze the elaboration of the ideal-type 
audience of WDR Funkhaus Europa at the time. I look at the ideal-type listener of the station 
as an expression of desired citizenship spawning from a certain national fantasy, a fantasy of 




Funkhaus Europa – transformations of a radio brand 
5.1. Introduction  
We are the international radio station in Germany. We have a unique mix of 
global pop and voices from the whole world. We deliver the soundtrack of the 
21st century. We are Global Sounds Radio: 
the Web page of the German public radio station WDR Funkhaus Europa promises those who 
decide to tune in all this and no less than “the best sounds of the world” (translation from 
German by the author.)35 
Funkhaus Europa (later broadcasting under the name Cosmo) is one of the six radio stations 
produced by the largest German public service broadcaster, West German TV and radio –  
Westdeutscher Rundfunk (WDR). The radio station goes on air every morning at 6 o’clock 
from its studios in Cologne. Starting from the late afternoon it broadcasts programs in Turkish, 
Italian, the languages of former Yugoslavia, Polish, Russian, and Arabic, expanding by more 
languages during the weekend evenings. The daily German-language program presents a mix 
of music pieces from the dance halls and clubs around the world, including songs in languages 
not often heard in mainstream pop charts, otherwise dominated by English-language hits. Its 
German-language word content caters to a target audience recruited among “young 
cosmopolitans” and the “urban mixture” of the German multicultural society, according to the 
station’s policy documents. The term “multicultural” is, however, avoided both on air and in 
the written descriptions of the station. Instead, the station outlook is referred to as 
“cosmopolitan” and “international,” encompassing in this way both the immigrants’ migration 
experience and their diverse ethnic origins, as well as those of their descendants in Germany, 
and the interest in foreign cultures among the members of the majority population. These two 
are, however, not seen separately but addressed as a whole, a “unity-in-diversity” of a 
culturally mixed and internationally mobile young portion of the German society. 
                                                      
35 http://www1.wdr.de/radio/funkhauseuropa/ueber-uns/ueber_uns100.html, accessed 1 May 2016, translation 
from German by the author 
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5.2 Funkhaus Europa – Integration radio 
Since the early 1960s, information bulletins in languages of the largest immigrant 
communities of the time – Turkish, the languages of former Yugoslavia, Italian, Spanish, 
Greek, and so on – were aired by various German public service broadcasters, among them the 
WDR. In 1999, Funkhaus Europa was established by uniting all the foreign language shows 
and adding to them a German language newsroom, thus creating a 24-hour daily station with 
its own frequency. 
At the time of its establishment, WDR Funkhaus Europa was endowed with the mission to be 
the “integration radio” of the largest German Land, North-Rhine-Westphalia, and the Land of 
Bremen, where it cooperated with its partner radio station, Radio Bremen.36 Its explicit task 
was spelled out as being an “integrative offer for listeners of foreign origin and interested 
Germans living in North Rhine-Westphalia” (translation from German by the author).37 At the 
time, it was broadcasting in 15 languages and German as the lingua franca of all, leaving 
behind the “ethnic” label of the individual foreign-language stations, to become a 
“multicultural” or “integration” station.  
The spread of new media technologies, such as satellite television and the Internet, gradually 
led to considerations concerning the need for continuing the production of foreign-language 
programs as pure vehicles of information for migrant communities. In Funkhaus Europa 
discussions, the emphasis of the program content gradually moved to the existing multicultural 
life in Germany – including the realities of second and third generations of people with 
immigrant origins, and the new hybrid and mixed identities. In a further metamorphosis, the 
station then accentuated its “internationality,”, “urban mix,” and “cosmopolitanism,” with the 
focus on the cheerful internationally mixed society. The station today explicitly addresses not 
only the descendants of immigrants but also the German majority, or at least that part of it that 
has international experiences and interests.  
Within only a few years, the station thus moved from the task of integrating migrants, through 
depicting the existing multicultural realities, to addressing young, urban cosmopolitans, 
regardless of their ethnic origins, and specifically including the German majority into the 
                                                      
36 Starting from January 2009, Funkhaus Europa was also awarded the frequency of Radio Multikulti, a station 
also dedicated to diversity that broadcast from Berlin from 1994 to 2008, when it was closed down.  
37 http://www.ard.de/home/intern/fakten/abc-der-ard/Funkhaus_Europa/458652/index.html, accessed 1 May 
2016 
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social mix it catered to. By addressing changing subject positions – from the migrant in need 
of information and positioned outside the media mainstream, through to the modern young 
cosmopolitan – the station makes decisions that concern the nature of citizenship and national 
identity. As such, it also functions as a political technology, in the sense discussed in Chapter 
1, in which it was shown how the public service media provide spaces for the articulation of 
“ideas of collective identity” (Nolan 2006: 227). 
Michel Foucault characterizes technologies of the self as “ways in which human beings come 
to understand and act upon themselves within certain regimes of authority and knowledge, and 
by means of certain techniques directed to self-improvement” (1980: 90). These technologies 
of the self encompass claims of self-knowledge and the exercise of power that is self-directed. 
Barbara Cruikshank addresses the question of how modern liberal democracies produce the 
“citizen-subject” through “technologies of citizenship” by leading them to self-government. 
She points out how “individual subjects are transformed into citizens by [...] technologies of 
citizenship: discourses, programmes and other tactics aimed at making individuals [...] capable 
of self-government” (1999: 1) through the multitude of learned and habitual ways that 
citizenship is embodied (1999: 124). In other words, the “citizen-subject” is “an effect and an 
instrument of political power” (1999: 5), both a product of domination and subjection, of 
agency and subjectivity. To paraphrase Foucault, the subjects are “conducted to conduct” 
themselves, so that technologies of citizenship “however well intentioned, [are] modes of 
constituting and regulating citizens: that is, strategies for governing the very subjects whose 
problems they seek to redress” (Cruikshank 1999: 2). Or put differently, power produces that 
which it seems to act upon, for example immigrants.  
So, how can the repositioning of the station Funkhaus Europa be read in terms of the changing 
ways in which citizenship is to be embodied in the context of Germany? How do these relate 
to the contestations of identity and difference, of the nation and belonging? Through which 
politics did these changes emerge and what and whose interests are served by them? Whereas 
technologies of citizenship are often perceived as private and not connected to the realm of the 
political, in reality, they present a mode of regulation of citizens, such as, for example, when 
claims are made on the individuals in the name of personal wellbeing or, in the case of 
multicultural societies, of integration. Encouragement for the citizens to govern themselves 
(through self-regulation) often means encouragement for them to actively work on their own 
functioning within the diverse democratic structures, by becoming “happy, active and 
participatory” citizen-subjects (Cruikshank 1999: 101). Looking at a media broadcast as more 
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than a technology of production and consumption of content, means that audiences often adopt 
certain technologies of the self that on the one hand respond to and on the other provoke 
certain media tactics (Flew 1995: 50, quoted in Nolan and Radywyl 2004: 45), for example, 
the encouragement of the audience to participate in managing diversity in a desired way. In 
this chapter, I show how the radio station Funkhaus Europa has taken up and represented the 
changing nature of the concepts of diversity and cosmopolitanism in Germany, and how it has 
contributed to shaping this change. In other words, I ask in what kind of dialogue the politics 
of cultural difference and this radio station are.  
The analysis will sketch the varying pictures of the nation, through the ways acceptable and 
desirable kinds of multicultural mixing are imagined and conveyed through this radio station. 
Here I find it especially interesting to address the question of what it means when a radio 
station dedicated to diversity – as a very small but focused resonance box – rejects the concept 
of multiculturalism, insisting instead on cosmopolitanism. What does the centrality of the 
concept of “unity-in-diversity” (on the national and the European level), that I show to lie 
underneath this move, mean for the political salience of difference? Is it a concept that leads to 
social equality in a diverse society or one that enables a de-politicization and exclusion of 
subjects from a political discourse, akin to what Ghassan Hage refers to as “multiculturalism 
without migrants” (1997)? In short, I ask what imaginary of the nation and diversity the radio 
station offers, as well as the ways citizenship is to be embodied in a diverse society, and what 
politics this supports. 
 
5.3 Change of paradigm - from an ethnic to a cosmopolitan radio station 
The WDR Funkhaus Europa radio station has repositioned, or attempted to reposition, itself in 
the media landscape on several levels, the first being the insistence on larger inclusiveness. In 
the practical editorial work this initially meant that all items that were to go on air were 
examined through the question of whether they would potentially interest listeners regardless 
of their ethnicity instead of catering only to one group, while excluding others. Another level 
was the gradual transformation of the music program, from a focus on “world music,” through 
to the concept of “world-wide music,” and later, “global pop” labels. Earlier traditional music 
and chart hits from around the world were replaced by a focus on urban sounds and music 
resulting from stylistic mixing. On a third level, the German language content no longer caters 
to the interests of individual ethnic communities. This is partly due to the demographic 
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development, with the community association representatives being no longer wholly 
representative of either the younger generations of migrants or the descendants of the first 
generation of migrants. It is also partly a consequence of program planning and the expressed 
desire not to exclude parts of the audience by focusing on topics that could appear too narrow. 
Furthermore, the position of the foreign-language programs, which have to a much larger 
extent retained their connection to the interests and demands of their specific audiences, has 
been a point of contestation through several program scheme changes. For example, in the 
program grid reform that took effect in 2013, the weekend bilingual Turkish/German and 
Italian/German programs were cancelled. In a further reform in 2016, all the foreign language 
programs were shortened to half-hour shows and moved to a time slot beginning at 8 p.m., 
arguably colliding with primetime television. Also, they were aired online-first, which made 
them more available to audiences, but also made live broadcasting and interaction with the 
audience impossible. 
Such decisions led to protests by foreign-language journalists working for the station as well 
as by migrant associations. A general sentiment was discernible in these debates, one that the 
foreign language programs, that were the reason for the establishment of WDR Funkhaus 
Europa in the first place, were now seen as an obstacle to higher audience ratings. At the same 
time, a high audience response to the announced changes, including protests from migrant 
associations, was taken as proof that these programs still had a faithful audience, not 
necessarily identical to the audience of the German language program. In general, the 
atmosphere in the radio station was one of division: the German language newsroom saw their 
foreign-language colleagues making a more old-fashioned program, dedicated to community 
topics and addressing an older generation than the desired modern urban mix, and the latter 
saw the former as lacking in real content and attempting to squeeze the foreign languages out. 
Finally, these paradigm changes can be seen in the choice of personnel for the station and the 
requirements they need to fulfill.  For example, former station director Thomas, in an 
interview in 2012, stressed that the radio makers needed to have an “origin that can be heard.” 
This could be fulfilled by a foreign name, a foreign language greeting spoken on air, or 
someone having another worldview, “completely different from the German mainstream.”38 
                                                      
38 Interview, 3 Sept. 2012, Cologne, translation from German by the author. A more elaborate analysis of this 
and other interviews with the Funkhaus Europa radio makers is the subject of Chapter 6. 
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In the early days of the station, journalists of foreign origins, many of them migrants 
themselves, were on the air both on the foreign and the German language programs, which 
often meant hearing foreign accents or less than perfect German on air. This somewhat 
changed with the move of the station brand towards cosmopolitanism. The new German 
society, as will be shown through an analysis of the station documents, was seen as ethnically 
and culturally mixed, with hybrid identities characterizing the second and third generations of 
immigrant descendants. In a practical sense, this meant that it was not necessary for the radio 
makers to know the language of their parents or that their German sounded as if it was native – 
it was important that their cosmopolitanism or openness to the world was visible through 
what, not how they said it.  
As will be discernible from an analysis of interviews with the radio makers in Chapter 6, 
several journalists working for WDR Funkhaus Europa described this as a loss of their 
journalistic voice. While the journalists of diverse ethnic origins working for the station at the 
time of its establishment felt it gave them a voice and a space in the German media regardless 
of their “foreignness,” they saw the step towards cosmopolitanism and hybridity as 
“smoothing out difference” and felt they were being “squeezed out again.” Interestingly, a 
further reform in 2016 again described foreign accents as welcome in the on-the-air content, as 
a recognizable auditive sign of diversity. 
All these transformations – as articulated in the radio station documents, marketing material, 
special projects, and also as witnessed in the everyday work of the editorial team – offer 
insight into the changing nature of the politics of cultural difference in Germany, especially 
the changes in the management of difference in the public sphere. At the same time, the way 
that the station has positioned itself shows how it has been attempting to create its own 
audience, and how it has been working on the identity formation of the ideal new German 
citizen. 
WDR Funkhaus Europa started from the position of an “ethnic radio station,” one whose 
concern was to help the emancipation of minorities by facilitating their integration and 
removing discrimination against them in media content. This often meant simply representing 
their realities or making them protagonists of on-air content. Seen from another perspective, in 
this, the station accepted the problematization of diversity and difference as outside the social 
norm and worked within that framework with clear political aims of emancipation. Through its 
metamorphosis, it started creating its own audience, “citizen-subjects” who live in a world that 
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imagines itself as having overcome the problems of the past. In the new narrative, the mixing 
and diversity, is the norm – at least as far as this radio station is concerned. Institutional 
barriers, structural inequalities, and manifestations of racism are left out of this picture and the 
political intent is largely cancelled. In this new “cosmopolitan normality,” there is no need for 
emancipation of the minoritized subject – the aim is rather to present this picture as social 
normality of modern life in Germany.  
A diversity of commodified ethnicities is celebrated as something that can be consumed, as 
Ann-Marie Fortier (2005) analyzes in her study of the public manifestations of happy 
multiculturalism in Great Britain in the early 2000s, and which was elaborated on in more 
detail in Chapter 2.  Especially in the media, she notes a highly emotionalized debate, 
abounding with public declarations of pride in British citizenship. In it, Fortier detects a new 
imaginary of Britain as a nation “enriched” and “strengthened” by its diversity (2005: 560), 
reimagined as a nation defined by a “common hybridity,” as a product of a mixing of cultures. 
The border of cultural difference is felt, however, not as a threat of the dangerous proximity of 
difference, but in a pleasurable, happy way – diversity can be consumed and celebrated even 
without the physical presence of migrants themselves. In this way, the exhibitions of national 
diversity in the media, which show it as “no longer a source of concern or shame, but rather of 
pride” (2005: 560), in Fortier’s view actually serve to strengthen the national hegemony and 
self-love. 
In other words, robbing the discourse of diversity of its political substance and establishing it 
as a matter of aesthetics, of celebration and emotion, permits the return of national self-love as 
played out in the picture of “unity-in-diversity,” which in turn fails to disturb the existing 
distribution of social positions of those who are and those who are not permitted into the 
nation. Furthermore, the status quo sets in not only on the cultural level but also on the level of 
class, since the appreciation of desirable diversity is a domain of the educated cosmopolitan, 
not the working-class (even if the actual physical vicinity and contact of different ethnicities is 
more probable). 
 
5.4 The Roots project 
At the time when Funkhaus Europa was still branded an “integration radio,” it positioned itself 
as an actor within the German media landscape that worked on the emancipation of 
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minoritized subjects, including bringing the minorities into the media discourse. One example 
of this positioning was the project Roots, which the radio station started in 2006. In the context 
of the project around one hundred secondary school students were invited to research their 
family histories and write them down. All the students were migrants to Germany or children 
of migrants, and all were students of the so-called Hauptschule, a secondary school type that 
prepares students with average or below-average grades for vocational training.  
Upon the successful closure of the project, the TV-report Roots – the story of your family 
(Roots – Die Geschichte deiner Familie)39 was broadcast. In the program report, Jona, director 
of Funkhaus Europa at the time, describes the project as follows: “We were consciously 
looking for people at the Hauptschule, which is usually mentioned in the context of problems, 
language problems, ‘no future’ and so on. However, those are young people with potential, 
and their identity, their origin is part of it” (translation from German by the author). At another 
point, Jona says,  
When we are talking about immigration and integration, it is important to 
understand these as chances as well. One chance is to realize what potential these 
people that come to us have, and this holds true for their children and 
grandchildren as well. Roots is great, because we say to them: what you bring 
with you is great, your languages, your culture, what created your roots, and that 
is for all of us a very important contribution, for our society, for the future of our 
society. (translation from German by the author) 
Yildiz, one of the initiators of the program and editor at Funkhaus Europa, stresses the 
emancipatory effect of looking into one’s past:  
The moment I ask where I come from, where my parents and grandparents came 
from, I learn something about myself, about history. It is a new self-assurance 
when you know that your parents and grandparents have done something 
important. They migrated, they moved in order to lead a different, better life; 
they were far-sighted. These are not only sad stories, they are also nice stories. 
(translation from German by the author) 
                                                      
39 Roots: Die Geschichte deiner Familie. Ravi Karmalkar, WDR, 2007. DVD. 
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Armin Laschet, at the time regional integration minister and patron of the project, also 
stresses the “self-awareness” that this immersion into the “roots,” as “a completely new idea,” 
brings. 
 
Fig. 1 - Roots – The story of your family / Roots – Die Geschichte deiner Familie, Funkhaus 
Europa project, 2006 
 
In all statements, the emancipatory motif is implied. The participants of the project were 
deliberately chosen from the Hauptschule – the branch of the German secondary school 
system with the lowest educational levels and often considered the natural gravitation point 
for the children of migrants. There are several premises that seem to inform this approach: 
young migrants are to be found in the Hauptschule rather than in the higher school forms of 
Realschule or Gymnasium, since they are bound to come from families with non-academic 
backgrounds. The teenagers in question involved in the program suffered from low self-
esteem and had a low esteem of their ancestors.  
The presupposed low esteem for themselves and their ancestors seems to imply their (self-) 
positioning on the periphery of society, their deviance from the norm, their “Otherness,” and 
 116 
their place on the lower positions of social power, due also to their low educational status. The 
interesting aspect is not so much that they were in this situation, but that this self-positioning 
was taken as a given; it was not a question but a premise that they saw themselves on the low 
end of the social scale, outside of the norm. Interestingly, however, none of the participants in 
the project appear in the television report – they were not asked their opinion about it or how 
they defined their own identity. However, since the teenagers in question were regarded as 
suffering from lack of clarity in regard to their identity, speaking about the history that brought 
about their personal situation, that of the migration of their parents or themselves, was 
understood as having an emancipatory impact. It helped define their identity, in which being a 
descendent of migrants is not negative any more but a product of a sage decision by their 
parents who were “far-sighted.”  
The discourse of “enrichment” permeates the attitude of the speakers in the TV program: 
Yildiz, herself a daughter of Turkish immigrants, takes a semantical position on the side of the 
students and speaks about “my story,” “my history,” “self-confidence,” and brings the 
decision to emigrate to the affective level (“your parents and grand-parents did something 
important,” “they were far-sighted”). Jona speaks of “us” and “them” (“our society,” “you 
bring your culture to our society,” “they have potential”), and in terms of a cost-benefit 
analysis (“that is for all of us an important contribution, for our society”). This attitude 
towards immigration and cultural diversity in the country is very clearly positive, it leads to 
pro-active promotion of the presence of “diverse” protagonists in the media discourse. It also 
sees diversity as “enrichment” of the host society – as “potential” or an “important 
contribution.” The past of every migrant defines the present of that person’s position as a 
member of the minority, but this admission of pre-acculturation can be turned – through an 
emancipatory impulse – into a source of pride and personal strength. Whereas the position that 
sees immigration and the resulting diversity as enriching is generally part of the liberal 
political attitude towards migration, the critical point about it is that it rests on a hierarchy of 
majoritized and minoritized cultures and subjects. As has already been mentioned, Ghassan 
Hage sees the discourse of enrichment not only as placing the majority culture in the position 
of the dominant culture but assigns it a different quality from the migrant cultures, whose 
value is not intrinsic but lies in their ability to enrich (2000: 121). In the context of the Roots 
project, the enrichment can only take place if (young/infantile) migrants start to fulfill their 
potential, so whereas the enrichment through diversity is not as yet realized, it is the 
emancipatory goal, shared both by those who feel “inside” the migration story, such as Yildiz, 
and those seeing its potential from the “outside.” 
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5.5 Funkhaus Europa 2007 – Unity in diversity 
The further evolution of Funkhaus Europa at the time, from an explicitly integrative, 
emancipatory radio station, towards a station more oriented to celebrating existing diversity, 
stemmed directly from this discourse of diversity as “enriching” a society, as giving it “added 
value.” While retaining its explicitly positive stance towards migration, the station at the time 
moved away from directly addressing minorities and being their political mouthpiece, and 
approached the narrative of “unity in diversity” in the social picture of modern Germany. In 
this, it emphasized the affective content, concentrating on transporting the “good emotions” 
resulting from mixing and hybridity to its audience. 
 A television program celebrating Funkhaus Europa40 retells the story of the station, describing 
it as the “integration radio for the people of North Rhine-Westphalia, Bremen and Lower 
Saxony, who now originate from the whole world,” stressing that the station “grasps the 
development of the population as an opportunity” (translation from German by the author). 
The report shows the daily work of the editorial team and in the studios, journalists recording 
their material in the city, listeners saying what they think about Funkhaus Europa.  
In the program, the team is shown as something resembling a group of friends, in almost 
family-like situations, embracing each other, discussing passionately, laughing a lot. The team 
is shown as very diverse in its ethnic origins – Italians, Greeks, Turks, and Germans are shown 
as part of this newsroom. Their relationships are shown to be those of friendship rather than as 
professional relationships – they are emotional, even physical in their dealings with each 
other. The diversity of the crew is stressed as central not only to the work, but also to the 
atmosphere, which is characterized by actions considered in Germany to be “Southern”: 
emotionality, physical contact in communication, loud speaking, passionate discussion, loud 
laughing. 
The brand claim of the radio station at the time of filming was “Without borders” 
(Grenzenlos), which was later replaced with “Global Sounds Radio.” Jona, who was station 
director at the time, stresses in the TV-report that  
the fact that people are on-air here with a light accent, where one is aware that 
                                                      
40 5 Jahre Funkhaus Europa. Ravi Karmalkar, WDR, 2007. DVD. 
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this person is of another origin, this leads to an especially high authenticity with 
our audience. If you want to put it in journalistic terms, it often brings another 
point-of-view into the reporting. Sometimes we do it differently on purpose and 
send a Turkish reporter into a Croatian pub or a German reporter into a Turkish 
coffee house, because when you are not so near the culture, you notice new and 
different things. (translation from German by the author) 
 
Fig. 2 – 10 Years Boundless Radio – 10 Jahre grenzenlos Radio – Funkhaus 
Europa brochure 2009 
The cultural difference, the diversity, the multitude of voices and points of view is stressed as 
an asset, as added value, differentiating WDR Funkhaus Europa from the mainstream 
reporting.  
But, what does it mean when diversity is established as “added value,” as more than the sum 
of the parts that make it up? How does diversity become an ideal cultural surplus? I see this 
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frame of cultural diversity as added value as tapping into the discourse on “European added 
value.” Starting from the field of macroeconomic policies, European added value was born 
from the idea that a networking of European economies would further the economic well-
being of all members, being “the value resulting from an EU intervention which is additional 
to the value that would have been otherwise created by member states alone” (Bertelsmann 
Stiftung 2013: 6). 
The concept translated into the area of culture, a development similar to the one within 
national borders, when the idea of diversity as a factor that can contribute to economic 
enrichment and demographic development moves to the field of celebrating cultural and social 
unity in diversity. On the level of European unification, there are numerous evocations of 
“common values,” a “common cultural heritage,” and a common feeling of “Europeanness” 
beyond the national roots in the EU documents and policy papers. The European culture as a 
surplus is presented as more than the sum of European national parts, where differences 
between the nation states are not erased, but elevated into a value in themselves, making 
Europe culturally desirable. 
The European “culture of cultures” is also a political project, similar to nation building. It 
involves imagining European culture as “surplus value” that cannot be broken down into its 
constitutive parts but must be grasped as an abstract “more” that makes Europe such a special 
place. “The message now conveyed in European Union reports and policy statements is that 
‘we’ Europeans, with our shared historical roots and common heritage, belong to the unified 
‘European culture area’” (Shore 2001: 114). However, as Shore points out, conceived this 
way, the concept does less to celebrate the existing difference or multicultural society and 
more to promote the idea of Europe’s overreaching unity, invariably also comprising the 
marginalization and exclusion of “those ‘non-European’ peoples and cultures that fall outside 
the European Union’s somewhat selective and essentialist conception of Europe’s cultural 
heritage” (2001: 117). Since identity-building also functions through how one is different from 
others, forging a common European identity, within a diverse, but externally closed cultural 
picture, it cannot avoid the dualism of “us” and those outside it.  
Cultural “added value,” or surplus through diversity, is essential to WDR Funkhaus Europa’s 
picture of its audience and its place in society. In the report on Funkhaus Europa the narrator 
stresses that the radio is successful, since every fifth migrant in North Rhine-Westphalia 
listens to it. This is followed by a sequence of a taxi-driver saying, “The reporting shows the 
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conflicts in the multicultural society too, but also how pleasing and exciting the contact of 
cultures can be.” The narrator concludes that, “From the taxi-driver to the PhD-student, 
Funkhaus Europa is heard by all classes and ethnicities” (translation from German by the 
author). A short survey-sequence with people of different origins follows, saying what they 
like about the program, most of them stressing the “good feeling” it gives them.  
The affective side of multiculturalism is also stressed in the reporting on music, the aspect 
most easily consumed via radio waves. Two video commercials from the time illustrate this, 
the first one shown in movie theater previews.41 The commercial focuses on a bi-national 
couple of presenters (blond young woman, young man of Turkish origins) dancing, followed 
by sequences of people of various origins, skin colors, and professions in their everyday 
situations in visually recognizable settings of the towns of Western Germany, also dancing to 
Funkhaus Europa music.  
 
Fig. 3 – Scene from the Funkhaus Europa commercial, 2003 
A further program presentation clip, produced several years later, also uses music, this time 
featuring members of the editorial team, presenters, and journalists lip-synching a pop hit and 
                                                      
41 Kinospot Funkhaus Europa. WDR, 2003. DVD. 
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dancing around the building. In both clips, the song played is an English-language pop hit, so 
that English here turns from being the one linguistic signifier of cultural assimilation, into a 
unifier of diverse cultures. English can be lip-synched by all, unified in music and rhythm. The 
narrator says, “North Rhine-Westphalia – united in the groove, a dance, a party, no problem” 
(translation from German by the author). 
The emotion, the “groove,” not only overcomes the lines dividing cultures, but it also bridges 
the class divide between the PhD student and the taxi-driver, the German and the migrant, in 
the happy multicultural mixture that makes the modern German (European) society so 
desirable. As Ann-Marie Fortier points out, the political discourses and public debates and 
representations of multiculture always “draw out the register of intimacy – the register of 
physical, cognitive, and emotional closeness” (2008: 8), making them about the management 
of physical, cultural, emotive proximities, about multicultural intimacies. These are, however, 
employed in citizenship-making, since the language of multiculture “is always filtered through 
an ethos of intimacy and closeness that prescribes for everyone [...] the criteria for responsible 
‘caring’ citizenship which establish the limits of a ‘civil’ nation” (Fortier 2008: 8, emphasis in 
original). As Lauren Berlant maintains, the issues of multiculturalism become less about 
respect for identity and more about identification with a nation, making it a policy that “turns 
the nation into a privatized state of feeling” (Berlant 1997: 11). Multicultural politics become 
invested in cultivating feelings for the nation: in all of Europe, strategies for fostering social 
cohesion are about engineering modes of living together, using languages of intimacy, 
closeness, and feelings “as a panacea to social conflict” (Fortier 2008: 8). It is this “good 
feeling” of “no problem” of diversity that is the added value of a young, mixed, apolitical 
audience that Funkhaus Europa celebrates in its commercials. 
 
5.6 Funkhaus Europa 2011 – Global Sounds Radio 
Like the other stations of the WDR, Funkhaus Europa underwent a brand essence-finding 
process in 2011, with the purpose of re-positioning the station. A guiding frame of “Vicinity” 
(Nähe) acted as a unifying brand essence for all the WDR channels. From the larger 
considerations of repositioning for all the radio stations, an external agency derived the brand 
essence for Funkhaus Europa: Global Sounds Radio. As Thomas, the station director at the 
time, formulated,  
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In defining our present location we have tried to use and define as far as possible 
the development which we have been aiming towards for a while now, from the 
image of a supposed “foreigners’ radio” or a well-meant “integration radio” 
towards a modern radio program around concepts such as diversity, openness to 
the world, internationality and – in the best sense – multiculturalism. (translation 
from German by the author)42  
Visible here is the negative connotation associated with a “foreigners’ radio” or “integration 
radio” and the ambivalence towards the concept of multiculturalism, which must be used “in 
the best sense,” or replaced. Elaborated on in more detail,  
the concept of “Sounds” reflects here both the central role of our unmistakable 
music color, and the equally valuable significance of intercultural origins, 
languages, and all the atmosphere elements that make out a radio station. With 
our focus on the ‘global,’ we leave the old self-imposed limits of the migrant 
flows of the guest-worker-era or the political construct of “Europe” behind us. 
The world is growing together (not only Europe), the transformations of the 
future are global (not only European), immigrants from all the continents (not 
only the Mediterranean area) live in the new German society – and we are part 
and spearhead of this development. (translation from German by the author)43 
The agency working out the brand essence for Funkhas Europa listed the assets of the station, 
among them the “hearable origins” of the radio makers or the music diversity, as well as 
reporting with sensitivity and understanding on the topics. The agency also analyzed the 
deficits, among them the image of a multicultural radio station, which it rated as 
anachronistic, and proposed to aim for another, more urban, international, young, and 
cosmopolitan image. The resulting brand grid of the agency described the station as vibrant 
and passionate, enriching and stylish, near to its audience and a station that puts emotions in 
the center of media making. The brand-guide grid was then used by editors and management 
to check the station decisions during daily work, and a big print out of it hung for a while in 
the newsroom of WDR Funkhaus Europa. The new brand essence permeated the wording of 
Funkhaus Europa’s self-presentation, as expressed in its flyers and Web page, and the audio-
packaging of the station. The jingles and trailers for the station now included phrases such as, 
                                                      
42 E-Mail from Thomas to Funkhaus Europa staff, 06/06/2011. 
43 E-Mail from Thomas to Funkhaus Europa staff, 06/06/2011. 
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“We are you,” “We speak your languages,” “We put accents,” and “We are Global Pop. 
        
Fig. 4 – Global Sounds Radio – Funkhaus Europa Brochure 
On the Funkhaus Europa Web page, the new brand essence of Global Sounds Radio was also 
presented, broken down into several headings under the “Who we are section”: 
Global Sounds Radio 
We are the cosmopolitan, international radio station in Germany. With our 
mixture of Global pop and voices from around the world, we are part of the 
cosmopolitan, urban feeling of life. We deliver the vibrant soundtrack of the 21st 
century. 
We are you 
Some people talk about each other, some talk past each other. We talk to each 
other – because together we are really good. Funkhaus Europa is the Global 
Sounds Radio for people from almost 200 nations and ethnicities who live in 
North-Rhine Westphalia, Bremen, and Berlin. From Dortmund to Bremerhaven, 
from Lisbon to Kiev, from Mumbai to Buenos Aires: we offer a platform for 
global living and see Germany through the eyes of the world. As a mirror of 
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colorful society, we take a stance and stand by it. 
We are the world 
Some people never risk a peek over the garden fence, others like it national. 
Then there are those who want to cross all borders. We network these people 
open to the world, regardless of whether they come from Germany or someplace 
else – because Funkhaus Europa is a global homeland feeling with news, 
everyday life, and trends from the metropolises of the world. We offer service, 
background, and talk. Produced and presented by an international team with a 
hearable origin. This makes us multi-voiced and rich in perspectives. Whoever 
listens to us does not miss anything, and always knows the talk of the town. 
We are Global Pop 
Some love the homeland sounds, others only chart hits. The musical pulse of the 
world(s) beats in Funkhaus Europa – because we open horizons and make the 
world dance. Modern styles and urban experiments meet well-known genres and 
old traditions and mix into the Soundtrack 21. During the day with well-chosen 
Global Pop, at night and during the weekends with a unique offering for the 
curious and the advanced. We not only know the best artists in the world, we 
bring them to you live. 
We put accents 
Some like it German, others want to understand more. That is what Funkhaus 
Europa is there for – because we speak your language(s) and have fun with 
contrasts. During the day, we broadcast our world-moving program in German 
for all. In the evening and on the weekends, you receive a cosmopolitan feeling 
of life in 14 further languages, that otherwise no one can offer you: with the 
newest stories from the global village and the best music of the planet. We love 
the European idea and we are enthusiastically underway in the whole world. 
(translation from German by the author)44 
                                                      




Several elements come to the fore when comparing the understanding of the role of WDR 
Funkhaus Europa as illustrated in its 2007 Roots project and the 2012 presentation of the 
station’s Global Sounds Radio brand.  
 
Fig. 5 – The Sound of the World – Der Sound der Welt – screenshot of the Funkhaus Europa 
web page 
One is the treatment of German and foreign languages. In 2007 the languages of the immigrant 
communities were, in official terminology, referred to as “mother-tongues,” which was a 
deliberate way of avoiding the term “foreign.” As can be noticed in the quotes in the Roots 
report, there is still a divide between “us” and “them” when referring to the majority and the 
immigrant groups, even if “they” are seen as a source of “potential” (even if not yet realized), 
and a “chance,” in the context of “enrichment.”  
In the new wording, the division between “us” and “them” is erased. However, any other 
reference to national belonging is blurred as well, with the accent on the all-encompassing 
“we” of cosmopolitan, international living, where no past, no origin is mentioned, since it is 
not seen as important. In this way, languages are neither foreign, nor mother-tongues, they are 
simply “your language(s),” stressing the character of the society as an ethnic mix, with the 
offspring of migrant generations already being “mixed” one step further, so that they are even 
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more than bilingual.  
So, “we” is in no opposition to any group: “we” is “all,” the “vibrant” ethnic and cultural mix 
living in “metropolises” and “urban” areas, with cities stylized into sites where people 
embodying cultural diversity live side by side and this is seen as added value. These new 
Germans of mixed origins are dancing in clubs to international music, using the best of their 
parents’ origins, mixing among each other, speaking several languages.  
The German language is mentioned twice in the self-presentation, once in a negative context 
(“Some like it German, others want to understand more”), and once in the role of the lingua 
franca of the new German ethnically mixed society (“During the day we broadcast our world-
moving program in German for all”). German should somehow not be in the foreground; it is 
either equated to narrow-mindedness and provinciality of spirit, or simply understood as a 
useful tool that opens the door of a program “for all.”  
The foreign-language program time slot started at 6 p.m. at the time of this reform. Continuing 
through the next few years, these programs were subject to program-policy debate around the 
question of whether descendants of migrants still needed these programs as a source of 
information. In the new wording, the programs are deliberately not linked to “communities,” a 
term that carries negative connotations of segregation in a scheme that insists on the all-
encompassing unity, the cosmopolitan mix and creolization.  
The implied critique that foreign-language programs are bad for audience ratings since they 
make the German speaking listeners turn to another station when programs in other languages 
start, was, in 2012, used as basis for a new weekend program schedule, which moved all the 
foreign-language programs from the afternoon to the evening. In the wording, however, this 
critique was circumvented so that these multilingual programs were described as bringing a 
“cosmopolitan feeling of life,” “stories from the global village,” and music styles 
encompassing the planet. In this brand presentation, it is not for community news that one 
chooses to tune into Funkhaus Europa, but for a “cosmopolitan feeling of life,” one in which 
one’s foreign origin is celebrated as the mainstream of the new German society. 
Whereas in the earlier stages of foreign-language programming the aspect of connecting to the 
country of origin was accentuated, it is now erased: origin or homeland are not mentioned. 
Homeland (Heimat) appears in other contexts: as an equivalent of German provincialism 
(“Some love the homeland sounds”), or as being at home in the cities of the world, not tied to 
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the anachronistic concept of ethnic origin (“We network these people open to the world, 
regardless of whether they come from Germany or someplace else – because Funkhaus Europa 
is a global homeland feeling with news, everyday life, and the ‘scene’ from the metropolises 
of the world”). So, there is not the one homeland, with its anachronistic connotations of the 
past, roots, sentimentality, family structures, ties to one fixed geography. Instead of the 
connotations of limiting confines and pre-acculturation, “we” all are open, we are at home 
globally, in the world. We are mobile, not tied to a geographic point or one particular 
language; our society is mixed, international, hybrid, and we like it that way.  
The concept of “diversity” is not even mentioned any more. The society is no longer seen as a 
sum of different constitutive elements, a site neither of contact of cultures, like in the previous 
view of Funkhaus Europa, nor of antagonism. Here, actors do not occupy power positions, do 
not struggle for dominance, or find themselves in the center or in the periphery. Instead, 
Germany is seen as a new society, a “unity-in-diversity” characterized by a celebration of its 
own internationality taking place in a perpetual present tense. Its international mix is frozen in 
the status quo, severed from its history of economic migration, political struggles over 
restrictions, and control of immigration as well as questions of citizenship.  
In the Roots project of 2007, the discovering, defining, the naming of origins, the history, and 
the memory, were crucial to identity formation and strongly linked to “a new self-confidence.” 
It implicitly admitted the relations of dominance and minority, a situation where self-
confidence must be hard won. In the new picture, the self-confidence of the actors is taken for 
granted, it is affirmative: “we” are proud to be international, to be cosmopolitan. Diversity 
here is the initial position that is taken for granted and does not need to be named.  
The accentuated present of the new brand denies and erases histories on different levels, first 
of all the personal ones. The new message is that it does not matter anymore where one comes 
from. The past, the origins, the family, the mother-tongue, they do not define a person. Now 
the personal assets are language(s), openness, a feeling of global belonging, and an ease of 
moving in the world. The new citizen is the global nomad, who leaves weights of the past 
behind and will participate in the new globalized economy with all its opportunities. Former 
station director Thomas describes the audience of the program as the “folk” that one sees 
around big German cities, that did not exist a decade or two ago. According to him, it is a folk 
characterized by the fact that they have several worlds within them and there is a growing 
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number of people who have that.45 Thomas explicitly cites migrants, but also ethnic Germans, 
who are connected with the world through social media and travel, but concedes that this more 
international and cosmopolitan world is to be found “in the enlightened class.” 
The Global Sounds Radio positioning leaves legislative, administrative, and political histories 
behind – both the history of immigration into Germany and the political discourse around it. 
The economic histories leading to migration, the power positions this entailed, and those 
involved in the history of political migration, are all made obsolete. 
 
5.7 Closing remarks 
Funkhaus Europa has moved away from the “ethnic multiculturalism” of its starting years –  
through a phase of being “integration radio” towards a “cosmopolitan” Global Sounds Radio. 
At the time of writing, it is the station’s aim to celebrate existing diversity, recognizing the 
multiple identities of the descendants of migrants as well as the existing reality of an 
ethnically mixed society. The question that I pose here is how this reflects the adjustments 
within discourses on multiculturalism, or what the positioning as a “cosmopolitan” broadcaster 
can say about the politics through which it emerged and the interests that are served by it.  
Funkhaus Europa can be analyzed in terms of its role in defining the (new) German 
citizenship as well as its imagined audience. Even if it is dedicated to reflecting the plurality 
of cultures in the country, and it addresses a relatively narrow fragment of the overall 
audience, the very way plurality is approached says something about the dominant 
understanding of nation and citizenship rights, and of social relations of power. The station’s 
policy transformations indeed point to a changing nature of the social discourse on difference 
and the self-positioning of the station as a technology of citizenship.  
So, what has factually changed in the discourse on multiculturalism in Germany since the 
establishment of this radio station? Immigration still (and again) is one of the most virulent 
topics of political discussion in Germany, especially since the refugee movements of 2015 
and 2016 and the ensuing problematizations of the topic. The celebration of cultural diversity 
and migration have become, if not a minority position, then certainly one that seems reserved 
for liberal circles. Therefore, it can be asked how the station, that has turned to 
                                                      
45 Interview with Thomas, 03 September 2012, Cologne, translation from German by the author. 
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cosmopolitanism as its reference frame, relates to its earlier political and emancipatory 
impulse in this new context. Are the young migrants at the Hauptschule from the Roots 
project now at more prestigious schools? Or rather, who is the urban, cosmopolitan, 
international audience that WDR Funkhaus Europa is now aiming at?  
Crucially, the station has rejected the terminology and the concepts of difference, and partly 
multiculturalism, and exchanged them for cosmopolitanism and internationality. The ethnic 
elements involved in the concept of difference are made harmless, they are aestheticized, 
commodified, and made consumable for the mainstream non-ethnic audience, whose 
inclusion into the station is in turn continually demanded. To put it in the words of bell hooks, 
“within commodity culture, ethnicity becomes spice, seasoning that can liven up the dull dish 
that is mainstream white culture” (1992: 21). Enjoying multiculturalism here means enjoying 
the enrichment of the culture of the modern cosmopolitan, through contributions that can be 
consumed in the form of music, food, or travel.  
This way of interacting with difference does not refer to the recent migrant, who does not fit 
into the class category of the urban nomad, or include the claims for political emancipation of 
minoritized subjects. To paraphrase Ann-Marie Fortier, multiculturalism has become part of 
the neoliberal economy that commodifies diversity as a valuable asset that deserves proper 
management and attention. It contains both the expanding (global) and the contracting 
(national) poles of the multicultural. However, multiculturalism still remains an “introspective 
process aimed at strengthening a nation (or a conglomerate of nations, such as the EU) in its 
struggles against perceived world forces that produce internal diversification” (Fortier 2008: 
14).  
I argue that, while the radio station has changed its paradigm from being an integration 
station, to a multicultural, and finally to a cosmopolitan station, it has continued to define and 
celebrate its understanding of diversity, while at the same time not threatening the reference 
frame of the official politics, that of the nation state. Framing the existing multi-ethnic and 
multicultural situation within the discourse of cosmopolitanism allows for a celebration of a 
multiculturalism that poses no political claims, offering instead a consumable, enriching 
diversity. It works on social cohesion in that it encompasses all of society, including both its 
majority and the minoritized subjects. But at the same time, this universalist, inclusive 
discourse of internationalism closes off the histories of inequalities that have led to the 
minoritization of subjects in the first place. Through this, this paradigm change enables the 
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society to indulge in national self-love as one that is capable of embracing difference and 
making it a part of its social body.  
Crucially, treating ethnic diversity as understood by the globally mobile trendsetter turns the 
discourse of cultural difference into a question of social class, since multiculturalism here 
“enriches” the new social type, defined as a well-educated, urban listener open to the world 
and moving freely in it. A new picture of the nation is offered, as an affective field where 
diversity of a certain kind is welcome, while at the same time the status quo of social 
positions in and outside the nation remains undisturbed. However, this static picture does not 
reflect the factual situation in the society, which is characterized by friction between the 
positions of dominance of the national cultural model and the minorities. I see the Funkhaus 
Europa station as trying to avoid the usual responses of mainstream media and its 
contestations around social and cultural diversity by creating its own audience, one 
subjectified as tolerant, cosmopolitan, and open. However, relying on Laclau and Mouffe 
([1985] 2014), I also see the efforts of the station as thwarted by the one characteristic of 
discursive struggle: the contingency of the meaning it produces. As was highlighted in 
Chapter 1, in the mediation of social phenomena through discourse, meanings are not fixed, 
but continuously reconstructed and reconfigured within the struggle of competing discourses. 
At the time when it seemed that the frictions of multicultural coexistence could be overcome, 
a new movement of migration started. The arrival of hundreds of thousands of refugees from 
Syria and other countries to Europe in 2015 and 2016 reignited antagonisms around 
immigration in the public debate in Germany. While favoring the rise of populist movements 
and right-wing political rhetoric, within the media it also led to a return to the integration 
intention in creating media content.46 What this showed was not only that struggles for 
identity formation continually open new breakages in the contestation of the society and 
citizenry, but also how fragile and contingent any imaginaries of the nation that rely on static 




                                                      
46 For example, Funkhaus Europa introduced a daily Arabic program in 2016 with the explicit purpose of 




Radio makers of Funkhaus Europa  
6.1 Introduction 
The following chapter presents an analysis of six interviews conducted with protagonists of 
the Funkhaus Europa radio station, linked to its work on different levels – from employed 
editors, through free-lance authors and presenters, to the former head of the radio station.  
The interviews search for answers to the question of how the creators of multicultural 
programs react to the public politics of difference. They also examine how they see their role 
and the role of minorities in the context of media representation. The analysis explicitly looks 
for emotions and affective states displayed by the media makers and puts these in correlation 
with the positions of the interviewees in the narratives of the nation or diversity in Germany. 
For example, Ella Shohat and Robert Stam, as has already been mentioned earlier, detect in a 
series of texts from popular culture implicit ideologies and power structures, pointing 
especially in their writing to the implicit Eurocentric paradigm. For them, the media gain a 
central role in the possibility to decentralize power, to refuse the Western or Eurocentric 
structures. As sites of representation in multiculturalism, the media can construct identity and 
the feeling of belonging (to a national or cultural community, for example), but they can also 
construct alternative affiliations, those beyond (national) community, allowing for 
transnational belonging. 
The Funkhaus Europa radio station broadcasts a daily German language program and several 
evening formats in the languages of migrant communities in Germany, so that the reporters, 
the presenters, and the editors making the programs are of various origins. Also, in the 
German language program, there is the standing requirement of finding protagonists who 
reflect the multi-ethnic make-up of the society, the “new normal” of the German society. They 
appear as interview guests, respondents in polls, or they giver statements in reports. The 
makers of Funkhaus Europa are encouraged to inform the audience of the “migration 
background” of protagonists if it cannot be heard in their accent, in order to emphasize the 
“international” and “cosmopolitan” make-up and outlook of the station.  
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There is an explicit desire on the part of the station management that the presenters in the 
German language program are of an origin other than German. Whereas it is a requirement 
that they speak an accent-free German, it is desirable that they feature a non-German, foreign-
sounding name, and display a “cosmopolitan flavor” on the air. In particular, this can be 
achieved by greeting the audience in a foreign language before going back to German (“Dobro 
jutro” or  “Günaydın” are common greetings in the prime time morning show). They are also 
encouraged to include a “colorful” anecdote illustrating their intercultural life and relations, 
and so on. 
Since its establishment in 1999, which brought together all the foreign-language shows for 
guest workers and added a daily German language program to make it a full-time WDR 
station, Funkhaus Europa has undergone several transformations in its self-definition. These 
point to changes in its journalistic aims, and, as has been analyzed in the previous chapter, 
these in turn point to their ideological underpinnings. These go hand in hand with the creation 
of public policies dealing with the questions of national identity in the German immigration 
society, partly responding to and partly participating in the management of cultural and 
national difference. 
The radio station that originated from the specific radio programs for the so-called “guest-
workers” in Germany, went on to become a station for ethnic minorities and migrant 
communities, and then to one understood as a tool in the integration of immigrants. This 
function of the radio station continues to be emphasized in many of the broadcaster’s policy 
papers, in particular, concerning the media offerings for new refugees arriving in Germany. 
And finally, the station moved to a self-definition as a cosmopolitan radio, dedicated to 
celebrating the “urban mixture,” international flair, and everyday hybrid and transcultural 
practices of the new German society, especially in its articulations in the modern popular 
culture. 
These transformations have run through various strata of meaning, touching on questions 
ranging from the practicalities of everyday editorial work to those concerning political 
positionings on the nature of multiculturalism and diversity themselves. Such transformations 
are not unique to Funkhaus Europa, and as in transformations of media channels in general, 
they have happened as a gradual process. The peaks of these changes have, however, been 
marked by the articulation of station goals and strategies in the official station policies, such as 
the elaboration of new brand strategies or the new target audience. These documents in turn 
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have marked points of breakage with the old and those departing in new directions, both in 
practical, and in ideological terms, and are thus suitable for analysis. 
Among the questions posed time and again in the discussions within the editorial team, with 
and within the management, and finally articulated through several station reforms, are these: 
What audience does this radio address? Who are they today, how “ethnic” or “mixed” are they 
actually? How old are they and how old do we want them to be? How do our audiences see 
themselves in terms of belonging and identity? Do they listen to the station from the position 
of a minority or that of the majority? What do they consider familiar, and what is foreign or 
Other to them? How does the station, through its content, categorize different identities and 
project this categorization on the audience? Should the emphasis be on the ethnic communities 
with their concerns, or on a German audience interested in and attracted by diversity? How 
can diversity be “heard and felt” on the air? What segment is defined as the target-audience 
and catered to? How big should it be in order to justify the existence of the station, and, related 
to this, how far should the station emphasize its unique selling points or rather move into the 
mainstream to cater to disparate expectations? What exactly is the unique selling point of the 
station today as opposed to the time of its establishment? Does strengthening the unique 
selling point further the profile of the station or rather stand in the way of higher ratings? In 
other words, how is the tension between particularity and broad appeal to be resolved? 
It was the aim of the interviews with the radio makers, that are the subject of analysis in this 
chapter, to solicit opinions of those involved in producing the program of the  station. They 
were asked to express their opinions on where the station should go, how they imagined their 
audience, how they viewed the German multicultural society, and where they saw their own 
position and role within that society. The interviews were conducted with persons who not 
only had varying degrees of formal bonds with the station, as full-time employees or free-
lance authors, but also varying levels of affective affiliation to it, depending on their position, 
length of time they had been part of the team, and their ethnic origins. Among the interviewees 
were two editors who were among the founding members of WDR Funkhaus Europa, as well 
as the head of the station at the time, during whose tenure the brand of the station was changed 
from multiculturalism to cosmopolitanism. 
It was also an explicit aim of the interviews to solicit emotional responses concerning the 
interviewees’ own cultural identity as well as their self-identification with the changes in the 
editorial direction of the station. Treated broadly as personal narratives, the interviews shed 
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light on the mechanisms of identity formation in the modern multicultural situation in 
Germany, and possibly identified if new subject positions are in the making. At the same time, 
the interviews also identified strategies for questioning these positions and resisting them 
through alternative discourses. 
 
6.2 Yildiz 
Yildiz47 is an employed editor and one of the founding members of the radio station WDR 
Funkhaus Europa. She is Turkish-born, but has spent most of her life in Germany, where she 
first worked in social work, before becoming a free-lance journalist and then editor. In earlier 
years, she was politically active in anti-racism NGOs and is familiar both with initiatives 
concerning multiculturalism in Germany and with the Turkish political spectrum of the time. 
At the time of the interview, she was in charge of public relations for Funkhaus Europa and 
had more contact with the management than with the everyday running of the station. In the 
interview, she was asked about the transformations the station had gone through since its 
establishment, particularly her interpretation of these changes and her feelings about them. It 
also included questions about her biography and experiences as a journalist in the past twenty 
years.  
Now in her mid-fifties, Yildiz is a member of the first generation of descendants of the former 
Gastarbeiter, “guest workers”, in Germany. Through Yildiz’s story, it emerges that being a 
daughter of Turkish migrants in Germany continues to be crucial for her identity-building, 
although in professional terms she has never wanted to be reduced to “niche-journalism.” In 
her interview, she clearly divides the German society into two parts: the socially dominant, 
German majority, and the minorities of various ethnic origins. The separation line between the 
two is not impermeable, but the division does intersect cultural, economic, professional, and 
many other strata. Yildiz sees herself as ethnicized somewhat against her will, with her origin 
strongly influencing her career, above all by placing her in a position outside of the social 
mainstream, and in need of fighting for a place in it. For her, both the story of her own 
professional path and the stories of other migrant-descended professionals, are stories of 
emancipation. This is also visible in the Roots project48 that she supervised for Funkhaus 
                                                      
47 Interview with Yildiz, July 12th, 2012, Cologne, translation from German by the author. 
48 The Roots program is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. 
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Europa in the mid-2000s, in which young people of various ethnic origins were encouraged to 
look for the stories of their families, and thus attempt to decipher their cultural identities. 
For Yildiz, what defines the group she places herself in, outside of the majority, is less a 
physical experience of migration, and more a “special experience” of people like her, with the 
“connecting link […] that in their generation or in some other generation Germany is 
somehow not their homeland.” Even though not all migrants identify themselves with all the 
other migrants, “still, something ties you to the others,” something Yildiz defines as a “break.”  
You have this break already through the fact that a part of your family in the 
first, second generation, does not live where you live. So, you have this break 
anyway. You have it inside, in the fact that you have another language that is 
important to you. I don’t mean a break in the negative sense; but not everything 
is smooth, not everything went in a linear manner. (this and all subsequent 
quotes in this chapter were translated by the author). 
Before becoming an editor, Yildiz was a free-lance journalist and during that time in her early 
career, she deliberately avoided the so-called “foreigners’ topics,” not wanting to be put in a 
narrowly defined thematic corner. However, she often found herself working in this area 
anyway. While Yildiz claims that she never experienced straightforward discrimination as a 
free-lance journalist, she was often confronted with the well-intentioned statement that “you 
can’t hear that you are not from here.” Her Turkish origin, however, became a topic when the 
“game” was about getting an editor’s employment position, where  
you think or notice that the people cannot abstract from the fact that you have 
this origin. It is always a topic. Funny, but I experienced that rather as an editor, 
that somebody says, yes, you don’t look like it at all, or they ask you totally 
personal questions, if my mother does this or that, or my father, or that they ask 
you biographical details. 
In Yildiz’s experience, the interpretation of her identity as linked to her social position was 
most obvious when an entitlement was at stake, in her case an employment contract with the 
WDR. She recounts an experience she had in a flat share with “a bunch of enlightened 
alternative left-wing people,” when she got her first short-term contract with the WDR.  
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So we raised a toast to that in this group of seven or eight people, and you could 
really tell how hard they took it, how they really had to swallow, because that 
was too much. As a Turkish woman, you can maybe become a manager at 
McDonald’s or even a free-lance journalist, but an employed editor with the 
WDR, this is really too much. You know, there you can tell that even with these 
alternative guys, because it touches on their own dreams, the racism comes up. 
When you do something that is attractive to them too. 
When Yildiz started working for Funkhaus Europa at the time the station was founded, it was 
a novelty for her to find a public service offering that explicitly put the experience of being a 
migrant or descendent of migrants to Germany, at its center. Although both the political 
discourse and the station policy and brand have since that time gradually changed, it is her 
opinion that the need for dealing with that experience has not diminished since the station was 
established. This is how she describes the initial sense of novelty this approach gave her:  
In the beginning, I was always totally touched by the fact that as a matter of 
course in these German-speaking surroundings, I was informed about the world 
and still had another approach to the country of my origin. Thematically, I 
learned a lot about other countries and in this music program it was a matter of 
course that a Turkish song would be played. This sounds totally banal, but that 
was it. For me, it closed a gap, it was not this only German or only ethnic thing 
any more, but there was something that actually reflected what you have in 
yourself. I thought this was really good and, in the beginning and since then, I 
found that the station lived from the experience of the people who worked there. 
It was not the knowledge of the news agencies or of the newspapers, but you 
had in this newsroom a lived life. 
It was only with the founding of Funkhaus Europa that the dichotomy of either being an 
“ethnic” or a “normal” journalist stopped existing. It was also a space where the “migrants’ 
Germany” crossed the boundary to the “Germans’ Germany,” with a Turkish song played on a 
German-language station. In this professional context, Yildiz could unite both sides of her 
experience, without needing to factor out one part of it – here she could bring in her “lived 
life.” In the following quote she brings out the whole emotional content of this experience, as 
well as the sheer novelty of being able to professionally process the multicultural situation she 
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lived in. It also points to the affective content within the group of radio makers that initially 
gathered around the project:  
Many discussions, many pieces developed from this [experience of migration], 
they arose from this story. This did me well, it was a sort of […] well, healing 
would be too much of a word, but a consolation or a growing together of 
something. I can work normally, on all topics, but I can also tie my origins into 
it without losing myself in it or glamorizing it or romanticizing it or something. 
This closed some sort of a gap and I am totally thankful for it. Now I notice that 
[…] at some point I have become indifferent, the stories do not have to arise 
from my story. So, my journalistic ambition or my biography is not coupled with 
my origin, there is no sense of mission, I realized that. But, at a certain time, 
Funkhaus Europa was totally important, it was a valuation or an upgrading, that 
I could get rid of these stories within a group and also in exchange with the 
Germans, that you did not just tell them, but you processed them journalistically. 
This was totally important. 
For Yildiz and most of the editors in Funkhaus Europa at the time of the establishment of the 
station, it was a first encounter with a German medium that was made by people like her for 
people like her – who clearly defined themselves as outside the dominant majority. It was not 
just a radio station for immigrants, such as the information programs for guest-workers in the 
1960s, but a station for their descendants, in German, and with a view of their bi-cultural 
allegiances. It offered them the possibility of making decisions on how this experience would 
be interpreted and represented, and this differed from the media mainstream. Working for 
Funkhaus Europa “closed a circle in the emotional sense.” 
In terms of career development, however, in hindsight Yildiz thinks that it was not a good 
step, “because one is not really taken seriously.” In Yildiz’s experience of contact with editors 
from other WDR departments, Funkhaus Europa is either not taken very seriously, or even 
openly disliked:  
Why is that so? Well, it is just the normal racism. You feel better than the 
minority, of course. But, I think many would be surprised if they saw the 
journalistic potential that is there in Funkhaus Europa. I think, many are 
surprised, many colleagues think that here some highly paid dimwits run around, 
who have this job, only because they have the right origin. Because they fill a 
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quota. […] I mean, many people want to do journalism and the resources are 
limited so this is also about competition and I believe racism is not far away 
here. If you think that way anyway. Journalists are no different there than other 
people. If it is about your job then, oh well […]. 
In her answers, Yildiz draws a line in all areas that separates the majority, to which she refers 
to in the third person plural (“they”), from the immigrants, who do not belong to the majority. 
They are used to their “uncomfortable positions” of not belonging, but when they move to 
occupy the more comfortable ones, such as good professional positions, the German majority 
attempts to redistribute the resources to its advantage again. She sees this as happening in 
Funkhaus Europa at the time of the interview, where a change of rhetoric from “cultural 
difference” to “cosmopolitanism” is for her a front for a continuing power struggle.  
I believe, that for many, if you belong to the main group, to the majority here, 
and you have to work with people who have another ethnic origin, that in the 
long run it cannot be endured not to belong. You have to retreat to a more 
comfortable position and deal with it. Because, this is an uncomfortable position, 
it is uncomfortable. As an immigrant you get used to it, but why should 
somebody do it who is actually part of the majority? In the end, I think, this is 
all about the distribution of resources and leading positions and qualifications 
and when you say, we do not care, or this is not important any more, either on 
the side of the broadcaster or on the side of the audience, then you do not have 
to take care about winning some representative of an ethnic minority as a listener 
or as an employee, because that is indifferent. The point is, you are 
cosmopolitan, right? 
Being in charge of station PR and therefore also involved in the re-branding of Funkhaus 
Europa in collaboration with an external agency, Yildiz points to an underlying power 
struggle. She sees here an attempt by the dominant German group to close all spaces of 
difference and possibly resistance within the discourse of this medium. In particular, the 
inversion of the concept of “inclusiveness” from its anti-discriminatory context into a demand 
for a homogeneously “colorful” German society, is seen as serving the goals of the dominant 
group. Yildiz interprets this as by not being excluded any more, the dominant group has 
regained control over the representation of difference and belonging. 
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I believe that those who belong to the main ethnic group, in this case the 
Germans, I believe that they find it difficult to repeatedly have to associate with 
ethnic groups, without being a part of it themselves. I believe […] this is about 
power relations and that defining how a station will be directed is not in the 
power of the ethnic groups but with the main group, the Germans. […] I mean, 
they are again a part of it, they are cosmopolitan. They are not simply Germans, 
they are cosmopolitan. All the other people are cosmopolitan, we are all 
cosmopolitan, we can take each other’s hands and dance a round dance. Through 
this we are all again the same, so to speak. They no longer have to occupy 
themselves with the realities of these ethnic groups. Because simply, because 
you annul something in this way. 
Yildiz sees in this a retreat away from political commitment – since everybody is 
cosmopolitan, reflecting on difference is not necessary or desired. Assuming a position of 
difference and then applying it in the media work is not an issue – freed from political 
considerations the work becomes much more comfortable.  
It becomes a self-service shop. You do not have to occupy yourself with the 
reality any more or with the difference, or what makes up those ethnic 
minorities, because you say: we are all the same, I am as much a cosmopolitan 
as you are. […] They [the Germans] want to feel better. […] And they create the 
same level with the ethnic groups, because they say: you are nothing special, I 
am exactly like you, look at me, because I am a cosmopolitan. […] That is, I 
believe, the point, and that they do not separate anymore, so that you never get 
to asking about the question of power, because you have put this lid on it, you 
know. 
For Yildiz, the struggle for dominance in Germany, in particular in her work environment, has 
not stopped or lost its valence in the last decades. Whereas on an abstract level and the level of 
political rhetoric the majority is committed to respecting diversity, the parallel political 
demands on migrants and their descendants to integrate point in another direction. In a 
professional environment, when it comes to the distribution of material resources and status, 
the origin can become a criterion for exclusion. In this way, the move from being “ethnic,” 
“minority,” or “multicultural” to “cosmopolitan” is for Yildiz a tactic in a struggle for 
resources, because  
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the German colleagues cannot stand this discrepancy. Because in that moment, 
you are also the Turk, the Italian, the Serb, or the Croat. Then they prefer being 
a cosmopolitan. […] I mean, hey, this is my origin and I would find it strange to 
say, I am cosmopolitan. Frankly, I think it is a bit silly. 
Yildiz believes that a move towards cosmopolitanism is a move into the mainstream, since no 
other broadcaster would actually refuse the label of being cosmopolitan. Choosing personnel 
without regard of their cultural competences, under the aegis of inclusiveness, reducing their 
difference to a foreign name, takes the station away from the realities of the society. For 
Yildiz, having “your finger on the pulse” would mean making people who share the 
experience of migration and/or have bi-national identities work as editors.  
That is the opposite concept to the cosmopolitan concept, which can practically 
be done by anybody. Such a program, I believe, they don’t do it anymore, 
because they would not be able to. You cannot do this with a completely linear 
biography. If the majority in the editorial staff consists of such people, then you 
cannot do such a program, how would you do it? It needs to arise from you or 
from your experiences in the community in which you move. 
 
6.3 Amir 
Amir49 is a regular free-lance author, who started working as a journalist for the Bosnian-
language program of Funkhaus Europa, and later for the German-language program. He then 
moved to Sarajevo, from where he continued to contribute to the station  program, and then 
back to Cologne. Amir is also a book author and, in the interview, he deliberately stressed that 
he does not want to define himself as a journalist in the classical sense, but as an author, 
somebody who, when working for the radio, “creates stories through sounds.”  
Amir sees a new multicultural society in Germany emerging, a generation for whom the ethnic 
mixture is the normal state – at the time of the interview in his late-thirties, he sees himself as 
part of this new society. Amir came to Germany as a teenager in the early 1990s, as a refugee 
from the war in Bosnia, and is now a German national. At the time of the interview he was 
preparing to move with his family to Sarajevo, but said that although he was leaving, he was 
                                                      
49 Interview with Amir, July 19th, 2012, Cologne, translation from Bosnian by the author. 
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taking his German passport with him and intending to return to Germany when his eldest child 
started school. He stressed that he felt “totally like a part of this society” – but for him, it is a 
society of diversity. To illustrate this, he recounted an anecdote about becoming a fan of the 
German national teams. As a university student, Amir trained a junior basketball team with 
players of different origins.  
And one year, there were the world championships in basketball, I don’t know 
where. Until then, I never was a fan of Germany and then suddenly I realized it 
was practically those kids of mine playing, that they are my kids, my world that 
is suddenly playing for Germany. So, I became a Germany fan, also of the 
German football team. Now, I don’t know how plausible that is, but [...] I think 
that some part, I will say it again, it is not a part of the mainstream audience, but 
that part [chancellor Angela] Merkel talks about when she is talking about 
foreigners, but that is how it is, it is part of some popular consciousness, which 
I live as a personal experience. So, working as a journalist I really found many 
[…] well, never an Italian actually […] but many Turks who are fans of the 
German team. And that is something that has changed with me and I have a 
feeling that it has changed in Germany in the past fifteen years. 
Amir insists on being a part of this new consciousness emerging in Germany – he sees its 
diversity as normality and imagines the audience for the content he creates for the radio as 
living that normality. Whereas at the beginning of his work for Funkhaus Europa he was 
working for a “typical foreign audience, migrants with a sensitivity for migrant themes,” this 
has changed. Now Amir feels he is addressing not only a portion of the audience interested in 
diversity, one that has traveled, seen remote parts of the world, and is interested in “some sort 
of extravagant immigrants,” but “a whole younger generation, people for whom it is 
something normal. I mean, that their parents are from another country, that they have the 
experience of other languages, and so on.” 
This normality is, however, a normality only for a portion of the society, one which stands in 
opposition to the dominant discourse of German politics, public institutions, and the media. 
Amir recounts an episode concerning 1LIVE, the WDR radio station specifically targeting a 
young audience. 1LIVE once dedicated a whole day to Turkish listeners, concentrating on 
only two topics: kebabs and belly dance. Amir ascribes this folklorization to the makeup of the 
editorial team of 1LIVE, where very few journalists and no employed editors of foreign origin 
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work, and “there is no presenter whose name ends in –ić.” For Amir, the dominant discourse 
on the existing multicultural situation, that continues to operate with categories such as 
“foreigners” and “immigrants,” is refusing to acknowledge realities.  
So, no matter how many so-called multicultural characters you find on the street, 
for whom it is the most normal thing, you will not find this picture in the public 
institutions, the same thing in politics, the same in the media. In the mainstream 
media, it is still not present. Milto [a journalist colleague] and I always joke, 
when we watch RTL [German commercial TV-broadcaster], we say, hey, did 
you see when they did that poll on the street, a foreigner walked behind the guy 
they were interviewing, and the camera sort of turned, it moved just a little, you 
know, but not quite, [laughs], not yet. […] There is some sort of mainstream 
fetishization of anything multicultural, but it has still not become part of the 
structure, so, as I said, in the institutions, in the politics, in our WDR, when we 
look at the structure of the whole radio, there are still no foreigners in key places. 
For Amir, the two poles – the “street” and the “establishment” – not only occupy different 
positions within the society, but actually interpret the picture of the society in completely 
opposing ways, with the “establishment” having a blind spot where multicultural life should 
be. Amir does not place himself in either of the two positions he makes out: neither in “the 
street” nor in the dominant discourse. Whereas he can participate in both of these discourses, 
he places himself deliberately outside them, in a third position, that of an “observer.” He 
describes himself as someone who can on the one hand guard the distance towards the world 
he sees and processes in his creative work, and on the other, owing to his origins, feel near  his 
interviewees, who are outside the mainstream. He claims he can elicit more honest responses, 
awaken feelings of solidarity, and even build coalitions with the “multicultural characters” he 
interviews. Somewhat like Yildiz in her interview, Amir also claims to possess a sort of 
hidden cultural capital due to his “different experience.”  
When I do a poll, as a Bosnian, I will communicate differently with that great 
colorfulness on the street, than, say, a guy from 1LIVE, your average middle-
class German, who spends his summer in Mallorca and does not have so many 
scars on his body and soul like me. I don’t hide that experience, so, when, with 
that experience, I talk to the people, then I get different information, different 
sound bites. I think that is the difference. So, when I as a Bosnian interview a 
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Turk, he will give me a completely different statement than to an 1LIVE boy 
who has come to do something interesting about kebabs or belly dance. I think 
it is qualitative, not good or bad, but concerning the content, those are two 
different worlds. 
In Amir’s narrative, this “different experience” turns into a secret code of understanding, with 
Amir switching codes in his everyday life, between that of what is desired by the mainstream, 
and that of subversive solidarity with his ethnicized co-citizens.  
Still, Amir’s stance is somewhat ambiguous, as several times during the interview he insists on 
a third position – an observer from the margins. He uses his own belonging to the “ethnics” to 
solicit material for his authorial work, which he then addresses to a group he makes out as 
emerging: a new generation marked by the experience of diversity.  
Amir’s picture is not characterized by open struggles for dominance or by divisions between 
the ethnic communities, which were present in the narratives of an older generation of 
immigrants in Germany. Whereas for Amir the society is willing to share on the superficial 
level, in private, the majority is suffering the fear of losing positions of power. Similarly to 
Yildiz when she talks about entitlements, Amir also thinks that when “multicultural Germany” 
starts to claim a redistribution of the resources, it will lead to “a conflict that is coming,” when 
the foreigners “who slowly somehow, purely statistically, are grabbing towards the middle 
classes, when they start to take positions away within the middle classes, there will be real 
conflicts.” Amir sees this fear smouldering under the surface of civility, which comes to the 
fore in times when populism peaks, for example, with Thilo Sarrazin’s bestseller from 2010,  
Germany is doing away with itself50, championing the thesis that Muslim immigrants, 
unwilling to integrate, are doing away with the German welfare state. Amir sees this conflict 
flaring up in his everyday work. He claims to know exactly whom to approach to get a racist 
statement against the Muslims.  
I look for the middle-class, you  know, not completely young, let’s say, around 
fifty years old, […] you know, nice jackets, missus and mister, always a couple, 
because the man always likes to prove himself in front of the woman, so you 
always catch them in couples. That is where the “regulars’ table”51 starts, it is 
                                                      
50 Sarrazin, Thilo: Deutschland schafft sich ab, 2010. 
51 Amir uses the German word Stammtisch, regulars’ table, which usually refers to a certain low-level right-wing 
populist discussion. 
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here in the middle class that I find most animosities, and articulated ones. So, 
what the garbage man will spit out, but will not know how to explain, this guy 
has instead read Sarrazin, you understand, and he will explain it well to you. 
They buy Sarrazin’s book to keep them safe, so that they feel better, so that they 
feel better [laughs]. 
Doing a street poll, Amir deliberately solicits racist statements against Islam. As a foreigner 
(and a Muslim), with subversive intentions, he consciously “manipulates” his poll in order to 
get the desired sound bite. As opposed to his unknowing respondents, Amir has the capacity to 
switch codes, due to his “difference,” a defining factor of his identity and his work. When 
asked to illustrate how this “difference” is expressed in his radio work, Amir recounts an 
anecdote about a live report from a lottery kiosk he once did for Funkhaus Europa and then for 
WDR5, the WDR information program targeting a well-informed, culturally-oriented, and 
politically interested audience.  
You know, it was a zoo, I am the zoo for them, the way I was doing that thing. 
Because German radio, the German WDR5 still has a sacral aura, […] like, it is 
very serious. […] Once I am reporting from a lottery shop, there is something 
like 30 million in the game, and I am reporting. People are buying their lottery 
tickets, the guy who owns the shop is English, there is an Albanian there, a 
Gypsy, a Roma, and I am reporting live for Funkhaus Europa, and what we do 
is something like a multicultural circus. So, this Roma will leave Germany if he 
wins, this Englishman I don’t know what, crazy stuff. And then I start my report 
for WDR5, a totally different atmosphere, so, when I talk about the Roma, 
nobody is laughing. First of all, nobody finds it funny that a Roma wants to leave 
Germany if he wins the lottery [laughs].  I find it totally funny, so then I sort of 
bla-bla-bla, and they pose a completely serious question. I mean, zero humor, 
zero. […] I went there to tell about the atmosphere, you understand, and they 
want information. So, maybe the difference is, if it is humor, I don’t know. 
Maybe the difference is in the distance. Maybe when you are Funkhaus Europa 
you are telling the story from the inside, otherwise you are telling it literally 
from above, although the society is not so, but you are still telling it from above. 
[…] All of them are like that. 
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The way Amir recounts this anecdote also has subversive traits: the high-brow, “sacral” 
WDR5 program looks ridiculous. The protagonists – Amir, the English owner of the kiosk, the 
Albanian, the Roma, but also the editors of Funkhaus Europa and the audience – are all in the 
know, united in a “multicultural circus.” For Amir, that is his “habitat,” in which he forms his 
identity in the mutual understanding with others who share a particular experience of 
difference. It is also there where he draws material for his work, aimed at an audience that 
belongs to the same club. The presenter, the editors, and the audience of WDR5 are, on the 
other hand, simply not let in on the joke. In this narrative, the shared joke is a secret code, the 
unspoken declaration of solidarity, which unites the “multicultural circus” and excludes the 
Germans: those who would otherwise do the economic and political excluding, or excluding, 
from the media discourse, those who look on this “zoo” from above.  
 
6.4 Miltiadis 
Miltiadis, a German radio and print media journalist of Greek origins, is a long-term, regular 
freelance contributor to Funkhaus Europa and, at the time of the interview, a presenter of the 
Funkhaus Europa bilingual Greek-German program Radiopolis, that was later, in 2016, taken 
off the air.52 At the beginning of his journalistic career, Miltiadis worked for a computer 
magazine and sporadically sold pieces to the radio or to regional papers. He tried to get a more 
regular engagement as a radio presenter or to enter public service broadcasting through a 
voluntary training year, but failed. He reports on having found himself in “this multicultural 
niche” by chance, when asked by an acquaintance to do a Greek press review for Funkhaus 
Europa.  
When I reflect upon it now, it is natural that it did not work through the normal 
channels, that it worked through a contact and it worked through a specific 
demand, that I specifically could fulfill, which is these multicultural topics, 
although I did not intend it that way. 
Miltiadis has contributed regularly to Funkhaus Europa and occasionally to other public 
service media or regional newspapers. In his case, his Greek origin was an entrance ticket to 
Funkhaus Europa; however, whereas this fact has the advantage of “qualifying” him for 
                                                      
52 Interview with Miltiadis, July 19th, 2012, Cologne, translation from German by the author. 
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reports on topics concerning Greece, it is also a handicap when trying to sell “normal,” 
mainstream themes. But, more than that, Miltiadis analyzes the situation in economic terms, 
self-critically speaking of “riding the Greek ticket,” especially during the Greek debt crisis.  
Somehow I can say, I am a little lazy and I know when I am, so to speak, riding 
the Greek ticket, somehow within these limits I can more easily bring it [pieces 
on the Euro crisis] when it suddenly boils over and the interest is there, than 
when in general I give it a try in an economics magazine, a newspaper, feature 
pages, whatever, to establish myself in a sea of other authors. […] I have already 
worked for other channels, I have done features for WDR5 that had nothing to 
do with migration, I have already done reports about minimal pay or something 
for WDR2,53 that had nothing to do with migration, but they ask me rarely, yes, 
they contract me more for these topics. I mean, WDR2 has already asked me to 
do something about Greece around the European soccer championship game, 
they didn’t ask me to do something on von der Leyen [Ursula von der Leyen, at 
the time of the interview was the Federal Labor Minister], although I had already 
done something about that. They could have also said, he has already done 
something about that topic, but instead there are others that can do it. 
Whereas Miltiadis reports on general difficulties in placing mainstream topics in the 
mainstream media, he takes a sober view of the advantages and disadvantages of an ethnic 
origin, which in his experience can be both an impediment and a bonus.  
On the other hand, Miltiadis also reports on difficulties in placing themes on migration, 
multiculturalism, and diversity in the mainstream media. He is the author of articles and a 
book on questions concerning immigration and is active in NGO work for refugees in 
Germany, which makes him sensitized to such topics. Therefore, this is the area where his 
main journalistic interests lie:  
And I mean, of course, in the nineties I noticed the themes, it was always this 
“the boat is full”-discussion, the foreigners’ discussion was going on in the 
media without the migrants themselves getting to say something. In that sense I 
naturally found it important to change that. Naturally I myself had an interest in 
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working on such topics and publishing, in order to create this visibility and make 
other points of view present in the reporting. 
Putting the system into question or challenging it through creating visibility for other points of 
view is something that is important to Miltiadis in his authorial work, but he is unsure as to 
what extent an “ethnic” journalist is permitted to do so in mainstream media. The boundaries 
here are often set by small editorial interventions with the aim of creating “more digestible” 
reports, which can sometimes also mean moderating negative information on ethnic 
protagonists.  
A limit is, so to speak, always there, how much self-confidence is possible there, 
how much putting into question of the system is possible, because at the back of 
your head, there is of course always, the listeners or the majority of the listeners 
could feel provoked, right? This piece I did yesterday for WDR5, they cut out 
one part about this [name of a refugee threatened by repatriation], and the part 
is where she says […] she is not making an effort to get her passport. She says, 
why should I help the foreigners’ office to repatriate me, right? And that’s what 
they cut out. […] OK, this will lead to somebody saying, right, that can’t be 
tolerated, she must make an effort and so on, right? […] Where I would say, it 
is a form of resistance and that’s what it is, most of the people prevent their 
repatriation for a while, because they don’t present their passport. And such a 
message is by all means a provocation. How far can you report on that and not 
present it simply, that is how it is, right. I don’t mean to value something as bad, 
but there is always a little bit of a limit there. 
A further problem in “ethnic” journalists reporting on “ethnic” topics is a practice of self-
censorship in order to make their reporting on provocative topics less irritating. Miltiadis 
recounts an episode of trying to sell a story about a particularly brazen petty criminal fighting 
his pending repatriation from Germany to a regional newspaper, and failing:  
I find it is an interesting topic, but it didn’t come through, with anybody, because 
that is like you said, the good foreigners. There I did not censor, just the opposite, 
I offered it uncensored and that does not work. 
This need for presenting the “good foreigners” and not irritating or provoking the audience in 
the mainstream context also points to tacit hierarchies in the discourse, to unpronounced limits 
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of tolerance that are set by the majority. In the end, what is presented is not unadulterated 
realistic reports, but an effort is taken not to cross this limit – a mechanism “ethnic” journalists 
are complicit in. For Miltiadis, starting to work for Funkhaus Europa also meant giving the 
protagonists of migration a voice, emancipating them from being objects that others speak of. 
He imagines the audience of this station as being able to move back the limits of tolerance, as 
being “somewhat critical, alternative, or migrants on the educated side, who have a certain 
openness to the world and interest in topics.”  
In Miltiadis’ answers it is visible that for him, journalistic work is political work, and it is this 
emancipatory, political component that he sees as slowly disappearing from the program 
selection of Funkhaus Europa, which now mostly “avoids problem themes.” It creates a sense 
of frustration for him not to be able to place such topics in a program that for him should 
specialize in them, especially in light of the difficulties of making them visible in the 
mainstream discourse. For Miltiadis, multiculturalism is by definition a field of political and 
ideological contestation, that cannot be reduced to lifestyle stories or light music, which he 




Ioannis is a free-lance journalist, born and raised in Germany as the son of Greek migrants.54 
He has been working for the German-speaking program of Funkhaus Europa for years and was 
also one of the two presenters and authors, together with Miltiadis, on the bilingual Greek-
German show Radiopolis.  
A radio station that used to be Ioannis’ regular employer for many years, Funkhaus Europa 
was at the time of the interview turning into a more sporadic and irregular source of income, 
and although he worked for other WDR channels and authored a regular series in another 
station, he saw few chances of ever becoming a mainstream journalist. Ioannis speaks of 
himself as somebody with a “crooked nose,” meaning visibly foreign – if not physically then 
certainly concerning his attitude – thus placing himself unequivocally outside the social 
mainstream. Feeling like a part of an unwelcome minority, especially in the media, he admits 
                                                      
54 Interview with Ioannis July 20th, 2012, Cologne, translation from German by the author. 
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to having assumed a consciously more offensive stance towards the dominant discourse in the 
past few years. His attitude is a mixture of bitterness and bellicosity; his language is relatively 
aggressive and he labels the Germans derogatively as “Hans Fritz Potato” or “Lieschen 
Müller,” In particular, German reporting on the Greek debt crisis, which he sees as one-sided, 
has made him re-examine his allegiances and gradually “take the Greek side”:  
It is the quintessence, so to speak, of the German position in the whole crisis, 
you have to save, you need to. I have often thought I should change profession, 
or I already have changed it, because I do not report objectively any more – I 
ascribe values, opinion, I often reflect that gesture, oh, we know all that already. 
And insofar, it is not actually why I took up this profession. 
A strong bitterness transpires also when Ioannis speaks of the transformation of Funkhaus 
Europa from a mouthpiece of ethnic minorities, with connotations of “the ghetto” and 
subversion of the dominant discourse, to what he sees as a docile and inoffensive music 
station. He questions the station’s aim of inclusiveness, especially the demand of the editorial 
staff to make all the details of his radio pieces accessible to the entire audience. Ioannis 
compares this to a chase for the lowest common denominator, describing it as “social 
democracy for the daft.” He is particularly embittered by the German editors telling him how 
to work, whom he sees as generally not qualified for editing programs dedicated to diversity. 
For him, the Greek-German bilingual show, which was still on the air at the time of the 
interview, is a refuge where he and his colleagues conduct “partisan combat.”  
I don’t do it only for the Greeks, I do it for the people who know Greece a little 
better and who maybe can enjoy a joke I make and say: there, he’s hit it right 
again. Whereas the normal German Hans Fritz Potato stands there and says: I 
don’t get it. It gets on my nerves anyway, that I often have to deal with people 
who often say, it can’t be understood. Whereas I think, yes, you don’t understand 
it, but there are enough other people who get it, who get it at once. 
In terms of the German-language program, Ioannis is very critical of its turn away from 
multiculturalism towards cosmopolitanism, comparing the new direction to a program of 
Schlager music “for urban wannabe-nomads.”  
The problem is, you cannot make such a radio without the emancipatory 
impulse. If you do that, only to give the boom-shakala-faction something to 
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teeter to, somebody will come and make this program better. […] I cannot 
believe that you simply throw away a part of your audience and say: the other 
part is much more important. That is probably so only in the heads of the people 
who read the media analyses. […] In ten years, you will have Turkish, Greek, 
Spanish, channels in Germany, just like in other countries. […] You don’t get 
the crooked nose off your face. And now to pretend that all the crooked noses 
would not interest us any more, you can do that, but there is always the question 
if that will pay off. 
He sees the radio as getting too “polished” for a non-existent urban, music-loving audience, 
rather than allowing it to be more challenging, have more “edge,” even if it might mean not 
reaching higher ratings. He laments the loss of emancipatory intention and thinks the station 
should cultivate a position on the margins of the media mainstream, “in the ghetto.” Even if it 
would mean alienating a part of the audience, the station should position itself politically so as 
to subvert the mainstream:  
It should be a radio station actually from the ghetto for the ghetto, which then 
has a certain specific charm. […] this program has no goal. Instead the boom-
shakala-faction comes and wants to tell me how great it is. I don’t need that. 
[…] That is posing and I don’t like posing. Some people want to float with the 
tide, that’s OK, but at least let the crooked noses be protagonists. And it gets so 
on my nerves. But that was a birth defect of Funkhaus Europa, that they didn’t 
say consequently, not everybody who has a Belgian shepherd dog is 
automatically multicultural. […] If you have super-stylish music, like say 
Funkhaus Europa, then you cannot have Lieschen Müller there. It got 
systematically boiled down, always down, down, down. 
Similarly to Yildiz and Amir, Ioannis also sees the migrant-descended population of Germany 
as sharing a common code, allowing it to understand certain things that “Lieschen Müller” or 
“Fritz Potato” cannot. Ioannis sees an aesthetization behind the strategy of cosmopolitanism in 
the station, that for him is a far cry from the political position as a space for subversion and the 
alternative discourse he wishes. He sees this as an attempt at elevating ratings by eradicating 
“edge” in the radio and making it compatible to a larger audience, “polishing it.” Avoiding 
“wog-topics” and the “crooked noses” is seen as representing diversity without its protagonists 
controlling the process, without having a real voice in the discourse. In the final consequence, 
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Ioannis predicts the station will lose the main argument for its existence and be forced into a 
competition with private special interest channels. 
 
6.6 Uwe 
In his late fifties, Uwe Meyer was at the time of the interview the most senior member of the 
Funkhaus Europa editorial team, who joined the station at its beginnings, in 1999.55 At the 
time, he was one of only a few German editors in Funkhaus Europa, with the initial team 
consisting mostly of editors from the foreign-language programs of WDR. The reasons that in 
1999 made him join a completely new special-interest radio station as a journalist from a local 
studio of the WDR were mostly practical: at the time he aimed at a more stable employment 
position and wanted to enter a full-time radio station, rather than continue supplying short 
news pieces for the WDR news desk, which was his main task in the local studio. He sees the 
strength of the first years of the station mostly in “depicting diversity” on the European level.  
The approach was this balancing act that is actually still there, between the topics 
of the migrants, […] and the European level. To get this perspective that all is 
interdependent, […] and that you report about that and reflect it onto what is 
going on in Germany, that we actually always had a European perspective, we 
compared. So, compare developments in different countries and look for 
commonalities and where the differences are too. And that was actually also a 
very analytical approach and at that time the other stations did not work that 
way. Today it is mainstream, for example, the “correspondents’ chains,”56 but 
at the time it was something completely new in Funkhaus Europa, or that 
through a press review you look into other countries, […] say, look into Croatia 
or into Turkey, get a look into the media of the other country. But also to get, 
for example, the Dutch view and also just document diversity. 
At the time, Uwe had a clear picture of whom the station should reach, people from “the 
Turkish truck driver with lots of time on his hands” to “a Greek doctor,” but not  
                                                      
55 Interview with Uwe, July 25th, 2012, Cologne, translation from German by the author. 
56 Korrikette – literally: a correspondents’ chain, a series of two or three short pieces on the same topic by 
correspondents from different countries. 
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the intellectuals or the students for whom we are maybe broadcasting today. But 
at that time, I took it seriously and thought, well, we also have to do topics that 
concern ordinary people. But, experience has shown that the listening habits of 
migrants do not greatly differ from those of the Germans, that it is rather a 
question of social conditions, of qualifications, of living standards. And today 
we have to see that we have not reached many of those people whom we wanted 
to reach. 
Uwe thinks that the station has failed to address the second and third generations of migrants 
in Germany, which was the expressed aim of the station reform at the time of the interview 
and which he put down to the station’s distance from the concerns of the ethnic communities, 
to which it had catered in previous years. Uwe thinks the station has lost the one feature that 
made it most attractive to the migrants and their descendants: people today in their thirties to 
fifties, for whom “a completely different approach” than the editorial policy pursued at the 
moment would be needed.  
But what we haven’t managed to do is to stay with the migrants. […] I can 
imagine that the migrants don’t even know why they should tune in to us during 
the day, we do not deliver the information that they maybe need reliably. 
Differing from his colleagues interviewed earlier, Uwe does not display an emotional response 
concerning questions of multiculturalism or difference. His interests in the topics concerning 
immigration are journalistic and have more to do with his wish for objective reporting than 
with questions of identity or belonging. His political stance on diversity in Germany is 
positioned on the German left-wing, where he sees questions of inequalities based on ethnicity 
as subordinate to those of socio-economic inequalities. In other words, for Uwe, concerns over 
the labor market, trade union politics, or the future of the social state have priority over 
questions of identity. Indeed, “migrant stories” were not the crucial reason for Uwe to join 
Funkhaus Europa, they were only  
partly very interesting, but they alone would not have been sufficient for me, 
because I think, what makes a station is always the music and a certain openness 
to the world and to see how all is interdependent, right? So, at that time, it was 
1999-2000, Germany was not doing so well – we had the costs of reunification, 
Germany was at the time the sick man of Europe according to The Economist, 
then it was always pretty helpful to look, yes, why the others are doing better, 
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or are they really doing better. And also, this checking of facts, where does 
Germany stand, Germany also with its immigration policy, this disastrous story 
with the postcard campaign against dual citizenship57, and all that. Of course, 
these were highly political topics and at that time they were not so present in 
other stations. 
Uwe sets forth his arguments from a firmly German position, even if one which displays 
tolerance of and interest in the multicultural society. The dissatisfaction with the direction the 
Funkhaus Europa radio station is taking, that he expresses in the interview, is based less on 
ideological reflections than on what he sees as betraying professional standards. Uwe is 
concerned about a general lowering of journalistic and editorial criteria, which he thinks leads 
to a lack of accountability for the audience. He calls the new direction the station has taken “a 
flight into non-committal.” He criticizes the fact that when stories go on air, this happens 
mostly as a reaction to immediate news relevance, instead of the team creating and setting the 
topics they want to broadcast, independently of other media. Furthermore, he thinks that 
Funkhaus Europa has “tired” of dealing with topics concerning migration. According to him, 
for a while now, Funkhaus Europa has been “a radio that always turns itself around” and 
generally always reports “the same topic.” But, for Uwe, the current efforts to do the opposite 
have  
failed even more, I believe. Saying, it is all normal, there is all this diversity, this 
international thing, this global thing, to think that the people will see themselves 
in it, I believe it is more difficult. It is also more arbitrary, we are not reliable 
any more, we are not close to the migrants’ associations or to those who say, we 
are active. […] It is always as sporadic as the mainstream media do it, we almost 
don’t differ from them at all. I believe it is a huge problem. 
 
6.7 Thomas 
Thomas was station director of WDR Funkhaus Europa from 2009 to 2018. Before that, he 
held different positions within the WDR and left the station for another management position 
                                                      
57 Reference to the election campaign by the Christian-democratic candidate and later prime minister of the Land 
Hesse, Roland Koch. In the 1999 elections, he campaigned under the slogan “Yes to integration. No to dual 
nationality,” with the aim of creating popular dissent over the idea of dual citizenship. The campaign raised 
much controversy and was described as xenophobic by its opponents. 
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within the broadcaster.58 During Thomas’s tenure in Funkhaus Europa, the re-branding 
process of the station was initiated, which resulted in the brand Global Sounds Radio. At the 
time of the interview, the station was preparing to continue the process, in order to translate 
the new brand in a more focused manner into the program content.  
In the interview, Thomas depicts his understanding of what audience segment he would like 
the station to address, talks about the position of the station within the WDR structures, and 
illustrates his understanding of the development of a new, ethnically mixed German society as 
well as his understanding of how the ethnic minorities should be represented through the 
Funkhaus Europa radio station. When asked about his feelings about the station he was 
appointed to lead three years before, and with which he had had almost no previous contact, he 
expresses enthusiasm, calling it a “challenge”.  
Hey, where can you do something like this? A station with this perspective, with 
this music mix, and with this, on the one hand most profoundly public-service 
[…] mission behind it, and at the same time it is really modern and forward 
going and when I look at our Facebook page and I see the comments, how 
enthusiastic people are, or the e-mails, I think it’s super. 
When talking about the station, he uses terms such as “modern,” “urban,” “perspective,” 
“forward-looking.” These categories are different from those more frequently used in 
discussions of migration or the multi-ethnic society in Germany, such as “community,” 
“ethnic,” “minority,” and “multiculturalism,” carrying connotations of old-fashioned and 
overcome left-wing policies. This negative association is also present in the terminology used 
in the brand positioning strategy of Funkhaus Europa from 2011, which juxtaposes 
“cosmopolitanism” and “provinciality,” “homeland sounds” and the “pulse of the world.”59  
Thomas wants the station to address a new generation of migrant descendants, an urban 
German society with multiple inter-cultural contacts, a synthesis of “colorfulness.” In his 
interview, however, he places himself outside of this generation, as an observer of a new 
“folk” on the streets of German urban areas, a deliberately self-conscious “bio-German,”60  
                                                      
58 Interview with Thomas, September 3rd, 2012, Cologne, translation from German by the author. 
59 The brand positioning as Global Sounds Radio was discussed in Chapter 5. 
60 “Bio-German” (Bio-Deutsch) is used as a self-ironic term, to denote German citizens without a migration 
background. 
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Yes, it is the folk, that I see time and again when I am on my way in cities like 
Cologne or somewhere, a folk that I did not detect like that ten, twenty years 
ago. […] One has several worlds in oneself and it is getting to be more people 
who live here, who have that. And it is not such a small childhood like mine 
was, but a broader one, in a positive and a negative sense, because it can also 
mean difficulties. And on the one side it comes together with, in quotation 
marks, perfectly normal bio-Germans, but who now also have a new horizon, 
because they travel abroad, because they network around the world through 
Facebook. The world is, at least in the enlightened classes, getting more 
international, more cosmopolitan, more tolerant too. So, that is the folk that I 
imagine, but I know that it is only a part of the society. 
Following its new strategy, Funkhaus Europa does not address concerns of individual ethnic 
communities, but the segment of the society that consists of the immigrant-descendent 
population, and the enlightened, tolerant, and open part of the “bio-German” population. 
These two groups form the cosmopolitan audience interested in contact, sharing, mixing. 
Some carry “several worlds” in themselves, the others get to know the world(s) through travel, 
music, food, Facebook friendships. Belonging to an ethnic group is no longer a distinctive 
feature for a radio station like Funkhaus Europa; instead, the interested audience is united in a 
cosmopolitan openness that puts both the German and the ethnic audience on the same level.  
In terms of the “worlds” existing within Germany, reporting on them is still a unique selling 
point of the station, but should be treated as “salt in the soup” rather than as the main 
ingredient. For Thomas, highest attention must be paid to not excluding a major portion of the 
audience, which does not belong to the ethnic community a report is about. This “major 
portion” is implicitly German. The rhetoric of inclusion through over-reaching content 
“interesting to everybody” is a fundamental part of Thomas’s elaborations on the station. He 
explains various station decisions with this wish not to alienate parts of the audience. Among 
them was the 2013 program schedule reform, which moved all the foreign language programs 
to a later time slot. Thomas explains that with this reform, “ethnic multiculturalism” has not 
been swept from the station, but is “only sorted differently,” starting later in the evening.  
And the other side is that, when you have a part which should be over-reaching, 
I mean multi-ethnic, so to speak, then you have to, in my opinion, you have to 
do it according to criteria that enable this over-reaching approach, so that really 
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different ethnicities, including the German listeners, stay with such a diverse 
station. For this reason, we have undertaken a stronger separation. Within the 
German language shows we do not go so profoundly into individual ethnicities 
any more, which is interesting only for one ethnicity, or, let’s call it mother-
tongue, whatever, but it is interesting for everyone. 
Thomas explains the wish for “over-reaching,” “inclusive,” and “accessible” content with 
practical concerns with “how radio works,” and refuses to see such station decisions through a 
political prism. Speaking of Germans as one among “different ethnicities,” he annexes the 
term from the context of the anti-discrimination struggle and implies that German listeners 
might be in danger of exclusion through reports that do not concern and thus cannot interest 
them. The following are two examples:  
When it is only the necessities of this one individual community, then I would 
say, hmm, do we really have to do that in the German language program? I 
would say that many things that come from the communities, that you can 
replenish them, and they are topics that have an overreaching interest, then we 
must protect ourselves a little from ourselves, so that we do not throw the baby 
out with the bath water, so that you don’t say, we don’t do any community 
stories. That would be completely wrong, then the salt would be missing from 
this soup. But you always have to see if the topic is really reaching out of the 
community. 
[…] 
Those are just things that don’t come from profound questions; they are simply 
mechanisms of how radio works or does not work. With the ethnic direction, it 
is simply so that in the moment when you go strongly in this one direction, you 
exclude everyone else. Here you have to make a clear decision. […] If you say 
there should be an overreaching element, that addresses everybody together, 
including, when I speak of the ethnicities, I always mean including the German-
speaking one, then you have to do it according to certain rules of radio-making. 
And then it is not a political argument, but simply how to interest people for a 
common topic. 
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The question remains as to whether or not the demand for including a potentially larger 
audience leads to the danger of submitting a special-interest radio station like Funkhaus 
Europa to media market models, otherwise applicable only to mass attractive media. Thomas 
rejects this assessment, conscious of the fact that the station can only reach a limited 
“interested” audience. When asked about how Funkhaus Europa differs from other public 
service broadcasters, he names several factors, first and strongest among them being the 
music, which fills two thirds of the daily broadcasting time. Thomas says he is proud of 
having a broad diversity in the musical program, a “cultural good” which “opens up worlds in 
a light way.” Another factor are the topics, community stories, and others that do not play a 
role in the mainstream programs. On the one hand, these topics are processed through a 
“special perspective” of the program makers, in which “certain influences come through,” on 
the other, the protagonists should reflect the diversity of the society.  
When we do a street poll on any topic, something that has nothing to do with 
diversity, with us it must be the goal, right, to reflect everything. Those are small 
efforts, whereby a part of it, for example, the protagonists but also the presenters, 
is just a reflex to the situation that this comes too short in the other stations. So 
if everybody else did it, if they really reflected a cross section of the society, 
then that part would be a little overcome here, right. But I don’t hope or fear that 
that will happen so fast, even if one or the other makes it, a presenter with a 
migration background. 
The makers - editors, presenters, and authors – are a “central message” of this radio station for 
Thomas. He is very much in favor of recruiting journalists with migration backgrounds but it 
is ambiguous as to what role such people should have on the editorial staff or at the 
microphone, how far and through what audio means they should be heard on the air as 
“diverse.”  
We do our best there, but we are by far not perfect in all areas, sometimes it is 
too normal for me, if you like, too interchangeable with WDR2 or 1LIVE, or 
whatever station. On the other hand, you cannot make it into a dogma. It is a 
difficult question. 
It must be noted that the recruitment criteria for the presenters have been subject to debate 
within the editorial staff, and in the interview, Thomas offers some insight into what he 
understands as elements that make out the “diversity” of a certain person into a factor in the 
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station. For Thomas, the diversity should go as far as being “salt in the soup” that gives a 
certain hue to the station, a touch that makes it different from the all too “normal” mainstream 
stations. This color can be achieved by such details as greeting the listeners in a language 
different from German, or even be contained in a foreign name, which awakens associations, 
thus permeating the station through something of a journalistic osmosis.  
In the ideal case, on the one hand, it is simply the name-dropping, that somebody 
simply through his or her name embodies, that they somehow have an added 
value. Or it is the small linguistic things, that a presenter simply lets flow in, 
something that goes on rather nonchalantly. This way you have already covered 
this part. The second part is for me in the ideal case that you really have a 
completely different perspective, like I, for example, cannot have at all, because 
I don’t have parents who have immigrated and no family feasts that are 
completely different from the German mainstream, and that this is conveyed in 
the station and in some cases it works really well, that we let such small things 
flow in, or that the radio makers that we have bring topics from the communities, 
but those that are overreachingly interesting. And the third thing is this really 
cosmopolitan part, that we have a really broad perspective, that we have 
tolerance in the sense that there are so many different great things in the world 
and also in our country, because the world lives here, that we manage that, which 
is almost the most difficult part sometimes. I also see, it is a sobering experience 
that I have for instance made, I see how migrants’ groups see each other among 
themselves, that is not at all with this starry-eyed, bourgeois German worldview, 
like, we all like each other. 
In the interview, Thomas places himself completely outside the diversity he wants the station 
to depict, irrevocably in the German mainstream (no family feasts, no immigrant parents, a 
small childhood, a starry-eyed bourgeois German worldview). The audience might share this 
identity but has acquired a cosmopolitan worldview. It is interested in the world and its 
diversity as expressed in international music, sound bites of foreign languages, names that 
awaken associations of foreign lands, and extravagant family feasts. The depiction of 
difference here is limited to superficial markers and consumable expressions such as music, 
which make participation in this new, more colorful, but ultimately homogeneous, society 
easy. The station or the audience do not want to deal with problems such as in-fighting 
between the migrant groups, or consider relations of social and economic inequality, histories 
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of migration, or group belonging. At the same time, Thomas is aware that this is but a small 
portion of an audience and thus ultimately a utopian vision of an island of bliss in the sea of 
social problems, when he says that  
a part of the society is that far. Not everybody is, and in that part that is, not 
everybody is interested in constantly being confronted with a radio station that 
is basically circling around diversity, with such a music style and such an 
attitude. But a part of it is in any case. And this is an attempt to, well, build a 
campfire, create a public, present a certain broader perspective on the world. 
But, I am at the same time constantly conscious that precisely in terms of our 
main topic, diversity, or integration if you like, well coexistence, that it is 
precisely those who would need it most, those of German nationality or those 
not of German nationality, we do not reach those people with our content, 
because we are actually too complicated, too intellectual, too demanding, 
whatever. So, we do not reach into the problem milieus, either in the, if you like, 
right-wing German problem milieus, or in the uneducated, Arabs living in 
Cologne, or […], we don’t reach them with our content. 
Considering a possible political role for the station, Thomas is here speaking from the German 
dominant social position. A political impulse here is not an emancipatory one, but an 
educational one, contributing to the integration of the problematic immigrants or opening the 
eyes of the right-wing milieus. The emancipatory element is not present here because the 
position of power in the discourse is never abandoned. This leads to dealing with multicultural 
life on the level of music, a name, a sound, without going into the salience that difference 
carries as an identity-formation factor in the modern German society.  
 
6.8 Closing remarks 
The six interviews conducted with people associated with the radio station WDR Funkhaus 
Europa give insight into a range of opinions about how diversity should and can be addressed 
in the media, in particular through a radio station. However, my analysis of the interviews also 
shows that underneath the professional discussion, there are whole world-views on relations, 
forces, and inequalities in the German society. A hope concerning these interviews was 
therefore that an analysis of them would offer insights not only into the work of a radio station 
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dedicated to diversity but also into the changing nature of the discourse on the politics of 
difference in the German mainstream. 
Four of the six interviewees, who are themselves representatives of the diversity the station is 
dedicated to, link their work life to their identity and display emotionally charged responses. 
In general, a high degree of dissatisfaction with the transformation of the station from one 
being dedicated to “ethnic multiculturalism” and run by people of various ethnic origins to a 
station that defines itself as “cosmopolitan” and insists on inclusiveness of a broader audience, 
was visible. The interviewees described this process as “polishing down,” “searching for the 
lowest common denominator,” or blunting sharper contours and edges both in the music 
selection and the word content of the station. Demands of the management of the station, 
including inclusiveness, overreaching appeal, or accessibility, are applied as benchmarks. 
Whereas they are handled as requirements for a more professional station, on another level 
they actually bring about political changes to the station. The respondents see the reluctance to 
assess the relations of inequality in the society as ultimately leading to a picture of an audience 
that is out of touch with reality. It must however be noted that all the interviewees belong to 
the “old generation” of the station, who joined WDR Funkhaus Europa before the re-branding 
of the station took place. 
What transpires in all the interviews is that the respondents separate strongly between the 
“foreigners” and the Germans in their narratives, both those who are themselves of foreign 
origins, those who came to multicultural politics in the politically charged atmosphere this 
topic carried in the early 1990s in Germany, and those such as Thomas, who came into contact 
with it late. A number of the respondents (Yildiz, Miltiadis, Ioannis) see themselves as 
ethnicized in their everyday and professional lives. They perceive themselves as belonging to 
a minority and having to fight for positions in the social middle, often in antagonism to the 
dominant majority, and all see a conflict when it comes to a redistribution of economic 
resources, or even more, that of positions within the establishment, such as through an 
employment position in the public service media. 
For all four of them, both their dilemmas concerning work and their personal experiences are 
accompanied by emotions concerning belonging. Being a part of a minority is also a crucial 
factor in their identity formation. At the same time, this belonging, that some describe as a 
“special experience,” becomes a unifying factor not only for a specific community, but for all 
the people of non-German origins in Germany. This special experience is described by Yildiz 
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as a “break” in personal history, Amir talks about a common understanding among members 
of the minorities and code-switching when speaking with members of the majority. Both these 
and the narratives of Ioannis and Miltiadis point to a perceived division in social positions, 
including economic and political entitlements, but also to different codes, to two divided 
discourses, to positions of being “inside” (as in Amir’s reporting “from the inside”) or 
“outside” and “above.” Seen in this light, the move towards what is labelled as 
cosmopolitanism, as much as it is unobjectionable on the professional level, is interpreted – or 
rather felt – by these media makers as a breach into the “inside,” and an attempt to take away 
the voice of the minority, their control of how this belonging should be interpreted and 
articulated in the station.  
They also feel that on the practical level of radio work, that their “experience” of being a 
migrant or migrant-descended is not valued as an asset in itself anymore; the “difference” is 
played out on the superficial level of a name, a musical style, a foreign greeting. They note 
that the immigrant associations are not automatically protagonists of the content as before, 
community stories must have an over-reaching appeal. A homogenizing discourse is 
introduced, about a new, multicultural urban class, that includes both the Germans and the 
migrants. The synthesis and the sharing are emphasized, but the accent on urbanity and a 
cosmopolitan feeling points towards this synthesis being played out within a certain social 
class. The rhetoric of particularity or identity building through ethnic belonging or cultural 
background is implicitly denounced as anachronistic and segregating. The multicultural 
experience is interpreted anew. But, whereas on the level of station strategy this is coded as 
modern and future-oriented, on the level of personal feelings of the radio makers, this 
reinterpretation is seen as a dispossession of their own experience. They see the new catch-
phrases of cosmopolitanism, unity in diversity, mixture, synthesis, and above all 
“inclusiveness” for the German majority, as having their control over the representation of 








Ideal-type audience – Sami and Carla 
7.1 Introduction: Funkhaus Europa and imagined ideal listeners 
Within the process of re-branding WDR Funkhaus Europa from an integration station to a 
cosmopolitan radio, a great deal of thought was given to defining its target audience. One tool 
of narrowing down the core audience segment in order to strengthen the content profile of the 
station was the elaboration of its ideal-type listeners, its marketing personas. Starting from 
more general categories of media user types, developed by the WDR media research unit, an 
imaginary couple was created specifically for Funkhaus Europa: Carla, a teacher in her late 
thirties, and her partner Sami. Carla and Sami were given fictitious lives: places of work, 
apartment, cultural interests, and political views. Their circle of friends, or love of music, were 
imagined, provided with concrete detail, and elaborated in a paper that was handed out to the 
radio makers – and this paper will serve as basis for the following analysis. 
Sami’s and Carla’s characteristics served as a grid, enabling the examination of all editorial 
decisions against the backdrop of the question: Would this piece of radio content interest a 
listener resembling Carla and Sami in their tastes and lifestyle? The description of Sami and 
Carla was supposed to function as a touchstone for editorial work, a template for creating 
radio content fitting within the overall idea of the station, as it was defined at the time. The 
idea behind the process was to give the team of editors and journalists an orientation tool in 
order to produce stringent, well-defined content with a strong and recognizable profile. The 
ideal-type listeners Carla and Sami were abandoned as a working tool several years later, 
when the station underwent further adjustments, redefining its audience as somewhat younger, 
digitally savvy, and characterized by a more explicitly cosmopolitan outlook. 
Even if these two personas were used as a working tool for a limited period of time only, their 
descriptions can be analyzed in light of the ways they represented an important media policy 
shift, implemented in this particular station. In this chapter, I examine the creation of Sami and 
Carla as ideal-type core audience at the time when the radio station WDR Funkhaus Europa 
was undergoing a brand reform from a multicultural to a more cosmopolitan, more specifically 
“urban” station. As shown in Chapter 4, this policy shift in turn reflects larger shifts in the 
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public and media discourse concerning the nature of multicultural life, and of German 
citizenship today, and those within European concepts, in particular that of “unity in 
diversity.”  
The content of a media channel is not a random collection of items, but in the ideal case 
follows a clear strategic line, having a strong sense of what kind of “feeling” it incorporates 
and projects. It is a selection of items that in the best case fit this overall picture: films, 
reportage, interviews, or radio pieces are as equally a part of it as the choice of the music 
played and the presenters’ choice of words, his or her attitude, and the way they address the 
audience. Through all these the channel constructs life-style fantasies for its real-life audience. 
It offers the individuals listening to or watching a program a fantasy of intimate connection 
with their individual reality. In other words, what is offered to the audience is a life-world 
branded as desirable, and those who follow the program accept this. Stuart Hall remarks that 
the mass media have  
progressively colonized the cultural and ideological sphere. As  social groups 
and classes live [...] increasingly fragmented and sectionally differentiated lives, 
the mass media are more and more responsible (a) for providing the basis on 
which groups construct an ‘image’ of the lives, meanings, practices, and values 
of other groups and classes; (b) for providing the images, representations, and 
ideas around which the social totality, composed of all the separate and 
fragmented pieces, can be coherently grasped as a ’whole.’ (Hall 1977: 340, 
emphasis in original)  
On a broader level, through this operation, the media also play a role in the discourse of the 
nation and national culture. Being explicitly dedicated to culturally diverse living in Germany, 
WDR Funkhaus Europa offers its listeners ways of consuming cultural difference, and thus 
partakes in creating a narrative in the economy of Otherness in Germany. As such, it plays a 
“role in providing arenas for articulating (or masking) national diversity” (Spitulnik 1993: 
306), by negotiating and representing cultural identity “in various subtle ways” (1993: 305).  
In this chapter, I explore the complex articulation that produced Sami and Carla as ideal 
citizens through its policy branded as cosmopolitanism, which at the same time was being 
produced by these characters. As already stated in the analysis of the station brand as 
cosmopolitan radio in Chapter 5, this radio station can, as can all media, be analyzed as a 
technology of citizenship. As any media channel, WDR Funkhaus Europa operates by 
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addressing a defined audience segment, that at the same time it produces as a body of subject-
citizens. So, as ideal listeners of a station dedicated to cultural diversity, the way Sami and 
Carla are imagined says a lot about the ways cultural diversity, and more generally the 
national identity of Germany as a place of many cultures, are imagined and projected onto the 
audience at a specific point in time. 
I therefore see Carla and Sami not only as ideal-type listeners but also as ideal subject-citizens 
in the narrative of a modern, mixed, and tolerant society. At the time Carla and Sami were 
used in the programming work of Funkhaus Europa, their imaginary projected a picture of 
how a life within the cultural diversity of Germany could be led, and how it should be led in 
order for it to be the “good life.” I see Sami and Carla as agents in what Lauren Berlant 
theorizes as a “national fantasy,” elaborated in Chapter 2: in a civil life characterized by 
discontinuity, they provide for the audience “protocols that at once make legible and ‘manage’ 
the complexities of the public sphere, sometimes to provide politically invested ‘materials’ on 
behalf of (a) version of national identity” (Berlant 1989: 16). In other words, the national, 
ideological fantasy, that makes the wholeness of reality look natural, is the base on which an 
imaginary framework is created through different discourses, a framework through which the 
subject interprets the symbolic order, the reality.  
I pose the question of what constitutes this particular national fantasy that is the base for the 
discourse that spawns Sami and Carla in this media channel. In other words, what do the ways 
this ideal couple is imagined, and the characteristics and opinions attributed to them, show 
about the ways multicultural living and proximity to ethnic difference is imagined in modern 
Germany? I also ask: What do the variations in imagining desirable multicultural contact 
convey about the ways the nation is imagined through time? What do they say about the 
desirable or permissible ways to embody citizenship in (a multicultural) Germany today? And, 
what desire or picture of the “good life” does the fictional portrait of Carla and Sami project, 
that incorporates innocuous diversity in a modern and tolerant Germany? 
Especially as vessels for offering affect and fantasy to the audience, I see Sami and Carla as 
giving expression to one particular version of the concepts of nation and citizenship in modern 
Germany and show that this particular version is based on a neo-liberal ideological fantasy of 
the globalized, cosmopolitan citizen. In it, the condition of the citizen is normalized as mobile, 
ready for any change, and above all self-supporting. It is also cut off from the historical 
continuum that has led to the present condition. The fantasy conceals both the past fissures and 
 165 
conflicts, and the present lack of the public sphere, a space in which the terms of citizenships 
could be discussed and negotiated. Instead, these terms are embodied in private practices, in 
the sphere of the subjects’ intimate lives. 
So, what does this particular imaginary of Carla and Sami tell us about the current imaginaries 
of the nation and the ways citizenship is to be embodied in these imaginaries  in Germany? In 
analyzing Sami and Carla’s relationship to the national imaginaries I will rely on the work of 
Lauren Berlant and her writing on the conflation of the intimate and the public, the politics of 
sentimentality, as well as on intimate and infantile citizenship and the (neo-liberal, national) 
fantasies of the good life. I also draw on the work of Anne-Marie Fortier and Sara Ahmed 
regarding proximity, stranger fetishism, and passing. Even if in certain contexts, for example, 
in the media, imaginaries such as that of Sami’s and Carla’s lives are presented as alternative 
to the norm (as binational or multicultural relationships often are), I will attempt to show how 
they are commodified in the models of the ideal life. 
Also, I will point to the contingency of such imaginary scripts of ideal-types by illustrating the 
paradigm change that the figure of the young North-African male of Arab origins has 
undergone in Germany in the period since the creation of Carla and Sami. Due to debates on 
heightening security measures in the wake of the terrorist threat in Europe and particularly 
events such as that of New Year’s Eve 2015/16 in Cologne, when a group of men of North 
African origins sexually molested numerous women, the image of the North African young 
male went from being an exotic and attractive “stranger” to the personification of danger and 
sexual predation. This transformation points to the practices of categorization and 
problematization at the heart of the discourse on immigration in Europe, especially 
accompanying the debate concerning the immigration of Muslims. 
However, the transitory character of Sami and Carla as a working tool was explicitly stated 
very soon after their elaboration, even before the picture of Sami could have become unviable 
in the editorial work. In the course of editorial work, the focus on the pair as ideal-type 
listeners was gradually relaxed, and finally completely abandoned. The newly focused ideal-
type listeners were imagined as younger and more technology-oriented, active in social media 
and more mobile, as visible in the catchphrase “the rolling suitcase generation” that was used 
informally among the radio makers to describe their imagined audience after the era of Sami 
and Carla. The picture of Sami and Carla, however, represented the imagined listeners at an 
important moment concerning the policy changes underlying this radio station. It was the shift 
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from it being described as a multicultural station to one celebrating cosmopolitanism. In this 
way, studying Sami and Carla provides insight into how the embodiment of citizenship that 
could represent this cosmopolitan feeling was narrated. I shall therefore first look at the more 
general question of how and why an ideal-type audience is created for a media channel in the 
first place. 
A great deal of literature on the media deals with the relationship and interaction between 
media texts and audiences. The analyses cover a large spectrum of theoretical approaches, 
ranging from top-down approaches that theorize media audiences as passive recipients, 
manipulated by dominant media messages, to those that examine the oppositionality or multi-
vocality of audience responses to the media. They ask questions on how media texts construct 
realities and how they can be subverted, and analyze the interplay of mediations between 
media and culture. A number of authors apply the analysis of media discourses in 
multicultural contexts or media discourses of race and ethnicity (Saha, 2018; Barker 2001; 
Shohat and Stam 1994, 2002, 2003; Abu-Lughod 2002; Askew 2002; Ginsburg 2002). 
However, how does a marketing persona, the ideal-type listener, or rather the ideal-type 
citizen, work in this process?  
It is worthwhile to pose the question of how a target group for a certain media channel is 
created in the first place and why. What is the purpose of simmering a broad target group, 
such as “young trendsetters” or “culturally interested listeners,” down to a set of concrete 
characteristics that can then be pinned onto an ideal-type couple? What is actually being done 
when radio makers imagine their listeners and endow this couple with names and 
backgrounds? 
In glossaries of media terminology, target audience is defined as “the specific group in society 
for which the media product is designed, and to which a media product should appeal,”61 and 
which “may be defined in demographic or psychographic terms, or a combination of both.”62 
In a media glossary of the German public service broadcasters, target audience is defined as a 
“localization of a basic population (for example, the inhabitants of Germany) to a certain 
group of persons according to socio-demographic, psychographic or consumption-relevant 
characteristics” (NDRmedia 2018) All the above definitions point to the roots of the term in 
the area of marketing, of product placement. The elaborations of target groups, especially the 




very specific categorizations such as those of concrete marketing personas, show that a media 
channel is developed as a product, intended for a specific portion of a population that is 
estimated to be attracted to certain traits of it. Indeed, target audience groups for media 
broadcasters are often worked out by marketing agencies specializing in the collection of 
demographic and other social data, with their analysis and the categorization of the population 
based on criteria such as gender, age, income group, consumption behavior, and others. Thus, 
the audiences are sorted by their demographic details, psychological profiles, behavioral 
patterns, and lifestyles. 
First, a general target group is defined, which is then narrowed down, fleshed out with specific 
characteristics, in order to produce the perfect fit for a specific channel – or rather a perfect fit 
for what a specific channel wishes to become. The process of defining the ideal-type listener 
of WDR Funkhaus Europa in 2010 parted from broader categories used in the public service 
media, which placed this station among those appealing to trendsetters and listeners interested 
in culture. Narrowed down to fit Funkhaus Europa, Sami and Carla and their “life world” were 
created by the media research department and with partial involvement of the editors working 
for the station itself. 
Marketing personas are created based on a template, which is used to flesh them out: they are 
given names and imagined as people with concrete characteristics. Their hair color, age, and 
gender are specified. The books they read are listed, along with their interests in music, 
favorite sports, favorite TV-shows, the places they have traveled to, and the place where they 
live. Their apartment, their tastes, their favorite meals, all these are described and illustrated 
by generic photos from photo agency collections. These all aim at creating multi-dimensional 
characters, so that the details of their imagined lives can be more easily visualized and “felt” 
by the content makers addressing audiences that resemble the marketing personas in their 
tastes. For example, if a media outlet has marketing personas who are a married couple in their 
early forties, home-owners living in the suburbs, parents of two children, and owners of two 
cars, the offering aimed at a target audience they represent might choose to broadcast topics on 
education policies or car insurance and play an occasional pop song from the 1990s.  
These topics and music would, on the other hand, fall out of the grid created by the picture of 
Sami and Carla, even if it is accepted that the audience of Funkhaus Europa might be married, 
have children, or be home-owners. While working with ideal-type listeners or viewers, media 
makers are “completely conscious of the fact that the spectrum of the potential audience is 
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naturally much larger,” as pointed out by the head of station of Funkhaus Europa at the time. 
“At the same time, an orientation of the station on such tangible individuals, brings it more 
structure, recognizability, and reliability, so that even those people who are not exactly like 
Carla and Sami are provided with an easier access to listening” (translation from German by 
the author).63  
The concrete work procedure suggested at the time in Funkhaus Europa was to re-examine all 
content, “a topic or a piece of music or even the way that hosts and reporters address the 
audience” against the question of whether “it could interest people like Carla and Sami or if 
they would appreciate it.”64 At the same time, this did not mean that something could not be 
broadcast if the answer to the question was “no” or “maybe,” but it meant that this should be 
“not the rule, but the exception.”65 The ideal-type listeners are therefore explicitly not intended 
to be measured against reality but rather to be used as a tool in the production of a media 
channel that in sum would appeal to the target group – the sum of whose ideal and salient 
characteristics they embody. 
So, what were Carla and Sami like, what narrative of citizenship in modern Germany and 
Europe did they tell? And on a further level: what kind of national fantasy spawned them?  
 
7.2 Ideal listeners – Sami and Carla 
The printout of the results of the working group that created Sami and Carla in 2010 (WDR 
2010)66 opens with a picture of a couple, man and woman, pictured from behind, sitting and 
embracing, a picture that is found on all the pages listing their characteristics. Their faces are 
never shown.  
The pages are organized under headings, among them “personal data,” “political views,” 
“interests and hobbies,” “work,” and so on. Sample photographs loosely connected to the 
heading are strewn around the listed bullet points, such as pictures of a living room, of book 
covers, music CDs, various dishes, magazines, and so on. 
                                                      
63 E-mail by Thomas to the Funkhaus Europa editorial team 27/10/2010. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid. 
66 All references to Sami and Carla are from the print-out “Zielhörer für Funkhaus Europa”, HA 
KomForS/Medienforschung, 2010.  
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Sami is described as a German national with a migration background, although only identified 
as from “North Africa or Asia Minor.” He is 34 years old, has a high-school diploma and 
works as a freelance Web graphics designer. Carla is 37 years old, she is German with distant 
South-European roots, and holds a university degree in humanities. She works as a teacher of 
French and German. Sami and Carla share a four-room rental flat in one of the urban centers 
of the Ruhr Area. They have no children, “but are not averse to the idea of having them,” they 
have no pets, “but are not animal haters” (translation from German by the author). Their 
combined net income is around € 3,000 a month.  
Their furniture comes from Ikea, the flat is decorated with holiday souvenirs, inherited pieces, 
and bits and bobs from the flea market. In their free-time, they like going to the cinema and 
the theater, and they travel. Carla practices yoga and pilates and collects picture books of 
travel destinations, whereas Sami plays football and likes going to concerts. Sami is also 
interested in technology and in politics, although he is not politically active himself. Carla 
likes traveling, she has Wanderlust, is less interested in politics and her views lean somewhat 
to the left of the political spectrum. Both have artistic interests and both like music, mostly 
Cuban rhythms and “other international sounds.” Carla watches American TV series (of the 
time), such as “Grey’s Anatomy” or “Sex and the City,” Sami is more the Internet and 
entertainment electronics type. He reads sports magazines, manuals on Web design, and crime 
novels, Carla prefers women’s magazines, self-help books, and novels by Elizabeth George. 
Both read a regional daily newspaper. 
In terms of their values and points of view, Sami is very highly motivated in his work. He 
sometimes indulges himself with a product – consumption goods in general are important to 
him. He supports gender equality and concentrates on what he is good at, such as handicraft 
and technical work. He is ecologically conscious, but no activist. Carla in turn is highly 
motivated in her work, although a little less than Sami. As opposed to her partner, she is 
critical of consumerism and is very ecologically conscious. She finds the house chores a 
nuisance and wants division of chores at home.  
Sami aspires to personal success and feels cosmopolitan. His grandparents were religious 
Muslims, but he was raised in “a very reduced sense of Islam.” Today, he keeps a certain 
distance towards it, and stands for tolerance and equality of cultures. Carla is strongly in favor 
of gender equality and is not religious. The keywords describing Sami’s values and attitudes 
are “success” and “openness to the world,” whereas for Carla they are “justice” and 
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“dedication.” 
Their food tastes differ slightly: Sami likes eating, especially meat, but rarely cooks. Carla 
likes French, Asian, and crossover cuisine, as well as vegetarian dishes. They go on vacations 
three times a year, including one holiday each without their partner. They take short trips to 
European cities, and a long summer vacation, usually in the South of Europe. 
The couple’s political and cultural viewpoints are listed under the heading “Cultural 
relations.” Sami has great sympathies towards Germany, a country he fully considers his 
home. He also feels European and wishes for “more Europe.” Carla is instead rather critical 
and dissatisfied with Germany. In terms of Europe, her attitude swings between criticism and 
disinterest. Both have a big and multicultural circle of friends and are interested in and open 
towards other cultures.  
The type-casting of Sami and Carla can raise several questions, among them: What does it 
uncover about the politics of difference as seen through the eyes of the media makers of this 
particular station? More broadly, what does this ideal couple say about the narrative of 
national identity and that of difference in Germany today? How is citizenship imagined in the 
discourse of this station? What would be the conditions for obtaining it? And finally, what 
picture of the good life in a multicultural situation is constructed here? 
Carla is an ethnic German, but with some mixed blood in the third generation. It is, however, 
not the blood of the Other of German immigration history – Turkish or East-European – but of 
a culture ranking high in terms of perceived cultural prestige: her grandmother was French. As 
opposed to Carla, who can see her French component as “added value” to being a full German 
citizen, even in economic terms, since she earns her living as a teacher of French, Sami is not 
“biologically” or “historically” a national. As a direct descendent of migrants, he has acquired 
German citizenship at a later point. Therefore, he is statistically still listed as somebody with a 
“migration background.” He is probably also marked as a foreigner through his physical 
appearance. In the context of the German discourse on immigration, the legislative framework 
and the statistical method that marks second and third generation migrants as people with a 
“migration background,” Sami not only cannot fully be seen as a German, but also cannot 
fully live his personal patriotism towards that country. 
Instead, he transcends his patriotism towards Germany into one towards Europe. Sami is 
imagined as feeling something akin to “constitutional patriotism” (Verfassungspatriotismus), 
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an attachment to the values of liberal democracy transcending the attachment to the national, 
or in the sense elaborated by Jürgen Habermas, as an expression of a “post-national identity of 
the constitutional state” in a culturally and politically “westernized” Germany (Habermas, 
1987: 169, translation from German by the author). In short, Sami is attached to the narrative 
of Europe as a multinational, democratic cultural space, and Germany as a part of it. This 
attachment to democratic supranational values, however, conceals the situation in which an 
attachment to national values on his behalf – as a visible minority and a second generation 
migrant – would not be fully possible in Germany. 
In this, Carla has a completely different starting position – her citizenship was not acquired, it 
has not been given as a “gift” by the receiving country, her full national belonging is not 
questioned in any way. As opposed to Sami, she is somewhat critical towards both Germany 
and Europe. Born into both Germany and Europe, she is entitled to a critical attitude. She can 
question the validity of the norms and values defining her citizenship, without risking that her 
loyalty as a citizen could be put into question. In a certain sense, she is entitled to a more 
reflecting, a more intellectual and differentiated approach, to the question of what constitutes 
her citizenship and what constitutes her national identity, than the migrant, who is expected in 
the first step towards belonging to accept all these wholesale, when given to him. Sami’s over-
identification can also be read as gratitude: he has been let in to participate in the imaginary of 
Europe as the home of the “good life” and he does so with conviction.  
At the same time, through this gratitude, Sami projects to the Western community the 
affirmation of its self-worth. As Sara Ahmed points out in her study Strange Encounters. 
Embodied Others in Post-Coloniality, which has been discussed in more detail in Chapter 1, it 
is the figure of the “stranger” that must be instrumentalized in order for the production of the 
(Western) self and community to function. Regardless of whether the proximity of strangers is 
deemed threatening, as in monoculturalist politics, or welcomed, as in multicultural openness, 
for Ahmed, the very  
definiton of the nation as a space, body, or house requires the proximity of 
'strangers' within that space. […] The proximity of strangers within the nation 
space – that is, the proximity of that which cannot be assimilated into a national 
body – is a mechanism for the demarcation of the national body, a way of 
defining borders within it, rather than just between it and an imagined and 
exterior other. (Ahmed 2000: 100, emphasis in original)  
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At the same time, the stranger is de-historicized: by being identified in advance as one who 
comprises all that is “beyond,” the “stranger” is static, pre-existing and lacking in agency, 
with agency at the same time being strengthened on the side of the (Western) community. 
This stranger fetishism “invests the figure of a stranger with a life of its own insofar as it cuts 
‘the stranger’ off from the histories of its determination” (Ahmed 2000: 5, emphasis in 
original). In other words, multiculturalism can function in reasserting the value of cultural 
hegemony, where the (White) elite premises that difference must be reconciled within a 
common culture, and excludes differences that can challenge the values that culture is 
predicated upon. At the same time, the framework that has defined Western (or European) 
values is seen as “neutral and universal” (Ahmed 2000: 110). 
So, how to read the physical proximity of a “natural” national citizen, Carla, to a stranger, 
Sami, in this case? How is their conceptualization situated within the negotiation of “nation”? 
The example of the couple’s religious affiliations can provide interesting analysis here. Carla 
is not a believer. It is not explicitly stated what her religion is, but the very omission shows 
that she is implicitly a Christian. Her secular stance is a product of her culture, of the 
privatization of Christian religious practice, so that her religious belonging or non-belonging is 
a matter of individual decision. Her religious background is therefore “neutral” in the sense 
theorized by Wendy Brown in her writings on Western secularism. Brown observes “the tacit 
universalization and generalization of Christianity tendered by this model of secularism” as 
casting religions (in the European case this refers particularly to Islam) as “insufficiently 
privatized (and) improperly tamed – excessive, possibly dangerous and certainly pre-modern” 
(Brown 2012: 5).  
Sami’s relationship to his religious roots needs more explanation in the marketing persona 
description, in order to be seen as unproblematic. His description includes the explicit 
statement that his relationship to the “Islam of his grandparents” is “very distant,” 
generationally speaking twice-removed. Sami has embraced secular containment, “a sign of 
the modern” (Brown, 2012: 5). Sami is not only “liberated” of his religious roots, he has 
symbolically cut off ties with his family history.  
Reading the description of the couple, we learn nothing of whether Sami’s or Carla’s relatives 
play any part in the life of the couple, and get no inkling of their family histories at all. We 
also know nothing about whether Sami’s ancestors migrated to Germany for political or 
economic reasons, as refugees or as “guest-workers.” Both Carla and Sami are characters 
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detached not only from family histories, but also from economic or national histories, and 
from the history of the South-North migration. They embody the conditions of their 
citizenship on a social, political, and economic tabula rasa, in the space of private, intimate 
encounter. So, even if, as every encounter, it is happening in a concrete historical, political, 
social, and economic setting, not free of friction, this encounter of the “natural” with the 
naturalized citizen, is smooth, it is – happy. 
Anne-Marie Fortier observes that the agenda of emotions has come to dominate the 
multicultural debate in general. “The feeling states of multiculturalism are organized around 
an economy of feelings: the production, circulation, and distribution of legitimate feelings for 
and within the nation” (2008: 102, emphasis in original). For Fortier, the media are crucial in 
circulating sentiments, feelings, especially through their highly personalized approaches: 
through stories about people or by developing very concretely defined target audiences. Their 
images highlight “the currency of feelings and their differential value within the wider 
economic structure of feelings that delienates the codes of conduct of good multicultural 
citizenry” (2008: 102). 
So, what do the mass media do when they imagine their ideal listeners as citizens in the zone 
of their privacy, in their intimate lives? The intimate sphere is the sphere of sensation, of 
feeling. The process of using someone like Sami and Carla in making a radio station involves 
much less the question, “What do I know about my audience?” and much more often, “What 
feels right for this radio?” What is the feeling that the editors have about the lifestyle they 
should project? Difference is here physical and sensual, it is something that can be tasted and 
consumed, it can be worn, felt, heard, and  experienced, it characterizes a lifestyle. The 
encounter with difference is not a matter of political negotiation taking place in the public 
sphere, but is something played out in intimacy, on the level of affect, sensation. In this 
economy of feelings, however, as Fortier points out, the burden of labor falls on the 
minoritized position, often required to make the majoritized subject feel better (2008: 102). 
Within the relationship of Sami and Carla, Sami remains the minoritized subject; he is the less 
“adult” of the two. He is not only biologically younger, he also earns less and possesses a 
lower educational degree than his partner, who is older and more intellectual. Furthermore, 
their citizenship is not realized to the same level of fullness. Carla is ethnically and culturally 
German, which gives her license to be critical of Germany. Sami is somebody who has 
acquired German citizenship, so that his situation is more precarious.  
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Always visibly foreign in the public space, Sami symbolizes difference and is “always 
auditioning for citizenship and social membership” (Berlant 2010). But he also symbolizes the 
outreach towards forms of difference that can be consumed and incorporated into the life of 
the couple, that can feed the fantasy of becoming Other, “a fantasy that is increasingly offered 
to the Western subject” (Ahmed 2000: 119). Sara Ahmed analyzes how the Western 
multicultural society turns ethnic belonging into a consumption good, a “spice or taste that can 
be consumed, that can be incorporated in the life world of the one who moves between 
(eating) places” (2000: 117-118), where difference becomes valued  
insofar as it can be incorporated into, not only the nation space, but also the 
individual body [...]. By implication, differences that cannot be assimilated into 
the nation or body through the process of consumption have no value. (2000: 
117-118, emphasis in original)  
The Western consumer culture in particular is imbued with fantasies of “becoming” or 
“becoming like” a stranger, fantasies “in which the Western self ceases to define itself against 
the bodies of strangers” (Ahmed 2000: 119, emphasis in original).  
This fantasy not only releases the Western subject from responsibility in the political sphere, it 
also “confirm[s] his agency, his ability to be transformed by the proximity of strangers, and to 
render his transformation a gift to those strangers through which he alone can become” 
(2000: 124-125, emphasis in original). For Ahmed, only through the construction of assimilble 
difference do multicultural spaces become inhabited, “difference becomes a style that the 
white nation and body can put on and take off” (2000: 133). Consumption, becoming, and 
passing are thus techniques based on the access to knowledges embedded in privilege “which 
give the dominant subject the ability to move and in which ‘the stranger’ is assumed to be 
knowable, seeable and hence be-able” (Ahmed 2000: 133, emphasis in original).  
But, what does this fantasy do to the position of Sami? In Ahmed’s analysis, the fantasies of 
“becoming” “reconstitute rather than transgress the integrity of the Western subject who 
becomes” (2000: 119). In this case, they constitute Sami as a Western subject, someone who 
can enjoy difference – but only on the condition that he has previously let go of his own 
cultural difference, or that specific difference that cannot be assimilated into the nation. He 
can only enjoy the Other if he is no longer the Other. But is this ever possible for Sami to do?  
Just how fragile and how contingent on social and political power relations the scripts 
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surrounding Sami really are, can be seen if we look at the picture of Sami and Carla from the 
perspective of several years later. In 2010, Sami was narrated as a young male of North-
African origins, remotely but not threateningly Muslim, a descendent of migrants, with Carla 
slightly older than him. From the perspective of only several years later, such a script seems 
rather surreal: not only did the discourses in all of Europe concerning immigration undergo 
changes in light of the refugee influx from the Middle East, but a completely new discourse 
developed specifically around the immigration of young men from the Middle East and North 
Africa in particular.  
Against the background of the increasingly Islamophobic discourse colored by feelings of 
insecurity and the fear surrounding the terrorist attacks committed in Europe, the events of 
New Year’s Eve 2015/16 in Cologne marked a paradigm change in Germany. The events 
concerned acts of sexual predation and theft committed against women by a number of young 
men of North African origins during the celebrations in the center of the city. In the new 
narrative after these events, young men from the Middle East and North Africa started figuring 
as embodiments of sexual predation, a picture soon spreading to the majority of the refugee 
population in Germany, imagined mostly as young men with too much time and pent-up 
sexual energy on their hands.67 This in turn led to items on rape or attempted rape committed 
by refugee men occupying prominent places in the German media.68 In general, the role of the 
media – as platforms spreading this narrative as well as objects of criticism for not reporting 
enough on the “true danger” of immigration – was crucial in this paradigm change.  
An example can be cited to illustrate the change in the tone and impact of media texts just a 
few years after Sami and Carla – the documentary film for young audiences Malvina, Diaa 
and love (Malvina, Diaa und die Liebe) in 2017.69 The film follows the love relationship 
between a teenage German girl, Malvina, and her boyfriend Diaa, who came to Germany as a 
refugee from Syria. Shown on the TV channel KiKa for children and young audiences, the 
                                                      
67 During the New Year’s celebrations in Cologne a year later, the men of “Southern appearance” were 
preemptively controlled. Even if this procedure led to sporadic accusations of racial profiling, the police got a 
strong show of support from large parts of the media and the public – this also shows to what degree the 
imaginary changed in its affective content within the course of only one year. It also indicates a new 
hierarchizing within the social power positions – not only between the ethnic Germans and the migrants, but also 
among different groups of immigrants, with especially Muslim and specifically Arab men becoming high on the 
scale of “undesired” immigrants. 
68 One indicator of the depth of change in the public discourse is the decision of the German Press Council in 
2017 to change its guideline on reporting crime. Under the pressure of public debate, in which the media were 
accused of hiding facts on the propensity to crime by Muslims and refugees, the Council changed the older 
recommendation that the ethnic origin of the perpetrator only be named if in “justified relation to the crime” to a 
guideline that recommended the ethnic origin be named “in cases of justifiable public interest.”  
69 https://www.kika.de/schau-in-meine-welt/sendungen/sendung103934.html 
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film sparked outrage on the populist right and in the far-right Internet forums, with 
representatives of the Alternative for Germany party claiming it “indoctrinated” German 
teenage girls and promoted subordination of German women to Muslim partners. The 
broadcaster found itself in the midst of public controversy, forcing the management to issue 
statements on the intentions of the film and appear in a panel talk with a representative of the 
Alternative for Germany to discuss its impact.70 
In the case of Malvina and Diaa, it was precisely the fact that their encounter was played out 
in the intimate space of their love relationship, that it struck the central core of the narrative of 
physical and moral danger to the White, German/European woman/girl that had developed in 
the space of only a few years. So, whereas at the time of Sami and Carla’s creation the picture 
of a young Arab man and a German woman was a slightly exotic, attractive image, only 
several years later, a person like Sami would be at least tainted by connotations of sexual 
predation, lack of control of his urges, being a violent, feared, and dangerous Other, and not to 
be trusted when he proclaims distance to religion or support for gender equality.  
This dramatic transformation makes evident just how fragile scripts on the encounter of ethnic 
difference are in the ongoing struggle between competing interpretations of social reality. Or 
in other words: in her analysis of the “Politics of Good Feeling” (2008), Sara Ahmed talks 
about “unhappy racism” turning to “multicultural happiness” in what she calls “the affirmative 
turn” in the British discourse on multiculturalism. Events such as the Cologne New Year’s 
Eve in turn show how quickly “multicultural happiness” can turn into exclusion of one 
particular group from the happy picture, how quickly happiness can turn into fear and 
rejection. 
The transformation of the imaginary around the “Arab man” in German media (reflecting a 
trend in the European media in general), lays bare the discursive nature of the construction of 
the meaning of the person “Arab man” within the media. It shows how aspects of the social 
world are contingent on discourses competing for the definition of what is “true.” 
For Foucault, the most powerful discourses, and media discourse is one of the powerful 
discourses, “in terms of the productiveness of their social effects, depend on assumptions and 
claims that their knowledge is true. The particular grounds on which truth is claimed – and 




these shift historically – constitute what Foucault called a regime of truth” (Rose 2002: 138). 
These regimes of truth are constructed through a network of disciplinary practices, that were 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 1. It is through the practice of classification that individual 
diversity is categorized into uniformed groups, through the practices of normalization that 
offer the picture of the norm against which “truth” is measured, and finally through the 
practices of problematizations that define the norm in comparison to the deviant. The practices 
of categorization are at the core of the discourse on racial and ethnic diversity, including the 
creation of the norm and the demand to integrate into the majority or “leading culture.” The 
discourse of problematization, on the other hand, permeates the rhetoric on immigration and 
particularly the immigration of Muslims and refugees into Europe.71 The picture of Sami, as 
well as the picture of the Syrian teenager Diaa, are neither arbitrary nor do they originate 
outside the discourse on immigration in general. Rather, they are products of processes of 
categorization and problematization inherent in the construction of “claims to truth” and 
originating at the very “intersection of power/knowledge” (Rose 2002: 138). 
So, how would the marketing personas of a radio station dedicated to cultural diversity be 
defined today, if the tool were used again in the editorial work? Would the picture be 
“naturally” adjusted to the discursive turn, just by what “feels” right or less right? Or would 
this particular media channel stick to a counter-discourse? And finally, to what degree – if at 
all – can media texts “disagree” with the mainstream media discourse (even if this 
disagreement is born as a reaction to it) or even completely disengage from it and the 
accompanying problematizations?  
If we follow Lauren Berlant, a national fantasy is crucial for the political legitimacy of the 
nation, not only as evidence of its Utopian promise, but also as a record of the “discontinuous, 
contradictory, ambiguous, and simply confusing elements of civil life,” mostly to help citizens 
manage the complexities of the public sphere, or “sometimes to provide politically invested 
‘materials’ on behalf of one or another version of national identity” (Berlant 1989:16). 
Whereas the paper on Sami and Carla reconstitutes Sami as a “collective subject or citizen,” 
translating him “into a realm of ideality and wholeness” provided by the national identity 
(1989:19), with the national identity being idealized as a multicultural society in this specific 
case, the new narrative of sexual predation de-constitutes Sami as a citizen, excluding him 
from the new national fantasy.  
                                                      
71 For a more detailed discussion see Chapter 1. 
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In 2010, however, the image of Sami and Carla as lovers did not stand in opposition to the 
mainstream discourse but personified the logic of enriching and happy diversity. Sami has 
fulfilled the first condition of belonging and let go of histories – religious affiliations, the 
history of South-North migration, the economic imbalances that bring people like him to 
Europe. All the sharp edges are smoothed out and Europe can be embraced as a space of 
belonging, on the basis of shared values. The second condition for harmonious blending is that 
the encounter with difference is contained in the intimate space of the private life of a couple, 
where difference can be consumed and celebrated in bite-sized manifestations. There is, 
however, no development towards something that could outgrow the sum of the offered parts, 
since the couple are cut off not only from the past, but also from the future. They live in the 
present tense only. 
With foreign elements not intruding or disrupting but instead being taken into their intimate 
lives through consumption – through travel, food, or music – there is no option or space for 
the unintended or the unexpected. Excluding any risk of precariousness, however, works only 
on the condition that Sami and Carla embrace the political and also the economic setup of the 
“good life” in diversity: not only with a multicultural circle of friends, respect for equality of 
the sexes, and with a general love of European values, but also through their modes of 
consumption – with Ikea furniture, vacations in the South, and the dishes they dine on. 
Ready to “let the past go and, with amnesiac confidence, face the prospect of the present” 
(Berlant 1997: 33), Sami and Carla are modern-day personifications of Lauren Berlant’s 
“infantile citizens,” a notion discussed in detail in Chapter 2. Berlant shows how in the setting 
of a late capitalist withdrawing state, which she sees in the U.S. of the late twentieth century, 
familial politics start to define what citizenship is. Citizenship is privatized, with the sphere of 
private life turning into the core concept of politics, played out in the “intimate public sphere.” 
At the same time, the real public sphere, a common public culture, where questions of the 
community are discussed and negotiated, is dissolved. Even in situations where the national 
space is separated by economic, social, or ethnic divisions, the narrative of what constitutes 
the nation depends on “personal acts and identities performed in the intimate domain of the 
quotidian” (1997: 4), with citizenship turned into a "category of feeling, irrelevant to the 
practices of hegemony or sociality in everyday life" (1997: 11). 
Sami and Carla are imagined as a private, closed system, in the permanent present tense. They 
share the same space of dwelling and have physical contact, but no dynamic or aspiration for 
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the future is hinted at. They are described statically, caught in a snapshot. They are not only 
unlikely to change anything in the public sphere, but this snapshot does not allow turning 
multicultural life into a topic of contestation or even discussion. Imagining the multicultural 
encounter in this way closes the space for discussing the political or social change that such a 
life brings – the intimate public sphere is not the public sphere where such change can be 
negotiated. Instead, in the intimate public sphere, questions and anxieties about the changing 
nature of the nation-state and about the terms of citizenship are contained within a limited 
field, and pacified.  
So, what do the mass media do when they imagine the multicultural encounter in this 
way? When all the editorial decisions are examined against the grid of this imaginary, 
it leads the discourse on the multicultural citizenship in a certain direction. In the 
words of Berlant, “the fetal / infantile person is a stand-in for a complicated and 
contradictory set of anxieties and desires about national identity” (1997: 6, emphasis 
in original). Citizenship is as a matter of fact apolitical, acted out by non-citizens, 
within the intimate space of their relationship. At the center of the discourse on 
national identity, it contains the potential of change within its limits, closing off the 
possibility of placing it within the public sphere. Sami and Carla are personifications 
of the process that Berlant refers to when she points out how today,  
(d)ownsizing citizenship to a mode of voluntarism and privacy has radically 
changed the ways national identity is imagined, experienced, and governed in 
political and mass-media public spheres and in everyday life. (1997: 5) 
In this sense, the picture of Sami and Carla, within a radio station aiming at a cosmopolitan 
feeling of life, corresponds with the wider neo-liberal policies that aim to produce, and 
normalize, the conditions in which citizens are de-politicized, mobile, open, well-educated, 
and ready to accept all changes, regardless of the traumas of the past. It creates a fantasy of 
cosmopolitan belonging that, however, clashes with the real conditions of belonging, which 
are marked by economic insecurity, structural inequalities, and even racism, and which are 






This part of the dissertation focuses on the term tolerance and its representations and 
articulations in the media, and looks at how these articulations relate to discourses of diversity, 
citizenship, and identity in Germany. Moving within theoretical frameworks of the post-
Foucauldian governmentality approach, the analysis in the following chapter concentrates on 
one specific case: a thematic week in 2014 organized by the Association of German Public 
Service Broadcasters, the ARD, dedicated to the topic of tolerance. 
Why analyze this particular media event? As opposed to radio stations such as WDR 
Funkhaus Europa, dedicated specifically to cultural diversity, integration, and 
cosmopolitanism, that was the focus of analysis in Part II of this dissertation, this media event 
was part of the media mainstream. Being an event aiming at the largest possible audience, not 
a niche, offers insights into the dominant perspective on modes of living with diversity at a 
particular point in time. Next to integration, tolerance has become one of the central terms in 
the discussions on ways of dealing with or responding to cultural diversity in Germany and in 
Europe, prominent as a way of establishing good multicultural co-existence. Also, it is also a 
term that has gone in and out of the discourse of difference: following its heyday in the 1980s, 
when many NGOs and projects dedicated to diversity in Germany contained the word in their 
name, it somewhat faded from public statements concerning modes of living with difference. 
Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, it has experienced a revival, but in a different 
sense: its reappearance in public discussion has gone hand-in-hand with the growing 
problematizations around migration and particularly around Islam, which has become almost 
synonymous with “intolerance” in the public debate in Europe, and is seen as a religion and 
worldview that oppresses women and rejects people of other faiths. Here, tolerance has 
increasingly grown into a discursive demarcation line distinguishing the West from the 
“intolerant others.” 
The following chapter analyzes the operation of tolerance as a technology of government, as 
well as the ways this was relayed through media content within the ARD Tolerance Week.72 
Several questions are asked in this context, among them: How was the concept of tolerance 
treated in the media programs during the ARD thematic week? How was tolerance discussed 
                                                      
72 Media channels as technologies of government were discussed in more detail in Chapters 3 and 4. 
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by the participating media makers and how was it filled with meanings? Was it stretched to 
encompass unexpected fields? Was the term explored and questioned in the discussions, or did 
the media makers look solely for ways to translate it into media programs? How did they do 
this? In what areas of life, in what contexts was tolerance depicted? Which individuals, 
behaviors, practices, or groups were seen as in need of tolerance? Who was awarded the role 
of tolerator? What assumptions lay under these articulations? And finally, what kind of social 
and national fantasy did tolerance convey?  
I analyze tolerance under the premise that media policies affect the lives and livelihoods of 
citizens. As Chris Shore and Susan Wright (1997) point out, public policies, as well as media, 
actively constitute social reality, "they give shape and meaning to what we call reality and are 
often designed not so much to generate public support, but to construct what they propose, in 
order to bear on the governance of the social" (Božić-Vrbančić 2010: 91). For Shore and 
Wright, it is, therefore, important to analyze “naturalized” assumptions that often frame 
public policy or media content, or to put it in Ahmed's words, to examine „what programmes 
actually set out to do“ (2004).  
In addition to this, and mostly inspired by the work of Wendy Brown (2008, 2014), tolerance 
is in this analysis explored as a discourse of depoliticization. In her debate with the German 
philosopher Rainer Forst, published in the book The Power of Tolerance (2014), Wendy 
Brown argues that tolerance is a discourse of power and that it has depoliticizing effects. It re-
marginalizes its objects (ethnicities, sexualities, disabilities, cultures), the objects “that it 
pretends to absorb, equalize, or emancipate” (Brown and Forst 2014: 18). Tolerance today is 
taught as a way to negotiate the encounters with others. Wendy Brown sees its main purpose, 
however, in governing, in constituting subjects.  
Within this theoretical horizon, I begin the analysis with the concept of tolerance as the topic 
of a thematic week presented by German public service broadcasters. I continue by 
considering the choice of persons from public life to be the patrons of the ARD Tolerance 
Week and conclude with an analysis of the advertising campaign that accompanied the 
thematic week in November 2014. The material is analyzed in terms of the role and effects of 
tolerance in subject construction and the creation of an economy of belonging, specifically 
within the framework of the politics of difference in Germany. In other words, rather than 
discussing the concept of tolerance as such, I look at the effects of this term in the German 
multicultural situation, of how it articulates with the neoliberal systems (Brown 2008, 2012, 
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2014), as well as to what ideal it aims in subject-citizens and subjectification. In short, the 
analysis will look for the effects of tolerance as a practice that creates certain subject positions. 
Again, I approach the analysis of the ARD thematic week both as an insider and an outside 
observer. As WDR coordinator for the radio content during the ARD thematic week, I took 
part in the preparatory meetings, had an insight into the broadcasters’ radio planning, and 
discussed the topic and ways of presenting the thematic week through the media with many 
colleagues. Together with a colleague, I also developed a comedy series on the topic of 
tolerance for the radio station WDR Funkhaus Europa. Therefore, by “studying through” 
(Wright and Reinhold 2011) this media event, by analyzing what was said at the meetings, 
what was written in the press material, what particular programs were to be produced and 
producing content for the subject myself, I was following “a metaphor, or circulation of an 


















8.1 Thematic weeks of the German public service media 
In April 2006, the German Association of Public Service Broadcasters, the ARD, launched its 
biggest media event produced by all its members thus far: the first ARD thematic week. Under 
the title “Living, what else?”, all the TV, radio, and other channels of the ARD took part in the 
event dedicated to the topic of cancer. All in all, the ARD channels produced 265 hours of 
broadcasting (Staschen 2006: 303), dedicated to a large array of topics around cancer, an 
illness that affects 420,000 German citizens a year. In the multitude of items, including feature 
films, documentaries, reportage, and an opening ceremony with 300 guests hosted by star 
tenor José Carreras, the aim was to treat the topic in its many facets and in a manner that was 
“complex, serious and reliable. Above all stood the main goal of the ARD thematic week: To 
take cancer out of the taboo zone and make clear that the diagnosis means above all one thing: 
‘Living, what else?’” (Staschen 2006: 303). 
The first ARD thematic week was deemed a large success: it presented an innovative way of 
cooperation among all the members of the public service broadcasters’ Association, as well as 
bringing the many channels into a novel and successful large-scale cross-media project. 
However, except for the content reasons, the main motivation for organizing such an event 
had to do with the need to emphasize the necessity for the existence of a big and expensive 
public-service media machinery. It was the proclaimed aim of the thematic week to point out 
the public value that the PSBs bring to the society in an environment that at the time was 
presenting them with the challenge of digital transformation as well as with the need to justify 
their existence in the face of rising popular and political pressure – pressure that would grow 
steadily in the following years. The strategy group of the ARD that came up with the proposal 
of the thematic week also pointed to the “difficulty of making the legitimation of the ARD 
clear to the citizens who pay their license fee. Why is it important to have public service 
media? What is the use of them for the people? What do they get for their money, for their 
license fee?” (Staschen, 2006: 302). 
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A singular model among the European public service media, the ARD consists of nine 
regional broadcasters, each with its own various radio, TV, and digital channels. All the 
broadcasters, among them the West German WDR as the biggest, broadcast their own regional 
channels and contribute to the ARD TV-channel, known as the 1st German TV channel, that 
broadcasts to the whole country. The system also includes a TV channel for German speaking 
countries, 3sat, the German-French channel ARTE, the children’s channel KiKa, and the youth 
multimedia platform Funk, along with 64 regional radio stations and the three stations of the 
German-wide radio Deutschlandfunk. The sheer quantity of the broadcasts, and the costs this 
entails, have in recent years led to growing pressure, especially, but not exclusively, from the 
populist right, calling for the abolishment of the license fees for public service broadcasting 
and a re-examination of the system as a whole. As a consequence, the need to point to the 
public value and the social importance of these media has become paramount for the 
broadcasters and was one of the motives for starting the thematic weeks. With them, the 
broadcasters wanted to offer “something socially relevant, that does not obey the laws of the 
market, but the necessities of a transparent democratic society” (Staschen 2006: 302).  
Since 2006, the ARD thematic weeks have been organized once a year. They are coordinated 
centrally, by one of the nine regional members of the ARD, with all the broadcasters 
dedicating a good portion of their programming to the given topic, through their TV, radio, 
and digital channels. The ways in which the given topic is articulated in media formats can 
vary widely, but it usually includes interviews with experts or with people affected in some 
way by the topic, as well as reportage and documentary formats, fiction films, and many other 
forms. Some of the broadcasters reach into cross-media fields, social media, or approach the 
audience using various interactive formats, complemented by events such as concerts or 
public discussions. The thematic weeks are always branded by jingles, image films, and other 
audio and visual layout packages produced especially for the event. 
One of the ARD broadcasters is responsible for the overall coordination of the thematic week 
as well as for originating the topic itself, which usually arises as a result of exchanges with 
relevant social institutions and groups such as political initiatives, religious institutions, and 
civil society. On the organizational level, there is a coordinator for the TV, radio, and the 
Internet in each of the regional broadcasters, who is in charge of coordinating the 
programming in their sector. This coordinator of each of the sections informs all the program 
makers involved, makes sure the deadlines are met, and so on. Further down the 
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organizational ladder, there is an editor appointed for each newsroom or subsection who then 
coordinates the output of their department. 
The thematic week starts with a kick-off meeting of all the broadcasters at the beginning of the 
year. The coordinators in the TV, radio, and Internet departments of all the broadcasters, the 
agency in charge of public relations of the thematic week, the marketing experts, and all those 
involved in the central planning, take part in this meeting. During the meeting, the 
representatives of the broadcasters are offered a program of lectures, discussions, and 
workshops concerning various facets of the overall topic. Speakers from very different areas, 
among them academics and lecturers, representatives of NGOs and various initiatives, 
activists, media makers, business leaders, and others, offer their expertise on the subject, thus 
introducing various perspectives on the topic. The aim of the program is to inform the editors 
present, offer new perspectives on the topic, and inspire participants to the innovative 
possibilities of presenting the topic through their media channels. During the two-day event, 
deadlines are agreed upon and contacts exchanged. The exchange among the broadcasters 
continues throughout the year through regular e-mail updates and telephone conferences. The 
work culminates when the actual thematic week takes places through the media channels, 
usually in October or November of each year.  
The tradition that started in 2006 has continued throughout the years, and like the topic of 
cancer, the topics addressed have continued to deal with existential questions that address 
everyone and position the broadcasters as providing strong public value. In 2007, the thematic 
week was dedicated to children, under the title “Children are the future,” and in 2008, “More 
time for living” addressed demographic change. “It is a matter of pride!” concentrated on 
citizens’ volunteerism in 2009, whereas “Food is life” dealt with nutrition in 2010, looking at 
an array of subjects, from the methods of producing food, cultural identity as transported 
through different dishes, through to topics of environment, trade, economics, and health in 
relation to nutritional habits. “The mobile human” concentrated on mobility in 2011, and 
“Living with death” on the topic of death and dying in 2012. In the following year, the topic 
was “Happiness,” and in 2014 “Tolerance,” a topic that will be central to the analysis in this 
chapter. Next came the week dedicated to “Heimat,” a German noun signifying home, 
homeland, or country of origin, as well as, in a figurative sense, the feeling of being at home. 
In 2016, the topic was “The future of work,” and in 2017 it was faith, under the heading 
 186 
“What do you believe in?” In 2018, the title of the thematic week was “Is this fair?”, dedicated 
to the topic of “justice and social equality.”73 
 
8.2 ARD Tolerance Week 
The week dedicated to tolerance was coordinated by the Bavarian broadcaster Bayerischer 
Rundfunk (BR) and it took place from November 15th to 21st 2014. All in all, over 500 hours 
of radio and TV programming were produced and broadcast during Tolerance Week, as well 
as an online package and several accompanying projects. The radio channels of the ARD 
broadcast over a thousand pieces, amounting to 275 hours of programming. The television 
channels dedicated 255 programming hours to the topic of tolerance, reaching 32.50 million 
viewers (Egger 2015: 136). The palette of formats included fiction films, documentaries, 
reports, interviews with experts and with members of minorities, talk shows, correspondents’ 
reports, interactive tools, such as “tolerance self-tests,” and so on. There were call-in shows, 
and online and social media content. A poetry slam “#freedomofspeech – The Tolerance 
Slam” (#Redefreiheit – Der Toleranz-Slam) was organized in Munich, and a school week on 
tolerance took place in an array of primary schools.  
So, how was the topic of tolerance presented in the context of such a large media event by the 
public service broadcasters? Or rather, how was tolerance understood and articulated in the 
media content? And, how did this media discourse articulate public policies concerning 
dealing with difference?  
Throughout the first decade of the ARD thematic weeks, one can easily observe that all of the 
topics treated were “big questions”: they were multi-faceted enough to offer an array of 
perspectives, questions, and protagonists to fill many formats and programs for a whole week. 
No thematic week dealt with trivial topics; rather, they addressed the very core of human 
existence: four out of ten topics contained the words “life” or “living,” and one included the 
noun “human” in their title. Covering illness, the feeling of happiness, citizenship, dealing 
with death, eating, aging, work, justice, and religion and faith, all the topics were “organised 
around the management of life” (Foucault 1998: 139). They addressed the conduct of life, the 
questions of how citizens are to live in specific fragmented life spaces, and how the 
                                                      
73 https://www.dwdl.de/nachrichten/66534/ardthemenwoche_widmet_sich_2018_der_gerechtigkeit/ 
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phenomena “characteristic of a set of living beings forming a population: health, hygiene, 
birthrate, life expectancy, race […]” (Foucault 1998: 317) are rationalized and managed. All 
of the ARD topics also worked on creating a feeling of belonging to a population, while being 
constructed around the questions of how “we” live, eat, believe, where “we” feel at home. At 
the same time, the public service broadcasters positioned themselves as a reliable partner in 
mediating the given existentially important topics – as the service, contributors, and added 
value providers to citizens as part of the community:  
The ARD is valuable for all. Only the ARD can report comprehensively and 
profoundly and show complex topics in a professional manner. “You are in good 
hands here”; this is the feeling the broadcasters want to create in their audience. 
(Staschen 2006: 303) 
Tolerance can also be counted into the “big questions” and is also a way of conducting life 
with others. It addresses the population, the citizens, and rationalizes or discusses specific 
conduct – the way in which citizens can deal with objects of tolerance, or rather, deal with 
difference. And again, the public service broadcasters took upon themselves the role of an 
authority in these questions, the role of producing an authoritative discourse on the subject. 
Indeed, an ARD survey on the perception of tolerance and tolerance deficits in the society, 
published a day before Tolerance Week, showed a “high positioning of the media, especially 
the public service broadcasters, in mediating tolerance” and “the social need for this topic to 
be dealt with comprehensively and in various journalistic dimensions” (Egger 2015: 144). 
So, the first question that can be asked here is: why tolerance? Why was this term chosen as 
“big” enough or crucial enough in the social discussion to justify one whole media week 
dedicated to it?  
As in the institutional discourse of the European Union, in Germany tolerance is generally 
lauded as a noble virtue, the desired way of conduct when in contact with difference – 
religious, cultural, ethnic, and other. In the German context, the centrality of tolerance is a 
value initiated from the field of religion, with associations dedicated to tolerance often 
originating with the big Christian churches. Today, numerous NGOs dedicate their work to 
promoting tolerance in the culturally diverse society, and the discussion on tolerance is lively 
in institutions and in the educational system, mostly in relation to inclusion policies. A 
perfunctory Google Scholar search for papers by authors writing in German and dealing with 
tolerance shows titles such as “Promoting tolerance in public education,” “Teaching tolerance 
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in education,” “Tolerance in a post-liberal era,” “Tolerance through education,” “Tolerance 
and the minority religious groups,” and so on74, all situating tolerance in the realm of the 
political and the collective. In the public debate in Germany, tolerance is generally discussed 
in the context of democratic order and rules of citizenship and it is regarded as a value 
distinguishing citizens of a developed democracy. Indeed, the ARD survey showed that 
almost 90 percent of respondents considered themselves to be tolerant (Egger 2015: 138). 
Therefore, tolerance is “a central term of a democratic, open society,” as ARD program 
director Volker Herres stated in the press booklet accompanying Tolerance Week 
(Bayerischer Rundfunk 2014: 5).  
So, what role do the media play, when they put tolerance at the center of their interest? How is 
the choice of this topic by public service broadcasters to be understood? Indeed, how do the 
public service media place themselves in the biopolitical sphere when they dedicate big media 
events to such topics as life, death, or faith? What can be said of the role of the media week in 
the multicultural context? And what does all that say about processes of normalization and 
problematization at work within the society and in relation to the cultural politics of difference 
in Germany?  
In the preparatory ARD meetings and discussions, tolerance was understood as an essential 
part of the civilized interaction of citizens in a liberal democracy. It emerged as a way of 
“managing” the contact with difference, invoked and applied in encountering a whole range 
of experiences – from managing the innocuous difference of opinion on the personal level to 
the moments when solutions for coexistence with categorized and unwanted difference are 
needed. The picture of a tolerant society went hand in hand with that of a cosmopolitan 
society open to the world, so that tolerance in this context was understood as one of the pillars 
of “our way of life.” At the same time, tolerance was kept as a very broad term, one open to 
be filled with concrete cases and examples in its media articulations during the ARD week – 
ranging from such everyday exercises as dealing with loud children playing to such politically 
charged topics as migration or freedom of expression. Tolerance was described as an 
atmosphere, an attitude, a “climate,” that could be sought, found, and exercised consciously, 
or even learned – on the one hand, it was understood as a precondition for the coexistence of 
citizens within a democratic setting, and on the other, as a consequence of it, an achievement 
in the development of civil society.  
                                                      
74 All the titles mentioned were translated by the author. 
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Fig. 6 – ARD Tolerance Week – ARD Themenwoche Toleranz – screenshot of the web page 
In this context, the media undertook the role of instructing, showing tolerance to be the 
“rational,” “civilized” way of responding to people or phenomena deemed outside the social 
norm, while at the same time in individual media examples showing that even tolerance has 
and should have its limits.75 Not only in the media channels, a school week on tolerance 
(Aktion Schulstunde) was organized parallel to the media week. All over Germany, primary 
school children and their teachers were invited to “deal with the different facets of tolerance,” 
because “children who learn early to be tolerant will profit not only in school, but in all life 
situations.”76 The proclaimed objective of the school week was to offer tolerance as the 
response of choice in cases of contact with difference, as stated in the accompanying text: 
The world is colorful. Somebody who is strange or foreign today, will be 
familiar tomorrow and maybe even the best person in your life. Everybody 
should take everybody the way they are – that is tolerance! If everybody lived 
that way, life would be much easier. (translation from German by the author)77 
                                                      
75 One such example was the feature film The end of patience (Das Ende der Geduld), based on the true story of 
Kirsten Heisig, a Juvenile Court judge, impotent in the face of rising juvenile delinquency and institutional 
obstacles in tackling the situation in a problematic Berlin neighbourhood. 
76 https://www.rbb-online.de/schulstunde-toleranz/, translation from German by the author. 
77 https://www.rbb-online.de/schulstunde-toleranz/ 
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The fuzziness of the term tolerance that appears here, taking it to denote a way “everybody” 
should live their lives, to make it “easier” for everyone, in a sort of colorful unity-in-diversity, 
was present in the discussions of the media makers as well. These were often struggling to 
find novel ways of “translating” the term into media content and avoid the clichés of 
multicultural or multi-religious coexistence. This is illustrated by Joachim Knuth, the then 
chairman of the ARD radio commission, who wrote in the press booklet,  
The radio stations of the ARD dedicate themselves to the whole conceptual 
width of tolerance. Its concrete application can be somewhat treacherous at 
times. Not everybody understands the same thing about tolerance, so 
contradiction, paradoxes, or even conflicts can ensue. For example, reporters of 
the young radio stations of the ARD will conduct self-tests on tolerance in 
everyday life. What happens when somebody eats a kebab early in the morning 
on the commuter train? Or when somebody uses a wheelchair and needs help to 
overcome stairs? (Bayerischer Rundfunk 2014: 5, translation from German by 
the author) 
For media channels, this breadth of the term made tolerance a “grateful” subject, since the 
categories invoked when applying tolerance – disability, migration, sexual orientation – could 
be shown as images; it was possible to illustrate what the encounter with tolerance looked and 
felt like, and how it could be shaped and organized. Within the ARD Tolerance Week, this 
included pieces on topics such as same-sex partners with children, Syrian refugees living in a 
town infamous for neo-Nazi attacks, the everyday life of a young man with Asperger 
syndrome, and the life of an ex-prisoner after his release.  
When all these media examples are considered, the general idea of ARD Tolerance Week and 
the individual projects involved, such as the school week, becomes clearer: to promote 
understanding and social cohesion, and not deepen social divisions. However, the media 
examples expose marginalized groups, such as migrants, refugees, people with disabilities, 
same-sex partners and others, as being outside the norm. So, on the one hand, it was the 
underlying aim of the thematic week to show tolerance to be the “right” response to 
difference, to that which is outside the norm, while on the other, the media makers were 
actively encouraged to engage in “controversial discussions about particularly disputed 
individual topics” (Bayerischer Rundfunk 2014: 26). An excerpt from the press booklet for 
Tolerance Week illustrates this approach: 
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How do the young people learn to appreciate tolerance as a fundamental 
characteristic of a living democracy? How does an open and tolerant attitude 
towards other cultures and lifestyles, and social attitudes to norms and 
regulations, manifest itself? How can tolerance be actively lived in the 
professional and private life, and not just suffered passively? […] Where is the 
border between tolerance and acceptance? How to define the limits of tolerance? 
(Bayerischer Rundfunk 2014: 26, translation from German by the author) 
Therefore, while tolerance is seen as a “fundamental characteristic of a living democracy,” 
reflecting a long liberal tradition when taught or shown to be the “desired” response to 
difference, at the same time, the operation of tolerance creates subjects and defines their 
conduct in diversity. In her book Regulating Aversion. Tolerance in the Age of Identity and 
Empire (2008), Wendy Brown analyzes tolerance as a tool of governmentality that influences 
the “conduct of life,” and analyzes its effects in the neoliberal system as those of not only 
responding to deviance, but also producing the norm and deviance in the first place. That is, 
she sees in tolerance the practices of problematization and normalization, as well as that of 
creating saturated minority identities (homosexuals, foreigners, Muslims). 
 
8.3 Preparing the ARD Tolerance Week 
The kick-off meeting of the ARD thematic week on tolerance, that took place in March 2014 
in Munich, endeavored to not only kick start the organizational machinery of the ARD, but 
also to offer the media makers inspiration on ways of approaching the topic, and finding new 
ways of representing it in their programs.  
During the two-day meeting, tolerance was detected in very different social spheres, and filled 
with different meanings. These concerned migration and cultural diversity, the rights of 
homosexuals and people with disabilities, child poverty, tolerance in Christianity, ethnic 
comedy, (in)tolerance on the Internet, and even diversity management strategies in business. 
Since it was a meeting of media makers, the principal questions circled around questions of 
how to represent and show tolerance in the programs during the thematic week. The question 
was not “what is tolerance?”, but rather where to look for stories involving tolerance or 
intolerance, and how to put these on the screen and on the air.  
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The meeting offered a rich program with speakers from very different fields: among them 
representatives of the Christian churches, anti-racism activists, homosexual visibility 
campaigners, and others. In other words, there were both “experts” on various facets of the 
topic, and representatives of minorities, or potential “objects of toleration.” For example, a 
panel entitled “Sometimes only humor can help – on dealing with intolerance” included an 
Iranian-born film director, a book author who suffers from multiple sclerosis, and a Turkish-
born stand-up comedian. People in this panel represented or articulated difference through 
their persons: through their bodies with a handicap, or through their origins. They also 
presented themselves as persons articulating certain histories of problematization to the 
majority, the mainstream, the norm. They were explicitly asked about their experience of 
differing from the majority, and seemed to accept this role, telling anecdotes and stories, some 
of them funny, and some sad.  
In this panel, and in many others during the two-day meeting, the discussion of the media 
makers circled around the struggle for recognition and against discrimination – sometimes 
humorously, sometimes politically. There was talk of “us” having to be tolerant towards those 
who are different from us, but it was not discussed how “we” was defined, or how it came 
about that “we” get to decide whom to tolerate and whom not to tolerate. It was not discussed 
what constitutes difference, or where the threshold for difference is situated. Does illness 
count, or does it count only when it causes a visible handicap? Does a foreign origin count as 
difference in itself, or does it constitute difference only when the person in question uses and 
articulates it, such as the comedian of Turkish origins? Does homosexuality constitute 
difference as such, or only when it is expressed in public, when it is visible?  
The participants on the panel on humor were speaking under the premise that their identities 
were marked, even saturated by difference. So, even if the operation of tolerating these 
identities is not the exclusive way of problematizing the categories of “migrant,” “person with 
disability,” or “homosexual,” tolerance does stabilize their belonging to these groups, outside 
the norm, saturating their identities by this one “deviant” characteristic. The Muslims become 
defined by their religion, the homosexuals by their sexuality, the handicapped by their 
disability. On the other hand, the operation of tolerance also defines the norm as something 
universal and neutral. In the words of Wendy Brown, this  
quality of saturation results from the normative regime and not from some 
quality inherent in the identities or practices. However, in aligning itself with 
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universality and relative neutrality, the unmarked-because-hegemonic identity 
also associates tolerance with this standing and, conversely, associates objects 
of tolerance with particularity and partiality. (Brown 2008: 186) 
In this framework, tolerance is not only a way of dealing with deviation from the norm, but 
also an operation constructing the norm and the ideal citizen, by marking subjects who are to 
be tolerated as those outside the norm. Thus, it deals with the question of how difference can 
be governed or managed, without overcoming the category of difference, which, through the 
very operation of tolerance, remains immutable.  
Rainer Forst, who debates with Brown on the “power of tolerance,” does not challenge this 
reifying of belonging and difference, but proposes to negotiate it through rational discourse. 
Arguing in the tradition of communicative rationality theory, Forst sees tolerance as a way of 
dealing with difference that does not erase difference or question the processes of 
problematization and normalization in the establishment of deviance and norm. While one is 
called upon to question the reasons for rejecting difference (or defining it in the first place), 
one is not expected to abandon these reasons for the sake of non-antagonistic coexistence with 
what constitutes difference. In order for tolerance to move from affirming the status quo of 
power imbalances, Forst breaks tolerance down into hierarchical stages– moving from a 
“permission” to a “respect conception.” This conceptualization comprises a paradox: here, 
emancipation “can […] at the same time mean to fight for and to fight against toleration – that 
is, to fight for and against certain forms of recognition” (Forst 2007: 216). Thus, there is a 
right and a false recognition – recognition as an individual or a group with equal rights, or 
recognition from a higher power position – in short, tolerance is in its core paradoxical, since 
it can simultaneously lead to emancipation and to a reification of marginalized identities. For 
Forst, toleration is thus “a normatively dependent concept, one that is in need of other, 
independent normative resources in order to gain a certain content and substance – and in 
order to be something good at all” (2007: 217, emphasis in original). 
Both the view that there are different levels to tolerance that can be exercised actively, and the 
view that tolerance needs to stop somewhere, point to the assumption of tolerance as being 
based on rational reasoning. That is, the act of tolerating comprises a rejection of the Other, 
and the rational decision not to discriminate is a consequence of this aversion. However, this 
decision does not have political effects, leading to a peaceful coexistence with something one 
is averse to, and does not lead to the equality of the tolerated object. So, while personal 
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tolerance for Wendy Brown refers to “a willingness to abide the offensive or disturbing 
predilections and tastes of others” (2008: 13) and cannot be criticized, tolerance as 
governmentality is related to the “enactment of social, political, religious and cultural norms” 
(2008: 13). At the same time, it turns political action into a “therapeutic project,” and justice is 
turned into a matter of respect and sensitivity. 
Significantly, one of the main questions posed during the discussions of the media makers in 
Munich was also where the limits of tolerance are, where “we” should “rationally” stop our 
tolerance. Where should we stand when faced with those who refuse tolerance, or attack our 
tolerance? Where do we draw the line where our tolerance must stop in order to protect the 
groundwork of our social order, including our tolerance? Ulrich Wilhelm, director general of 
the Bavarian broadcaster BR, also invokes the limits of tolerance in his contribution to the 
press booklet for Tolerance Week: 
With our ARD thematic week […] we want to take you on an exploration tour, 
from the questions of everyday coexistence to the limits of our tolerance – there, 
where the human and democratic quality of our society is defined. (Bayerischer 
Rundfunk, 2014: 5, translation from German by the author) 
Here, the knowledge of how to tolerate and the willingness to use tolerance as the right 
response to aversion becomes the “human and democratic quality,” the line dividing “our 
society” from others. In the discussions in Munich, one line where tolerance reached its limits 
was detected when dealing with the extreme right, another when dealing with Islamist 
fundamentalists, both seen as embodying non-tolerant political positions and a propensity to 
violence. Indeed, the lack in tolerance has, in recent years, become a recurring motif of media 
discourse when showing the incompatibility of Islam with the European mode of life, 
contrasting the cosmopolitan and open West to the fundamentalist Other. For Wendy Brown, 
tolerance here 
emerges as part of a civilizational discourse that identifies both tolerance and 
the tolerable with the West, marking nonliberal societies and practices as 
candidates for an intolerable barbarism […] with tolerance in and as a 
civilizational discourse distinguishing Occident from Orient, liberal from 
nonliberal regimes, "free" from "unfree" peoples. (2008: 6)  
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In the context of the “civilizational discourse” of the West, and in line with the subject-
making operation of this media discourse, tolerance becomes something that can be taught, 
and something that can be learned by those citizens not “naturally” versed in living in a 
pluralist society, for example, migrants from patriarchal societies. Under the premise that 
migrants do learn this fundamental virtue of living in the West, multiculturalism can in 
consequence be associated with positive values, “articulated through a conservative discourse 
of tolerance and an economic discourse of comparative advantage” (Nolan & Radywyl 2004: 
58).  
To illustrate this, I invoke an older media example, not pertaining to Tolerance Week, to show 
how this discourse was articulated in a time when Islam and Muslims were perceived in a 
more benevolent light in the German media, and the overcoming of cultural differences was 
seen as almost just a step away: the WDR documentary TV series The Özdags (Die Özdags).  
Broadcast starting from January 2007, the series follows the everyday lives of the Özdags, a 
family of Turkish origins living in Cologne. It was the first documentary soap in German 
public service TV dealing with a family of migrants, the real-life Özdags, owners of a famous, 
fine oriental bakery in a mostly Turkish-populated neighborhood of Cologne. The series 
shows the everyday business and private life of the family: the devout Muslim parents, Hasan 
and Aliye, and their more secular children, the daughters Selda, Zülya, and Hülya, the sons 
Uzay, Nebil, Aydın, and Servet. Hasan, the first-generation immigrant from Turkey, is a strict 
father, but lenient with his daughters. The children call him a “family dictator” but love and 
respect him at the same time. In the individual episodes, the series strives to show the changes 
in cultural attitudes of the younger members of the Özdag family. For example, one daughter 
marries an African American and the rest of the family must come to terms with him not 
being a Muslim. In one episode, one of the sons rejects a half-serious proposal to marry a girl 
from Turkey, asking what he would do with a woman who does not speak German. In another 
instance, one of the daughters complains that her child is not learning “proper German” in 
kindergarten because of all the migrant children there. In one episode, one of the sons is 
revealed as a lover of German Schlager music, which prompts his brother to tell him he is 
“more German than the Germans!” As the magazine Der Spiegel asked in one review, “[a]re 
the telegenic, eloquent Özdags, who all have an education and an income, maybe cast too 
much like a picture book family, some sort of multicultural propagandists of the public 
service broadcasters?” (Luley 2008, translation from German by the author). 
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The WDR accompanied the broadcast with a TV-report in one of its local news programs:  
“The strong daughters of Hasan Özdag”78 concentrates on the relationship of the three 
daughters to their more conservative parents. The report has the girls talking about how they 
disagree with their father’s commanding style but still respect him for what he has done for 
them and built in Germany. The report ends with the scene of a same-sex couple, regulars at 
the Özdag bakery, entering the shop and talking to one of the Özdag sons. He in turn explains 
how the bakery is expanding its assortment into making figurines of couples for same-sex 
wedding cakes. The author concludes: “[t]he three daughters are emancipated and strong […] 
It has been a long way, but it has paid off: for our palate, for their business, and for the life in 
Germany” (translation from German by the author).  
Therefore, the second generation of migrants has embraced progressive German and European 
tolerance, rejected racism and homophobia, become economically successful, and are 
“building something in Germany.” They are indeed displaying cosmopolitan tolerance where 
it is not explicitly demanded of the Germans (same-sex marriage), and “enriching” the 
German society to the point where this enrichment can be consumed through the smell and 
taste of their fine oriental bakery. But, who is this “multicultural propaganda” (Luley 2008) of 
diversity as enriching and harmonious actually directed at? On the one hand, it is the German 
audience, those willing to “taste” the difference in the form of oriental sweets, and at the same 
time rest reassured that the contact with difference will bring no friction as far as common 
values are concerned. On the other, it is also an educational example for the migrants 
themselves, showing them that tolerance towards Others (African Americans, homosexuals) is 
a prerequisite for belonging, a sign of true integration. Here, tolerance sets in motion processes 
that create subjects as liberal, through their changing attitudes, their speech, their behavior. 
 
8.4 Patrons and advertising campaign of Tolerance Week  
Every ARD thematic week has had one or more patrons, public faces chosen to carry the 
message of the thematic week to the audiences. These faces of the ARD weeks need to 
embody in one way or another the given topic, either through their public statements, their 
publicized attitudes, or their work. These are always personalities of German public life, from 
                                                      
78 Die starken Töchter von Hasan Özdag, Jürgen Kura, WDR, 2009., https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lMI-
gJcSRGQ&t=1s, accessed 12 Nov. 2018  
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the arts, sports, and show business and have in the past included athletes, actors, a celebrity 
chef, a classical violinist, and others. The patrons appear in the TV trailers or as interview 
partners in the programs and generally represent the thematic week in the public.  
Three patrons were chosen to represent Tolerance Week: Anna Schaffelhuber, a German 
Paralympic skier and gold medalist; Pinar Atalay, a TV presenter of Turkish origins; and Jan 
Delay, a hip-hop musician. How is the choice of the patrons of Thematic Week to be 
understood? Of course, there are practical concerns in the choice of personalities to represent a 
media project, the first one being their availability for interviews and appearances during the 
week in question. But, also, they have to embody or represent the topic in some way. 
Therefore, the three faces of Tolerance Week were chosen because in one way or another, they 
were considered to stand for the topic of tolerance.  
Jan Delay was chosen for his work because of what he publicly stands for: a diverse, tolerant 
society, as exemplified through the attitude of openness and the cultural diversity 
characterizing the German hip-hop music scene. In the cases of Anna Schaffelhuber and Pinar 
Atalay, the choice as patrons was made for different reasons. These two represent tolerance 
not primarily in their attitude or statements, they were not chosen for what they thought or 
said, but for being who, or rather, how they are. Anna Schaffelhuber has used a wheelchair 
since birth and Pinar Atalay is the daughter of Turkish immigrants in Germany. So, both of 
them – regardless of their attitudes or even of what they would say during Tolerance Week – 
represent groups in the society that are seen as in need of toleration. They represent this 
through their bodies and biographies: one of them has a physical disability, the other has 
Turkish origins and a Turkish name. At the same time, they are also high achievers: one has 
won Olympic gold medals, the other has made it into the elite team of anchors for a central 
news program in German public TV, so she occupies a place of “objective authority” for the 
TV audience. In both cases, it is implicit that these achievements are special, that they are 
more than the achievements of other people, because they have achieved these high goals in 
spite of their “handicaps” – physical or social.  
Through the choice of its public faces, the thematic week set the goal of promoting tolerance 
in the society. At the same time, from the very start it moved within fields where processes of 
problematization and normalization are at work. The choice of patrons said that there are 
problematic fields in the first place, there are differences that are considered as alterity, 
“invariably marked as undesirable and marginal, as liminal civil subjects or even liminal 
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humans” (Brown 2008: 28). By promoting them in a positive way, they were made into 
objects of tolerance, with those called upon to tolerate, “asked to repress or override their 
prejudices in the name of civility, peace or progress” (2008: 28).  
Physically the two public faces of  Tolerance Week – Anna and Pinar – are the material of 
abjection and resentment. Their bodies, each for different reasons, are associated with 
exclusion. Whereas the representation of the body of a person with a handicap has become 
normalized to signal difference, the question is never posed as to why such a body is 
considered problematic in the first place. In Pinar’s case, however, the representation is not 
visual, but the presumption of her difference is implicit, as expressed in her name and our 
knowledge of her background in light of the history of Turkish immigration into Germany.  
At the same time, Jan’s position is associated with strength – he belongs to a group that can 
experience aversion, but that has chosen toleration. In his statement in the press booklet, he 
does not place tolerance in the political realm, but links it to an emotion, one that is warm and 
bright, a love that unites all mankind in equal measure. The statement reads almost as one of 
his song’s lyrics: 
Love is the most important thing in life. Every human must give and receive 
love to survive. The only problem: everybody chooses to love and receive love 
from different people and things. In order to let all these different “loves” 
coexist, some smart guy at some point invented tolerance. Because of tolerance 
there is no “right” or “wrong” love, but only – love. Tolerance lets love live. So, 
everybody can live his loves and love his life. When there is no tolerance, love 
gets unplugged. And then it gets dark and cold… (Bayerischer Rundfunk, 2014: 
8, translation from German by the author) 
In short, through the choice of the three public faces of Tolerance Week, tolerance does not 
respond to, but rather produces troubling subject positions. Similarly, the advertising 
campaign for Tolerance Week worked with social groups in presumed need of tolerance. It 
consisted of four images that formed the basis for the TV and radio trailers broadcast during 
the thematic week, that were displayed as posters throughout the country.  
Each poster showed a photograph of a person or two persons, accompanied by a pair of 
semantically opposed words and a question mark. One showed a Black man’s face, 
accompanied by the words: “Burden or enrichment?” (Belastung oder Bereicherung?). The 
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next one showed two young men holding hands and one kissing the other on the forehead, 
accompanied by the words: “Normal or not normal?” (Normal oder nicht normal?). The third 
showed a little girl screaming, accompanied by the question: “Pain in the neck or the future?” 
(Nervensäge oder Zukunft?), and the fourth poster showed a man in a wheelchair and the 
question: “Outsider or friend?” (Außenseiter oder Freund? all translations by the author). So, 
while the media makers were urged not to limit the representation of the topic to the usual 
“problem fields” such as immigration, sexual orientation, minorities, and others, but to look 
for new topics instead, it was exactly in these fields, in the framework of presumed latent 
negativity, that the advertising images were located. 
All four images showed people of marked identities, ranging from “Black” to “homosexual,” 
from “disabled” to “obstinate child,” and thus all of them deviated from the norm. The 
question mark indicated that one part of the dichotomy (burden, outsider, pain in the neck, not 
normal) presented the audience with the attitude of the “prejudiced viewer,” with the other 
part supposed to refute this attitude (enrichment, friend, future, normal) through the decision 
to tolerate. So, while these marked subjects were objects of tolerance, individuals that carried 
the group identity, members of the dominant group were asked to tolerate  
subjects carrying [...] ascriptive identities [...] that harbour orders of belief, 
practices or desire [that are] cast as significant enough to provoke the rejection 
or hostility that makes tolerance necessary. (Brown 2008: 44-45) 
The campaign led to a strong public backlash: minority groups and several politicians 
criticized it, and it also met with criticism from the public. The debate continued in Internet 
forums, with a part of the discussion criticizing the posters, and a part saying the debate itself 
showed how necessary it was to talk about tolerance in the society. Parodies of the poster 
campaign circulated on the Internet, with the questions from the campaign, such as “Normal or 
not normal?” or “Burden or enrichment?” accompanying pictures of politicians or music stars.  
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Fig. 7 – Posters of the ARD Tolerance Week 
The main criticism from minority representation groups was that such a campaign would not 
foster a real debate on tolerance, and instead of putting “the human at the center and asking for 
unconditional respect [… the campaign…] does not ask about the human but about his utility,” 
as Ulrich Schneider, head of the Parity Welfare Association, put it (translation from German 
by the author). Also, the public service broadcasters were criticized for neglecting their legal 
mandate and “putting the existence of minorities in question” (Ehrenberg 2014, translation 
from German by the author). The ARD produced counter-arguments saying that the campaign 
fulfilled its purpose, which was also “to provoke”, since  
it is not about presenting backward ideas, but rather, on the contrary, it is about 
giving an impulse for reflection about one’s own attitudes and prejudice. Are 
we, as a society, really as tolerant as we want to be? The question marks on the 
posters show that we are only posing questions that are already being discussed 
in society.” (Ehrenberg 2014, translation from German by the author) 
Therefore, the first question that arises from the campaign was who it actually disturbed or 
provoked. Obviously, it was directed not at minority groups but at the dominant position, the 
position that is called upon to do the tolerating. However, while the posters acknowledged the 
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existence of prejudice, they actually re-marked already marked subjects. Here tolerance works, 
as Brown argues,  
as a disciplinary strategy of liberal individualism to that extent that it tacitly 
schematizes the social order into the tolerated, who are individuated through 
their deviance from social norms and whose truth is expressed in this 
individuation, and those doing the tolerating, who are less individuated by these 
norms.” (Brown 2008: 44)  
Whereas the campaign started from the premise that prejudice exists, it presented the 
existence of prejudice as natural. By its question mark behind every dichotomy 
(friend/outsider, normal/not normal, etc.), it not only showed the mechanisms of exclusion at 
work but led to the question of whether a campaign that operated from such a starting position 
could demand social equality at all. In spite of the presumed intention, the posters reinforced 
the ascribed belonging to marginalized groups, they enhanced the Otherness of tolerated 
subjects by constructing them as the product of a group identity. On the one hand, the posters 
essentialized their identities as cultural (as certain practices), but on the other hand, they re-
inscribed the marginalization of the already marginal by reifying and opposing their 
difference to “the normal” or “the neutral” (2008: 45). According to Brown, this is one of the 
ways in which contemporary tolerance takes shape as a normative discourse: it reinforces 
rather than attenuating the effects of stratification and inequality.  
As has already been discussed, Laclau and Mouffe show how subjects are placed into certain 
subject positions through the institution of the media (or the educational system, the family, 
etc.). They are ascribed positions in many contingent, sometimes competing discourses, in the 
midst of attempts to stabilize them and “arrest the flow of differences” (Laclau and Mouffe 
2014: 98), with identity arising from identification with certain subject positions. These “nodal 
points,” or empty signifiers, only gain meaning through chains of equivalence that establish 
identity relationally. In this way, the ad campaign could be seen as fixing the subject positions 
of the tolerated. Its message rested upon certain chains of equivalence that arose through the 
gaze of the audience, whereas at the same time, the campaign articulated these identifications 
anew. In other words, the operation of tolerance can be seen here as not leading to change, 
bringing neither solutions nor antagonisms, but continuing to produce positions within society.  
Tolerance in the modern Western society has become a fundamental value, something of a 
right. Being a part of education or an accepted common value, propagated by state institutions, 
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the educational system, or the church, it operates in the processes of normalization. At the 
same time, it does not prevent that exclusion and marginalization happening in the name of 
tolerance. Through its essentialization of the cultures of others, it continues the process of the 
culturalization of politics, paired with an emphasis on individual freedom, thus actually 
blocking re-negotiations of the politics of difference in the public sphere. Wendy Brown also 
sees the operation of tolerance as having depoliticizing effects, which by neutralizing conflict, 
relegates the struggle for equality to the private sphere and away from institutional 
responsibility. Tolerance, for Brown, regulates the presence of the Other, or put differently, as 
a mode of late modern governmentality, tolerance  
iterates the normalcy of the powerful and the deviance of the marginal that 
responds to, links, and tames both unruly domestic identities or affinities and 
nonliberal transnational forces that tacitly or explicitly challenge the universal 
standing of liberal precepts. (2008: 8) 
Furthermore, tolerance removes the politics included in the positioning of subjects from its 
historical context of power struggle, so that for example, when people are urged to tolerate 
another person’s race, ethnicity, or culture, they are asked to tolerate “difference” as such, 
instead of unmasking that the difference in question, or  
the identities through which their differences are negotiated, have been socially 
and historically constituted and are themselves the effect of power and 
hegemonic norms, or even of certain discourses about race, ethnicity, sexuality, 
and culture. (Brown 2008: 16)  
As articulated in the advertising posters and through the faces of the thematic week as well, 
tolerance casts culturally produced differences as given, as matters of nature rather than as 
sites of inequality and domination. Indeed, by producing difference as a criterion for 
tolerating, it firstly produces difference as a criterion of exclusion. For example, disabled 
people are seen as dependent and then regarded as “Other” and punished by being excluded 
from ordinary life, even if the oppression and inequality of disabled people is not caused by 
their bodily impairments as such, but by the social arrangements, which allow those 
impairments to become disabilities (Evans 2005). 
It is interesting to note that an obstinate child was presented in one of the posters, since 
children in general are not seen as objects of toleration. How exactly did the child deviate 
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from the norm? Where was this girl’s difference? Was it because she was loud, disturbing the 
social order, or because she was occupying public space, while not under the control of adults? 
Or because as a loud girl, it hinted at a future in which she would be a “loud woman”? Was 
the undisciplined child escaping the position of a passive object of discipline, disturbing the 
ideal imagined space within which fragmented bodies function? 
The picture of the Black man with the question “Burden or enrichment?” also represented the 
migrant as one who is firstly to be excluded and then tolerated. The word “burden” plays on 
the recurring theme of political debates on immigration, where migrants are seen as a burden 
on the social system or on communal life. Through the black face, the chain of meaning 
between Otherness (“black cannot be German”), through to migration and the debates on 
immigration policies, is made. Implicitly, this is a case where the majority can exclude or 
tolerate – even if the word “enrichment” would not normally imply that there is toleration, but 
rather enthusiastic acceptance at play.  
At the same time however, tolerating a migrant is different from tolerating a person with a 
handicap or who is homosexual, since there is an important demand posed on the migrant, 
namely the demand to integrate. The migrant is the only one of these three marked identities 
who can actually change towards the normative standard, through processes of integration or 
assimilation, theoretically ending the need to be tolerated at some point. At the beginning of 
the process, however, there is no perspective of ending tolerance (which remains part of a 
static relationship), since the demand to integrate runs counter to the implied immutability of 
cultural difference. As Gail Lewis explains, in the struggle to define the parameters of 
inclusion or exclusion from the nation, two strands of liberal ideology are in tension. On the 
one hand, it is the tolerance of a certain degree of diversity, and on the other, a tendency to 
impose a hegemonic normalizing regime which subordinates and disciplines minorities. Of 
course, the very notion of tolerance is constitutive of an imaginary in which the social 
comprises a network of hierarchically organized social differences that mark the boundaries 
between majority/normative/tolerator and minority/deviant/tolerated (Lewis 2005: 540).  
In this sense, and regardless of the degree of assimilation, the black skin of the man in the 
poster remains a marker of difference, with all the assumptions linked through this chain of 
equivalence. Tolerance here remains, in the Words of Gail Lewis,  
a central capillary in a network of power/knowledge underwriting strategies for 
the governance and representation of heterogeneous populations. One 
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significant social figure articulating this space of tolerance, governance and 
representation is that of 'the immigrant', for it is in the immigrant that we have 
distilled the question as to how much difference can be respected and tolerated 
and to what extent must this figure be subject to practices of assimilation (2005: 
540). 
In short: when so-called normal people are urged to tolerate the disabled, when White people 
are urged to tolerate persons of color, when heterosexuals are urged to tolerate homosexuals, 
powers that produce these differences, that mark them as significant and organize them as sites 
of inequality, exclusion, deviance, or marginalization, are ideologically vanquished.  
In this way, tolerance actually substitutes for equal rights. Furthermore, this substitution is 
masked by the expectation that tolerance be performed by individual citizens rather than by 
the state, so that it “substitutes emotional and personal vocabularies for political ones in 
formulating solutions to political problems” (Brown 2008: 16). In the words of Wendy Brown, 
When the ideal or practice of tolerance is substituted for justice and equality, 
when sensitivity to or even respect for the other is substituted for justice for the 
other, when historically induced suffering is reduced to difference or to a 
medium of offense, when suffering as such is reduced to a problem of personal 
feeling, then the field of political battle and political transformation is replaced 
with an agenda of behavioural, attitudinal and emotional practices. While such 
practices often have their value, they reduce political action and justice projects 
to sensitivity training, or what Richard Rorty has called an ‘improvement in 
manners’. A justice project is replaced with a therapeutic or behavioral one. 
(2008: 16) 
The emotionalization of the debate on multiculturalism, the transference of the political public 
sphere into the sphere of the affective and the intimate, are central phenomena of ongoing 
depoliticization, as analyzed in the previous chapters. This has large consequences for the 
concept of citizenship. On the one hand, the state does not do the tolerating, but is the source 
of the calls for tolerance. At the same time, through the discourse of tolerance and through 
essentializing differences, the existing inequalities are legitimated. The citizens are called 
upon to practice tolerance, and in this call they are presented with the normality of saturated 
group identities marked as deviant, and the normality of their exclusion.  
 205 
To conclude, the posters, as well as the choice of patrons, illustrate well the new economy of 
belonging propagated by liberal states. It is an economy that functions as a form of 
depoliticization and opens the space for the ideal citizen – the one who occupies a privileged 
position to tolerate; the one who should not condemn. Like other cultural and media programs 
and initiatives that celebrate tolerance, public service broadcasters’ Tolerance Week 
contributed to this economy by dislocating subjects of tolerance from their original spaces and 
from the historical problems associated with their construction.  
Tolerance was shown in the thematic week to work as a viable supplement for equality, as is 
the case in the liberal societies that understand themselves as suffused with difference and not 
only sameness. By converting the effects of inequality into a matter of different practices and 
beliefs, this discourse masks the working of inequality and hegemonic culture as that which 
produces the differences it seeks to protect. Whereas in the past, tolerance was used as an 
alternative to violent exclusion, today it has turned into a generalized language of anti-
prejudice, promising a vision of the good society, yet to come. It marks the subjects of 
tolerance as deviant and marginalized, refusing to take into account the historical and political 
phenomena, and the powers that have produced the subjects of tolerance in the first place. In 
other words, it covers over the workings of power and the importance of history in producing 














Germany today is not only a country receiving (and sending) ongoing migration, it is a 
country deeply characterized by a diversity of ethnic origins, cultural practices, linguistic 
habits, and transcultural allegiances in most areas of social life – in short, it is a multicultural 
society. Almost one quarter of the inhabitants of Germany have a so-called “migration 
background,” denoting that they either immigrated themselves, or are descendants of at least 
one parent who has immigrated into Germany. Statistically, every third child in Germany has 
a so-called migration background at birth, because at least one of the child’s parents are 
migrants, so that around one third of the people with a “migration background” today have 
not actually migrated themselves (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung 2018) – this portion 
of the population is likely to increase. In several larger cities of west Germany, already over 
half the young population have a migration background. The life-worlds defined by 
influences from migration, multilingual upbringing, and intercultural contact in everyday life 
make up the myriad of facets of identity characterizing the increasingly culturally diverse 
German society. At the same time, however, the political and institutional discourse upholds 
the categories of the “majority,” somehow understood to be ethnically German, and the 
migrants and their descendants, imagined in the bulk (and allowing for the many individual 
examples to the contrary) as either outside of or only on the margins of the social mainstream. 
Immigration into Germany has been continuous since the early 1960s, starting with the guest 
worker contracts with countries of the European South of the time and continued with 
economic immigration from the EU and outside of it. Further immigration has occurred with 
people seeking refuge or political asylum, firstly in the 1990s, during the wars in the countries 
of former Yugoslavia, and more recently in the migration resulting from the war in Syria, the 
continuing violence in Afghanistan, and political and economic instability in many other 
countries mostly of the Middle East, North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa, during the second 
decade of the twenty-first century.  
The tremendous transformations since the 1960s have affected policies concerning education, 
the labor market, citizenship laws, immigration laws, antidiscrimination, and many others, but 
these have for the most part arisen as reactions to the evolving social situation, not as a result 
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of an encompassing vision on how the future of Germany in the times of globalized 
movements should look like or be actively shaped. Crises such as occasional labor shortages 
in individual industrial or service sectors, or the changing make-up and needs of the primary 
school classroom such as during the influx of refugees from Syria, have led to the 
introduction of policies that are largely approached as compensatory measures. As pointed out 
by German authors such as Terkessidis (2010, 2017), such policies have not arisen as 
proactive measures within a larger strategy concerning living in a society characterized by 
cultural heterogeneity. The transformation caused by the continuing movement of people as 
well as the changing make-up of the society has, in short, for the most part not been 
accompanied by profound institutional reflections concerning the very concepts of diversity, 
difference, and multiculturalism. 
In this way, instead of more inclusive terms, the one term that has been at the center of the 
German discourse on migration for the past decades is integration. After the end of the active 
recruitment of the Gastarbeiter in the early 1970s, and continuing throughout the period until 
the refugee migration from the Middle East in the twenty-first century, integration denotes the 
array of demands posed on the migrants, pointing at the same time to the discursive 
framework of the nation-state, in which migrants continue to be seen as the exception in need 
of adjusting to the “normal” functioning of the society. At the same time, integration is central 
to the political statements of the actors who reject social heterogenization, such as the populist 
or the far right-wing forces, but used in the negative sense when lamenting “insufficient” or 
even the “impossible integration” of migrants. In this way, instead of considering what a long-
term vision of Germany as a country of diversity could look like, both those who deal with 
migration constructively and those who reject it, continue to do so from the framework of a 
static and closed model of the German nation-state, in which migration or other cultural 
practices are seen at best as an add-on to the “national culture” or “identity,” not as a process 
that continually transforms both of these for all those living in the country and the ways 
citizenship is continuously remodeled. 
This thesis has analyzed the ways in which the cultural politics of difference, nation, identity, 
and citizenship have been embedded and articulated in the German media, in particular 
through the public service broadcasters. Within the political debate and the institutional 
responses, the media discourse has in the past few decades also adopted as central the concept 
of integration but to a large extent, has failed to look for radically new media articulations of 
multiculturalism. As Shohat and Stam point out, it is within the realm of the possible in media 
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production to challenge Eurocentric or national paradigms by radically new articulations, such 
as those of multicultural belonging, although this endeavor remains mostly reserved for 
minority programs outside the media mainstream (1994, 2003, 2012). The radio station 
Funkhaus Europa, part of the public service broadcaster WDR, is an example of a media 
channel striving to challenge monocultural paradigms – in many ways, through its choice of 
music and topics, as well as through its team of culturally diverse radio makers. In this way, it 
succeeds in producing a sense of transnational belonging in its audience. The thesis has, 
however, also shown that this radio station has in many of its policies and transformations 
also upheld dominant discourses, even when striving to question them – for example, when 
defining the subject-citizens of its audience as urban mobile cosmopolitans, at the same time 
personifying the ideal-type citizens of the neoliberal globalized economy. 
The thesis has critically examined the core concepts of the discourse on difference and 
diversity in Germany – integration, tolerance, cohesion, cosmopolitanism, and others –   
through the prism of their articulations in the media discourse. It has concentrated on media 
policy papers, on the analysis of the above-mentioned radio station dedicated to cultural 
diversity, and on a public service media event dedicated to the topic of tolerance. It identified 
and examined the core notions of how “difference” is articulated in these channels, looking at 
where the vectors of power and knowledge intersect in their particular discourses, and how 
these intersections have moved over time.  
What fantasies of citizenship in diversity, what fantasies of the nation do such intersections 
arise from? In the case of WDR Funkhaus Europa, these movements led it from being 
dedicated to “integration,” through to “multicultural living,” and finally to an “urban” and 
“cosmopolitan” audience. So, what do these movements do? What effects do they have on 
subject citizens, especially the minoritized subjects? And what cultural politics of difference 
do they uphold? Those were the main questions underlying the analysis, which saw the media 
as a crucial space of representation in the society, and one where the control and quality of 
these representations arises from the distribution of social power – which in turn has 
consequences in a multicultural situation, where difference is still a matter of 
problematizations. Seen as closely related to social and political power, the media in this case 
were analyzed as technologies of government in the Foucauldian sense, as not only vessels 
through which to transfer messages, but as technologies that create subject-citizens. 
Concretely, they were analyzed in terms of their ability to reinforce discrimination and 
divisions, to fashion “atomized consumers or self-entertaining monads,” to foster a sense of 
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common belonging and social cohesion, and to offer alternative, transnational identifications 
(Shohat 2003: 1). The thesis, thus, in particular, asked how the media discourses of these two 
case studies relate to public policies in Germany through the ways in which they take part in 
the discourse on nation and cultural difference, and how they participate in the creation of 
subject-citizens of the new German diversity. It also asked how they articulate cultural 
politics of difference and what interests are served by these articulations. 
In the first part of the thesis, some of the key concepts of the political discussion and the 
discourse on cultural difference were highlighted. These concepts show that recent 
developments, such as those in the course of economic or information globalization, have not 
only led to ambiguities concerning identity and belonging, but also to a re-negotiation of the 
concepts of nation: in some cases, however, they have lent the nation-state new strength. In 
spite of the Western desire for the rest of the world to “overcome” nationally and ethnically 
based confines and confrontations, such as those embodied in the ideal picture of the 
European unification and in the (neo-)liberal belief in the force of material globalization as a 
great eraser of national conflict, neither nationalism nor racism have diminished in the recent 
decades. Instead, as Étienne Balibar notes, their nature has changed so that after the 
abolishment of categories of biological race of colonial times, racist violence has moved to 
immigration as a new category, elevating cultural belonging to an essentialistic category and 
leading to social distance, which is seen as insurmountable (1991).  
Balibar especially concentrates on the constitution of new political entities, such as the 
process of European integration, as offering a new field for the exploration of nation and 
citizenship, but also for posing questions of sovereignty and political power. Whereas on the 
level of public policies and proclamations European integration is hailed as an expression of 
historical progress towards peace, a culture of inclusiveness and tolerance of diversity, 
Balibar sees it as also housing mechanisms of exclusion. For him, the exclusion of non-
members inherent in the very European project through its preferential treatment of nationals 
of member states is a crucial obstacle to the development of Europe as a democratic 
institution. Even if the European project has dissolved the link between nationality and formal 
European union citizenship, this has not led to a constitution of actual citizenship at the 
supranational level or to a dissolution of the notions of community in a post-national society 
(2004). 
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A crucial question in many discussions concerned with the discourse on difference, cultural 
diversity, and race, is under which political, social, economic, and cultural conditions 
racialized categories emerge, and under which conditions they can be made irrelevant. Both 
Sara Ahmed (2000) and Paul Gilroy (2004) call for a re-historization of stranger-production, 
for consideration of the history of creating power asymmetries as expressed in today’s 
inequalities and discriminatory practices. Whereas the modern societies of Great Britain or 
Australia, for example, reject monoculturalism and racialized or ethnic divisions on the level 
of the official and institutional discourse, and construct an image of themselves as tolerant, 
multicultural spaces, these are underpinned by hidden hierarchical assumptions. Instead of 
weakening with the passage of time, the former racialized categories are transformed and 
again function in the assignment of societal positions. Ghassan Hage (2000) sees in the 
Australian brand of multiculturalism a “White multiculturalism,” whereas Anne-Marie Fortier 
(2005, 2008) sees the pride of the modern British “mongrel nation” to be “multiculturalist 
nationalism” at its core, and exposes the fallacies hidden within the official discourse on 
multiculturalism. 
At the center of the discussions considered in this thesis stands a rejection of classifications of 
groups and identities. Paul Gilroy (2004) questions the categories of “race” as a result of the 
raciological ordering of the world, and sees this ordering as rooted in imperial history and 
forming the base of today’s patterns of discrimination and inequalities. As an alternative to 
what Gilroy sees as misuse of power through classifications of and within societies, he offers 
“planetary humanism” and cosmopolitanism, based on doubt and questioning instead of on 
hegemony, and on open, destabilized identities and planetary solidarity. Gilroy demands that 
the simple categories of identity and belonging be rethought and questions posed whether they 
are at all suitable for reflecting the complexities of life. In the words of popular culture, the 
energy spent on discussing whether the character of Ali G, played by Sacha Baron Cohen in 
his Channel 4 comedy series, was  
a white Jew pretending to be black, a white Jew pretending to be a white 
pretending to be black, a white Jew pretending to be an Asian pretending to be 
black, and so on might have been better spent positioning his tactics in a proper 
historical and artistic sequence of strangers whose strangeness was functional 
and educative. (Gilroy 2004: 79) 
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Sara Ahmed proposes contact as a response, insisting it is crucial to recognize the importance 
of the mode of encounter, not the status of the stranger/other. In this way, difference ceases to 
be something to be judged, rejected, accepted, or overcome, and becomes instead a productive 
dynamic. She calls for  
politics that is premised on closer encounters, on encounters with those who are 
other than ‘the other’ or ‘the stranger’ [...] bound up with responsibility – with 
recognising that (labouring) relations between others are always constitutive of 
the possibility of either speaking or not speaking. [...] It is the work that needs 
to be done to get closer to others in a way that does not appropriate their labour 
as "my labour," or their talks as "my talk," that makes possible a different form 
of collective politics. (Ahmed 2000: 180)  
Even if dealing with specific national settings and conditions stemming in part from the 
historical legacy of British colonialism, the authors discussed here leave the tight frame of the 
nation-state, and allow a consideration of factors arising from the international markets, global 
histories of labor and power relations, communications, and global migratory movements in 
crossing social, cultural, and physical borders of the multicultural society. They refuse to 
consider racism or multiculturalism in an isolated manner, instead, understanding national 
space as formed within global interactions – occurring both along the state borders and within 
them, played out in the transnational experience and everyday practices of diasporas and 
migrant communities. They are asking for the debate to open up to the possibility of 
destabilizing the dominant narratives of the nation – this implies the willingness to 
acknowledge the existing power assymetries, to process the histories of inequalities, to reject 
the modern forms of their continuation, and ultimately to redistribute power. 
From the theoretical framework discussed above, the analysis turned to the specific political 
and institutional discourses around immigration and cultural diversity in Germany, as well as 
responses to this situation in the media policies and their elaborations in the media research in 
the German language literature. A historical overview of immigration into Germany and the 
political and discursive responses to this transformation, discussed in Chapter 4, showed the 
difficult path that has led the political institutions to admit that Germany is indeed a country 
of immigration in the first place. This admission has, however, not gone hand in hand with 
legislation that would adjust to the facts “on the ground,” nor a profound reflection on the part 
of political institutions on questions of what constitutes (national) culture, how identity can be 
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defined in this new Germany, or citizenship embodied and lived. The contact with 
“difference” continues instead to be a site of conflict and contention, where a range of 
institutional responses are negotiated, and where processes of problematization continue to 
unfold.  
The thesis has identified some of the core concepts around which these negotiations turn, 
integration being the central one. In the German institutional discourse, “integration” is 
mostly presented as a non-hierarchical concept, one which must be undertaken both by the 
migrants and the “host” society, and as in the best interest of the migrants if they want to 
become a part of the German society. It is, however, quickly obvious that integration 
continues to be a demand strongly directed towards migrants, and in the best case migrants 
and institutions, but not towards the migrants and the rest of the society, all of the citizens. In 
this way, the narrative of migration and diversity as an exceptional state is upheld, as an 
anomaly added onto an existing and rather well-defined culture. It is something that needs to 
be molded in order to secure social cohesion and peace, not as something that continually 
transforms and redefines culture, state, and identity. 
Furthermore, integration is a hierarchical term, based on the model of something well defined 
and relatively static: a culture, a set of norms, an array of social habits and accepted 
behaviors, that a migrant can integrate into. When directed at the descendants of migrants, the 
demand to integrate heightens the power asymmetry involved. It places them as citizens 
outside of the nation and the norm, still not full social members, regardless of formal 
citizenship. Integration thus remains a term based on empty assumptions, and while used 
frequently, depending on the context, it gets filled and re-filled with all sorts of meanings. 
The analysis has indeed shown the inadequacy of terms such as integration to respond to the 
social developments of the recent decades. Even if presented as a “win-win” situation for both 
the host country and the migrants, integration is increasingly exposed as based on an 
antiquated national and cultural model, out of contact with social realities characterized by 
lived transnational practices and multiple memberships. Instead, through the continuing 
insistence on conditioning citizenship and inclusion on cultural conversion, integration as a  
consequence upholds the discourse of cultural distance. 
At the same time, the term “multiculturalism” has, over the past years, exhausted itself, 
suffering criticism and rejection on the political level. A part of this fate can be attributed to 
the often disparate definitions of the term. The edge of critique is here pointed at its alleged 
 213 
essentialization of identities, due to its defense of group rights. Allegedly reducing individuals 
to membership in disadvantaged groups, the multiculturalist approach and demands for 
specific rights and concessions are seen as eternally locking members into their fixed 
identities and disadvantaged positions. This critique, however, interprets group membership 
as the unavoidable result of essentialist racial or ethnic belonging, rather than considering 
those categories of belonging as a product of raciological or other discriminatory ordering of 
the world. In other words, the critique does not see belonging as based on a history of power 
inequalities involved in the production of an essential “difference.” Rather, it perpetuates the 
idea of this essential difference existing and forming the “natural” basis for problematizations 
within a society, producing what Balibar (1991) terms the current “neo-racism.” 
On the level of media and political discourse, the term “multiculturalism” is increasingly being 
replaced by “interculturalism” or “cosmopolitanism.” Also lacking a clear definition, 
interculturalism differs crucially from multiculturalism in that it accentuates individual contact 
rather than group rights. Thought through to its conclusion, this means that the possibility of 
discrimination due to belonging to historically disadvantaged groups is not acknowledged. 
Instead, cosmopolitanism celebrates the existing diversity of second and third generation 
urban immigrants as “enriching” the host country. Its ideal citizen is a young, mobile, 
economically strong individual, unbound by a history of inequality and capable of being at 
home in various cultures, due to a set of universally acceptable (Western) cultural norms. Sara 
Ahmed also relates the term “diversity” to the discourse of new cosmopolitan citizenship, 
where diversity work is incorporated in the figure of the global nomad, who can move across 
national borders and feel at home in the world. At the core of both concepts – 
cosmopolitanism and diversity – there is an implicit wish for social homogeneity, envisioned 
as a constructive and positive social inclusiveness, a “unity in diversity.” However, for 
Ahmed, as long as the understanding of the national-state norm and the periphery has not been 
fundamentally transformed, diversity will remain little more than a decorative element 
enriching the host culture.  
Seeing that the terminology concerning difference and belonging is in ongoing transformation 
– due to discursive exhaustion, political undermining, and conceptual changes – several 
authors have proposed new terms with the aim of conceptually coping with existing social 
realities or leading to conceptual changes of dealing with them. Terms such as super-diversity 
or civil-integration, proposed, for example, by Vertovec (2004, 2007, 2010) as more 
appropriate for depicting the complexities of today’s immigration societies and their everyday 
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cultural practices, reject the hierarchical positions implicit in terms such as integration. They 
also acknowledge factors that shape social realities more strongly than categories of 
nationality and which have largely been ignored in the political and institutional discussion so 
far. Instead of simplistic essentializations of ethnic belonging, terms such as super-diversity 
acknowledge the widely varying experiences in migration routes and channels, as well as 
legal and social statuses within and between groups. They also acknowledge the reality of 
social contact and mixing between groups, leading to new generations with migration 
backgrounds who cannot be neatly categorized in terms of national belonging. In this way, 
these terms overcome static models of identity and group belonging, along with the model in 
which a “host” culture “accepts” newcomers and expects them to adjust. Several authors, 
among them Gilroy and Vertovec, also concentrate on the city as the arena where the new 
super-diverse social cohesion (Vertovec) evolves and constantly regenerates itself. It is built 
in the city but it is also of the city, due to its character as a “world of strangers” (Lofland, 
quoted in Vertovec 2007: 30) in which a capacity for sustaining a functioning grid constructed 
of random, fleeting exchanges based on ground rules of civil-integration enables the 
functioning of urban life.  
This acknowledgement of the self-regulating and spontaneously forming social cohesion 
presents a more accurate view of how European immigration societies function and makes 
“super-diversity” (Vertovec 2007) or “conviviality” (Gilroy 2004) more practical at least as 
descriptive terms. Even if they do not involve calls for action in the political public sphere, at 
least they expose the detachedness of the official policy debates and their top-down political 
prescriptions as separate from the lived reality, pointing to the life power fueling the existing 
multicultural life that rejuvenates itself often in the face of official denials of its very 
existence.  
However, what is the role of media discourse in community and identity formation, in the 
construction of difference? And, what are the ideological grids – often hidden or naturalized –  
underlining media texts? Shohat and Stam (1994, 2002, 2003, 2012) explore the hidden 
paradigm of Eurocentrism underlining media texts from the peak of European imperialism to 
the media production of today, where the Western subjects continue to be implicitly positioned 
against the European/North American Other. In today’s multicultural situations – which arise 
from consequences of former colonial rule, from modern migration movements, and from 
globalized economic flows – the media have attained a crucial role as field of representation in 
which the Eurocentric grid is perpetuated or it is rejected. As fields of contestation, as spaces 
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of representation and dissemination of power structure models, they are also crucial in the 
project of a radical rethinking of today’s relations, as spaces where dominant discourses can 
be resisted. This rethinking goes beyond both the descriptive and the normative approaches to 
multicultural realities, linking them instead to a thorough re-examination and rejection of 
global power structures, which can offer a contemporary answer to today’s miscegenated 
spaces, superseding simple racial, national, and other binarisms. 
The German language literature on the subject, analyzed in Chapter 4, does not dedicate much 
space to the questions of how media discourse can become a space of alternative narratives in 
multiculturalism. Most of the texts concentrate on analyzing media frames, occurrence of 
representation of difference through protagonists or authors, or rather media consumption, 
and reception and effects in terms of reinforcing discrimination or combatting stereotypes. 
The starting premise of most of the analyses that I encountered is the causal relationship 
between the participation of media makers of differing cultural origins and resulting media 
content on the one hand, and media content and usage and resulting integration success on the 
other.  
Seen as important players in the process of integration and social cohesion, the media 
institutions are called upon by the relevant political institutions to work on facilitating 
integration, a demand represented in the media policy papers of the broadcasters, or various 
program projects and events, such as, for example, the thematic week on tolerance, analyzed 
in Chapter 8. Furthermore, a large body of literature in the area concentrates on questions of 
how the media can further integration, employing media consumption studies, representation 
studies, and others. As such, this research strengthens the narrative of migration and diversity 
as being an exception outside the norm, something that can be managed if approached right. It 
is implied that discrimination can be diminished through ethical reporting, social 
emancipation strengthened by showing role models on screen, and also that media channels 
can teach newly-arrived migrants about the modes of exercising citizenship in Germany.  
The assumption of the integrative power of the media is reinforced by policies of the 
broadcasters, among them the policies that led to the inception of special-interest media, such 
as WDR Funkhaus Europa, and to the institutions concerned with furthering integration. Most 
of them place the term integration in the center, emphasizing the role of the media, 
particularly public service broadcasters, in processes of integration and social cohesion, as 
well as the political responsibility resulting from this role. 
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The third and fourth part of the dissertation looked at two specific case studies – the radio 
station WDR Funkhaus Europa and the 2014 thematic week of the public service broadcasters 
dedicated to tolerance. The main question leading the analysis was how the media actually 
work on the multicultural society. What do they do to the citizens subjects when they embrace 
certain key terms, such as cosmopolitanism, multiculturalism, or tolerance? What pictures of 
Otherness and social relations with Otherness do they transport? How do they articulate 
politics of difference? Do they offer counter-narratives? What national fantasies spawn them, 
and what fantasies of the good life in diversity do they produce? 
The third part of the thesis concentrated on the case study of the radio station WDR Funkhaus 
Europa. Even if this station, especially at the time of establishment, contained in its self-
understanding some of the truisms mentioned above, such as that of the integratory function of 
the media, in many ways it abandoned and elaborated further the simple recipes of the 
integration frame. Explicitly dedicated to questions of difference in Germany and Europe, the 
station embarked on routes that left the well-traveled paths of the integration policies behind, 
in search of new, alternative ways of responding to the antagonisms of a society in constant 
change through cultural diversity. In any case, Funkhaus Europa has avoided the 
problematizations of the mainstream media discourse, as concerns migration and growing 
diversity, and has always worked on framing these in a positive, desirable light. As the 
analysis has shown, some of these responses have been emancipatory and political, others 
have furthered neoliberal commodifications of diversity, and thus – without intending to – 
actually perpetuated some of the dominant frames concerning diversity.  
However, writing this conclusion from a distance of only a few years after the main period 
under analysis means that there is a completely different political environment, which allows 
for a somewhat different perspective on the media in question. In the midst of new and 
massive problematizations of migration evident in the German public and political discourse, 
and with the public service media in Germany (and many other European countries) under 
fierce attacks not only from the political right wing, such projects as Funkhaus Europa or 
Tolerance Week seem to paint an almost idyllic picture of a past in which difference and 
diversity were approached from a decidedly more positive stance. 
Funkhaus Europa’s development has been discussed in detail in Part III of the thesis: 
Established in 1999 as a special-interest radio station by the West German radio and 
television WDR, Funkhaus Europa was given the task of being the integration radio for the 
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German Land of North Rhine-Westphalia. The station was established by uniting previously 
existing programs in the languages of the largest migrant communities, and adding to them a 
daily program in German, with the emphasis of its word and music content being about 
diversity, as well as employing an international team of journalists. In a further policy change, 
while continuing to broadcast in German and foreign languages, and employing a team of 
journalists and editors of diverse cultural origins, Funkhaus Europa shifted its focus to 
become a station dedicated to celebrating cultural diversity as “enriching” the country through 
music, languages, and cuisine. Finally, after a brand and later a name change to WDR Cosmo, 
it became a radio station specifically addressing a young, urban, cosmopolitan audience of 
migrant and explicitly also of German origins. 
At the beginning of writing this thesis, I was working as an editor for WDR Funkhaus Europa. 
I belonged to the middle generation of editors working there – not one of the “grounding 
generation,” but with a longer experience than the younger colleagues joining the station. In 
the early 2000s, which is the main analysis period of this thesis, the Funkhaus Europa radio 
station was going through a deep transformation that touched not only the practical questions 
of making a radio station and the everyday work involved, but through this also the political 
framework the station was articulating. It was transformed from a station that was founded as 
the “integration radio” of North-Rhine-Westphalia, that consisted of the German program and 
an important and large element of mother-tongue programs,  to gradually become a radio 
depicting and celebrating the existing multicultural life in the broadcasting area. This was 
epitomized in its advertising tagline, “My music, my world, my radio” (Meine Musik, meine 
Welt, mein Radio) and its brand “Without borders” (Grenzenlos). One of its projects, Roots – 
The story of your family (Roots – Die Geschichte deiner Familie), strove to strengthen the 
self-esteem of students of migrant origins by letting them research the migration stories of 
their parents and grandparents. In its music color and word content, the station celebrated a 
happy mixing, the cheerful present tense of the multicultural society, with all its comparative 
advantages, such as its versatile music styles, tasty dishes, exotic travels – in short, a diversity 
that “enriches” and can be consumed. 
In a further brand redefinition, Funkhaus Europa became a “Global Sounds Radio,” shifting 
its wording and with it its ideological framework from multiculturalism and integration 
towards cosmopolitanism and urban pop culture. The analysis of the trajectory of the station 
brand in Chapter 5 uncovered that such shifts not only affected the everyday work of program 
making, but also articulated deep ideological transformations concerning the ways of dealing 
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with difference, culture, identity, and citizenship. One particularly important aspect here – 
both in the analysis of concept shifts in the public discourse, as in the media policies – was 
the abandonment of the concept of multiculturalism and the adoption of concepts such as 
cosmopolitanism and unity in diversity. The analysis of the brand change towards 
cosmopolitanism uncovered processes of depoliticization at work, reflecting in the media 
discourse the overall shift away from difference as a site of emancipatory efforts, towards a 
situation where difference is made consumable and detached from its political connotations. 
The paradigm change of the program policy to a radio that wants to attract young 
cosmopolitans with hybrid identities rather than addressing the problematizations that make 
migrants subaltern was shown to be articulated within broader changes in the cultural politics 
of difference in Germany and Europe in general. The analysis uncovered how the imaginaries 
of citizenship created by the media went hand in hand with the shifts in public policies 
concerning Germany as a society of many cultures, a society that acknowledged itself to be an 
immigration country but did not quite develop a vision of how this would change its modes of 
citizenship, or its cultural identity, instead perpetuating the problematizations surrounding 
cultural difference. 
As I showed in the analysis of interviews with the radio makers, discussed in Chapter 6, this 
shift towards a self-description as a cosmopolitan radio station left a deep mark on the team. It 
affected not only their working practices, but also their emotions about belonging and 
identity, which brought me back to questioning the viability of such media projects in terms 
of their impact on the existing discursive structures around nation, identity, and belonging. 
The finding that surprised me most from analyzing the interviews at this sensitive time for the 
radio station was the strong division between German editors and those of migrant origin 
(regardless of their generation) that was never articulated but was obviously felt by both sides. 
In a station celebrating diversity and intercultural mixing, the editors, even those who were 
descendants of migrants to Germany and had no migration experience themselves, saw 
themselves as a group socially separate from the German majority – they spoke of racism, of 
envy around the redistribution of resources, of special codes among migrants, and about 
losing their voice in the new, cosmopolitan Funkhaus Europa, which they judged to be 
apolitical in its celebration of unity-in-diversity in its urban mixing.  
In the chapters of Part III, dedicated to Funkhaus Europa, I adopted a critical stance towards 
this transformation of the station. Both from an insider-position as editor on the program team 
at the time, and from a later, analytical point of view, I see in it a closing off of discursive 
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spaces for counter-narratives and people who are not part of the mainstream. I see the move 
from multiculturalism to cosmopolitanism as maintaining the framework of the dominant 
problematization of multiculturalism. The analysis also uncovered depoliticizing effects in 
this process, that precluded real emancipation of minoritized subjects. These were instead 
taken as belonging to this new diversity celebration only if they could be counted into the 
cosmopolitan spirit – itself a category referring more to class than to culture. 
The analysis of Funkhaus Europa’s construction of ideal listeners in Chapter 7 also showed 
the station leaving a political or emancipatory discourse, and a public sphere where political 
negotiations on the modes of citizenship can take place. Instead, the projection of the ways 
citizenship was to be embodied in this new diversity constructed by the station was one where 
difference could be consumed, and contact with it played out in the intimate sphere of the 
citizens’ private lives and their bodies. I showed this to be a part of a larger discursive shift 
towards a privatization of citizenship within neoliberal policies. 
Part IV of the thesis put the considerations on station policy into a different context, analyzing 
a media thematic week dedicated to the topic of tolerance. The event was organized by the 
Association of the German Public Service Broadcasters, ARD, in 2014 as part of a series of 
yearly thematic weeks of the ARD. I also participated in this media event as an insider, as a 
radio coordinator for the WDR radio content, and as an outside observer at the same time.  
In this way, the analysis moved away from a specialized radio channel, such as Funkhaus 
Europa, to a mainstream event addressing the whole population. It concentrated on the 
question of what effects the term tolerance has, and in this context, what framework the 
public service broadcasters upheld when they placed the term tolerance at the center of a 
country-wide media event. In other words, I asked: what does the media mainstream do 
within the discourse on diversity when tolerance is at its center? Following Wendy Brown, I 
showed tolerance to be a tool of governmentality and pointed to the depoliticizing effect it has 
on the social struggle around cultural difference. The operation of tolerance was uncovered as 
constructing subjects in need of toleration by a presumed “norm” and fixing their identities as 
being outside of it. I showed that, rather than securing pluralism, which was the explicitly 
stated goal of Tolerance Week, tolerance tends to operate in a profoundly ideological way, 
preserving the social relations that define the norm and those who deviate from it. In Wendy 
Brown’s words, it continually reproduces the position of the Other, “structurally inherent to 
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the discourse of tolerance, which stabilizes unequal positions between those tolerating and 
those tolerated” (Brown and Forst 2014:10). 
Looking at the media event from the distance of a few years, a new question comes to mind 
when looking at the effect of the term tolerance. Whereas during the thematic week, tolerance 
could be placed as a desirable method of conflict resolution, possibly contributing to social 
justice, at the time of writing this concluding chapter, tolerance has become a term at the 
center of new problematizations around immigration. Instead of being the “civilized” 
response to difference, it becomes what distinguishes “us” from “intolerant others,” it belongs 
“collectively rather than selectively to Westerners” whereas intolerance “has become a code 
word not merely for bigotry or investments in whiteness but for a fundamentalism identified 
with the non-West, with barbarism, and with anti-Western violence” (Brown 2008: 16). In 
this, tolerance can be interpreted as an example of how the “nodal point” tolerance (Laclau 
and Mouffe 1985), which even during the thematic week was filled with all kinds of 
meanings, moves within the flow of competing discourses, suddenly becoming the center of 
new chains of equivalence.  
The repositioning of “tolerance” towards the problematization around Islam and Moslems in 
the European discourses on diversity and cultural difference would certainly be of interest for 
further research that goes beyond the scope of this thesis. 
It is not only the discursive repositioning of tolerance that shows how contingent on social 
and political power relations the scripts of diversity can be. In Chapter 7, I showed how such 
a repositioning happened to the script of the ideal-type listeners of Funkhaus Europa within a 
range of only a few years. The narrative of the German-North African couple Carla and Sami 
turned from being a script celebrating “happy multiculturalism” (Fortier 2005: 567) to a 
highly problematic one. In 2010, Sami was imagined as a young Arab man, with a distant 
relationship to Islam, and a German patriot. Only five years later, at the height of the refugee 
movement from the Middle East to Europe, and after the events of New Year’s Eve in 
Cologne, it was not only the problematizations around immigration that came to the fore of 
the political debate: a completely new discourse emerged, in particular around young male 
immigrants from the Middle East and North Africa, who suddenly epitomized narratives of 
sexual predation against the body of the White European woman. For Kutlaçan, after the 
Cologne events, gender relations moved “to the center of the construction of an anti-muslim 
racism” (2016: 115). It is not only the growing racism against Muslims, but also the 
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interlocking and reciprocal action between sexism and racism against Muslims, that will 
certainly be a subject for further research and is already of growing interest to authors in the 
German context (Kutlaçan 2016, Messerschmidt 2016, Attia 2018, Yildiz 2013), some of it in 
explicit reaction to the problematizations of immigration in the wake of the “Cologne events.”  
As I pointed out, such paradigm changes show just how fragile scripts concerning encounters 
with ethnic and cultural difference are, depending on the re-positionings in the struggle 
between competing interpretations of social reality, competing claims to “truth.” Again, 
further research on these transformations and the role of the media in them will certainly be 
worthwhile in light of the dramatic re-positionings within the discourses concerning 
difference in recent years in Europe and elsewhere.  
In terms of the case studies of this thesis, in this conclusion I can only offer a perfunctory and 
personal “look back.” In the course of continuing (refugee and other) migration into Germany 
and the simultaneous rise of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) through the political 
institutions, a general shift in media discourse is obvious to anybody consuming the media, 
although a profound analysis of this shift would be a matter for further research. On the level 
of personal impressions, what was unthinkable on the rhetoric level a few years ago finds its 
way into media texts today. At the same time, the definitions of identity, homeland, culture, 
and nation are again a matter of fiery public contestation. 
WDR Cosmo, formerly Funkhaus Europa, is at the moment of writing again tapping into the 
more politicized public sphere, dealing with topics ranging from the #MeToo movement 
through to uncovering racist experiences in Germany. It would be interesting for later analysis 
to see how a media project dedicated to diversity will navigate the current discursive shifts. 
What concepts will stand at the center of the new imaginary projected by a channel such as 
this one? Will they be more political and emancipatory, or will they continue to locate the 
“good life” in diversity in the area of consumption and intimate lives? 
Also, in hindsight and from another vantage point outside of the radio station, it becomes 
obvious how different this station is from the media mainstream when it comes to its stance on 
diversity. Regardless of the critical points concerning the ways it transmits this, the station 
does offer alternative imaginaries to the dominant problematizations around diversity and 
migration. The question remains, however, to what extent a media channel, especially a public 
service channel, can respond to cultural diversity without tapping into dominant discourses. 
How can it create counter-discourses and what knowledge can they articulate? Can such a 
 222 
channel, as Shohat and Stam state, become a space that escapes both the problematizations and 
discriminations on the one hand, and the dominant striving for cohesion on the other, and 
articulate modes of a new, transcultural belonging and citizenship instead?  
This dissertation has attempted to uncover some of the strategies that the selected media 
follow in order to stake their “claims to truth” in the social struggle on difference and 
diversity. It has also shown where these media have succeeded or failed in offering 
alternatives to the dominant discourse. A large field for further research is opening in the 
context of growing polarizations surrounding immigration and diversity in Europe and the 
ways these are articulated in the media discourses. It will also be interesting to follow the way 
in which the responses of this media, specifically dedicated to cultural diversity, will develop 
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Media discourses of nation and cultural differences: A case study of of Westdeutscher 
Rundfunk 
 
Gerrmany is a country of migration and continues to be so, increasingly becoming a society of 
diverse ethnic and cultural identities. Today, over one fifth of its inhabitants have a so-called 
migration background, defined either as having migrated themselves or having at least one 
parent who has migrated to Germany. In institutional politics, or in the media, this reality is, 
however, often represented in a fragmented, belated, or even contradictory manner. At the same 
time, ways of responding to and “managing” difference within the territorial borders of the 
nation-state remain crucial concerns in the approaches to the questions of nation and 
citizenship. The thesis unlocks the régimes of truth that construct the discourses of the German 
society, identity, or belonging, identifying some of the core “nodal points” of these discourses, 
among them the terms multiculturalism, integration, tolerance, and cosmopolitanism. The thesis 
unpacks some of the concepts of the media discourses on “difference” and locates the points 
where they crack and rupture, pointing to the intersections of power and knowledge, and the 
shifting historical conditions that provide the horizon for their construction. The analysis is 
focused on a set of broadcasts specifically dedicated to multicultural life: Funkhaus Europa, a 
radio station within the biggest public service broadcaster in Germany, the Westdeutscher 
Rundfunk (WDR), established with the purpose of reflecting the cultural diversity in the 
country, and the thematic week dedicated to tolerance, organized by the German public service 
broadcasters in 2014.  
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Medijski diskursi nacije i kulturne različitosti na primjeru Westdeutscher Rundfunka  
 
Njemačka je danas zemlja obilježena migracijom, pretvarajući se sve više u društvo raznolikih 
etničkih i kulturnih identiteta. Preko petine njezinih stanovnika ima takozvanu „migracijsku 
pozadinu“, što znači da su ili sami uselili ili potječu iz useljeničkih obitelji. Useljavanje u 
Njemačku kontinuirano traje od šezdesetih godina 20. stoljeća, a čak kad bi useljavanje 
odjednom i posve prestalo, broj ljudi „migracijske pozadine“ nastavit će rasti, budući da je 
svako treće dijete u Njemačkoj rođeno u useljeničkoj obitelji. Institucionalni odgovor na ovu 
transformaciju bio je spor, pa je tek posljednjih godina uopće postignut konsenzus oko toga da 
je Njemačka useljenička zemlja. Službeni stav institucija danas je usredotočen na naglašavanje 
potrebe integracije i osjećaja zajedničkog građanstva, te lojalnosti zajedničkim kulturnim 
normama. Temeljni je cilj ove disertacije istražiti nove politike različitosti koje nastaju u 
suvremenom njemačkom društvu kroz analizu kulturnih javnih politika te artikulacija tih 
politika kroz medijske programe. Analiza se usredotočuje na radio Funkhaus Europa, jednu od 
šest radio postaja zapadnonjemačkog javnog medijskog servisa Westdeutscher Rundfunk 
(WDR), te tematski tjedan posvećen toleranciji, u organizaciji Radne skupine njemačkih javnih 
medijskih servisa ARD, 2014. godine. Kroz etnografsko istraživanje ovih medijskih programa 
rad kritički analizira glavne koncepte diskursa različitosti u Njemačkoj – integracije, 
tolerancije, zajedništva, kozmopolitizma i drugih – kroz prizmu njihovih artikulacija u 
medijskom diskursu, otkrivajući neke od strategija koje mediji slijede kako bi položili vlastito 
pravo na istinu u socijalnoj borbi oko razlike i različitosti. Glavna pitanja u analizi su: Što mediji 
zapravo čine u multikulturnom društvu? Kakve slike Drugosti i odnosa s Drugošću 
transportiraju? Kako artikuliraju politiku različitosti? Nude li alternativne narative? Koje 
subjektne pozicije stvaraju? Iz kojih nacionalnih fantazija proizlaze i kakve fantazme „dobrog 
života“ produciraju? Pristup analizi medijskih programa kao i javnih politika u ovom je radu 
inspiriran teoretičarima i teoretičarkama diskursa, a interes je utemeljen u teorijskom okviru 
“moći i znanja” i “identiteta i subjektivnosti”, te uzima u obzir suvremene debate u društvenim 
i humanističkim znanostima oko koncepata “identiteta” i “kulture” (Ahmed 2000; Balibar 2004; 
Gilroy 2004; Laclau 1990, 2007; Stam i Shohat 1994, 2003, 2012). Disertacija također slijedi i 
teoretičare kulturnih studija (Brah 1996, 2000, Hall 1992, 1996, 2003), koji koncepte “kulture” 
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i “identiteta” promatraju kao diskurzivne artikulacije koje označavaju povijesno promjenjivu 
sponu društvenih značenja. Ovi koncepti, koji se propituju u prvom dijelu disertacije, ne 
promatraju se kao odvojeni od ekonomskih, socijalnih i političkih odnosa već kao polja koja su 
kroz te odnose konstruirana (Božić-Vrbančić 2008). U tom smislu na „kulturu“ se gleda kao na 
društveni konstrukt, i kao što Stuart Hall (2003) tvrdi, kultura je proces, skup praksi, ona je 
uključena u stvaranje i promjenu značenja koja nastaju među članovima nekog društva ili grupe. 
U skladu s takvim konceptom „mediji“ su konstruirani kulturom, odnosno društvenim, 
gospodarskim i političkim odnosima, ali oni tu kulturu kroz procese reprezentacije istovremeno 
i konstruiraju. U analizi uloge koju mediji igraju u kulturnoj raznolikosti u Njemačkoj, mediji 
se ne promatraju samo kao odraz socijalnih pitanja, već i kao oblik socijalne akcije, mehanizam 
koji pridonosi formaciji identiteta. Kao i u institucionalnoj politici, i u medijima se stvarnost 
Njemačke kao zemlje kulturne raznolikosti često reprezentira na fragmentiran, zakašnjeli ili 
čak kontradiktoran način. Ipak, mediji su od strane službenih vlasti prepoznati kao ključni 
faktor koji može pomoći pri integraciji, te se u tom smislu potiču medijske politike koje 
promoviraju interkulturalizam i toleranciju, a jedan od proizvoda takvog pristupa je i radio 
program Funkhaus Europa, na koji se rad usredotočuje. U ovom dijelu analize otkrivaju se neki 
od ključnih koncepata njemačkog diskursa identiteta, pripadanja ili „razlike“, među kojima su 
multikulturalizam, integracija, tolerancija i kozmopolitizam, te se lokaliziraju točke na kojima 
se ti diskursi lome, što pak ukazuje na intersekcije moći i znanja i klizeće povijesne uvjete koji 
stvaraju horizont za njihovu konstrukciju. U povijesnom prikazu migracija i diskursa o 
migraciji u Njemačkoj, disertacija pokazuje kako su politički pristupi multikulturnoj situaciji i 
načini „upravljanja“ kontaktom s razlikom i prisustvom razlike unutar nacionalne države 
artikulirani kroz političke i medijske diskurse. Takav pristup u kontekstu današnjih javnih i 
medijskih politika u Njemačkoj poprima nov značaj te omogućava sagledavanje politika 
identiteta, pa time i konstrukcije različitosti, kroz prizmu upravljalaštva. Foucaultove teze o 
upravljaštvu i tehnologijama vladanja povezuju se ovdje s djelovanjem medijskih diskursa, koji 
se promatraju kao prostori u kojima se snažno artikuliraju javne politike i kreiraju subjekti-
građani te prava na istinu. Ovdje se ključni koncepti kulture, moći, nacije i identiteta koji su 
utjecali na analizu snažno oslanjaju na koncept artikulacije Laclaua i Mouffe (1985). U 
analiziranim tekstovima i dokumentima, disertacija otkriva neke od režima istine koji 
konstruiraju diskurse njemačkog društva, nacije i građanstva, a konflikti oko pitanja identiteta, 
pripadnosti, razlike i rase identificiraju neke od “čvornih točaka” (Laclau i Mouffe 1985) ovih 
diskursa, među njima multikulturalizam, integraciju ili kozmopolitizam. Upravo analizi 
upravljalaštva i specifičnosti njemačkog konteksta posvećen je drugi dio disertacije. Prema 
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Foucaultu (1991, Rose 2006), analiza upravljalaštva pokušava identificirati stilove mišljenja u 
vezi upravljanja populacijom, uvjete nastanka određenih mišljenja, principe znanja na koje se 
upravljanje oslanja, te prakse od kojih se upravljalaštvo sastoji. Foucault pri tome prepoznaje 
čitav niz autoriteta koji upravljaju na različitim mjestima, pa glavni fokus političke analize moći 
iz ove perspektive nije država, već tehnologije i strategije koje se koriste da bi se upravljalo 
populacijom, odnosno teorije koje se koriste da bi se objasnila „stvarnost“ i legitimirale prakse 
i programi koji se uvode u tu svrhu. U tom smislu, disertacija i medije promatra kao tehnologiju 
moći u foucaultovskom smislu te riječi. Inspirirana pristupima koje su razvile Lauren Berlant 
(1997, 2011), Sara Ahmed (2000, 2004) i Anne-Marie Fortier (2000, 2005), posebna se 
pozornost posvećuje i analizi zamišljenog ideala kako nacije, tako i medijske publike, te politika 
sentimentalnosti koje uokviruju i obilježavaju javni prostor današnje Njemačke. U središtu 
analize je radio Funkhaus Europa, osnovan 1999. godine kao program posvećen kulturnoj 
raznolikosti u području emitiranja, Sjevernoj Rajni-Vestfaliji, a s ciljem poboljs ̌anja integracije. 
Radio od tada emitira program na njemačkom jeziku, te na jezicima većih useljeničkih skupina. 
Uređuje ga tim novinara i novinarki različitog etničkog porijekla, a na valovima ovog radija 
čuju se teme, glazba i protagonisti koji kulturnu raznolikost predstavljaju kao njemačku i 
europsku stvarnost. U dvadesetak godina od osnutka, “duh“ ovog programa prešao je put od 
integracijskog, preko programa koji slavi multikulturalizam i raznolikost, do programa koji se 
definira kao “kozmopolitski” i slavi ”urbanu mjes ̌avinu” kultura. Premda se radi o vrlo maloj 
radio postaji, ona ima jedinstvenu zadaću, pa se stoga razvoj njezine programske politike može 
interpretirati kao artikulacija određenih kulturnih politika koje se odnose na pitanja 
“različitosti” u Njemačkoj. U trećem dijelu rad se bavi programskim reformama ovog radija. 
Analiziraju se intervjui vođeni s novinarima i urednicima programa, koji pokazuju kako 
konceptualni pomak programa prema kozmopolitizmu djeluje na emocije i mišljenja ljudi koje 
program proizvode, te kako oni u jeku programske reforme redefiniraju vlastite pozicije u 
društvu karakteriziranom migracijama i kulturnom raznolikošću. Također se analiziraju 
dokumenti u vezi programskih reformi, među njima novo definiranje branda ovog radija kao 
kozmopolitskog, te elaborat zamišljenog ideala publike radija Funkhaus Europa. Analiza 
pokazuje da ono što u prvom trenutku izgleda kao progresivni slijed - s etničkog na integracijski 
i multikulturalni, a potom na kozmopolitski program – zapravo ukazuje na različite 
antagonizme njemačkog društva i odnosa spram Drugosti. Jedan od glavnih argumenata ovog 
dijela disertacije je da je promjena pradigme prema kozmopolitizmu dovela do snažne 
depolitizacije. Diskurs kozmopolitizma gura pitanje različitosti u privatnu sferu, a različitost 
pri tome postaje esencijalizirana kao osobni identitet, te na taj način i depolitizirana, što ukida 
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ideju javne politike kao područja debate. Problemi se svode na identitarne odrednice, više se ne 
govori o građanima i građankama, već o potrošačima i potrošačicama određenih identiteta. U 
posljednjem dijelu rad promatra procese depolitizacije u kontekstu pitanja tolerancije, u okviru 
analize tematskog tjedna javnih medija posvećenog toj temi. Tolerancija, koja se obično 
predstavlja kao način osiguravanja pluralizma, ovdje se analizira u smislu operacije u 
konstruiranja subjekata i fiksiranja njihovih identiteta kao objekata tolerancije. Ukratko, kao 
što to tvrdi Wendy Brown (2008, 2014) tolerancija producira subjektne pozicije, ona orkestrira 
identitete, daje im značenja, obilježava tijela i uvjetuje političke subjekte. Drugim riječima, ona 
definira normu i one koji od te norme odstupaju. Analiza u konačnici ukazuje i na nove lomove 
u borbi oko definiranja razlike i pripadnosti, nacije i kulture, te ukazuje na krhkost narativa 
kontakta s etničkom ili kulturnom razlikom, te na to koliko snažno oni ovise o borbi između 
interpretacija stvarnosti i svojatanja prava na istinu. Pomaci u medijskom diskurs u jeku novih 
migracijskih pokreta i antagonizama koji se stvaraju, otvaraju i pitanja za daljnje istraživanje u 
smislu strategija kojima mediji odgovaraju na nove problematizacije oko ovih pitanja, ne samo 
u njemačkom već i u europskom kontekstu. 
 
Ključne riječi 
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Transcripts of interviews 
 
Interview Yildiz  
Cologne, 12 July 2012 
 
Q: SBS ist ein sehr erforgreicher Sender in Australien, der sich dem Thema 
Multikulturalismus verschrieben hat. In Australien ist Multikulturalismus eine Art 
Staatspolitik. Das ist hier in Deutschland ganz anders. Die reden da von einem 
Paradigmenwechsel, der sich da vollzogen hat, von diesem Ethno-Multikulturalismus, wo du 
so zu sagen auf die Gemeinschaften guckst, auf die Einwanderergruppen und so weiter, zu 
einer Art kosmopolitischen Multikulturalismus, wo gesagt wird: Ja, diese Gruppen sind nicht 
mehr wichtig, wir sind so zu sagen… 
A: … kosmopolitisch. 
 
Q: Wir sind sehr kosmopolitisch. Also du hebst diese ethnische Ebene weg, als ob es sie nicht 
gäbe, und tust so, als ob alles in Ordnung wäre… 
(unverständlich) 
… dann gibt es dieser populäre, das ist die dritte Phase, die sind sehr kritisch, dieser populäre 
Multikulturalismus, so zu sagen, Multikulturalismus als Mainstream, was auch eine Illusion 
ist, weil so funktioniert es in der Realität nicht. Kurzum: Funkhaus Europa jetzt, die machen 
jetzt, wo sind wir? Wo siehst du uns jetzt? Oder unsere jetzige Farbe? Die versuchen jetzt 
diesen kosmopolitischen Multikulturalismus herzuzaubern. Ist das das richtige? Oder siehst 
du uns da? 
A: Also, diese Entwicklung, die du von diesem australischen Radio beschreibst, passt eins-zu-
eins auch zu Funkhaus Europa. Genau dieser Schritt ist auch vollzogen worden. Deine Frage 
war genau?  
 
Q: Wo siehst du uns? Sind wir uüberhaupt so weit, dass wir so was herzaubern können? 
A: Ich kann ja nur spekulieren, warum man das macht. Also, erstmal ist ja diese Idee, das mit 
Einwanderern, für Einwanderer, zu multiethnischen Gruppen, sowohl von innen als auch von 
außen, das zu machen, ist was sehr ordinäres, das ist wirklich was, was in sich total logisch 
ist. Es ist aber natürlich schwierig durchzuhalten, weil du dich drüber immer wieder 
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austauschen, immer wieder neu definieren und finden musst, ne? Ich glaube auch, dass die, 
die jetzt nicht der ethnischen Gruppe angehören, die jetzt, oder nicht der hauptethnischen 
Gruppe angehören, also in diesem Fall den Deutschen, dass denen schwerer fällt in dem 
Zusammenhang, immer wieder halt mit den ethnischen Gruppen zu tun zu haben, ohne selber 
ein Teil davon zu sein. Ich glaube, das fällt ihnen einfach schwer und da geht es ja auch noch 
um Machtverhältnisse der Definition, und die Definition, wie sich so ein Programm ausrichtet 
liegt ja nicht bei den ethnischen Gruppen sondern bei der Hauptgruppe, nämlich der 
Deutschen. Und die, glaube ich, findet das einfach, um in dem Sprachgebrauch zu bleiben, 
irgendwie sexier. Also, dass sie sich selber, sie sind dann ja auch wieder ein Teil davon, sie 
sind dann kosmopolitisch, sie sind das halt auch. Sie sind jetzt nicht nur die Deutschen 
sondern eben kosmopolitisch. Alle anderen sind kosmopolitisch, wir alle sind kosmopolitisch, 
wir fassen uns an den Händen und tanzen ein Reigen, so. Dadurch sind alle wieder gleich, 
quasi. Und sie müssen sich auch nicht mehr, die müssen sich auch mit den Realitäten dieser 
ethnischen Gruppen nicht mehr beschäftigen. Weil einfach, weil du diese, du scheinbar 
irgendwas aufhebst. 
 
Q: Es ist ein ganz großer Teil dieser ganzen Entwicklung ist, dass du diesen Unterschied, der 
natürlich aus bestimmten Machtverhältnissen entsteht, dass du den konsumierbar machst. 
Dass du den so klein machst, dass er konsumierbar ist. Das heißt, der äußert sich dann 
dadurch, dass du fremde Küchen magst, oder Musik, oder Tänze… 
A: Das wird zum Selbstbedienungsladen. 
 
Q: Also, irgendwas was du konsumieren kannst, ohne dass du dich jetzt mit der politischen 
Dimension befasst. 
A: Du musst dich nicht mehr mit der Realität oder mit dem, was eben der Unterschied ist, und 
was er eben auch für Teile der ethnischen Minderheiten ausmacht, nicht beschäftigen, weil du 
sagst, wir sind alle gleich, ich bin genauso ein Kosmopolit wie du. 
 
Q: Also, du meinst, dass diese ganze Bewegung, die wir jetzt durchmachen im Radio, dass es 
so zu sagen… ja, das hat sich so zu sagen in diesem Fall die Mehrheitsgesellschaft, die 
Deutschen, so zurecht gelegt, damit sie… 
A: Sich besser fühlen. Die fühlen sich dann besser, sie fühlen sich zugehörig, sie erheben sich 
ja über alle, ne? Also, sowohl über die Mehrheit der Deutschen, die das nicht interessiert, jetzt 
in dem Fall. Und sie schaffen eine gleiche Ebene mit den ethnischen Gruppen, weil die sagen, 
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ihr seid ja auch nichts Besonderes, ich bin genauso wie ihr, seht her, weil ich bin ja 
Kosmopolit. Und wenn du auch einer bist, dann gehören wir zusammen. Also, das ist, glaube 
ich so, dieser Punkt, und dass sie sich einfach nicht mehr auseinander, also dass man gar nicht 
dahin kommt, dass die Machtfrage gestellt wird, indem du halt diesen Deckel da drauf 
machst, ne. Es wird gar nicht mehr geguckt und du machst das. Dieses Konsumistische sehe 
ich auch, also wo ich jetzt bei 5 (WDR5) bin, sehe ich auch, dass die, also alle anderen 
Wellen sich auch von Funkhaus Europa bedienen, wir sind wie so ein Gefäß, ne, also WDR5 
hat viel von dieser etwas ruhigeren Weltmusik, bei WDR2 höre ich bestimmt Sachen, bei 
EinsLive sowieso, WDR3 hat ja auch seine Weltmusik-Sendung. Und dieses, das was uns 
wirklich abgehoben hat, teilweise sind die Autoren auch die gleichen, das was uns immer 
unterschieden hat, war ja dieses Programm aus uns selber auch für Menschen, die so sind, die 
diese Erfahrung haben. Dadurch dass das nicht mehr ist, hat dieses Programm eigentlich kein 
Alleinstellungsmerkmal mehr, die Musik ist das nicht mehr und die Themen auch nicht. Weil, 
auch die anderen verstehen sich als Kosmopoliten, die sitzen ja nicht in den Redaktionen und 
sagen, ich bin ein Deutscher und will nur deutsche Themen um mich herum, ne. Teilweise 
sind die, gucken die sogar genauer hin auf bestimmte Sachen, die bei uns jetzt nicht mehr 
stattfinden, finden da trotzdem statt, weil da dieser Diskurs trotzdem noch da ist, so zu sagen, 
es gibt diesen Unterschied, es gibt die Machtfrage, ne. Aber, ich glaube, dass es für viele, 
viele der, also wenn du der, eigentlich der Hauptgruppe angehörst, also der Mehrheit hier, und 
mit Leuten zusammen arbeitest, die eben eine andere ethnische Herkunft haben, dass das auf 
Dauer nicht auszuhalten ist für die, da irgendwie mit zugerechnet zu werden. Sondern dann 
sich auf eine komfortablere Position zurück zu ziehen, ne, und sich damit beschäftigen. Weil, 
das ist ja auch eine unbequeme Position, es ist ja auch unbequem. Als Einwanderer gewöhnst 
du dich da dran, aber warum soll das einer tun, der eigentlich der Mehrheitsgesellschaft 
angehört. Letztendlich denke ich, glaube ich, geht es einfach um Verteilung von Ressourcen 
und Führungsposten und auch Qualifikationen, wenn du sagst, das ist uns egal, oder das ist 
nicht mehr wichtig, weder von der Sender-Seite als auch von der Empfänger-Seite, dann 
musst du dich auch nicht mehr drum kümmern, dass du irgendwelche Vertreter von 
ethnischen Minderheiten als Hörer gewinnst oder als Mitarbeiter gewinnst, weil das ist ja 
egal. Hauptsache, du bist Kosmopolit, ne. Es erinnert mich an die Linken, die türkischen 
Linken früher, die, für die war es immer ganz wichtig, dass du eine Position hast, im linken 
Spektrum, innerhalb des, und wenn du das nicht hattest, dann warst du für die ein Demokrat. 
Aber, das war für die das größte Schimpfwort überhaupt, weil das eigentlich nichts war, in 
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deren Augen, ne. Und so ist es mit den Kosmopoliten auch, das ist eigentlich ein total blasser 
Zustand. Er zieht sich ja eigentlich immer auf den neutralen Standpunkt zurück, ne. 
 
Q: Auch eine kontrollierbare Situation. 
A: Ja, eine kontrollierbare und im Grunde genommen, machst du dich damit überflüssig, weil, 
ich meine, wer würde von sich gerade in so einer Radio-Landschaft behaupten, es sei es nicht, 
zumindest als Macher. Kenne ich jetzt niemanden, der sagen würde, ich bin provinziell, oder 
ich denke immer nur an das deutsche Volk, oder mir sind die Minderheiten in diesem Land 
und in der Welt egal. 
 
Q: Was meinst du jetzt, wenn wir einen Schritt zurück tun könnten, für wen, oder… ja, für 
wen sollten wir eigentlich senden? Oder, dass wir jetzt für keinen senden, das dürfte klar sein, 
aber für wen sollten wir eigentlich Programm machen? 
A: Also, ich fand den Ursprungsgedanken, zu sagen, wir machen Programm für all die, die 
irgendwie in dieses Land zugewandert sind, ob nun jetzt als Angeworbene, so genannte 
Gastarbeiter, oder sind nach dem Studium hier geblieben, oder jetzt irgendwie, es gibt immer 
noch Leute, die kommen. Und das verbindende Glied ist halt, Deutschland ist irgendwie 
vielleicht in erster, vielleicht in mehrfacher Generation nicht Heimatland. Das fand ich eine 
gute Klammer, und ich glaube schon, dass es unter den eingewanderten Gruppen also 
wiederum eine kleine Gruppe gibt, die sich dessen bewusst sind, und nicht nur die eigene 
Gruppe sieht, sondern auf dieses Gesamte. Aber, ich glaube, das ist eine kleine Gruppe. Und 
dass man dieses Wunschdenken vielleicht hat, nur weil man jetzt zugewandert ist, hat man 
viel mit anderen Zugewanderten zu tun, du kannst als Türke, die Asylbewerber auch zu viel 
finden, ist ja kein Widerspruch. Und trotzdem verbindet dich was mit den anderen, und 
dennoch ist es eine kleine Gruppe, aber für diese kleine Gruppe, fand ich das absolut richtige 
Zielgruppe, weil mich hat am Anfang immer total berührt, dass ganz selbstverständlich in 
einem deutschsprachigen Umfeld, dass ich informiert worden bin um die Welt und trotzdem 
zu dem Land, aus dem ich stamme, noch mal einen anderen Zugang hatte, thematisch viel von 
anderen Ländern gelernt habe und ganz selbstverständlich in diesem Musikprogramm auch 
mal ein türkischer Titel läuft. Das hört sich total banal an, aber das war das. Für mich hat das 
so eine Lücke geschlossen, dass du nicht mehr dieses nur deutsche oder ethnische hast, 
sondern dass es etwas gibt, was eigentlich das spiegelt, was du selber ja in dir hast, ne. Also, 
das fand ich richtig gut und ich fand immer auch gut am Anfang oder eigentlich immer 
zwischen durch, das Programm von den Erfahrung derer gelebt hat, die da gearbeitet haben. 
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Also dass das jetzt nicht aus so einem Agenturwissen sich schöpfte oder aus dem 
Zeitungswissen, sondern dass du gelebtes Leben halt in dieser Redaktion hattest, die auch 
einschätzen konnten, was ist das, was ich da jetzt mache oder sende, oder dass sich das quasi 
so, dass das zusammen passte, das fand ich gut. Ich glaube, das war auch richtig. Ich meine, 
die Frustration darüber, dass man da jetzt mit nicht die Massen erreicht, kann ich verstehen, 
aber, ich meine, es ist doch selbst unter Deutschen oder der Mehrheitsgesellschaft, die sich, 
die über den Tellerrand blicken, einen anderen Blick haben, sie ist klein und die ist natürlich 
naturgemäß bei den Einwanderern noch kleiner, weil sie ja immer noch ein kleiner Teil der 
Bevölkerung sind, sie sind ja nicht die Mehrheit. Was sind die, 12% 10%? Mehr ist es ja 
nicht, ne. Und trotzdem finde ich, hätten sie es verdient, ein Programm zu haben, was ihre 
Realität spiegelt, ne. War das.. hat das deine Frage beantwortet? 
 
Q: Ja, ja. Ich habe mir ja im Züge meiner kleinen Recherche bisher, du wirst es nicht glauben, 
ich habe mir die alten Roots-DVD und diese ganzen Dinge angeschaut. Dabei ist mir 
aufgefallen, es gibt da diesen alten Beitrag von Ravi über den Preis oder das 
Preisausschreiben, und da bist du drin und Jona, ne, als O-Ton-Geberinenn. Und es ist mir 
jetzt echt so aufgefallen, dass du… also die Jona ständig von dieser Warte spricht, da sind 
Potentiale, auch in der Hauptschule, wenn die Leute erstmal ein Selbstbewusstsein kriegen, 
dann müssen wir das so betrachten, als Chance, die bringen uns was, so, ne? Sie spricht von 
„wir“, „sie“, so, das ist total offensichtlich irgendwie, dabei sagt sie nette Sachen, aber 
irgendwie ist das, sind das zwei Pole. Und du sprichst viel emotionaler, sagst dann, also jetzt 
nicht „wir“ oder so, aber so Sachen wie: Wenn man sich mit der eigenen Geschichte befasst, 
dann sieht man, dass die Eltern was Wichtiges gemacht haben, indem sie nach Deutschland 
gekommen sind. Also, wie siehst du dich jetzt, in deinem Alter als Journalistin, ne, nach so 
vielen Jahren, weißt du, gehörst du, nö, weißt du, was ich meine? Bist du jetzt Mainstream 
oder bist du… 
A: (laughter) 
 
Q: Weil du siehst das total anders. In diesem einen O-Ton, du gehst von einer ganz anderen 
Position und sagst nicht: Ich bin Einwanderin, oder so, aber schon dieser Satz: Dann erkennst 
du, dass deine Eltern was Wichtiges gemacht haben, indem sie ihr Land verlassen haben, nö, 
ist schon eine ganz andere Perspektive.  
A: Ja, natürlich, ich habe das Projekt ja auch bezogen, wo du dich ja mit Wurzeln 
beschäftigst. Ich weiß nicht, ob du das weißt, als ich angefangen habe journalistisch zu 
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arbeiten, habe ich ja nicht mit Themen angefangen, die was mit Einwanderern zu tun haben, 
weil ich nicht in die Ecke wollte. Das fand ich auch gut, hat mir auch gut getan, und bei 
Funkhaus Europa war das ja anders, also genau das Gegenteil. Viele Diskussionen, viele 
Beiträge, die daraus entstanden sind, die aus dieser Geschichte sich gespeist haben, das hat 
mir irgendwie gut getan, das war wie so eine... ja, Heilung ist jetzt übertrieben, aber wie so 
ein Trost oder wie so ein Zusammenwachsen von etwas, ich kann halt ganz normal, bei allen 
möglichen Themen arbeiten, aber ich kann auch meine Herkunft daran einbinden, ohne jetzt 
da völlig drin aufzugehen oder die irgendwie zu verherrlichen oder zu romantisieren oder so. 
Da hat sich irgendeine Lücke geschlossen und da bin ich total dankbar für. Jetzt merke ich, 
wo ich auch bei den anderen wieder arbeite, dass aber schon bei mir dieser Punkt überwiegt, 
gute Geschichten zu recherchieren und an einem Punkt ist es mir eben egal, die müssen sich 
nicht aus mir speisen. Also, mein journalistischer Ehrgeiz oder mein Werdegang ist nicht an 
meine Herkunft gekoppelt, dass da Sendungsbewusstsein ist oder so, ne, das habe ich so 
festgestellt, aber in einer Zeit war Funkhaus Europa total wichtig, weil, es hat ja auch eine 
Wertung oder Aufwertung erfahren, dass ich diese Geschichten auch loswerden konnte, dass 
die irgendwie dich selber, deine Gruppe, also auch im Austausch mit Deutschen darüber zu 
sein, dass man sie auch journalistisch verarbeitet und jetzt nicht nur einfach erzählt hat, das 
war total wichtig, aber das wäre jetzt nicht etwas, wo ich sagen würde, dass ich das jetzt auf 
Dauer nur machen will, weil im Grunde ist das andere, journalistisch zu arbeiten, mindestens 
genauso stark. Ich hätte das jetzt, glaube ich, weiter gemacht, wenn es so weiter gegangen 
wäre, aber. Es hatte eine wichtige Funktion, also ich finde nach wie vor absolut richtig, dass 
es auch das bessere Konzept ist, dann natürlich immer wieder mit anderen Leuten, ich glaube, 
du kannst es halt auch nicht auf die Dauer machen, irgendwann hast du auch, brauchst du 
auch, das war ja, glaube ich, das besondere auch in der Startphase, dass da Leute dazu 
gekommen sind. Jeder von uns hatte einen Bruch in der Biographie gehabt, da war ja keiner, 
der zur Schule gegangen, Abi gemacht, Journalistik studiert, ist dann beim Hörfunk gelandet, 
ne. Da ist jemand abgehauen von zu Hause, ein anderer ist von der Armee geflüchtet, ich habe 
vorher beruflich was ganz anderes gemacht, also, daraus ergab sich dieses Spannungsfeld ja 
auch, und ich glaube, dass so ein Konzept von Einwanderern auch mit Blick auf die 
Zugewanderten Programm zu machen, auch immer wieder Leute braucht, die dazu kommen. 
Also, jetzt in dem Fall hätte das bedeutet, dass man verstärkt Leute nimmt, die jetzt so neu 
dazu ziehen, das wäre auch Osteuropa, zum Beispiel, oder jetzt ganz aktuell, Griechen zu 
holen, Portugiesen, Spanier, was auch immer, also dass du das immer wieder erfrischst. 
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Q: Gut, aber heute haben diese Leute ganz, also diese Generation hat ganz andere 
Werdegänge, die machen halt diese klassische Biografie, um in den Journalismus zu kommen. 
Nur, meinst du, das sind dann die Leute, die noch die politische Tragweite, nö, diese, diese 
ganzen Rahmenbedingungen überhaupt durch blicken können? Ich… 
A: Einwanderer auch, Einwanderer? 
 
Q: Ja. 
A: Doch, ich glaube, dass die Mischung total wichtig ist. Also diesen Bruch hast du ja allein 
dadurch, dass ein Teil deiner Familie in der ersten, zweiten Generation nicht da lebt, wo du 
lebst. Also, du hast den Bruch sowieso. Du hast ihn da drin, dass du noch eine andere Sprache 
hast, die dir wichtig ist. Und den Bruch meine ich gar nicht negativ, da ist einfach nicht alles 
glatt, so linear abgelaufen. Aber so ein Programm, also gerade wenn du dich an Einwanderer 
wendest, du brauchst eben auch Leute, die das erneuern, und dann ist, glaube ich, die 
Mischung wichtig, nicht dass ich denke, dass die Leute, die da lange arbeiten, da nicht mehr 
hingehören, aber dass du, wenn du den Anspruch hast, da auch quasi am Puls zu sein und da 
was zu fühlen, dann auch tatsächlich die Leute für diesen Sender auch irgendwie im 
Programm hast, entweder sie mehr reinholst oder ihnen mehr Platz gibst aber auch tatsächlich 
den Platz schaffst, dass sie da auch wirklich als Redakteure arbeiten und nicht nur als freie 
oder Producer oder so. Weißt du, das Gegenkonzept zum Kosmopolitschen, das kann dann 
quasi jeder machen. Ich glaube nicht, dass das, also so ein Programm, ich glaube auch, die 
machen es auch nicht mehr, weil sie es nicht könnten. Du kannst es eben nicht mit so einer 
ganz linearen Biographie, wenn du da die Mehrheit in der Redaktion hast, die aus solchen 
Leuten besteht, da kannst du so ein Programm nicht machen, wie? Das muss sich schon aus 
dir speisen oder aus deinen Erfahrungen in der Community, wo du dich bewegst und alles. 
 
Q: Was meinst du eigentlich von diesen Fremdsprachen- oder Muttersprachensendungen? 
Haben die heute noch, was haben die für einen Sinn, haben die einen Sinn? Deine Meinung. 
A: Also, ich verstehe die ja leider nicht, aber das Türkische verstehe ich schon. Also, ich 
glaube, sie machen keinen Sinn in der Richtung, dass sie Wissen oder Nachrichten in der 
jeweiligen Sprache vermitteln, die du auch aus der Tagesschau beziehen kannst. Also, ich 
könnte mir vorstellen, dass man, wie am Wochenende ja auch, wenn es so Gäste sind, wenn 
du einfach, ich glaube, es gibt ein Bedürfnis danach, einfach die Sprache zu hören, das Radio 
einzuschalten und die Sprache zu hören. Also, da würde ich auch denken, dass man sich an 
denen orientiert, die hier leben und zugewandert sind und an deren Alltagsrealität, ne. Da ist 
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ja immer noch dieser Gedanke hinter, man muss diese Menschen informieren, die müssen 
irgendein Wissensdefizit aufholen. Und ich glaube, der ist echt überholt. Ich glaube, kein 
Mensch braucht mehr eine Sendung auf Türkisch oder Italienisch, wo ihm der EU-Gipfel 
oder, was haben wir denn jetzt, keine Ahnung, das Elterngeld erklärt wird, ehrlich gesagt, 
glaube ich das nicht. Weil sich die ganze digitale Welt verändert hat. Du kannst hier 
Radiostationen empfangen, du kannst Fernsehstationen, und, und, und. Also, das glaube ich 
nicht. Es müsste also, es würde Sinn machen, genau wie bei dem deutschen Programm, wenn 
du etwas findest, wo du diese Realität dieser Community, dann noch viel kleiner ist als das 
Gesamtprogramm, auf die Pelle rückst und die quasi reinholst, dann würde das noch mehr ... 
das zu, mit den Leuten, die da jetzt in dem Fall, wenn wir jetzt bei den Italienern bleiben, die 
hier als italienische Community leben, dich viel stärker verzahnst mit denen, viel mehr 
Programm mit denen machst, da draußen bist, und das jetzt weniger, weil sie das brauchen, 
sondern weil es einfach schön ist, diese Sprache, immer noch Mal mit der Sprache was zu 
machen und in der Community sich zu fühlen, ne. 
 
Q: Also, ich finde, man kann diese Sachen nur auf der affektiven Ebene irgendwie packen, 
vor allem was diese Muttersprachen angeht. Weißt du, das ist etwas, was du verbindest mit 
deiner persönlichen, irgendwie… du willst jetzt nicht ein Service haben in deiner 
Muttersprache, oder so, aber ein bisschen auch auf dieser Ebene, so, wir sind ein Teil von 
dem und dem oder wir, nö, so, oder man findet uns interessant oder so, etwas ja, weil es die 
Leute auf der emotionalen Ebene anspricht, ohne Soapopera zu machen, aber so auf, weißt du, 
was ich meine? Etwas was nicht reine Information ist. 
A: Dass du auch präsent bist, zum Beispiel bei dem Fußball-Spiel Italien-Deutschland, da war 
ich auch noch in der italienischen Kneipe oder Verein, wo auch viele italienische Kollegen 
waren, übrigens, die haben das da... 
 
Q: Im Mondo Dings-Bums. 
A: Ja, ja. Aber, die haben das da auch genau wie ich geguckt. Aber, ich finde, da hätte halt ein 
Ü-Wagen da hingehört. Und dann das auf italienisch, auf deutsch, ist egal wie, aber da 
brauchst du, glaube ich, wenn du das auch noch, noch Mal in so einer kleineren Gruppe 
machst, einen viel stärkeren, also unmittelbaren Kontakt zu den Leuten, die hier leben. Also, 
die müssen meiner Ansicht nach, dauernd unterwegs sein, ne. Und das ist ja das, was die 
anderen nicht können, dein Radiosender aus der Türkei, der kann das nicht mit dir machen, 
ne. Und das deutsche Radio hier auch nicht. Aber mein türkischer Sender, der kann mit mir 
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auf Tuchfühlung gehen, auf Augenhöhe, und das ist, glaube ich, ich glaube, so sehen sie sich 
nicht, oder? Keine Ahnung, ich weiß es nicht, weil ja auch dieses, das ist ihnen dann nicht 
journalistisch genug, aber im Grunde ist es das einzige, das ist, wenn man überlegt, das ist das 
einzige, was die anderen nicht können. 
 
Q: Genau, ja. War es eigentlich, als du angefangen hast als Journalistin, war es eigentlich 
schwer für dich in dieser Welt, also journalistische Szene, sagen wir mal, sich zu behaupten, 
oder war das, wie war das eigentlich? Ich war ja in der Zeit nicht hier, deswegen. 
A: Ja, ja. Ne, also, sagen wir mal... Ich habe das Glück gehabt, dass es zwei-drei Leute gab, 
die erkannten, dass ich das kann und mich nur trauen muss, also ich hatte Unterstützung. Und 
dann war ja meine eigene Überlegung, fang nicht mit Ausländerthemen an, das wirst du nicht 
wieder los, und das war, glaube ich, auch eine gute Entscheidung. Und mir ist es nur... ich 
erzähle dir ein Positiv- und ein Negativ-Rassismusbeispiel. Ein Mal passierte, ich habe einem 
Sender, das war nicht der WDR, etwas über Kurden, Kurden-Türken, ich weiß gar nicht mehr 
was, und dann hatte ich eine lange Diskussion mit dem Redakteur darüber, ob eine Türkin 
was zu einem Kurden-Thema machen kann, also das Übliche. Dann habe ich so lange mit ihm 
hin- und herdiskutiert, bis ich das gemacht habe und er war am Ende dann auch mit dem 
Ergebnis ganz zufrieden. Das andere war, da hatte ich mit einem deutschen Kollegen etwas 
gemacht, was wir auch in Berlin einem Sender angeboten haben, und da mussten wir 
Kassetten einschicken, ob wir auch sprechen können, und da durfte mein Kollege den Beitrag 
nicht sprechen, aber ich, weil der Redakteur war der Ansicht, der hatte einen rheinischen 
Akzent, bei mir hört man das nicht, wo ich herkomme. Das war dann ein großes Lob, also. 
Ne, ich habe jetzt da, auf der Ebene das nicht erlebt, aber ich glaube, das hatte total viel damit 
zu tun, dass ich so zwei-drei Beiträge über irgendwas erotisches gemacht habe, die Sex-Tante 
auf einmal war und irgendwie alle Themen bei mir gelandet haben, die irgendwas mit Erotik 
und weiß-ich-nicht-was, total skurril, wie schnell das geht. Fand ich dann auch irgendwie ein 
bisschen komisch, also man muss unheimlich aufpassen, dass du nicht irgendwie auch in der 
total seichten Ecken landest oder dieser Problem-Ecke oder in dieser Ausländer-Ecke, also 
das ist, glaube ich, die große Kunst so als Freier auf Dauer, außer das gefällt dir da. Also, 
deswegen ich überlege gerade, ist mir jetzt nicht so. Jetzt auf dieser reinen Arbeitsebene, habe 
ich das nicht erlebt, als Feste dann schon eher, ne. Dass du da schon denkst oder merkst, die 
Leute können nicht davon abstrahieren, dass du eben diese Herkunft hast. ... Also, das ist 
dann immer wieder Thema. Komischerweise habe ich das als Redakteurin eher erlebt, dass 
irgend jemand sagt, ja, Sie sehen ja nicht so aus, oder dann dir total persönliche Fragen stellt, 
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wie ob meine Mutter das oder jenes, oder mein Vater, oder wie genau, und so Biographisches 
abfragt, was ich sonst, eigentlich so als Freie eigentlich überhaupt nicht gekannt habe. Und 
komischerweise, wenn du dann Kollege bist, dann eher passiert, ne. Und dass es so eine 
strukturelle, ja, Benachteiligung, Diskriminierung gibt, das glaube ich schon. Und das, so gut 
ich das eigentlich für mich finde, dass sich bei Funkhaus Europa so ein Kreis für mich 
geschlossen hat emotional, so Karriere-technisch war das kein guter Schritt, also. Ja, weil man 
wird da nicht so ernst genommen, ist einfach so. Aber, gut., das ist halt so. Ist jetzt auch nicht 
schlimm. 
  
Q: Warum, ja. Du bewegst dich ja in den WDR-Strukturen. Ich weiß ja, dass uns keiner ernst 
nicht, aber warum eigentlich? Liegt es an dem…   
A: Das ist normaler Rassismus, du. Ich glaube, zum Rassismus gehört auch, dass du dich 
besser fühlst als der andere. 
 
Q: Also, es liegt nicht an unserem Programm, dass es schlecht ist, sondern es liegt in der Tat 
daran, an diesem… 
A: Nein. Ja, das ist ja auch genau der Punkt, wo die Deutschen jetzt, die Kollegen, diese 
Diskrepanz nicht aushalten. Weil sie sind in dem Moment auch Türke oder Italiener oder 
Serbe oder Kroate. Dann sind sie doch lieber Kosmopolit. Für mich ist das so was wie 
Demokrat. Ich meine... (laughter). Hey, ich habe diese Herkunft und ich finde es dann 
komisch zu sagen, ich bin kosmopolitisch, finde ich ein bisschen albern, ehrlich gesagt. Aber, 
ich glaube, warte mal, deine Ursprungsfrage war was? 
 
Q: Ja, wie man uns, warum…  
A: Warum das so ist? Ja, das ist der ganz normale Rassismus. Du fühlst dich besser als die 
Minderheit, na klar. Also, ich glaube, dass viele sich darüber wundern würden, wenn sie so, 
dieses journalistische Potential, was es ja bei Funkhaus Europa gibt, tatsächlich erleben, ich 
glaube, da wundern sich viele. Ich glaube, viele denken, auch viele Kollegen, dass da einfach 
irgendwelche hoch bezahlten Dummköpfe rum rennen, die diesen Job haben, weil die die 
richtige Herkunft haben, ne. 
 
Q: Quote erfüllen? 
A: Weil sie eine Quote erfüllt haben, ja, oder weil du… Du kannst halt fürs italienische 
Programm nur arbeiten, wenn du italienisch sprichst. Aber das sind ja trotzdem noch 
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Journalisten. Und ich glaube, das spricht man ihnen gerne ab, aber gibt es natürlich auch, ich 
meine, Journalismus wollen ja viele machen, da sind die Ressourcen knapp und da geht es 
auch um Konkurrenz und ich glaube, das ist der Rassismus auch nicht mehr weit. Also, wenn 
du eh so tickst. Also, da sind Journalisten nicht anders als andere. Wenn es um die eigenen 
Jobs geht, dann... Ich hatte so ein Erlebnis in so einer WG, das war ja eine linke WG mit 
lauter aufgeklärten alternativen linken Menschen, damals habe ich schon als Freie gearbeitet 
und dann, in der Zeit, habe ich den Job beim WDR bekommen, so als Redakteurin, und 
irgendwann war klar, dass ich einen Vertrag kriege, ich weiß nicht, der drei, fünf, oder wie 
lange Jahre war. Und dann haben wir da darauf angestoßen in dieser Gruppe von sieben-acht 
Menschen, und du merktest richtig, wie schwer denen das fiel, wie die echt schlucken 
mussten, weil das war jetzt zu viel. Also, du kannst als Türkin vielleicht Managerin bei 
McDonald’s werden oder meinetwegen auch als freie Journalistin arbeiten, aber Redakteurin 
beim WDR, das ist echt, das ist jetzt zu viel. Weißt du, da merkst du richtig, dass auch bei den 
Alternativen, weil sie ja, weil das so an ihre eigenen Träume grenzt, ne, das da auch dann der 
Rassismus eben hoch kommt, wenn es etwas ist, was du machst, was auch für sie attraktiv ist, 
für sie selbst. 
 
Q: Bist du eigentlich hier geboren? 
A: Ne, mit sieben Jahren bin ich gekommen. Ich bin der lebende Beweis dafür, dass du in 

















Cologne, 19 July 2012 
 
Q: Kad ti radiš na ovom programu za koji radiš, za koga ti radiš, kome se obraćaš? Što je tvoj 
Selbstverständnis? 
A: Kojoj publici se obraćam? 
 
Q: Ne mislim samo u etnickom smislu, nego kako zamisljas svoju publiku? 
A: To se mijenjalo, na početku kad sam došao na ovaj radio, kad sam počeo raditi, mislio sam 
da je moja publika zapravo ona tipična strana publika, znači doseljenici i oni koji imaju 
senzibilitet za doseljeničke teme, znači oni koji mnogo putuju, koji su na neki način povezani 
sa doseljeničkim životom. E, to se u međuvremenu promijenilo. Ja sad, 2012., imam osjećaj 
da se obraćam ne samo doseljenicima i ljudima koji, ajmo reći, imaju senzibilitet za te neke 
ekstravagantne doseljenike, već i jednoj cijeloj mlađoj generaciji, pod navodnicima, ljudi za 
koje je to nešto normalno. Znači, da su im roditelji iz neke zemlje, da imaju iskustvo drugih 
jezika, itd. Znači, ja se obraćam ne baš onoj mainstream publici kojoj se obraća EinsLive koji 
je kao veliki radio za masovnu publiku, već jednoj publici koja raste, koja vrlo brzo raste, 
recimo između 20 do 50 godina. Oni su mlađi možda malo premladi za to, a recimo dvadesete 
do pedesete godine su tu negdje. 
 
Q: Sad se ide nekako politički prema nekom kozmopolitskom shvaćanju. Dakle, više se ne 
govori o multikulturalizmu, nego o kozmopolitizmu. Da li misliš da je Njemačka, u smislu 
javnog diskursa, u političkom smislu, ili u bilo kojem drugom smislu, u socijalnom smislu, 
stigla do te neke točke da se…? 
A: Opet ću to prepoloviti preko sebe. Znači, ja sam... ovo je tipična bosanska priča, kad ti 
netko postavi pitanje, ti kažeš, pričat ću ti priču... Kako sam počeo navijati za njemačku 
reprezentaciju u košarci i fudbalu? Dugo nisam navijao, paralelno sam trenirao djecu, znači 
mladi košarkaši od 12 do 15 godina. I tako sam ja njih trenirao, znači iz Rusije, Albanije, 
Belgija, Venecuela, tralala. Znači, oni su tako odrastali, ti klinci, i ja sam ih trenirao. I jedne 
godine je bilo svjetsko prvenstvo u košarci, ne znam gdje. Ja do tada nisam nikada navijao za 
Njemačku, i onda sam odjednom shvatio da ta moja djeca igraju, da su to ti moji, zapravo taj 
moj svijet koji odjednom igra za Njemačku. I tu sam počeo navijati za Njemačku, i za 
njemačku fudbalsku reprezentaciju. E sad ne znam koliko je to vjerodostojno, ali ja mislim da 
se to u mojoj nekoj parcijalnoj svijesti ipak nešto ogleda. Ja mislim da taj neki, opet ću reći 
 267 
ne, da to nije dio mainstream politike, znači onoga što ćemo čuti od Merkelice kad su stranci 
u pitanju, ali to je tako, dio neke popularne svijesti, koju ja doživljavam kao lično iskustvo. 
Znači, ja sam pronašao radeći kao novinar zaista mnogo... Italijana nisam pronašao... ali 
Turaka koji navijaju za Njemačku. I to je nešto što se kod mene promijenilo i imam osjećaj da 
se to promijenilo u Njemačkoj u posljednjih petnaest godina. 
 
Q: Dobro, a zašto onda? Da li misliš da…? Dakle, mi očito radimo program koji je 
namijenjen publici koja je po nečemu različita od mainstreama. Da li misliš da treba toj 
publici taj program i zašto? Ili zašto ne? Jer, mislim, ako je ta svijest već tako daleko, što je tu 
još različito? Zašto treba nekome taj program? 
A: Ja mislim da su opet tu dvije stvari. Ja mislim da imamo na jednoj strani tu neku ulicu, ja 
ću je nazvati ulicom, jer ja radim puno na ulici, imamo politički establishment, političke 
programe i političku vlast. I ja mislim da to stoji u suprotnosti. Znači, ono što ja doživljavam 
na ulici, da to nećemo pronaći u njemačkim, recimo, ustanovama, kao što su, ne znam, kako 
se to zove... Bezirksamt. Znači, koliko god ti pronađeš puno nekih tih takozvanih multikulti-
likova na ulici, za koje je to najnormalnije, tu sliku nećeš pronaći u javnim ustanovama, isto 
tako u politici, isto tako u medijima. Isto tako ni u mainstream medijima nema još uvijek. 
Milto i ja se šalimo, kad gledamo RTL kažemo, ej, jesi vidio kad je bila ona anketa na ulici, 
prošao je jedan stranac iza onoga koga su pitali i kamera se malo uvrnula, malo se pomakla, 
znaš, ali još nije, znaš, hahaha, još nije. Znači, još uvijek se, postoji, mislim da mi je čak 
kolega Terkessidis to rekao jednom, ima to neko mainstream fetišiziranje multikulti, znači 
gdje se bukvalno fetišizira to, ali to još uvijek nije postalo dio strukture, znači, kao što rekoh, 
u ustanovama, u politici, na našem WDR-u, kad pogledamo strukturu cijelog radija, tu još 
uvijek nisu stranci na ključnim mjestima. Jesu tu i tamo šef, ali nisu kad pogledaš na široko. 
Recimo na EinsLiveu sam slušao prije dvije godine emisiju posvećenu turskom slušateljstvu i 
cijeli dan im je bila tema kebab i trbušni ples, cijeli dan. Zašto? Zato što u EinsLiveu ne sjede 
ljudi koji sjede u Funkhaus Europi. To u Funkhaus Europi ne bi prošlo, nema teorije, zašto, 
zbog Ayce i zbog Turaka koji bi ubili ostale prije nego što bi to uradili. I to tako možemo 
prepoznati, baš zbog toga što u EinsLiveu nema niti jednog moderatora čije ime završava na –
ić ili ne znam ni ja što, koji radi takve teme ili betonira stanje, jel tako. 
 
Q: Kako ti sebe vidiš kao novinara? Ti si došao kao gotov čovjek u Njemačku, mislim mlad. I 




Q: Da li bi ti mogao raditi za mainstream medije, odnosno po čemu si ti različit od 
mainstream novinara? Da li si različit? Zašto ne radiš za njih? Da li je to neka, neko pitanje 
diskriminacije, ili je li teško ući u to, ili ti misliš da tematski nisi? 
A: Radi se o različitom iskustvu prije svega, znači kad ja nastupim, opet ću se vratiti ulici, 
znači, ako ja na ulici radim anketu, kao Bosanac, drugačije ću komunicirati s tim velikim 
šarenilom na ulici od, recimo, tipa s EinsLivea, prosječnim Nijemcem iz srednjeg sloja, koji 
ljetuje na Mallorci i koji nema toliko ožiljaka na tijelu niti na duši kao ja. Ja to iskustvo ne 
krijem, znači ja kad s tim iskustvom razgovaram s ljudima, onda dobijam drugačije, druge 
informacije, odnosno druge O-Tonove. I ja mislim da je to razlika. Znači, kad ja kao Bosanac 
intervjuišem Turčina, on će meni potpuno drugi statement dati nego EinsLive dečkić koji je 
došao da napravi nešto zanimljivo o kebabu i trbušnom plesu. Ja mislim da je to kvalitativno, 
ne sad dobro ili loše, nego što se tiče sadržaja, to su dva svijeta. Po tome se možda razlikujem. 
 
Q: Da, ali zašto ne plasiraš te materijale u druge medije? Da li ne želiš to, ili misliš da ne bi 
pasalo? 
A: Dobro, ja sad opet, sebe smatram kao, ja nikad ne bih rekao da sam novinar, ja uvijek 
kažem da radim kao novinar. Znači, ja sebe ipak smatram autorom, i ja mislim da je za autora 
uvijek... i to možda nije tipična posljedica, ja sebe uvijek smatram, smatram da se uvijek 
može bolje opisati stvar kad je posmatraš sa strane, znači ja bukvalno tražim marginu i uopće 
mi nije u interesu da idem u centar. Premda to ne bih isključio, znači može se potrefiti da 
netko dođe, da mi nešto ponudi, da ja kažem, uradit ću to, ali to nije dio moje energije, ja tako 
ne radim, ja ne idem ka centru, odnosno sve što sam do sada uradio sam uradio tako da su 
ljudi meni, došli do mene, a ne ja do njih, možda sam ja takav tip, ne znam. 
 
Q: Da, nisam išla za tim, zašto ne radiš za 1LIVE recimo, nego više, ne znam, ti bi mogao 
feature raditi za WDR5. Nisi tražio to, ili nisi htio do sada? 
A: To nije neka politička odluka. Ja mislim da sam ja, ja sam uvijek radio, shvaćam taj 
posao… Kao, zarađujem dovoljno, da mogu imati mir za sebe i za neku knjigu, za pisanje, za 
familiju, i to je to. Znači, ja nemam te neke pretenzije da otkrivam nove, imam pretenziju da 
radim uvijek nešto drugačije, ali nemam pretenziju da, ono, politički mijenjam busiju, da 
kažem, idem sad u WDR5, pošto je to top. Znači, ja sam uradio za Consuelo neka dva 
komentara, oni su me nazvali, i ja sam to uradio. Ali, u mom nekom habitusu nije to da ja 
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idem i kažem, ej, ljudi, imam. Znaš, pitao me ovaj iz Neugier genügt da nešto radim za njih i 
ja sam rekao, uradit ću, znaš.  
 




Q: Kako sad gledaš na to? Je li to bila ulaznica I da li bi bez toga ušao? Kako gledaš na takve 
instrumente iz vlastitog iskustva? Jel ti to pomoglo, jel ti odmoglo? 
A: Meni to nije odmoglo, ali nije me to ni ubacilo u priču, Grenzenlos. Znači, ja sam već bio 
na radiju kad sam išao na Grenzenlos. Ali je bilo zanimljivo kako to funkcionira u Njemačkoj. 
Ja mislim da je to ista priča kao ova priča o kvoti za žene, znaš. Znači, ja čisto vidim da je to 
etnički, da je to dobar instrument da tu uđu ljudi koji inače možda ne bi ušli u tu instituciju. Ja 
to totalno tako na to gledam. Ne govorim uopće o kvalitetu te stvarno radionice, i o tome što 
smo mi tu radili i koliko je to bilo malo romantično, nonšalantno, glupo urađeno, ali čisto kao 
instrument otvaranja vrata, da. 
 
Q: Da se vratimo sad na svakodnevni rad. Možeš slobodno onako, na glupom nivou možemo 
razgovarati. Kad radiš s urednikom koji ima migracijsko iskustvo, da li drugačije radiš nego s 
urednikom koji je Nijemac? I, sad se vraćam na Luigija koji hoće prilog o tome da su migranti 
zmazani, koja su tvoja iskustva? 
A: Moram napomenuti da živimo u jednoj Njemačkoj, u kojoj jedan stranac može biti veći 
Nijemac od Nijemca. Znači, takvi su uslovi. Ja tu ne bih vukao baš striktno po... ne bih vukao, 
ja bih tu više išao u pravcu miljea, znači, da li je u pitanju neki stranac koji dolazi iz srednjeg 
sloja turskog, ili je u pitanju, ne znam ni ja, Bosanac koji dolazi iz tipičnog gastarbajterskog 
sloja, koji su tu, ovaj, došli, pa postali veći Nijemci od Nijemaca, ili je u pitanju neki stranac 
koji je došao prije godinu dana. Ne znam, ne mogu... 
 
Q: Dobro, ali u svakodnevnom radu s urednicima? 
A: U svakodnevnom radu? Evo, u svakodnevnom radu, posao s urednicima. Turske teme s 
Aycom raditi ili s Luigijem je isto kao raditi turske teme s Nijemcem i s Turčinom. Jer, ti 
imaš recimo osjećaj, a to ti je ta njemačka strast, sigurnost, samokritika, to vole, to je dio 
njemačke kulture koja drži ovu kulturu stabilnom donekle, ali to kad primijeni netko tko je i 
ovako i onako marginaliziran na sebe, je ovaj, nije nepotrebno, ali može postati groteskno, 
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znaš. To je onaj primjer, hoćemo li raditi prilog o strancima koji prljaju okolinu i stvarno 
misliti da ćemo biti kritični prema sami sebima i da će time priča biti završena, a previdjeti to 
da time služimo jedan veliki kliše, politički kliše o prljavom strancu, i time uzrokujemo više 
štete. Otišao sam u neku priču... ne, nemam... pazi, ne bih bio u Funkhaus Europi... čekaj 
radio sam na WDR5, kad sam na WDR5, radio sam sa njemačkim urednicima nekoliko puta, 
ali sam to radio na način na koji radim za Funkhaus Europu, i to je uvijek bilo super 
prihvaćeno, ali je to bila velika, ono, zoološki vrt je to bio, ja sam za njih bio zoološki vrt, 
onako kako sam ja radio stvar. Jer njemački radio, njemački WDR5 radio još uvijek ima 
sakralnu auru, ja mislim da je to njemački radio, Deutschlandfunk i svi ostali, imaju još uvijek 
taj neki sakralni, onako, to onako ozbiljno. I jednom sam radio priču za WDR5... ja se javljam 
sa lotto iz kioska, lotto, nešto 30 miliona su u igri, i ja kao nešto javljam se, ljudi uplaćuju, tip 
čiji je kiosk je Englez, tamo je neki Albanac, Cigan, Rom, i radim za Funkhaus Europu se 
javljam uživo, i napravimo ono, pravi cirkus multikulti, znači, ovaj Rom napušta Njemačku 
ako dobije, ovaj Englez ne znam što, ludilo. I onda razgovaram sa WDR5, totalno druga 
atmosfera, znači, ja kad govorim o Romu, nitko se ne smije, prije svega, to nikome nije 
smiješno, što neki Rom hoće da napusti Njemačku ako dobije na lottu. Onda me onako, 
hahaha, meni je to totalno smiješno, onda ja onako bla-bla-bla, a onda dođe neko pitanje 
sasvim ozbiljno. Znači, nula humora, nula. I, ovaj, na kraju se završava tako da je on zaista 
htio od mene saznati što će se desiti ako nitko ne dobije, ako dvojica dobiju, mislim, neku 
matematiku su htjeli sa mnom napraviti, ja pojma nemam, mislim, ja sam došao tamo da 
kažem kakva je atmosfera, razumiješ, on mene nešto, neke informacije. Uglavnom, možda je 
razlika u, je li to humor, ne znam. Možda je razlika u distanci. Možda ti kad si Funkhaus 
Europa priču pričaš iznutra, ovu pričaš bukvalno odozgo, iako nije ti društvo takvo, ali ti još 
uvijek odozgo pričaš, ti si još uvijek ono... i to su svi ti njihovi, WDR5 je tako, imam taj 
osjećaj. 
 
Q: Da se vratimo sad na tvoju osobnu procjenu. Ti kad govoriš o Nijemcima, onda govoriš o 
tome tko je veći Nijemac od Nijemaca, dakle u nekom 3. licu, mislim, nisi ti doma tu, očito. 
Mislim, nisam ni ja doma, ne? U smislu, ti govoriš o tome kao da nisi dio, što je meni 
normalno, ali (hahaha). 
A: Mislim, nisam dio ove strukture, ali… 
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Q: Ne govorim sad o medijima, nego čisto koja je, ja sam starija od tebe nešto i došla sam sad 
tek nedavno do nekih zaključaka za sebe, nakon višegodišnjih frustracija koje nisam mogla 
imenovati točno (hahaha). Ti sad napuštaš ovu zemlju… 
A: Da, ali uzimam njemački pasoš. 
 
Q: Da li si ti dio ovog društva?  
A: Jesam. Jesam. Totalno, skroz sam dio ovoga društva. Isto toliko koliko sam dio društva 
ovog u Sarajevu. Možda čak i sekundu više zato što ovdje plaćam te neke poreze. Totalno se 
osjećam kao dio društva, ali se osjećam kao dio jednog društva, opet ću se vratiti mojoj ulici i 
mom tom nekom, margini, kao dio margine. Kao dio društva, ali kao dio margine se osjećam. 
I možda iz te margine proizlazi neka produktivna nelagoda koju ja iskorištavam kao novinar. 
To znači da se ne osjećam kao dio WDR-aparata niti kao dio, ne znam, tih nekih struktura 
koje, ovaj, kako lijevih, tako i desnih, koje vole opaučiti po multikulturalizmu, znaš. 
 
Q: U Njemačkoj je veliki tabu, jedan od najvećih tabua danas, je taj da je ovo društvo 
jednakosti. Da svi imaju jednake šanse. Da nema strukturne diskriminacije. Onda doletiš u 
Njemačku s avionom, onda vidiš da samo Turkinje čiste podove (hahaha), niti jedan Nijemac. 
Da li si ikad…? Da li na bilo kojem nivou se susrećeš, ne na ovom nivou što govore političari 
i ne što govore asocijalni, ali da li se na nekom nivou u svom životu susrećeš s nekom 
strukturnom diskriminacijom, ili rasizmom? To nije mržnja prema imigrantima, nego rasizam 
u tom smislu. 
A: Rasizam? 
 
Q: Ne rasizam zbog rase, nego… 
A: Strukturne, da. Na koje strukture misliš, medija, ili? Kako mediji rade? 
 
Q: Svejedno, iz svog života. Mislim, gdje si izvan? 
A: Gdje sam izvan? Izvan sam na mnogo toga. Izvan sam kad sam prije nekoliko godina bio 
student još, znači, kad te kontroliraju u tramvaju i kad pokažeš, ovaj, Semesterticket, je li, 
onda ti Nijemac pokaže to, i to je to, a ja, kad ja pokažem Semesterticket, onda su često od 
mene tražili još ovaj, ličnu kartu, razumiješ, što se sad možemo se smijati, znaš, ali to je jedan 
simptom od mnogih. Evo sad još jednog, sačekaj, ima njih puno. Mene su, recimo, zaustavili, 
ja sam jednom trčao, zakasnio sam na tramvaj, i ja trčim da uhvatim tramvaj, i iza mene se 
pojave dva tipa u civilu i zaustave me, ne zaustave me, i prislone uza zid, da dignem ruke i da 
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raširim noge, i pretresu me, razumiješ, i ono, walkie-talkie, znaš, policajci, nešto, droga, ovo-
ono. Kao, oni ganjaju neke drogeraše i sad misle da ja bježim, kao tu, i zašto su pomislili da 
sam ja taj, zato što tako izgledam valjda, zato. I sad, opet se tu možemo smijati, ali to je meni 
malo, ovaj, traumatično, recimo, iskustvo. Čekaj, što ima još? Ima toga koliko hoćeš. Recimo, 
kad tražiš stan, ja kad sam sa ženom tražio stan, moja žena je zvala uvijek, nikad nisam ja 
zvao. Što ima još? 
 
Q: Postoje neke studije, ali kad malo čovjek bolje razmisli, doći će i sam do tog zaključka da 
diskriminacija na osnovu jednog latentnog rasizma u zemljama poput Njemačke, postoji više 
na nivou… Oni stalno govore, to je socijalno pitanje. Dakle, kad si iz nižih slojeva, onda imaš 
te i te probleme, nije bitno da li si stranac ili Nijemac. Postoji saznanje da je diskriminacija 
raste u srednjim slojevima, prema srednjim slojevima, dakle, da ću ja možda biti veća žrtva 
diskriminacije nego neki radnik, jer radnik, na nisko plaćenim poslovima nikome nije trn u 
oku Turčin. Ali, ti možeš biti kao urednik na WDR-u trn u oku njemačkom slobodnjaku koji 
ne može dobiti uredničko mjesto. Zato što na osnovu latentnog rasizma se smatra da ti nemaš 
što tražiti, da ti njihove interese…. 
A: Da, da. Ja mislim da je to konflikt koji dolazi. Kada, znači, ovi stranci koji dolaze mahom 
iz nižih slojeva, i koji polako nekako, čisto statistički, grabe prema srednjem sloju, kad oni 
počnu u srednjem sloju preuzimati pozicije, da će tu doći do pravih konflikta, kao što, recimo, 
sad primjećujemo u ovim fenomenima tipa, a to sam i ja, recimo primijetio, recimo, to je 
iskustvo koje se ponavlja. Ja bukvalno znam da je svaka anketa, kolaža, manipulirana. Znači, 
do mene je kako ću je manipulirati, da li ću je manipulirati tako da zaista pokušam napraviti 
sliku neku mišljenja ljudi, koje sam ja, evo, sam uočio, pa ću je tako sasjeći, ili ću ići u to da 
provociram. Znači, ako radimo call-in, onda će moj zadatak biti da ja provociram. I onda ću ja 
iz svog iskustva tačno znati na ulici kome da priđem i da izvučem rasistički ton protiv Islama, 
protiv muslimana. Daj mi, ono, pet pokušaja, ja ću četiri puta ću izvući najcrnje. A to koga 
šicam, šicam u srednji sloj, znači, ne baš skroz mladi, nego ajmo reći onako, pedesetak 
godina, mogu biti i mlađi nekada, ali su oko pedesetak godina, onako fine jakne, gospođa i 
gospodin, uvijek u paru, pošto se uvijek voli se muškarac dokazati pred ženom, znači tako 
uvijek u parovima pohvataš, tamo gdje Stammtisch gdje krene, i tu u srednjem sloju 
pronalazim najčešće te animozitete, i to artikulirane. Znači, onaj će ti smetljar onako nešto, 
znaš, pljunuti, ali ti neće znati to obrazložiti, a ovaj tip je čitao Sarrazina, razumiješ, i on će ti 
to dobro razložiti. 
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Q: Tog Sarrazina nitko živ nije čitao jer je toliko dosadan i glup da to ne možeš pročitati. To 
su ljudi kupili, jer je… 

































Interview Miltiadis  
Cologne, 19 July 2012 
 
Q: Ich weiß nicht, worum es geht in deinem letzten Werk. Aber davor hast du was gemacht 
über Personalpolitik. Was sind jetzt deine Erfahrungen? Sagen wir so: Du bist ja griechisch-
stämmig, aber eigentlich deutsch. Was sind jetzt deine persönlichen Erfahrungen als 
Journalist? Sagen wir so: Wo siehst du dich hier in den deutschen Medien? Wo kannst du 
arbeiten? Für welche Themen wirst du genommen? 
A: Gut, OK, das ist natürlich schon so, wo sehe ich mich da? Ich meine, es ist halt so... Ich 
hatte ja früher gar nicht vorgehabt, im Funkhaus Europa zu arbeiten. Ich hatte es mal so 
gehört, so, als Hörer, entdeckt, fand das auch ganz gut, hatte aber gar nicht vor, da zu 
arbeiten. So, das war nicht so, oh, da musst du jetzt irgendwie hin, sondern ich hatte weiter im 
Studium so weiter gejobbt, dann irgendwie mich auch formell beworben, ich hatte mich noch 
ein Mal für so eine Moderation von so einer Sendung beworben, die diese 
Gastarbeitersendung gelöst hat, die gibt es aber auch nicht mehr, habe bei so einem Casting 
mitgemacht, aber da bin ich auch nicht genommen worden. Ansonsten hatte ich mich da für 
so ein Volontariat noch mal beworben, wo die mich auch nicht genommen haben. Dann hatte 
ich irgendwie ein Volo gemacht bei so einer IT-Zeitschrift, das war einfach gut, um einfach 
sagen zu können: Ich habe ein Volo gemacht. Die ist dann auch Pleite gegangen, weil die 
Internet-Blase geplatzt ist, ich glaube, das war auch gut, weil dann war ich mit meinem Volo 
schon nach einem Jahr durch, musste nicht mehr nach Hürth fahren und irgendwelche IT-
Themen schreiben. Das war eine gute Erfahrung, weil ich habe irgendwie die Scheu davor 
verloren, ich hatte auf einmal Titelgeschichten da, ja? Weil, irgendwie, es reichte schon, dass 
man ein bisschen gut schreiben kann, so, und du musstest du gar nicht mit IT auskennen, 
sondern es ging darum, Themen gut zu verpacken. Meistens hast du ehe irgendwelche 
Marktforschungsinstitute zitiert, OK? Dann hat sich das aber doch so herausgestellt, dass ich 
dann doch in dieser Multikulti-Nische, würde ich jetzt mal sagen, gelandet bin, obwohl ich 
mich da nie gesehen habe, so. Es war halt über Mark, weil er halt meinte, die suchen 
jemanden, der Mal eine griechische Presseschau machen kann, würdest du machen, habe das 
gemacht, dann hatte ich noch einen Beitrag direkt angeboten, so und darüber bin ich halt 
dahin gekommen, so. Wenn ich jetzt reflektiere, ist es natürlich schon so, dass es über den 
normalen Weg nicht geklappt hat, dass es über einen Kontakt geklappt hat und das hat über 
eine bestimmte Nachfrage geklappt, die ich spezifisch bedienen konnte, was eben diese 
Multikulti-Thematik ist, obwohl ich das gar nicht vor hatte. 
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Q: Das ist die klassische Erfahrung, das sagen alle, die am Anfang sich nicht fest machen 
wollen, einengen wollen auf die multikulti-Themen, aber dann zwangsläufig dahin gehen, wo 
sie überhaupt Karriere-Chancen haben. 
A: Klar, klar. Auf der anderen Seite ist es natürlich auch so, dass ich selber auch ein Anliegen 
habe, weil mich die Themen interessieren, weil ich bin auch selber antirassistisch aktiv, und 
so. Und ich meine, klar, wir sind schon, ich meine, ich habe in den Neunziger Jahren die 
Themen so wahrgenommen, dass da immer so „das Boot ist voll“-Diskussion, die Ausländer-
Diskussion statt fand in den Medien, ohne dass Migranten dort selber zu Wort kommen, 
insofern fand ich es natürlich wichtig, dass sich das ändert. Insofern hatte ich ja natürlich 
selber Interesse daran, an solchen Themen zu arbeiten und zu publizieren, und eben diese 
Sichtbarkeit herzustellen und andere Sichtweisen präsent zu machen in der Berichterstattung. 
Insofern bedingt sich beides, sozusagen, ich hätte es auch so, in gewisser Weise geht es auch 
von mir aus, klar, weil ich mich solcher Themen annehme, was ich ja immer noch mache. 
Mache jetzt halt was zur Abschiebung in meinem Buch, klar, warum interessiert man sich. Ich 
habe letztens so eine kleine Lesung gehabt in Düsseldorf, habe ich ein bisschen unterstützt, da 
war so eine Frau, die dann meinte, ja, also, Sie sind ja selber gar kein Flüchtling, und so, wie 
kommen Sie überhaupt zu so einem Thema, sich zu interessieren halt, so. Sie hatte selber so 
einem migrantischen Hintergrund, so einen Akzent halt, ne. Sie hatte es sozusagen von dieser 
Sichtweise, ne, interessant, wie kommen Sie dazu. So, sie hatte aus Interesse gefragt, nicht, 
die hat das nicht abwertend gemeint, hat sich gewundert halt, ne. Und deswegen, das ist 
sozusagen beidseitig in einer gewissen Weise. Aber ich hätte, wie soll ich sagen, es ist auch 
jetzt so in dieser Gesichte, zum Beispiel, mit der Schuldenkrise, dass ich halt irgendwie durch 
das Griechen-Ticket halt dazu ein paar Sachen geschrieben habe, weil es halt in Griechenland 
ist und weil ich einen Bezug zu habe und dann eben auch mit diesem Bezug das thematisieren 
konnte und so, obwohl ich sicherlich grundsätzlich Sachen zu Griechenland machen würde, 
und es ist immer so eine ökonomische Sache, weißt du, weil, die Frage ist, also, ich würde 
auch allgemein, grundsätzlich Sachen schreiben, zum Beispiel zur Schuldenkrise, ja, und ich 
würde es im allgemeinen auch für die anderen Programme machen, mache ich aber nicht. Ich 
habe das vielleicht mal gemacht als Tagesreporter, als einer der ersten habe ich, glaube ich, 
diesen Max Otte wahrgenommen mit seinem Buch „Der Crash kommt“, als es raus 
gekommen ist, und dann habe ich gesagt, hier den müssen wir machen, dann habe ich 
angerufen, einen Telefon-O-Ton, so einen Beitrag gebastelt, wo alle gedacht haben, ah, 
Telefon-O-Ton ist Scheiße, mach mal, und dann hat noch kein Hahn danach gekräht, so, aber 
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der hat damals schon gesagt, das wird hier noch den Bach runter gehen, dann im Nachhinein 
super, das war bevor irgendwas mit Griechenland los gegangen ist. Aber ich hatte es natürlich 
für Funkhaus Europa gemacht, weil ich da angebunden bin, weil ich da halt als Tagesreporter, 
und da muss ich nicht groß Akquise machen, weißt du. Und dasselbe ist es, sozusagen, mit 
dieser Thematik, ne. Irgendwie dann kann ich sagen, ich bin ein bisschen faul und ich weiß, 
wenn ich sozusagen mit dem Griechen-Ticket fahre, kann ich halt irgendwie das in diesen 
Grenzen einfacher an den Mann bringen in dem Moment wo das auf einmal hoch kocht und 
Interesse da ist, als wenn ich sozusagen allgemein jetzt versuche, im Wirtschaftsmagazin, 
Zeitung, Feuilleton, was auch immer, versuche im Heer der anderen Autoren mich da 
durchzusetzen. 
 
Q: Also jetzt, das sind zwei verschiedene Paar Schuhe. Einmal die Frage, ob du mit einem 
allgemeinen, nicht Griechenland-gebundenen Thema, hättest du da Chancen? Das hast du 
selber gesagt jetzt, dass du nicht großartig Akquise machst, und es ist ein bisschen schwierig, 
in einem Mainstream-Medium anzukommen mit einem Thema, was jetzt nicht an deine 
Herkunft gebunden ist. 
A: Ja, das wäre schon, das wäre schon… Das ist ja nicht so, es gibt ja Journalisten, die das 
machen, das ist ja nicht der Punkt, natürlich kann man es machen. Man kann es nicht 
ausschließen, dass es völlig unmöglich wäre, das wäre jetzt unfair. Aber, es ist halt eine Frage 
der Ökonomie, weißt du? Es ist halt ökonomischer für mich das so zu machen, weil ich dann 
irgendwie, es hat sich eingespielt, so, und das andere würde jetzt noch mal einen erneuten 
Aufwand bedeuten, weißt du, mit ungewisserem Ausgang. Und das heißt nicht, dass es nicht 
erfolgreich sein könnte, aber... 
 
Q: Also, könnte man in diesem Fall sagen, oder positiv formuliert, hilft dir das, dass du das 
mit, dass du das sozusagen anbinden kannst an die… 
A: Ja, es hilft mir, ich ruhe mich ein bisschen drauf aus, negativ formuliert, es behindert aber 
natürlich auch, ja? Weil sozusagen dadurch, dass es sich eher lohnt es so zu machen, 
verhindert das eben, dass man anderswo präsent wird und dann anderswo tätig wird, ja? Das 
ist einfach der Punkt. Das hat sozusagen auch einen gewissen negativen Effekt dann 
wiederum. Es ist nicht so, dass ich, ich habe schon Sachen für andere Programme gemacht, 
ich habe schon mal Features gemacht für WDR5 für Neugier genügt, die nichts mit Migration 
zu tun hatten, ich habe auch mal Beiträge über Mindestlohn oder so für WDR2 gemacht, die 
nichts mit Migration zu tun hatten, aber ich werde da selten angefragt, ja, angefragt werde ich 
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eher für diese Themen. Ich meine WDR2 hat mich angefragt, um was zu Griechenland zum 
EM-Spiel zu machen, also, die haben mich nicht angefragt zum Thema von der Leyen will 
jetzt, so halt, obwohl ich dazu schon mal was gemacht habe.  
 
Q: Klar, man kann die Ursachenforschung jetzt… 
A: Nein, aber offensichtlich, verstehst du? Das ist auch ein Thema, was ich schon oft gemacht 
habe. Das ist so, also, man hätte ja auch sagen können, der hat dazu schon was gemacht, aber 
da gibt es auch andere, die das machen können. Und während das ist sozusagen ist etwas, gut, 
da gibt es nicht so viele andere und das hat diesen positiven und gleichzeitig negativen 
Nebeneffekt. 
 
Q: Zurück zu diesen Multikulti-Themen und Antirassismus-Themen und so weiter. Unser 
Programm definiert sich auch teilweise dadurch, oder hat sich dadurch definiert. Jetzt viel 
weniger, nö? Aber, was ist deine Erfahrung? Also, du sagst, wir sprechen nicht, also man 
spricht nicht über Ausländer, sondern wir sprechen selbst oder mit ihnen, oder wie auch 
immer. 
A: Ja, genau, genau. 
 
Q: Wie ist es, deine Erfahrung, jetzt nur deine Erfahrung in den anderen Medien? Kannst du 
da diese Themen platzieren, wie ist da die Nachfrage? Oder, wie ist die Tendenz, über diese 
Themen zu sprechen oder über diese Menschen? Oder eher, ändert sich da was? Rein aus 
deiner Erfahrung jetzt. Oder, hast du da welche? Hast du bestimmt. 
A: Ja, doch, eigentlich schon. Es ist natürlich eine begrenzte Aufnahmefähigkeit für solche 
Themen. Aber eigentlich schon und es hängt davon ab, wie hintergründig die Sendungen sind, 
die Sender sind, also du kannst bei WDR5 und Deutschlandfunk da mehr unterbringen als bei 
WDR2, verstehst du. Also, ich habe damals schon, als dieses No Border Camp auf Lesbos 
war, wo ich ja war, habe ich nicht mal für Funkhaus Europa was gemacht, da habe ich für 
diese Europa heute Sendung von Deutschlandfunk was gemacht, was natürlich viel mehr 
Leute hören. Ich weiß überhaupt nicht, ob ich das überhaupt WDR2 oder EinsLive angeboten 
habe, aber so was würdest du nicht machen können, das ist schon zu abseitig. Und irgendwie 
dasselbe ist jetzt mit diesen Geschichten halt auch in anderen Fällen. Das ist halt eher, je 
mainstreamiger es ist, desto weniger ist da Platz für. Im Fernsehen ist es vielleicht noch ein 
bisschen anders, aber dafür arbeite ich nicht, aber so was ich halt so mitbekomme und sehe, 
Zeitungen arbeite ich ja selten für, so, und für die, für die ich arbeite, na gut, dann ist es 
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wirklich auch... also ich habe dann, so gesehen, wenn ich das in Angriff genommen habe und 
das waren dann entsprechende Medien, die entsprechend ticken, die kritischer sind, so, dann 
geht das auch, das muss man schon sagen. Aber es gibt natürlich immer eine gewisse... ja, die 
Grenze ist halt immer sozusagen da, wie viel Selbstbewusstsein ist da möglich, wie viel 
Infragestellung des Systems ist möglich, weil da ist natürlich immer im Hinterkopf, ja da 
könnten sich jetzt die Hörer, oder die Mehrheit der Hörer provoziert fühlen, ja? Ich habe 
dieses Stück hier, was ich gestern gemacht habe für WDR5, die haben eine Stelle 
herausgeschnitten von dieser Nojana (?), und zwar war das die Stelle, wo sie sagt, sie kriegt 
eigentlich die 40 Euro nicht bar ausbezahlt, weil die haben sie ihr gekürzt auf 1,63 Euro, weil 
sie wirkt halt nicht mit bei ihrer Pass-Beschaffung. Sie sagt, warum soll ich der 
Ausländerbehörde dabei helfen, mich abzuschieben, und so, ne? Und das haben die jetzt raus 
geschnitten. Jetzt kann man sagen, ich finde es eigentlich ganz interessant, so, jetzt kann man 
sagen, warum haben die das jetzt raus geschnitten? Ich denke schon, dass ist sozusagen so ein 
Punkt, wo man halt sagt, OK, das wird dazu führen, dass so mancher sagt, na ja, das geht jetzt 
auch nicht, also man muss ja schon mitwirken und so, ne. Man kann ja nicht irgendwie sagen, 
ich mache gar nichts und dann beschwere ich mich auch noch irgendwie, dass ich das... also, 
ich denke, da gibt es sozusagen die Grenze, ne, wo ich jetzt sagen würde, das ist eine Form 
von Widerstand, und das ist es auch, die meisten Leute verhindern ihre Abschiebung 
vorläufig, weil sie ihren Pass nicht vorlegen, ne (laughter). Und so eine Message ist 
sozusagen durchaus eine Provokation, inwieweit kann man darüber berichten und das halt 
sozusagen nicht, erstmal einfach so darstellen, das ist halt so, ne. Ich will das gar nicht als 
schlecht bewerten, das ist immer ein bisschen so eine Grenze da, aber ansonsten, ja. 
 
Q: Ja, das ist ja, das kann man schon als Infragestellung des Systems bewerten. In jedem 
normalen Beitrag macht man das. 
A: Ja, klar. 
 
Q: Aber, würdest du sagen, dass die Autoren, oder du, eine kleine Selbstzensur betreiben, um 
diese Themen in den Mainstream-Medien konsumierbar zu machen, weißt du? Oder nicht? 
Oder, ich meine, du bist nicht so ein Typ. 
A: Ja, eben. Also, ich persönlich mache das eigentlich nicht, seltener, wobei es kommt immer 
darauf an, wem du ein Angebot machst und dann machst du schon immer das entsprechend 
so, dass du da ein bisschen vielleicht Selbstzensur machst, aber eigentlich würde ich jetzt 
sagen, dass ich das nicht mache. 
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Q: Aber irgendwie, man holt dann irgendwelche vorzeigbaren, netten Ausländer. Nicht 
irgendwelche Asis. 
A: Ne, das stimmt nicht. Also, ich habe zum Beispiel auch mal was gemacht, und das hat 
nicht geklappt, weil ich was machen wollte über Leute, die abgeschoben werden aufgrund 
von Straftaten. Da war so ein Typ, so ein Roma aus ex-Jugoslawien, aus dem Kosovo, und, 
aber Vater war schon als Gastarbeiter hier, ich meine, das ist natürlich, der ist ein Asi, 
verstehst du, der hat sogar den Pfarrer beklaut, der ihm geholfen hat im Knast, den 
Gefängnispfarrer und so, ja, ne? Den habe ich ja zitiert in meinem Buch halt, ich habe nicht 
alles gesagt, nur der Rechtsanwalt meinte irgendwann zu mir, so, hören Sie auf mit dem und 
so, der kam irgendwann und meinte er, er hatte kein Geld und der wollte mich halt in 
Naturalien bezahlen, hatte er da eine junge Frau dabei, und für die er dann als Zuhälter, 
verschwinden Sie hier, hahaha. Total Horror. Das ist aber so, da hat die Familie drunter 
gelitten, weil er hatte eine Frau aus Mazedonien, wahrscheinlich arrangierte Heirat, die war 
als Flüchtlingsstatus hier und als er im Knast war, haben die die abgeschoben, die Familie, 
mit Kindern. Sind dann illegal zurück gekommen und so, aber verstehst du, der ist ein Essener 
Jung, so gesehen, er spricht auch Deutsch und so, die nennen ihn alle Toni und ich habe 
gedacht, es ist eigentlich eine interessante Geschichte. Man muss sagen, gut, es ist ein 
Kleinkrimineller aber der ist in Essen geboren, aufgewachsen, warum soll er jetzt da nicht 
leben, ne, und vor allem, wenn die Familie noch illegal zurückkommt, warum soll man nicht 
sagen, so, pass mal auf, OK, das bringt ja auch nichts, so, das fördert seine Kriminalität, wenn 
die dann ständig in der Illegalität leben, und darüber habe ich halt sozusagen Angebote 
gemacht, und das ist halt von niemanden genommen worden, also das ist auch von der WAZ 
nicht genommen worden ins Ressort (?) der meinte irgendwann, ne, er traut der Sache nicht, 
weil so Leute, die erzählen dann immer was anderes, als dann wirklich stimmt und so, ja? Ich 
hatte aber auch, ich hatte von der Stadt Essen die Aussagen, was die dazu sagen, so nach dem 
Motto, ja, wer die Gesetze bricht, der will sich ja nicht integrieren und dann ist bei uns 
Schluss, Ende der Fahnenstange und so, und das habe ich der WAZ angeboten, mit denen 
diskutiert, wollten sie nicht haben, die trauten da der Sache nicht, und irgendwie der, auch 
WDR5 wollte das nicht haben, also das wollte eigentlich keiner haben. (laughter) So, da war 
das Ende, ich hätte das ein bisschen so, die Überschrift war Heimatrecht für Straftäter, so, 
wenn Deutschland doch deren Heimat ist, irgendwie, soll man dann trotzdem abschieben, 
obwohl die Straftäter sind, die konnten noch nicht mal abschieben, weil das Strafmaß von ihm 
war unter dem, wo die Ausweisung zwingend ist, es gibt ja Ausweisung zwingend und 
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Ausweisung kann, ne? Und der hat dann quasi gesagt, ne, ich stimme dem nicht zu, wir 
bekommen ihn nicht ausgewiesen, nur die anderen, als er im Knast war, haben die seine 
Familie ausgewiesen, ne, also die Frau und die Kinder halt, ne, so. Ich finde es ein 
interessantes Thema, aber das ging nicht, bei niemandem, weil das ist, was du gesagt hast, die 
guten, da habe ich das auch nicht zensiert, im Gegenteil, ich habe das unzensiert angeboten 
und das funktioniert nicht. 
 
Q: Jetzt wollte ich dich zu diesem Programm was fragen. 
A: Ja. 
 
Q: Du arbeitest seit Jahren… 
A: Ja, zehn Jahre... 
 
Q: Ja, ich bin seit 12 Jahren… 
A: Ja, du warst vorher bei den Jugos… 
 
Q: Ja, Wahnsinn. 
A: Ja! 
 
Q: Hat sich… jetzt hat sich einiges geändert. Wenn du jetzt arbeitest, jetzt nur angenommen 
heute und so, für wen machst du das? Was ist jetzt… wie siehst du das als Autor? Also, ich 
habe da meine Meinung, nö? Aber, du bist jetzt Autor, freier Autor, der nicht jeden Tag hier 
ist. Für wen sendest du jetzt hier? Wenn du hier jetzt was machst? Was ist jetzt dein… weil, 
es gibt Papiere, konzeptuelle Papiere, darüber, wer unser Publikum heute ist. 
A: Für wen sende ich? Ja. Ich sende für, kann ich schlecht sagen, vielleicht mache ich mich zu 
wenig Gedanken darüber. Ich glaube, ich sende halt für Leute, die halt so irgendwie kritisch, 
alternativ sind, ich sende für Migranten, die halt eher so, gebildet sind, und eine gewisse, 
dieselbe Weltoffenheit und Interesse haben an Themen, wie halt Deutsche, die halt ähnlich 
ticken, eher so für Leute in unserem Alter, also für dieses Milieu sende ich, und die 
griechische Sendung, da sende ich noch mal für ganz andere Leute, auch. Da ist es sozusagen 
schon auch ähnlich auch, ja, aber durchaus, ich kriege es dann auch mit, da ist irgendwie 
sowohl die Bildungsspanne als auch die Altersspanne ist da weiter, ja. Ich weiß, dass es auch 
Rentner hören, kriege es immer über meinen Vater mit, der hat mir letztens erzählt, der So-
und-so ist gestorben, und ich so, wer? Ja, Der-und-der, der hat da-und-da gearbeitet und so, ja 
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und der hat dich auch immer gehört. Ich kannte den Mann gar nicht, verstehst du, ich kannte 
den gar nicht, aus der Vater-Generation halt, ne? Aber auch manchmal, wenn man irgendwo, 
ah so, du bist es, so, da kriegt man immer so mit, so. Da ist sozusagen der Hörerkreis weiter, 
weil es so... 
 
Q: Aber jetzt die zweite Generation, dritte, was weiß ich? 
A: Die hören das auch, aber nicht alle, ne. Also, die hören das auch, aber nicht alle, manche 
hören es auch sporadisch, viele hören es auch im Auto, das kriegt man halt mit. Und ich 
glaube, für die griechische Disco-Fraktion sind wir wahrscheinlich und die Hauptschul-
Discofraktion sind wir wahrscheinlich schon wieder zu anspruchsvoll, für die ganz Kultur-
beflissenen sind wir wahrscheinlich musikalisch zu wenig anspruchsvoll, so das ist immer so 
ein bisschen ein Spagat, aber ich glaube, man kriegt, in jeder Gruppe kriegt man so ein Fuß 
rein, holt man so eine gewisse Schnittmenge ab. Die ganz traditionellen, die in ihrer 
Parallelwelt leben, die kriegst du oft auch nicht, weißt du, es sei denn, die sind Rentner und 
die haben Zeit. 
 
Q: Aber du bist schon unterwegs in der Community, präsent, ne? Also, du bist… du hast 
Kontakt, so, mit deinen Hörern, ne? Ich meine… 
A: Ja… 
 
Q: Gehst du in die griechische Disco jeden Samstag? 
A: Nicht mehr. Nein, nicht mehr. (laughter) Ich habe das vielleicht mal gemacht vor zwanzig 
oder fünfzehn Jahren halt, wobei da sind wir auch nicht immer dahin gegangen, aber, ich bin 
auch nicht derjenige gewesen, der halt immer nur in griechische Läden gegangen ist, ich habe 
die Leute eigentlich verachtet, die immer nur in griechische Läden gegangen sind. Aber mir 
fällt auf, dass wir dann doch regelmäßig in griechischen Läden waren, es gab so eine Bar in 
(inaudiable) Bahnhof, die gibt es nicht mehr, es gab halt eine Disco, Rheingold, die haben ab 
und zu griechische Parties gemacht, da sind wir eigentlich auch immer hingegangen, aber es 
gab Leute, die sozusagen immer nur in so was gegangen sind, in griechische Cafés, das habe 
ich nicht gemacht. Und jetzt bin ich natürlich irgendwo, also ich habe schon Kontakt, das 






After the interview, we discuss the concept of „cosmopolitan multiculturalism“, which Milto 
says is „everything but multiculturalism“ („alles außer Multikulturalismus“). According to 
Milto, Funkhaus Europa has always had a „funny relationship towards migration“, so that 
somehow it did not happen in the program itself. Even the music is Latino or French,  not that 






























Interview Ioannis  
Cologne, 20/July/2012 
 
Q: Du bist jetzt seit sehr vielen Jahren Medienmacher, Journalist usw. Wie… wo soll ich 
anfangen? Was ist deine Erfahrung? Bist du ein Nischen-Autor? Oder bist du… siehst du dich 
in der Lage… Hast du einen Platz in den Mainstream-Medien oder bist du… 
A: Mainstream bin ich nicht, nein. Würde ich auch nicht wollen, mehr…. 
 
Q: Hat sich das geändert? 
A; Ja. Also, zuerst habe ich geguckt, ob ich irgendwo reinkomme, dann habe ich gemerkt, ich 
passe nicht rein, weil, es liegt nicht nur am Namen und der Nase, oder so was, und ich will 
jetzt auch gar nicht über Mainstreaming in deutschen Medien sprechen, weil das werden 
unsere Kinder erst erleben. Ich habe zum einen ein Problem mit der Sozialisation der Leute, 
die mich befehligen und das hat sich in den letzten, würde ich mal sagen, seit dem 26. Januar 
2010 hat sich das geändert. 
 
Q: Wieso? Was hat es da gegeben? 
A: Ich habe damals im Flugzeug gesessen nach Athen und ich hatte mir fest vorgenommen, 
ich werde, ich hatte der Eva gesagt, ich habe einfach kein Bock mehr, ich will jetzt vier-fünf 
Tage in Athen Konzerte besuchen, bisschen mich tummeln und dann komme ich wieder und 
mache ein-zwei Beiträge. Und damals hatte ich den Flug aus Frankfurt genommen, der ganze 
Flieger war voll mit Chinesen, ich hatte das Wall Street Journal in der Hand, da stand 
irgendwas von Chinesen wollen Griechen einen Kredit geben oder nicht, und seitdem ist 
sozusagen die Finanzkrise eskaliert. Und in der Zeit habe ich oft darüber nachgedacht, ob ich 
persönlich eigentlich so was wie ein Pausenclown bin, so ein Jack-in-the-box. Konkret habe 
ich mich gefragt, auf wessen Rechnung arbeite ich. Ich habe die Situation verglichen oft mit 
der Berichterstattung im Stürmer vor Verabschiedung der Rassengesetze, weil, ich würde mal 
sagen, meine Mutter sagt immer, im Krieg muss man sich entscheiden, auf welcher Seite man 
steht, damit man nicht ins Kreuzfeuer gerät. Und ich habe mich entschieden, anti-deutsche 
Positionen zu vertreten, und zwar systematisch. 
 
Q: Jetzt meinst du, in diesem Zusammenhang? 
A: In diesem Zusammenhang der Krise. Ich habe drei Vorlesungen besucht in meinem 
Volkswirtschaftsstudium und ich fand die alle bescheuert und habe aufgehört zu studieren. 
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Und vieles von dem was ich mache, ist eigentlich nur noch Wirtschaftsgeschichten. Und ich 
habe festgestellt, dass die Leute, mit denen ich zusammenarbeite, die das redigiert habe, dass 
die a), erstens keinen blassen Schimmer haben von dem Thema, zweitens dass die eine ganz 
klar vorformulierte Position haben und drittens, dass man gegen diese Klischees und 
Vorurteile, die es als amalgamierte Meinung gibt in den Köpfen, dass man da wenig tun kann. 
 
Q: Hast du denn die Möglichkeit, du, als Journalist mit deinem Background, irgendwelche 
Thesen zu vertreten, die… 
A: Ja, ich vertrete zum Beispiel in meiner Sendung Radiopolis… 
 
Q: Die das System bedrohen, sagen wir so, oder in Frage stellen? 
A: Ich sage ja immer, Radiopolis, das ist ja Finanzpornographie, es geht immer nur ums eine, 
man weiß, wie es endet, das Drehbuch ist also klar, und am Ende muss es allen noch gefallen. 
Und das ist eigentlich die Quintessenz sozusagen der deutschen Position in der ganzen Krise, 
ihr musst sparen, weil ihr braucht das. Ich habe oft überlegt, ob ich nicht mal den Beruf 
wechseln soll, oder habe ihn eigentlich schon gewechselt, weil ich berichte nicht mehr 
objektiv, sondern bin wertend, Meinung, auch oft so, ich spiegele oft so diesen Gestus wieder, 
oh, das wissen wir doch alles schon. Und insofern, das ist eigentlich nicht das, wofür ich 
damals diesen Beruf ergriffen habe. Das kann man vielleicht so in eine Position 
zusammenfassen, man wird oft gruppiert, sozusagen als griechischer Journalist, der ich nicht 
bin, und ich bin froh, dass ich keiner bin, weil ich nicht den Zwängen ausgesetzt bin, die 
meine Kollegen in Griechenland haben. Man könnte dem Berufsfeld Journalist in beiden 
Ländern vorwerfen, dass sie den Möbelwagen nicht gesehen haben, der vor ihnen stand, wo 
drauf stand, das wird kommen. Ich finde es ganz witzig, ich war öfter mal mit einer 
Delegation der EZB unterwegs auch in Griechenland, dann später mal in Rumänien, das 
waren alles Feuilletonisten und wir saßen zum Beispiel in Rumänien, in Bukarest, während 
der Generalstreik war, mit dem griechischen, mit dem rumänischen Zentralbankchef 
zusammen und es wurde nicht gefragt, warum streiken die Leute, was ist hier los, was kommt, 
so, möglicherweise auf andere Länder zu, sondern es wurde einfach gesagt, na, das ist jetzt 
einfach so, ne. Und da merkt man die Sozialisation vieler Leute in dem Bereich ist entweder 
arme Kinder reicher Eltern oder eben die kommen aus so einem kleinbürgerlichen Bereich, 
wo sie sich hochgearbeitet haben, wo auch die Engstirnigkeit ganz klar zu sehen ist. Und da 
ist man nicht offen, und das ist leider auch national geprägt. 
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Q: Und, jetzt aus deiner journalistischen Biografie, so eine Geschichte, dass du jetzt als 
griechisch-stämmiger Journalist mitten in der Krise vielleicht mehr Aufträge hast. Ist das gut 
oder schlecht, in diese Ecke gedrängt zu werden? 
A: Manchmal habe ich gekotzt.  
 
Q: Ja, aber ist das jetzt… 
A: Ob mir das Umsatz gebracht hat? Ja. Weil es war klar, zum Beispiel, es war für mich klar 
letztes Jahr, die Nummer wird abreißen, die reißt ab, und es ist jetzt auch inzwischen so, ich 
sage mal so, Ende Juli wird es wieder hoch kochen, das haben inzwischen, was das öffentlich-
rechtliche Fernsehen betrifft und das Radio, das haben die inzwischen ganz gut selber 
abgedeckt. Lange Zeit war Griechenland ein weißer, schwarzer, weißer Fleck, weil die alten 
Hippies, die Griechenland toll fanden, die waren alle in Rente, und die ganzen neoliberalen 
Kiddies oder auch die Generation danach, sie hat sich für alles andere interessiert aber nicht 
für Griechenland. Oder die kannte das eben als Gyros, Tsatsiki und Salat, und inzwischen hat 
man das erkannt und abgedeckt, das heißt, für mich ist auch gar kein Platz mehr da, außer 
vielleicht mal für so eine extra-Meinung. 
 
Q: Aber jetzt abgesehen von der Krise, jetzt lass uns so tun, als ob es die Krise nicht gegeben 
hätte und so weiter, in deinem journalistischen Werdegang, bist du jemand, der Chancen hat? 
Oder, was… 
A: Keine Chance, eine feste Stelle zu kriegen. 
 
Q: Nicht eine feste Stelle, aber jetzt, würdest du mehr Akquise machen in den anderen 
Medien außerhalb von Funkhaus Europa oder so? Würdest du… 
A: Im Moment bin ich am überlegen, das zu machen. 
 
Q: Könntest du zu Themen arbeiten oder nicht, arbeiten, die jetzt nichts mit… 
A: Ja, gut, kann ich machen. Ich mache ja… 
 
Q: Mit Griechenland oder Multikulturalismus zu tun haben? 
A: Ich mache nebenbei eine Kochrubrik bei WDR5 und theoretisch kannst du dich in jedes 
Thema einarbeiten. Nur ich sehe die Affinität ist einfach im Moment, die ist nicht da. Ich 
würde auch gerne über Fußball, nur ich habe keine Lust auf dieses Sportreporter Getue, also 
ich sehe, dass immer mehr Türen zugehen und bin am überlegen, wie ich das jetzt sozusagen 
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umnutze. Weil, ich behaupte, mir sieht man es sowieso auf der Stirn angeschrieben, ob mich 
ein Thema interessiert oder nicht. Ich kann, vielleicht sozusagen dieser Background, den ich 
habe... man muss es vielleicht so erklären: Man kann eh nicht alles machen. Ich bin jetzt nicht 
der Generalist von der Zeitung, der alle Rubriken abdecken kann, da habe ich auch keine Lust 
zu, will ich auch nicht mehr. Und das ist jetzt das letzte Wort zur Krise: Wenn du merkst, dass 
ein Thema dich abstößt, oder wenn du merkst, dass du eine Meinung hast, dann musst du das 
auch sagen, du kannst nicht so tun, als ob. Und die Frage ist, ich sehe inzwischen hier die 
Medien, das ist, stößt mich ab, wenn ich sehe, dass sozusagen das Seichte und so weiter, dass 
es Überhand nimmt, da habe ich auch kein Bock mehr zu. 
 
Q: Jetzt, wenn wir auf Funkhaus Europa gucken, das ist sozusagen irgendwie deine 
Stammredaktion lange Jahre gewesen, oder so… 
A: OK, wenn ich so sehe, was an Hauptumsatz da läuft, dann nicht. 
 
Q: Genau. Wie siehst du das Programm jetzt? Weil, du arbeitest ja immer noch. Für wen… 
A: WDR4 für urbane, Möchtegern-Nomaden. Das Problem ist, du kannst so ein Programm 
nicht machen, ohne emanzipatorischen Ansatz. Wenn du das machst, nur damit die Bum-
Schakala-Fraktion was schönes zum wippen hat, wird jemand kommen und er wird dieses 
Programm besser machen. Weil ich das höre, zumindest die Programme, die es da teilweise 
auch zu hören gibt, seit ich klein bin, wundert mich, dass man einfach ein Stück der 
Hörerschaft einfach wegwirft, und sagt: Das andere ist aber viel wichtiger. Das ist wohl nur in 
den Köpfen der Menschen, die Medienanalysen lesen so, dass man die nicht braucht. Und ich 
sehe, in zehn Jahren wird es türkische, griechische, spanische Sender geben in Deutschland, 
so wie in anderen Ländern auch. Die Zeit ist noch zu früh. 
 
Q: Du meinst, also du meinst, du machst ja auch Radiopolis. Wer ist da dein Publikum? Oder, 
bzw. was ist der Sinn dieser Sendung? 
A: Hippies, Grecos der dritten Generation, Griechenland-Möger und von mir aus die Leute, 
die einfach die Musik gut finden. Es sind nicht nur, ich mache das nicht nur für die Grecos, 
ich mache das auch für die Leute, die Griechenland ein bisschen näher kennen und die von 
mir aus den einen Gag, den ich da mache, auch noch goutieren und sagen: Das hat er wieder 
richtig ausgedrückt, wo der normale deutsche Hans Fritz Kartoffel daneben steht und sagt, das 
habe ich jetzt aber nicht verstanden. Das geht mir sowieso auf den Sack, dass ich oft vor 
allem, ah ja, meine Erinnerungen, mit Leuten zu tun hatte, die oft sagten, das versteht man 
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doch nicht. Wo ich dann denke, ja, du verstehst das nicht, es gibt aber genug andere Leute, die 
es kapieren, die sofort schalten. 
 
Q: Aber jetzt erstmal zurück zum deutschsprachigen Programm. Meine Meinung müssen wir 
jetzt nicht… 
A: Ja, ist ja deine Meinung. Ich kann ja meine Meinung sagen. 
 
Q: Man hat jetzt diesen Schritt vollzogen von einem ungeliebten ethnischen 
Multikulturalismus zu diesem Kosmopolitischen. Was heißt das für dich? Ist das machbar, ist 
das möglich in Deutschland oder macht es, macht das Sinn? 
A: Die krumme Nase kriegst du nie aus dem Gesicht. Guten Appetit. 
 
Q: Guten Appetit. 
A: Die krumme Nase kriegst du nie aus dem Gesicht. Und jetzt so tun, als ob uns die 
krummen Nasen alle nicht mehr interessieren, kannst du machen, aber es ist immer die Frage, 
zahlt sich das aus. 
 
Q: Weil ich meine, dieser emanzipatorische Ansatz ist jetzt komplett weg. 
A: Ja, den gibt es nicht mehr. 
 
Q: So, den gibt es nicht. Meinst du, das macht noch Sinn oder für wen würde man jetzt diese 
Sachen machen? 
A: Wenn du es nur machst als lustige Musikfarbe, das können private Anbieter besser, weil 
die das günstiger machen. Das macht die PR-Abteilung von der Plattenfirma gleich mit. 
 
Q: Was die Praxis betrifft, habe ich den Eindruck, dass manche Mainstream-Programme diese 
Themen mittlerweile besser abdecken als… 
A: Ja, du siehst oft im RTL bessere Beiträge zu dem Thema als in der ARD. Und was in den 
deutschen Medien gelaufen ist während der Griechenland-Krise, will ich überhaupt gar nicht 
sagen, ne. 
(Interview interrupted)  
A: Jeder dahergelaufene Korrespondent hat sich wahlweise im King George, im Athens Plaza 
oder im Grande Bretagne einquartiert, hat einen lustigen Abend gehabt und zwischendurch 
noch irgendwie zwei-drei Leute auf der Straße interviewt, so waren ja die Beiträge der ersten 
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Stunde. Oder (inaudiable) hat gesagt nein, das kann nicht sein, erzählt ihr eurem Friseur, aber 
nicht mir. Meinen die, aber ja, so muss das sein. 
 
Q: Bist du eigentlich hier geboren? 
A: Ja, ja, hier geboren, aufgewachsen. 
(Pause) 
Was ich ein bisschen schade finde, ist einfach, dass man im Rahmen, dass man auf Quote 
guckt und auf die Medienanalyse, dass man Profile runterkocht, abschmirgelt, ne. Lass es 
doch anders sein, verdammt noch mal. Lass es doch anders sein, Fritzchen Müller muss es 
nicht kapieren. Mach es doch einfach. Wenn du WDR3 halten kannst, dann halte das 
Programm auch. 
 
Q: Ja, man schmirgelt das erstens auf den kleinsten gemeinsamen Nenner… 
A: Ne? Das ist sozusagen so Sozialdemokratie für blöde. 
 
Q: Wie der Milto sagt, das ist dann Multikulturalismus ohne den multikulturellen Mann. So, 
alles was, du hast nur so kleine häppchenweise, so, nö, so… Wir sind alle kosmopolitisch. 
A: Lass es doch.  
 
Q: Nichts was beleidigen könnte, nichts was in Frage stellen könnte. 
A: Kostet nichts, tut nicht weh, etc. etc. Du hättest kein Problem damit, wenn so, wie es 
eigentlich gedacht war, dieses Programm sozusagen als Farbenteam gedacht wäre. Effektiv 
hast du zwei Leute gehabt, die sich durchgesetzt haben, das ist Asli Sevindim, AKS, und 
Birand Bingül als stellvertretender Pressesprecher. Dann musst du sagen, OK, wir haben es in 
der Hierarchie, Alse ist keine Hierarchin, aber wenn man die fragt, erzählt mal, was Harald 
Brand mit dir angestellt hat früher, dann wird sie dir Geschichten erzählen, da rennst du die 
Wände hoch. Die Geschichte ist, es müssen sich erstmal Seilschaften bilden, und dann ziehen 
dir die anderen nach. Aber das funktioniert nur innerhalb eines Senders, ich sehe das ja auch, 
beim SWR gibt es auch so eine kleine Griechen-Fraktion, bevor die mit uns reden, schneiden 
sie sich eher die rechte Hand ab. Dann sprechen sie, der Milto und ich, Milto auf seine Art, 
ich eben so, machen wir eben so einen auf Partisanenkampf, wobei mein Großvater eben im 
EDES war, nicht ELAS, das nur so nebenbei, also er war rechts. Oder wie mein ehemaliger 
Teamleiter gerne zu sagen pflegte, dein Großvater hat für die Führer gekämpft, und mein 
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Großvater stand im Dienste Seiner Majestät des Königs von England, also das nur so neben 
bei. Wirkt übrigens immer wieder gern als Spruch.  
 
Q: Ihr seid ja auch so… 
A: Total bescheuert. Kannst du eigentlich nur an den elektrischen Stuhl anschließen. Was ist 
denn jetzt mit dem Casting zum Beispiel? Ist Milto eingeladen worden? Bin ich eingeladen 
worden? Also, ich nicht, aber Milto? 
 
Q: Was heißt eingeladen? Der steht nicht mal auf der Liste, aber hat er sich da angemeldet? 
A: Musste man sich da anmelden? 
 
Q: Es sieht so aus, dass man Interessen bekunden sollte. Ich weiß nicht, ob er da… Keine 
Ahnung, auf der Liste ist er nicht. Der kommt nicht ins Casting, soweit ich weiß. 
A: Ne, der macht jetzt Elternzeit und dann gucken wir mal weiter. 
(Pause) 
A: Es ist alles so, also jetzt zum Beispiel die Moderatoren-Auswahl bei Funkhaus Europa, 
man hat sich die Leute ausgesucht nach Profil, also von mir aus jetzt Juan Moreno, ah, der 
schreibt für den Spiegel, oder SZ vorher. Er war nicht unbedingt der Radio-Mann. 
 
Q: Nein, aber im Vergleich... Manche Sachen, die über den Äther gehen bei uns… 
A: Er hatte sich übrigens ein-zwei Gedanken gemacht. Dass er manchmal so einen Absatz 
brauchte, OK. 
 
Q: Ich meine, im Vergleich... was wir sonst noch so haben. Jetzt, im Idealfall, im Idealfall, 
was ist jetzt deine Meinung? Sollte es Funkhaus Europa als, mit diesem Gedanken geben, 
dass man für eine bestimmte Gruppe sendet und wenn ja, im Idealfall, für wen sollte sie 
senden? 
A: Das sollte Programm sein eigentlich aus dem Ghetto für das Ghetto, was dann einen 
gewissen eigenen Charme besitzt. Und dieser eigene Charme des Ghettos kommt nicht rüber. 
Das ist total un-sexy. Ich denke da zum Beispiel an so Zeitschriften der Schwarzen in 
Südafrika aus den Sechzigern, die intellektuell waren, sehr stylisch und ein eigenes Ziel 
hatten, dieses Programm hat kein Ziel. Sondern da kommt immer die Bum-Schakala-Fraktion 
und will mir erzählen, wie toll sie ist. Das brauche ich nicht. Das habe ich in Düsseldorf auf 
der Rathinger Straße samstags abends, ne, volle Kneipe. Das brauche ich nicht. Wenn ich das 
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so erleben will, muss ich da einfach hingehen und die Ohren aufmachen. Das ist Posing und 
Posing mag ich nicht. Da wollen sich Leute mit einem Mäntelchen gerieren (???) als ob, das 
ist OK, aber lass die Protagonisten wenigsten mit krummen Nasen. Und das geht mir so auf 
den Wecker. Das ist aber auch ein Geburtsfehler von Funkhaus Europa, dass man nicht gesagt 
hat konsequent, nicht jeder, der einen deutschen, Entschuldigung, nicht jeder der einen 
belgischen Schäferhund hat, ist automatisch multikulti, so a la, wie heißt der im ZDF, Lanz. 
Der ist Südtiroler und verkauft sich als super-multikulti, und wenn du weißt, wie es bei dem 
im Kopf zugeht, ist er deutscher als so mancher Oberförster. Das Mainstreaming ist in den 
deutschen Medien leider nicht existent oder es dauert eben ein bisschen. Die kritische Masse 
ist noch nicht erreicht. Du hast immer den Makel, dass du dich beweisen musst als besser als, 
und dieses Programm wollte immer sein als besser als. Lass es doch einfach Mittelmaß sein. 
Aber lass es einen eigenen Stil haben. Wenn du WDR4 die Moderation hörst, dann bist du 
sofort tot, aber es passt zur Musik. Wenn du super-stylische Musik hast, ich sage mal in 
Funkhaus Europa, dann kannst du da nicht Lieschen Müller haben. Das wurde systematisch 
immer runtergekocht, immer runter, runter, runter, runter. Und der aktuelle Trend, den du hast 
mit dieser Süpermercadisierung, ich habe etwas gelesen in einer lustigen Beilage von der SZ 
und das muss ich jetzt umsetzen, ist es auch nicht. 
 
Q: Also, man hat es runtergekocht, das ist jetzt total unbedrohlich, und ja, harmlos. So, das ist 
der Punkt. 
A: Du hast keine Kanaken-Themen. 
 
Q: Da ist kein Edge. 
A: Why should it. Ich stehe da immer vor und denke, ja, OK, und jetzt? Und ich muss auch 
ganz offen sagen, ich höre es nicht. Und ich frage mich, wer das hört. Einsamer 
Lastwagenfahrer? Weil diese urbane Klasse, die es ansprechen soll, ich finde es sehr witzig, 
was sozusagen die Konkurrenz macht von Deutschlandfunk und vom Deutschlandradio, ne, 
oder ZDF. Die investieren sehr viel Geld in Digitalradioprogramme, digitales Fernsehen, 
extra, neu, und das ist sogar manchmal cooler, als das was der WDR versucht und immer die 
Sache da sein muss, ja, aber es muss doch die breite Masse. Nein, es muss nicht, nein. WDR3 
ist auch nicht für die breite Masse. Da ist Intelligenz. 
 
Q: Ja, das wurde aber jetzt runtergekocht für die breite Masse. 
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A: Aber ich verstehe nicht, du hast ein Programm, was abends aus der ganzen Welt sendet 
und tagsüber soll es aber für Lieschen Müller sein, es geht nicht, das klappt hinten und vorne 
nicht. Das ist so eine Geschichte, ich stehe da immer davor und denke, von der 
Personalakquise, über die Programmgestaltung selber, über die Abendgeschichten, es soll 
immer gremienkompatibel sein. Und es wird in zehn Jahren eine Konkurrenz geben durch 
spezielle Sender, ich bin am überlegen, ob ich einen eigenen Sender aufmache. 
 
Q: Kann man damit Geld machen? 
A: Ja, mit einer anderen Positionierung, dass du sagst, ich verkaufe von mir aus die Mucke 
dazu, die kannst du über mich beziehen und du kannst über mich auch alle kulturellen 
Ereignisse, kannst du dabei sein, sozusagen als Abonnement, und dann macht es Sinn. Und 
das Radioprogramm nur als Zugabe, dass du ein bisschen Geplapper hast. That’s the point. 
Und dass die bei Funkhaus Europa immer in der Nische sind als nur Nischenprogramm, kein 
Vollprogramm, ich behaupte, wenn du versuchen würdest Werbeplatz zu verkaufen über 
dieses Programm, das würde funktionieren und zwar eigenen. Aber das machen sie nicht. Da 
muss echt erst einer mit der Nase drauf stoßen. Oder dass sie Medienpartnerschaften suchen 
mit fremdsprachigen Medien hier, macht es doch einfach, es gibt doch die Menschen, 
stattdessen wird immer nur... 
 
Q: Ich verstehe, ehrlich gesagt, nicht diesen Grundgedanken, wenn du sechs Programme hast, 
warum hast du so eine Angst vor der Nische? Weil, wenn das nicht so wäre, dann kannst du 
nur ein Radioprogramm oder zwei. 
A: Oder drei, wie früher. 
 
Q: Aber, wenn du sechs hast, dann heißt das, dass du sechs verschiedene Publikumssegmente 
bedienst. Was ist das Schlimme dran? Oder… 
A: Wenn du sechs hast, dann musst du sechs bedienen.  
 
Q: Ja, eben. Was ist das Schlimme an der Nische? 
A: Die Kosten. Natürlich wäre es billiger WDR3 den Leuten, die CD nach Hause zu schicken. 





Interview Uwe  
Cologne, 25 July 2012 
 
Q: Also, du bist jetzt vom Anfang an bei Funkhaus Europa dabei. Es geht, ich wollte sprechen 
über diese Medien für Migranten oder Medien und Multikulturalismus. Du bist vom Anfang 
an? 
A: Na ja, vom Anfang an nicht, es gab einen Vorlauf, eine Planungsphase, da war ich nicht 
dabei, im April, ich bin im April 99 dazu gekommen und da waren im Grunde schon alle 
Claims verteilt, da gab es im Vorauf auf der 103,3 schon eine Sendung ab 18 Uhr, davor lief 
WDR2, das, also als ich quasi dazu kam, waren schon die Rubriken, das war alles schon 
besetzt von denen, die schon da waren. Die kamen eben zum großen Teil eben aus den 
muttersprachigen Sendungen. 
 
Q: Ja, warst du… du warst aber nicht der einzige Deutsche… 
A: Elmar Pott damals, Jona… 
 
Q: Michaela? 
A: Ne, die war noch nicht da, die war noch nicht da. Oh je, da muss ich gucken, 
Anfangsmannschaft, damals war Consuelo noch Chefin, die war Teamleiterin. 
 
Q: Und die Nadi war noch da. 
A: Ja. Und Renzo Brizzi und, und… ja. 
 
Q: Warum bist du eigentlich ins Funkhaus Europa gegangen? 
A: Ich wollte weg aus dem regionalen, ich habe so 88 fest angestellt angefangen bei so einem 
WDR-Lokalradioprojekt, das war Kabel-Pilotprojekt damals, das ging bis 94, wurde dann 
eingestellt, dann ging das familiär nicht anders, das Kind war zu klein, ich konnte erst 98 nach 
der Einschulung der Tochter gucken, mich nach Köln orientieren, und dann habe ich geguckt, 
Stellen gab es bei WDR5, aber auch nicht viele, auch nur Zeitstellen, und dann eben 
Funkhaus Europa, da habe ich mich drauf beworben nach langer Zeit und. Das war einfach 
mal der Impuls, mal was anderes zu machen, richtiges Radio, ein Vollprogramm und nicht 
nur im regionalen irgendwelche Nachrichtenminuten zu schreiben oder Reporter als 
Zulieferer für die etablierten Wellen zu sein. 
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Q: Aber jetzt… es hat sich einiges geändert. Aber in dieser Anfangsphase, was war jetzt der, 
was war euer Ansatz, als ihr angefangen habt, da zu arbeiten? Also, inhaltlich? Oder was war 
jetzt euer Ziel oder euer Punkt? 
A: Der Ansatz war dieser Spagat, den es eigentlich immer noch gibt, zwischen den Themen 
der Migranten, die im großen Teil in der Muttersprachensendungen stattfinden und 
stattfanden damals, und der europäischen Ebene, so einen Blick hinzukriegen, dass es auch 
miteinander zusammen hängt, dass wenn man zum Beispiel berichtet über meinetwegen 
Arbeitsmarkt in Spanien, damals war der Boom da, das natürlich ganz viel damit zu tun hat, 
dass in dem Land eine relativ junge Bevölkerung war, das es da Zuwanderung gab, da kamen 
die Rumänen nach Spanien, da waren da in den Gemüseplantagen nicht nur die Marokkaner, 
und dass man darüber berichtet und das eigentlich spiegelt mit dem, wie es in Deutschland 
läuft, dass wir eigentlich immer einen europäischen Blick hatten, vergleichen.  
(Pause) 
Also, Entwicklung in verschiedenen Ländern vergleichen und schauen, wo man 
Gemeinsamkeiten hat und wo dann doch die Unterschiede so stark sind. Und das war 
eigentlich auch ein sehr analytischer Ansatz und damals haben es die anderen Wellen nicht 
gemacht. Heute ist es Mainstream, zum Beispiel diese Korri-Ketten, das war damals im 
Funkhaus Europa was ganz neues, oder das man über das Vehikel Presseschau in andere 
Länder geguckt hat. Dass man gesagt hat, wir nehmen uns zwei Mal vier Minuten Zeit um, 
meinetwegen nach Kroatien zu schauen oder in die Türkei, um so auch einen Einblick in die 
Medien des anderen Landes zu kriegen, aber auch den holländischen Blick zum Beispiel, also 
einfach Vielfalt da zu dokumentieren. 
 
Q: Das war also dieser analytische Ansatz war wichtiger für dich als diese Migranten-
Geschichten? 
A: Die Migranten-Geschichten waren zum Teil interessant, aber die wären mir alleine nicht 
ausreichend gewesen, weil ich denke, das was die Welle ausmacht, das war immer die Musik, 
über die, und auch eine gewisse Weltoffenheit und zu gucken, wie das miteinander 
zusammenhängt, ne. Also, damals war, das war die Phase 99-2000, da ging es Deutschland 
nicht so gut, wir hatten die Einheitslasten, Deutschland war damals der kranke Mann Europas, 
zumindest im Economist, dann war es immer ganz hilfreich zu schauen, ja, warum geht es den 
anderen besser, oder geht es ihnen wirklich besser und, auch dieses Abchecken, wo steht 
Deutschland, Deutschland auch mit seiner Einwanderungspolitik, diese unselige Geschichte 
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Postkarten-Verfahren gegen Doppelpass, all das, das waren natürlich hochpolitische Themen 
und die waren damals noch nicht so in den anderen Wellen präsent. 
 
Q: Und damals, also war dein Hörer, den du dir vorgestellt hast, war so ein aufgeklärter, der 
sich, der über den Tellerrand guckt, oder was war das für ein Hörer? 
A: Der Hörer war für mich einmal der türkische LKW-Fahrer, der viel Zeit hatte, Radio zu 
hören, aber auch der vielleicht der griechische Mediziner, der Zeit hat, Radio zu hören, also 
nicht nur die Intellektuellen oder die Studenten, für die man vielleicht Radio heute macht, 
sondern ich habe das damals ernst genommen und habe auch gedacht, na ja, man muss dann 
auch Themen machen, die einfache Leute angehen. Die Erfahrung hat aber gezeigt, dass die 
Hörergewohnheiten der unterschiedlichen Migranten sich von denen der Deutschen nicht groß 
unterscheiden, dass es eher nach sozialer Lage geht, nach Qualifikation, nach Wohlstand. Und 




A: Na ja, wir hatten ja gedacht, gerade die zweite Einwanderer-Generation zu erreichen, weil 
die Eltern, die waren ja oft gut versorgt eine Zeitlang mit diesen abendlichen 
muttersprachigen Programmen, aber ich glaube, den Kampf um die heute 35- bis 50-jährigen 
der zweiten Generation, den haben wir eigentlich nicht gewonnen, weil wir vielleicht dann 
noch einen ganz anderen Zugang gebraucht hätten. Also, das war lange Zeit eine Qualität von 
Funkhaus Europa, in die Communities reinzuhören, raus zu gehen, viel zu machen, aber ich 
denke, wir sind da nicht dran geblieben. Es wäre, auch durch unsere Sendung, zum Beispiel 
die türkische Frühsendung, die eine Stunde war für mich, war eine wichtige Erfahrung, das 
hat uns auch viele Hörer gesichert, nicht nur die, die abends mal diese eine Stunde hören 
wollten. Als das dann alles zurückgenommen wurde, war das zugleich auch mit dem 
Absterben der anderen täglichen Programme, zum Beispiel griechisch, spanisch, war das eine 
Entwicklung, die einerseits logisch ist, ich glaube, im Zeitalter vom Satellitenfernsehen, muss 
man nicht noch irgendwie Nachrichten aus aller Welt in der jeweiligen Muttersprache 
aufbereiten, aber eine adäquate Form zu finden, die Migranten einerseits Musik und Sprache 
vorfinden, und Infos, und trotzdem in Deutschland leben, das ist vielleicht heute eher möglich 
mit diesen Stundenformaten, weil da ist mehr Platz, aber, also das sind eben 
Einschaltprogramme, aber was wir tagsüber nicht geschafft haben, ist vielleicht an den 
Migranten dran zu bleiben. Weil, ich kann mir vorstellen, die Programmumstellung, gerade 
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jetzt die auf die vier Stunden Frühprogramm, also nur deutsches Programm von sechs bis 
sechs ist in sich logisch, aber auch für die Ernteeinfahren, das ist die Frage, weil, ich kann mir 
vorstellen, dass die Migranten gar nicht wissen, warum sie uns tagsüber einschalten sollten, 
weil wir liefern zuverlässig nicht die Informationen, die sie vielleicht brauchen. 
 
Q: Genau. Also jetzt ein Schritt zurück. Ich habe oft den Eindruck gehabt, das ist jetzt, das ist 
jetzt Standard bei uns. Aber früher noch, mit Jona und so, habe ich manchmal den Eindruck 
gehabt, dass wir uns so geschämt haben irgendwie, diese Migranten-Themen zu nehmen. 
Also, dass wir die im weiten Bogen manchmal umgegangen sind, wo andere, Mainstream-
Programme diese Themen angepackt haben. Du hast echt den Eindruck gehabt, dass die 
machen: Nee, das ist zu sehr Migranten-Ecke. Meinst du, hast du dieses Gefühl?  
A: Also, es war eine Zeitlang ja so, dass wir bei den eigenen Kollegen drauf geachtet haben, 
dass der Akzent nicht zu stark war, das hat die Kollegen in den Mainstream-Programmen 
eigentlich nicht so interessiert. Da waren wir vielleicht zu korrekt. Wir haben dann auch eine 
Zeitlang, nachdem wir eigentlich müde waren, immer wieder die gleichen Interviewpartner zu 
nehmen und deren Deutsch auch nicht so toll war, dann haben wir, das ist so leicht 
ausgeklungen, habe ich das Gefühl. Man hat sich davon verabschiedet, weil das mühselig ist, 
es sind immer die gleichen Themen, und das waren so reflexhafte Geschichten, ich erinnere 
mich an verschiedene Interviews und eigentlich ist es ein Radio, was immer um sich kreist, 
was eigentlich nicht, ich meine, man ethnisiert ein bisschen, man schaut auf das besondere, 
aber der Versuch, das Gegenteil zu machen ist eher gescheitert, glaube ich. Zu sagen, das ist 
alles normal, es gibt vieles verschiedene, dieses Internationale, dieses Globale, auch zu 
finden, dass die Leute sich da wieder finden, ich glaube, das ist schwieriger. Das ist auch viel 
zufälliger, wir sind nicht mehr zuverlässig, an den Verbänden oder an den dran, die sagen, wir 
sind aktiv. Also, ob das jetzt die Türkische Gemeinde Deutschland, das ist immer so genau  
so sporadisch wie das die Mainstream-Medien machen, da unterscheiden wir uns kaum. Das 
ist, glaube ich, ein Riesenproblem. 
 
Q: Also, für mich ist dieser, für mich persönlich ist dieser globale Ansatz, dieses 
Kosmopolitische, das ist für mich genau die entgegengesetzte Richtung von der Anerkennung 
einer multikulturellen Gesellschaft, weißt du? Weil, das geht in diese Richtung ein bisschen 
einer Gleichmachung. Und dieses, ja, alles ist in so kleinen Häppchen konsumierbar und nett. 
Also, wir sind alle kosmopolitisch. Aber so ist es nicht, ich finde, das Publikum, diese 
Gesellschaft ist nicht so, ne? Also, ich finde es einfach an der Realität vorbei. 
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A: Also, wenn man das jetzt das Programm betrachtet, ist das eine Flucht in die 
Unverbindlichkeit. Das ist so. Weil man traut sich nicht, auch dieses klein-klein noch zu 
schildern, und macht das dann immer nur zu Anlässen, aber man könnte natürlich genau so 
Beiträge, die das dokumentieren, aber nicht tagesaktuell sind, einzukaufen und da was zu 
dokumentieren, aber das wird nicht mehr gemacht. Es ist ja ohnehin so, dass das Programm 






























Interview Thomas  
Cologne, 03 September 2012 
 
Q: Es hat einige Veränderungen gegeben im Verständnis von dem Programm. Es gab diesen 
Markenkernprozess und so weiter. Jetzt, gut. Dieses Konzept vom ethnischen 
Multikulturalismus, also im Radio und was uns betrifft, das ist jetzt wohl überholt. Seit 
mehreren Jahren gehen wir in diese Richtung. Ist das, kannst du mir deine Gedanken dazu 
geben? 
A: Ja, kann ich. Ich würde es nicht als überholt bezeichnen, was unser Programm betrifft, weil 
es ja zum großen Teil schon stattfindet. Es ist nur anders sortiert innerhalb des Programms. 
Wir haben ab 18 Uhr eine Schiene, wo genau das, nämlich ethnischer Multikulturalismus ja 
stattfindet, eine Sendung nach der nächsten für eine bestimmte Zielgruppe und das über die 
ganze Woche. Da findet das statt und ich glaube, das hat auch seinen absolut richtigen Platz in 
so einem Programm, wird auch noch auf lange Zeit Bestand haben. Und die andere Seite ist, 
wenn man auch einen Teil macht, der übergreifend sein soll, also multiethnisch dann, so zu 
sagen, dann muss man sehen den, nach meiner Überzeugung, nach Kriterien machen, die 
dann übergreifendes Vorgehen ermöglichen, also dass da wirklich verschiedene Ethnien, 
inklusive der deutschen Hörer, an so einem vielfältigen Programm dran bleiben. Deswegen 
haben wir eine stärkere Trennung vorgenommen. Wir machen nicht mehr innerhalb auch der 
einzelnen deutschsprachigen Sendungen, in dem Fall, ist ja so vertieft in die einzelnen 
Ethnien reingehen, das ist nur die jeweilige Ethnie, ne, nennen wir es Muttersprache, wie auch 
immer, da sind nur diejenigen interessiert, sondern auch andere darüber hinaus. Es ist ein 
Paradigmenwechsel, der nicht jetzt heißt, dass hinten raus die ethnischen, die 
muttersprachigen, die Nationalitäten-Formate völlig runterkippen. 
 
Q: Aber was jetzt das deutschsprachige Programm betrifft, früher war das viel mehr so, jetzt 
ist es nicht mehr so. Und es gab eine Zwischenphase. Also, wir sind jetzt nicht, wir reagieren 
nicht mehr auf die Bedürfnisse der einzelnen Communities, oder der einzelnen Ethnien, also 
was das deutschsprachige Programm angeht. 
A: Richtig, also wenn es nur, Bedürfnisse nur dieser einzelnen Community wäre, dann würde 
man eher sagen, hm, müssen wir das denn wirklich im deutschsprachigen Programm machen, 
wobei ich aber schon sagen würde, dass ja viele Dinge, die aus den Communities kommen, 
man auch so aufbereiten kann, und das es Themen sind, die auch übergreifend interessant 
sind, da müssen wir uns auch vor uns selber ein bisschen in Schutz nehmen, dass man nicht, 
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oder anders, dass man nicht das Kind mit dem Badewasser ausschüttet, also dass man nicht 
sagt, wir machen gar keine Community-Geschichten, das wäre völlig falsch, da würde dieser 
Suppe das Salz fehlen. Aber eben, man muss schon immer gucken, ob das Thema auch über 
die Community hinausgreift oder man es aufbereiten kann, dass es drüber hinaus greift. Das 
ist meine Meinung, ob wir es immer so hundertprozentig umsetzen, das ist die andere Frage. 
 
Q: Aber es gibt ja diese Bewegung zu dem, was man kosmopolitscher Multikulturalismus 
nennen könnte. Ich nutze hier eine Terminologie, die übrigens, ich weiß nicht, ob du den 
Sender kennst, SBS in Australien, die sind supererfolgreich. 
A: Ne. 
 
Q: Vielleicht googlest du mal, weil die durch bestimmte Prozesse gegangen sind, die uns sehr 
ähnlich sind, mit dem Unterschied, dass sie Fernsehprogramm machen, also statt das Radio 
machen sie Fernsehprogramm, und sind der zweitgrößte öffentlich-rechtliche Sender in 
Australien, also sind riesig. Die gehen natürlich aus einem anderen politischen Kontext 
heraus, weil in Australien der Multikulturalismus sozusagen die Staatspolitik ist. 
A: Eben, es ist so… Einwanderungsland, ja. 
 
Q: Aber die machen so ungefähr dieselben Entwicklungen, und es gibt da auch Kritik. Dieser 
kosmopolitische Multikulturalismus ist ja viel, wie sagt man? Viel mehr… viel mehr Leute 
finden sich darin, aber ist es so ein bisschen… die Frage ist, ob es jetzt so eine 
Verharmlosung von dem Politischen ist, weißt du? Weil das so, diesen ganzen 
Multikulturalismus konsumierbar macht für die Mehrheit. Weißt du, was gemeint ist damit? 
A: Ja… Sagen wir mal so, wenn die Fragen, ich habe, ich muss das so sagen, zumindest was 
meine Steuerung hier des Ganzen anliegen, den Dingen die unser Programm so gar nicht 
solche grundlegende Fragen zu Grunde, sondern eher einfach Mechanismen, wie Radio 
funktioniert, oder auch nicht funktioniert. Also, der ganze Überbau, vielleicht kann man 
drüber reden, aber der ist da für mich nicht so tragend und zielführend dabei gewesen, 
sondern einfach die Frage, wenn man zum Beispiel, mehr in die ethnische Richtung geht, 
wenn das Unterscheidungsmerkmal ist, die kosmopolitische Richtung und die ethnische 
Richtung. Bei der ethnischen Richtung ist es halt so, dass man in dem Moment, wo man zu 
stark in diese Richtung jeweils geht, man alle anderen immer ausschließt. Da kann man eine 
klare Entscheidung treffen, man kann sagen, man könnte so ein Programm wie dieses hier 
komplett so aufsetzen, man könnte sagen, da läuft jede Stunde eine Sendung für eine 
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bestimmte Gruppe und das wird dann wiederholt oder abends gibt es noch ein Update oder so. 
Dann wäre das den ganzen Tag, so wie wir es jetzt abends im Prinzip laufen haben. Kann man 
so machen, wenn man aber sagt, es soll auch ein übergreifendes Element geben, was sich an 
alle gemeinsam richtet, inklusive, bei Ethnien meine ich immer inklusive der 
deutschsprachigen auch, dann muss man es eben, finde ich, nach bestimmten Regeln des 
Radios machen. Und da ist es dann nicht ein politischer Hintergrund, sondern einfach der, wie 
kann ich Menschen für ein gemeinsames Thema interessieren. 
 
Q: Wenn du jetzt diese Richtung und unsere Zielhörer und so weiter, wir haben ja diesen 
Prozess durchgemacht und er hat sehr konkrete Früchte getragen, wenn du das jetzt im 
Kontext von Deutschland siehst, meinst du… Oder, sagen wir, andersrum gefragt, für wen 
senden wir jetzt, deiner Meinung nach? So, ist die deutsche Gesellschaft soweit?   
A: Ja, habe ich ein ganz klares Bild zu. Wir sind eh ein zweigeteiltes Programm. Ich 
klammere da jetzt Mal aus... (inaudiable) ... die Abendsendungen, für jeweilige 
Nationalitäten. Im deutschsprachigen Programm, ein Teil der Gesellschaft ist so weit. Das 
sind längst nicht alle und von dem Teil, der so weit ist, ist auch nicht jeder daran interessiert, 
ständig mit einem Programm konfrontiert zu werden, was dann hauptsächlich um Vielfalt 
kreist, so eine Musik hat und so eine Ansprache. Aber ein Teil davon auf jeden Fall. Und das 
ist so der Versuch, für diesen Teil ein, ja, Lagerfeuer zu bilden, eine Öffentlichkeit zu 
schaffen, eine bestimmte weitere Weltsicht auch dazustellen. Mir ist gleichzeitig ständig 
bewusst, dass wir, jetzt gerade was unser Oberthema angeht, Vielfalt, meinetwegen 
Integration, also, Zusammenleben, dass wir natürlich ausgerechnet diejenigen, die es am 
nötigsten hätten, ob die jetzt deutscher Nationalität sind oder nicht deutsche Nationalität, die 
erreichen wir nicht mit unserem Programm, weil wir dazu eigentlich zu kompliziert, zu 
intellektuell, zu fordernd, was auch immer, sind. Also, wir greifen ja nicht in Problemmilieus, 
weder in, meinetwegen, rechte deutsche Problemmilieus, noch in bildungsferne, in Köln 
lebende Araber oder, die erreichen wir mit dem Programm so nicht, aber ehrlich gesagt, da 
sehe ich auch keine Möglichkeit, überhaupt keine, ein Programm, das so aufgestellt ist, das zu 
tun, da müsste man mehrere Wellen haben, die sich ganz speziell, ganz, ganz eng fokussiert 
an diese jeweiligen Zielgruppen richten, und selbst dann würde man es wahrscheinlich in 
bestimmten Bereichen nicht schaffen. 
 
Q: Oder das Mainstream müsste mit diesem Leitgedanken... 
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A: Oder so, oder so, der Leitgedanke. Aber selbst, wir bezeichnen 1Live oder WDR2 als das 
Mainstream hier, selbst die greifen da ja nicht richtig rein. Willst du ein Wasser? 
 
Q: Nein, danke, ich habe so ein Husten. 
A: Selbst die greifen da ja nicht wirklich rein, da ist noch mal eine Welt daneben. Und das 
sind sogar Welten, wo du als Öffentlich-rechtlicher gar nicht richtig hingehen kannst, weil 
dann von der anderen Seite wieder kommen würde, ey, was macht ihr da eigentlich? Das ist 
sehr schwierig. Da sehe ich ganz klare Grenzen, insofern können wir eher, glaube ich, im 
Idealfall, die, ich bezeichne so die positive Seite, stärken, indem was sie tut, wie sie auftritt, 
wie sie konstituiert ist mit unserem Programm. 
 
Q: Meinst du, wir, so wie alle Öffentlich-rechtlichen und überhaupt alle Medien stehen jetzt 
in verstärkter Konkurrenz zu allerlei Kanälen wie Internet und was weiß ich. Kann man so ein 
Programm, oder überhaupt, sagen wir mal, öffentlich-rechtliche Programme mit bestimmten 
Ansprüchen, kann man die nach marktwirtschaftlichen Modellen, also sprich nach Quote, 
überhaupt eigentlich jetzt wirklich messen? Oder, macht es Sinn überhaupt? 
A: Auch eine Frage, die mich umtreibt, wie alle anderen Programme auch, insbesondere für 
die kleineren. Ich glaube, auch da wieder beides, also ich glaube, man kann schon ein Ziel 
formulieren, wir machen ein Kulturprogramm, wir machen ein Wort- oder Infoprogramm wie 
WDR5, wie machen ein Programm, was um Vielfalt geht, eben Global Sounds Radio. Das 
sind ja erstmal Überlegungen, die sich nicht grundsätzlich, weil da weiß man von Anfang an, 
dass da kleine Dinge sein werden. Man kann da trotzdem versuchen, ja innerhalb dieses 
Bereichs schon, man kann da ein Programm ganz und gar unzugänglich machen, oder man 
kann versuchen, es schon einer etwas breiteren Hörerschaft zugänglich zu machen. Das ist 
mein Bestreben zum Beispiel bei uns, aber das machen die Kollegen bei WDR5 zum Beispiel 
nicht anders, man überlegt ja schon, OK, wie schaffen es Akzeptanz zu haben, Menschen zu 
erreichen, Relevanz zu haben. Das sind für mich wichtige, mehr als Quote. Relevanz ist für 
mich wichtiger. Wenn ich ein halbes Prozent habe, dann habe ich keine Relevanz, wenn ich 
mit so einem Programm zwei Prozent, drei Prozent Tagesreichweite habe, siehe WDR5 mit 
vier Prozent, hat man Relevanz. Man ist dann, das sind dann, auch in bestimmten Kreisen, es 
sind Multiplikatoren, und das wird dann auch sofort, kriegt eine andere Qualität. Also, man 
muss ja gehört werden, wenn man Radio macht, man muss gekauft werden, wenn man 
Zeitungen macht, man muss eingeschaltet werden, wenn man Fernsehsender ist, sonst sendet 
man völlig ins Leere, das ist ein ganz andere Umgang mit der Quote für mich, als jetzt bei 
 301 
1Live oder bei den wirklichen Massenprogrammen oder bei Privatsendern, die wirklich exakt 
dran hängen, dass es funktioniert. Das sehe ich bei uns nicht, deswegen, wir gucken ja nicht, 
wir gucken immer so, wo stehen wir, und geht’s... ne? Und haben wir, tun wir alles, um 
wirklich Menschen... ich würde aber dann bei bestimmten Dingen, da können wir auch nicht, 
würden es auch nicht opfern, dann... 
 
Q: So, wenn du jetzt, für dich, ne? Wenn du als Person, bio-deutsch und so weiter, bist zu 
diesem Programm gekommen. Jetzt machst du ein Programm, was du früher nicht gemacht 
hast. Was heißt das für dich jetzt? Also, wie machen wir vielfältiges Programm? Spiegeln wir 
diese Vielfalt, und wenn ja, welche sind unsere Merkmale? Also, Musik ist klar, aber… 
A: Genau, also ich würde, es sind ja vier oder fünf Eckpunkte, die ich sehe, die Vielfalt für 
mich in dem Programm ausmachen. Also, viel zitiert, die Musik ist da ganz wichtig, ich 
nenne sie jetzt einfach mal deshalb zuerst, weil sie quantitativ halt viel einnimmt, etwa zwei 
Drittel einfach im Tagesverlauf, das ist eine Vielfalt, die es wirklich so nirgendwo anders gibt 
und auf die ich auch stolz bin, weil die Welten eröffnet und zwar auf eine leichte Weise. Das 
hört sich immer so, ja nicht so tiefgehend an, man sagt, Musik, wir spielen da Musik aus aller 
Welt, das ist ja wirklich ein Kulturgut, also ganz viele Dinge, von denen das wir machen, 
selbst im Pop-Bereich, ist für mich kulturell oder subkulturell wertvoll und das verkörpert für 
mich Vielfalt. Die zentrale Botschaft ist für mich die der Macher, also was sind das für 
Menschen, die so ein Programm betreiben, ist da diese Vielfalt hörbar und spürbar. Da geben 
wir uns Mühe, da sind wir aber längst nicht in allen Bereichen perfekt, manchmal wird’s mir 
da schon zu normal, wenn man so will, und zu verwechselbar mit WDR2 oder EinsLive, oder 
wen auch immer, andererseits kann man auch kein Dogma daraus machen, das ist eine 
schwierige Geschichte. Das dritte ist die Themen, Community-Geschichten, also immer, die 
so woanders nicht stattfinden und damit bei diesen Themen, aber auch bei allen anderen, der 
Versuch ebenso einen Blick zu haben, eine spezielle Perspektive, wo bestimmte Einflüsse 
durchkommen, bis hin zu Menschen, Protagonisten, die sind ja in einer Fernsehsendung wie 
Markt sind die Protagonisten irgendwie immer Deutsch, weiß auch nicht warum. Wenn wir 
eine Straßenumfrage zum x-beliebigen Thema machen, etwas was gar nicht mit Vielfalt zu 
tun hat, muss es bei uns halt der Ansatz, ne, das soll das Ganze spiegeln. Das sind so die 
kleinen Versuche, wobei ein Teil davon, zum Beispiel das mit den Protagonisten aber auch 
mit den Moderatoren, oder, ist ja nur ein Reflex darauf, dass in den anderen Programmen das 
zu kurz kommt. Also, wenn die es auch alle machen würden, wenn die wirklich ein 
Querschnitt der Gesellschaft spiegeln würden, dann wäre dieser Teil bei uns schon ein 
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bisschen überholt, eigentlich, ne, also. Aber ich habe nicht, weder die Hoffnung noch die 
Befürchtung, dass es so schnell bei denen geht, selbst wenn da der eine oder der andere mal es 
schafft, ein muttersprachigen oder einen Moderator mit Migrationshintergrund, sie da noch 
nicht auf absehbare Zeit, die Bandbreite der Gesellschaft spiegeln. 
 
Q: Ja, es gibt, das was du erzählst, natürlich gibt es diese Mainstreaming-Bestrebungen als 
Teil dieser Vielfalts-Politik, in der Medienpolitik schon seit langem. Die funktionieren aber 
nicht. Kann man so nicht sagen in den massenattraktiven Programmen 
A: Jedenfalls nicht in der Breite. Punktuell ja, aber nicht in der Breite. 
 
Q: Ja, wie siehst du das jetzt, wenn du, hast du eine Idee, oder wie siehst du die Entwicklung 
der deutschen Medienlandschaft, also die öffentlich-rechtliche zum Beispiel? Wie wird sich 
das weiter entwickeln? Wird, werden die mehr alle wie Funkhaus Europa, global, oder 
werden die Mainstream-Programme mehr mit Migranten bespickt? 
A: Ich glaube schon, dass das so sein wird. Also, wenn ich die Entwicklung der letzten 
zwanzig Jahre sehe, inklusive uns, und man zehn-zwanzig Jahre nach vorne gucken, ich 
glaube schon, dass da was deutlich noch mal passieren wird. Das ist einfach vor allem eine 
Frage der Zeit. ich glaube selbst, dass sich so Musik, wie wir sie hier spielen, immer mehr so 
ihren Weg durchsickern wird. Es ist mir gestern Abend noch im Tatort aufgefallen, wo Leute 
getanzt haben zu so Musiktiteln, wo ich dachte, he, hallo? Das ist unseres, das war nicht 
irgendwie WDR2, EinsLive, das war Musik, die so bei Funkhaus Europa laufen würde. Ich 
glaube, es war keine ethnische Party, es war eine ganz normale Party, ja? Also, ich, da 
passiert etwas, verändert sich wirklich die Gesellschaft, die jüngere Mitte der Gesellschaft, es 
ist einfach eine Zeit-Frage. Aber ich bin ganz, ich würde jetzt Wetten abschließen, dass das 
in… 
 
Q: Wieso haben wir dann so wenig, wie haben zu wenig Hörer? Eigentlich nach dieser 
Kalkulation, warum klappt es dann nicht? 
A: Ah, Gott, das hat so viele Gründe, wir waren ganz, ganz lange Zeit sehr schwierig und 
doch schwer zugänglich, selbst wenn wir jetzt alles richtig machen würden, was ich nicht 
weiß, ob es so ist, dauert es lange, bis sich Hörerverhalten ändert ohne riesige 
Werbekampagnen und dazu kommt, dass wir trotz allem, was wir machen, dass wir eben 
nicht Mainstream sind und die Mitte, die hört ja WDR2 und EinsLive und Radio NRW, das 
werden die auch weiterhin lange, lange Zeit tun. Das ist... was man auf so einem Programm 
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hier kriegen kann, ist, glaube ich, wirklich so, in der Liga zwei, drei, vier Prozent, wenn’s 
richtig toll läuft, mehr dann doch nicht, ohne den Charakter zu verlieren, oder sonst hat man 
irgendein Programm, was ab und zu mal ein Titel aus dem Ausland spielt, ja, das wär’s aber 
nicht. 
 
Q: Also, wenn man sich das Konzept Global Sounds Radio und so weiter liest und so, das ist 
alles sehr gut. Fragt sich aber, ob das so in der Realität so wirklich… jetzt für dich, so, du bist 
Teil dieses Programms, was für eine… Sagen wir so, es gibt diesen berühmten Satz von 
einem Kulturanalysten, Stuart Hall, ich weiß nicht, ob du ihn kennst, er hat viel über die 
Medien geschrieben und unter anderem, dass die BBC eine Nation geschaffen hat, vor allem 
in Kriegszeiten und nach dem Krieg. Also, die BBC hat sozusagen eine Nation-bildende 
Funktion auch gehabt und hat immer noch, nur weniger. Wenn jetzt, also nicht ganz so 
hochtrabend ausgedruckt, was, wenn wir Programm machen oder wenn du dieses Programm 
konzipierst, du bist schon leitend hier, was ist das für ein Volk, was du da, was du da, 
verstehst du, das du mit diesem Programm zauberst? Oder imaginierst? (laughter) 
A: Ja, es ist ein Volk, was ich schon immer wieder wahrnehme, wenn ich hier jetzt auch in 
Städten wie Köln oder so unterwegs bin, eins was ich eben vor zehn-zwanzig Jahren so noch 
nicht festgestellt habe. Es ist eins, was davon geprägt ist, also, man hat mehrere Welten in 
sich und das werden immer mehr Menschen, die hier leben, die das haben. Und das ist nicht 
so eine kleine Kindheit wie meine, sondern eine weitere, positiv wie negativ, das kann auch 
Schwierigkeiten bedeuten und das, das kommt von der einen Seite zusammen mit, in 
Anführungsstrichen, ganz normalen bio-Deutschen, die aber trotzdem ja auch einen anderen 
Horizont inzwischen haben, weil sie ins Ausland gehen, weil sie jetzt über Facebook weltweit 
vernetzt sind. Die Welt wird einfach zumindest in der Aufgeklärten Schicht, internationaler, 
weltbürgerlicher, auch toleranter. So, das ist das Volk, was ich da imaginiere, ich weiß aber, 
dass das nur eine Teilschicht dieser Gesamtgesellschaft ist. Und, es gibt aber kein 
Radioprogramm, oder kein Fernsehsender mehr, der die gesamte Gesellschaft komplett 
erreicht. Wir sind da eher, stehen wir auch für diese Segmentierung, die inzwischen da ist. 
Gab es vor 30 Jahren auch nicht, da gab es dann zwei-drei Sender, die haben das unter sich 
aufgeteilt und das war’s. Das ist lange nicht mehr, heute hat EinsFestival einen ein-Prozent 
Marktanteil, ja, das ist der Teil, und ZDF Neo noch einen, und der und der und der und da 
sind noch die Radios. 
 
Q: ZDF hat jetzt auch kein klares Programm. 
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A: Ne, oder ARTE hat auch 1,2 Prozent, also, aber das ist so, ich denke immer ja, ein Prozent 
ist sogar gar nicht so schlecht, Arte hat auch ein Prozent und Arte ist so ein Name, also... 
Also, ich glaube, in unserem Fall, wie auch bei Arte, wie auch bei WDR3, das sind 
Angebotsprogramme, da muss eine öffentlich-rechtliche Anstalt sagen, ja, das ist ein Ziel, 
was wir haben, das ist eine Idee, die wir, wo wir zu stehen, und die wir verkörpern, und dann 
machen wir das auch. Und dann finde ich, werden die Macher gefragt, dann aber zu 
überlegen, für wen, mit welchen Mitteln, wie kriegen wir Relevanz. Das sind so die... 
 
Q: Du hast einen Stichpunkt, ein Stichwort angesprochen, Schicht. Wenn man sich den 
modernen Kulturorientierten oder so was als idealtypischen Hörer nimmt, das ist schon eine 
Schicht-Frage. 
A: Ja, oder Milieu-Frage. Schicht? Milieus auf jeden Fall, eindeutig, das kannst du, kann man 
auch nicht wegleugnen. Also, und je nachdem, das hängt natürlich auch mit der größeren 
Auswahl zusammen, die inzwischen da ist. Je nachdem, wo man ein Programm hinlenkt, da 
ist man sofort da wieder welche los in einem bestimmten Milieu oder Schicht und kriegt dafür 
woanders her, was früher vielleicht nicht so gewesen wäre, weil das Angebot insgesamt 
einfach kleiner war, ohne Satelliten, ohne Privatradio, in den Zeiten, wo ich noch 
aufgewachsen bin. Wenn man da ein öffentlich-rechtlichtes Programm wie unseres gemacht 
hätte, wäre jetzt inhaltlich nicht so, aber, es wäre einfach deshalb, also wenn wir auch die 
gleiche Mediensituation hätten wie vor 30 Jahren, dann hätten wir deshalb schon weitaus 
mehr Marktanteil und so, weil es einfach nicht so viel gibt, gab, ja? Ist aber so. Jetzt ist es 
alles segmentiert, und man holt sich seinen kleinen Teil daraus. 
 
Q: Was sind jetzt, zurück zur praktischen Arbeit und zu den Leuten, die hier arbeiten. Also, 
nicht die Protagonisten sondern die Macher, also Moderatoren, Redakteure, Autoren. Was 
müssen sie mitbringen? Also, es geht um diese Sprachenvielfalt. Wie hört sich das im 
Programm? Wie machst du das bemerkbar im Programm? Ist das jetzt ein Blickpunkt, oder ist 
es die Themenauswahl, was ist das? Oder ist es so eine allgemeine Einstellung zur Welt, 
oder? 
A: Also, es ist im Idealfall, ist einmal Name-dropping einfach, dass jemand allein über seinen 
Namen verkörpert, dass er irgendwie Mehrwert hat, oder es auch in kleinen sprachlichen 
Dingen, der eine oder der andere Moderatoren, einfach mal es so einfließen lässt, so, was so 
mehr so nonchalant läuft. Da hat man also schon mal diesen Teil abgedeckt. Der zweite Teil 
ist für mich im Idealfall, dass man wirklich einen ganz anderen Blick hat, weil man den, wie 
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ich zum Beispiel so gar nicht haben kann, weil ich habe keine Eltern, die zugewandert sind 
und keine Familienfeste, die sich völlig von dem deutschen Mainstream abheben und, und, 
dass das halt im Programm zum Tragen kommt und klappt in manchen Fällen auch wirklich 
gut, dass wir solche kleinen Dinge einfließen lassen, oder dass auch die Macher, die wir da 
haben so Themen aus den Communities eben ranholen, die aber übergreifend interessant sind. 
Und das dritte ist wirklich dieses Weltbürgerliche, dass wir ganz weiten Blick haben, dass wir 
Toleranz im Sinne von, es gibt so viele unterschiedliche tolle Dinge in der Welt, damit auch 
in unserem Land, weil die Welt ja jetzt hier lebt, dass wir das hinkriegen, was nicht, was fast 
der schwierigste Teil manchmal ist. Ich sehe auch, eine ernüchternde Erfahrung, die ich da 
zum Beispiel gemacht habe, ist wie sich einzelne Migrantengruppen untereinander auch 
sehen, also gar nicht so mit der blauäugigen gutbürgerlichen deutschen Weltsicht oft, also, wir 
haben uns ja alle lieb, sondern das auch teilweise viel schwieriger. 
 
Q: Und noch eine Frage: Du bist als WDR-Mensch gefragt. Migrantische Autoren oder MH-
Autoren und Redakteure, wie siehst du ihre Rolle in den Mainstream-Programmen überhaupt? 
Kommen die gut voran oder sind es nur so Einzelfälle, oder…? 
A: Es geht voran, aber auch da langsam, also ich glaube auch da, es wird sich raus wachsen, 
es wird normaler und mehr werden und das muss aber auch mehr werden. Ich erinnere mich 
gut an eine Veranstaltung ich hatte, vor einem Jahr ungefähr, es waren Kanadier, die waren 
hier, ich habe da für den WDR zum Anlass einen Vortrag gehalten und da kam auch, es ging 
um Diversity, und kam sofort die Frage nach, ja es ist ja schön und gut, was ihr da macht, 
aber wie viele Moderatoren mit Herkunft habt ihr denn in den Mainstream Media. Da sagte 
ich, ja, jetzt zum Beispiel in so einem jungen Programm, gerade keinen im Moment, und die 
sagen, es wäre unheimlich schwer jemanden zu finden. Dann sagte einer von denen, auf 
Englisch dann, Sie sind, aber, wie, also Sie haben eine Bevölkerung von 80 Millionen in 
Deutschland,  und Sie wollen mir sagen, Sie finden keinen, der das kann, und der Mann hatte 
Recht. Ja, es ist eine Frage des Wollens, der Haltung dahinter, und da können wir helfen, 
diese Haltung noch mit ins Haus zu transportieren. Ich glaube, ich sehe an verschiedenen 
Stellen, dass es sehr erwünscht ist, inzwischen das auch verkörpert und sich fast damit 
schmückt, also das soll jetzt nicht in so eine positive Diskriminierung sein, aber in manchen 
Fällen ist es ja schon, bestimmte Stellen im Haus sagen, ah, das ist ja toll und können uns 
damit schmücken, andere sind da nicht so weit. 
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Q: Also, das habe ich gehört vor fünf Jahren oder länger her. Jemand hat mir gesagt, also, ist 
das wahr, dass man als Migrant besser jetzt, also dass man migrantischen Hintergrund haben 
muss, um im WDR weiter zu kommen. Und ich sagte, ja, schön wäre es. Aber, sagen wir so. 
Ich habe mit vielen Leuten gesprochen und so, mit Kollegen und überhaupt mit den Leuten, 
die ich kenne und die haben durch die Bank alle dieselbe Erfahrung, von der selben Erfahrung 
berichtet, dass die das überhaupt nicht wollten, aber dann irgendwie festgelegt wurden in 
diese migrantöse Ecke, ne, also auch Leute, die hier geboren sind und akzentfrei deutsch 
sprechen. Und dann fanden sie das erstens als eine Einschränkung, dann aber fanden sie, das 
war ökonomisch gar nicht so schlecht, weil sie dann irgendwie rausgegriffen wurden, jedes 
Mal als Experten, aber dass es letztendlich wirklich… ja, du wirst thematisch beschränkt.  
A: Nehmen mir ein Beispiel, die Auswahl der Volontäre, wurde bis vor einiger Zeit 
unheimlich darauf geachtet, dass da Männlein und Weiblein, so dass die Geschlechter, und es 
ist schon ein ganz wichtiges Kriterium, dass es da keine Gruppe mehr stattfindet, wo nicht 
auch, in welcher Form auch immer, aber Migrationshintergrund auch mit dabei ist, auf jeden 
Fall. 
 
Q: Das ist nicht mehr dieses „Wir begrüßen Menschen...“ 
A: Nein, nein, sondern das ist einfach dabei. Also, ich, das ist auch so, also es gibt Leute, ich 
glaube, hier in so einem Haus wie den WDR, klar, Ausnahme bestätigen immer die Regel, 
aber da ist ja keiner mehr gegen Vielfalt, oder so, also es gibt auch, den Großteil ist es egal, 
die interessiert das einfach nicht, die machen Regionalsendungen und dann denken die, was, 
was. Und es gibt einen Teil von Leuten und darunter auch Leute, die an Schnittstellen sitzen, 
wie jetzt Ausbildungsleiter Rainer Assion, die reden auch immer, dem das richtig so ein 
inneres Anliegen ist, im positiven Sinne, dass man sagt, nein, wir brauchen Vielfalt, wir 
haben auch den Integrationsbeirat jetzt, der das intensiv diskutiert. Es ist schon so ein 
wachsendes Einvernehmen da drüber. Deswegen bin ich optimistisch, dass es für die Zukunft, 
dass es normal und positiv wird, nicht exotisch, nicht künstlich herbeigeführt, sondern... und 
da ist der WDR auch einerseits Vorreiter und andererseits langsam. Also, ich glaube, dass da 
mancher Privatsender viel schneller auf so was reagiert, wenn ich jetzt im 
Fernsehprogrammen sehe. 
 
Q: Die haben einfach kürzere Reaktionszeiten. 
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A: Genau, zack, zack, zack und die sehen, das geht und da hast du da auf einmal in 
Fernsehsendungen die Gesichter, denkste, eh, warum sind wir nicht so weit. Das ist schon so 
eine, aber das liegt an den Strukturen, weil da alles langsamer läuft. 
 
Q: Wie wird Funkhaus Europa im Haus, jetzt nicht von den politischen Papieren her, sondern 
von der Stimmung, wie wird das Programm wahrgenommen? Weil wir, die hier arbeiten, wir 
haben sehr unterschiedliche Erfahrungen immer, was wir so von dem einen oder von dem 
anderen hören. 
A: Würde ich auch so bestätigen, unterschiedlich. Es gibt Leute oder Kreise oder Einzelne, 
die sagen, ja, was soll das, wofür brauchen wir das, und es gibt andere, die sagen, wir haben 
da ein tolles Programm, dieses Kompliment kriege ich in letzter Zeit öfter für unser 
Programm, die eben seine Dynamik, seine Frischheit sehen und eine Zukunftsorientierung 
eigentlich auch. Also, das ist total gemischt, das kann ich nicht so, je weiter es nach oben 
geht, desto mehr kriegt man einfach auf die Schulter geklopft für dieses Programm. 
 
Q: Und du? Bist du jetzt, ich frage das auch nicht im Sinne der…, bist du glücklich in diesem 
Programm, hier zu sein? Oder, gefällt dir das? Oder meinst du, das ist irgendwie doch nicht, 
keine Ahnung. Fühlst du dich wohl? 
A: Ich finde, das ist eine super... eine Herausforderung hört sich immer so abgedroschen an, 
aber, es ist... ej, wo kann man so was hier machen? Ein Programm mit dieser Perspektive, mit 
dieser Musikmischung und auf diese, einerseits zutiefst öffentlich-rechtlich, indem man 
wirklich was macht, spezielles Angebot mit dem Auftrag dahinter und so, und gleichzeitig ist 
es wirklich modern und nach vorne und wenn ich mir unsere Facebook-Seite gucke und mir 
die Kommentare da ansehe von Leuten, wie begeistert die sind oder die E-Mails, finde ich 
super. 
 
Q: Aber Druck gibt es nach wie vor, so ist es nicht. Ja, Druck, dass wir erfolgreich sein 
sollten. 
A: Ah, du, also, ne. Also, nicht so, da weiß ich noch von meiner Zeit bei 1LIVE, ich weiß es 
auch von der Beobachtung unter der WDR4 oder WDR2 stehen, das ist ganz andere Druck, 
da sind wir völlig frei von, also. Falls ich hier Druck mache, das ist keiner den ich weiter 
gebe, bin ich selber, ne, nein. (laughter) Weil, natürlich gucken schon alle irgendwie, geht es 
vorwärts? Ja, und, aber, wenn wir jetzt in 0,1-er Schritten vorwärts kommen würden, würde 
es reichen, Hauptsache es geht ein bisschen vorwärts. Das ist so der, aber Druck, ich glaube, 
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ne, das ist er nicht. Wenn das Druck ist, dann ist Druck nicht schlimm. Ehrlich, da muss man 
woanders hingehen, da ist Druck, auch außerhalb unsere Anstalt, da ist ganz anderer Druck. 
Da können wir relativ frei... Der Druck ist auch nicht so, nehmen wir jetzt unter uns, ein 
Programm wie WDR3, wo die Kosten viel, viel höher sind, und wo man seit Jahrzehnten im 
Sinkflug ist, da ist der Druck auch viel höher, natürlich, das ist eine andere Form von Druck, 
wir sind da ein relativ kleines, relativ schlankes… 
 
Q: Relativ billig. 
A: Relativ billig auch, im Vergleich zu anderen. Durch so Bremer Geschichten und so, das ist, 
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